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# Nikolaevsky B

## Secret pages of history

B. I. Nikolaevsky

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DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

MINUTES

OF THE POLITBURO AND

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NKID OF THE USSR, 1934

Editor-compiler Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu. G. FELSHTINSKY  
The book includes

previously unpublished documents and materials from the archive of the famous Russian historian B. I. Nikolaevsky, stored at the Hoover Institution (Stanford, USA). It deals with such subjects as the history of the "Bolshevik Center", Lenin and the money of the Bolshevik organization, Germany and Russian revolutionaries during the First World War, Malenkov's biography, decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1934. For researchers, teachers,

students and everyone  
interested in the history of Russia.

A few words about the author of this  
book The son of a priest, Boris Ivanovich Nikolaevsky (1887--1966) studied at the gymnasium in Samara and Ufa. In 1903---1906. Bolshevik, then Menshevik. In 1904, as a high school student, he was arrested for the first time for belonging to a youth revolutionary circle, tried for possession and distribution of illegal social democratic literature. He spent about six months in prison. In total, before the revolution, he was arrested eight times, for short periods. He was released twice under the amnesty of 1905. For participation in the first Russian revolution, he was sentenced to two years. Ran from prisons, exiled three times. He was engaged in revolutionary activities in Ufa, Samara, Omsk, Baku, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinoslav. In 1913-1914. worked in the legal Menshevik "Workers' newspaper" in St. Petersburg. After the revolution, in 1918-1920. as a representative of the Central Committee of the Mensheviks, he traveled all over Russia with instructions from the party. Since 1920 - Member of the Central Committee of the Menshevik Party. In February 1921, together with other members of the Central Committee of the Menshevik Party, he was arrested and, after an eleven-month imprisonment, was deported from the RSFSR abroad. In exile (in Germany, France and the USA) he continued to take an active part in the political activities of the Menshevik Party. On February 20, 1932, together with the Trotsky family and a number of other emigrants, he was deprived of Soviet citizenship. However, the political activity of Nikolaevsky, no matter how one relates to it, was not the main thing in his life. B. I. Nikolaevsky was primarily a historian, and his merit to Russia and Russian history

is that since 1917 he collected, kept (and preserved for posterity) an invaluable collection of archival materials. After the February Revolution, when revolutionaries all over the country smashed central and local archives (especially police archives), Nikolayevsky, as a representative of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, joined the commission for studying the Archives of the Police Department. In 1918, together with P. E. Shchegolev, he drafted the organization of the Main Directorate for Archival Affairs. And it was Nikolaevsky who then convinced the Bolshevik D. B. Ryazanov to take up the task of saving the archives. In 1919-1921. Nikolaevsky was at

the head of the historical-revolutionary archive in Moscow, published a number of books on the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia and the West.

As a Social Democrat, Nikolaevsky was primarily interested in the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia and Europe. But his interests as a historian went far beyond the narrow confines of social democracy. He was almost the only Menshevik who tried to understand the tragedy of the Vlasov movement and justify it (thus bringing down numerous criticisms of fellow party members on his head). His ability to correspond with people of various political views, from monarchists to communists, to make them treat him as a historian with full confidence, to convince them of the need to write memoirs, or to compose detailed answers to numerous and specific questions, cannot but impress everyone. who today works with the archives collected by B. I. Nikolaevsky. As far as it was possible in those years, he had information that allowed him to know everything, everyone and everything about everyone. Writers, historians and publicists from different parts of the world turned to him for information. And almost always received sensible and specific information from him. He possessed a unique, almost photographic memory and was a "walking encyclopedia" of the Russian revolution. But the Menshevik B. I. Nikolaevskii would not have been able to win such an unconditional trust among the split Russian emigration and even Soviet

communists sent abroad, if his personal ethical principles as a historian and collector of archives usually did not stand above politics and above the needs of the moment. Initiated into many human and political secrets of his



time, he never allowed himself to chase after a sensation and publish the material that became available to him to the detriment of the interests of his

informant. As a collector of archives, Nikolayevsky left more than eight hundred boxes of archival materials. Today they are kept at the Hoover Institution (Stanford, USA). As a historian and publicist, he published a large number of articles in Russian and major European languages. Devoting a lot of time to archives, correspondence with people and political activities, Nikolaevsky was less productive as an author of his own books. His most famous book, about Azef, written in 1932 from a traditional point of view, does not seem very valuable today. Much later, Nikolaevsky came to new, very important, sensational conclusions: Azef was not a provocateur, but was a police agent and carefully conveyed information about the impending terrorist acts to the director of the police department, Lopukhin. It was Lopukhin (almost with Witte's consent) who shelved this information and thereby deliberately allowed several terrorist acts. This was reported to Nikolaevsky by the

widow of Lopukhin, with whom he spoke already in exile. Nikolaevsky was going to use these data in the new edition of the book. "I have picked up unpublished materials about Lopukhin and his relationship with Witte (in connection with the great struggle between Witte and Plehve) [...] a lot of new and important material, which I would gladly give as a "special introduction and addition", - - wrote Nikolaevsky. [GA, collection of Nikolaevsky, box 500, folder 8. Letters from B. I. Nikolaevsky to Prof. P. Sheibert dated December 28 and March 14, 1962] However, Nikolaevsky did not have time to develop this topic. There was no new edition Boris Ivanovich Nikolaevsky

died in 1966, leaving many of his projects for the publication of books and historical collections unfinished. His priceless archival collection is the best monument to the deceased historian.

The idea of publishing a historical collection based on materials from his own archive belonged to B. I. Nikolaevsky. Several decades have passed since then. The historian has passed away. Due to financial difficulties, the project he conceived never came out.

collection - A number of materials were published in the periodical press. Others are buried in archive folders.

This edition includes two previously unpublished texts by the historian: <On the history of the Bolshevik Center a> and <On the biography of Malenkov and the history of the Communist Party of the USSR>. The first work is a preface to the unfinished fundamental work of B. I. Nikolaevsky - a multi-volume collection of documents on the history of the "Bolshevik

Center". The second work, whose title belongs to the editor of this book, is an unfinished biography of Malenkov, who became the leader of the Soviet state for a short time. From the fragmentary phrases of the correspondence that Nikolaevsky conducted at that time, one can easily understand how the work on Malenkov should have ended. Nikolaevsky came to the conclusion that Stalin had

been killed. "Life always demands compensation, and if it gives such a good gift as a blow to Stalin (or a blow to Stalin?), then it repays with something else," Nikolayevsky wrote to the former leader of the French Communist Party, the famous historian and publicist Boris Souvarine on March 23, 1953. -- [...] I am more and more coming to the conclusion that Stalin died as a result of a great struggle that filled the first months of this year and the meaning of which was the defeat of Stalin's personal secretariat by the block Malenkov with Beria" [International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam . Archive of B. K. Suvarin, folder 1.] "It

seems that Stalin was helped to die and that a struggle is now beginning on this basis," he wrote to T. I. Vulikh two

weeks, April 6 [GA, col. Nikolaevsky, box 207, folder 16-] "[...

] I am trying to decipher the meaning of the events that preceded the death of Stalin (now I am convinced that there was something like a palace coup and that Stalin was "helped to die"), Nikolaevsky concludes in another letter to Souvarine. [B.K. Suvarin's archive, folder 1. Letter from Nikolaevsky to Souvarine dated April 14, 1953]

However, after the execution of Beria and the removal of Malenkov, the end of work on the biography of Malenkov lost all meaning for Nikolaevsky, and the book remained unfinished.

The second part of the collection contains documents of interest both to historians and to a wide range of readers. The materials of the Hoover Institution are published with the kind permission of the administration. Yu. FELSHTINSKY Boston B. I. NIKOLAEVSKY On the history of the "Bolshevik Center" The

Bolshevik Center (BC) was the name of the organization that in 1906-1909 headed the Bolshevik faction of the then formally united RSDLP. The history of

this Center still remains completely unexplored. In all the vast literature on the history of the Bolshevik movement there is not a single work that would contain an attempt to give an overview of the activities of this organization, although the exceptional importance of the latter for the general history of Bolshevism is obvious. In the early years of the revolution, Soviet historians of Bolshevism, it is true, attempted to raise the issue of this Center, albeit with great restraint (G.E. Zinoviev, for example,

mentioned it in his History of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (GIZ, Petrograd, 1923). But the stronger the dictatorship became, the such references have been made less frequently, and in recent years the very name "Bolshevik Center" has disappeared from official courses in the history of Bolshevism; in particular, the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks", edited by Stalin, and the review of the same history, published in second edition of the Great Soviet

encyclopedias.

Acquaintance with the materials about the BC allows us to understand the reasons for the silence: in its history there were too many such aspects, to draw attention to which Soviet historians consider unwanted.

Three main periods should be distinguished in the history of the BC: from May 1906 to May 1907 (that is, between the Stockholm and London congresses of the RSDLP), from May to the end of 1907 (until Lenin and Bogdanov went abroad, and then Krasin and a number of other members of the BC) and, finally, with

beginning of 1908 until the official dissolution of the BC, which took place after the plenum of the Central

Committee in January 1910. Regarding the first of these periods, the question of the forms of functioning of the BC at that time cannot be considered clarified. A. Bogdanov, in the appeal "To Comrades of the Bolsheviks", which was issued by the "Vperyod" group regarding the official dissolution of the BC at the plenum of the Central Committee of the RSDLP in January 1910, dates the creation of the BC to the time of the London Congress (May 1907). Only the official commentators of the Marx Institute talk about this Center

Engels-Lenin<sup>2</sup>. Only Zinoviev writes about the fact that a special center of the Bolshevik faction was already created in Stockholm. Saying that at this stage of the congress the Mensheviks won (by a majority of 62 against 46 votes), he adds: "There was nothing left for the Bolsheviks

but to submit, since they were in the minority, and the workers demanded unity. united the Bolsheviks with the Mensheviks, and in fact we left Stockholm in two separate factions. The Central Committee took several of our comrades, as we then said, hostages. But at the same time, at the congress itself, the Bolsheviks formed their own internal and illegal This period in the history of our party, when we were in the minority both in the Central Committee and in the Petrograd Committee and had to hide our separate work, was very difficult and painful for us ... The situation was as if two parties were acting within one" <sup>3</sup>. Zinoviev, who was a member of the Center, established in May 1907, and in 1906-1907. was one of the most prominent representatives of the Bolsheviks in the St. Petersburg Committee, of course, was aware of what was happening then at the top of the Bolshevik faction. It also

had its own center in 1906-1907. -- and to hide its existence was "very hard and painful." But even Zinoviev does not apply the name "Bolshevik Center" to it. On the other hand, Bogdanov, who at that time was generally one of the central figures of the Bolshevik faction, by no means says that in 1906-1907. there was no central organ of the faction at all. He only says that the center, called the "Bolshevik Center", was established in London.

There is no contradiction between these testimonies; and it would be most correct to consider that the Bolshevik faction of the Stockholm Congress, which then issued a special "Appeal to the Party"<sup>4</sup>, at the same time created its own special internal organization with some kind of center, but this center, although it actually performed all the functions that later fell on BC, has not yet had such an official name. Who exactly was a member of the

BC of the first composition is not exactly known: the names of the members were not named in the press either at that time or later. Undoubtedly, the core of the BC was the troika consisting of Lenin, Bogdanov and Krasin, which appears in Bogdanov's letters under the name of the "financial group", and in Kamo-Petrosyan's statement - under the name of the "collegium of three" - It is she who also appears in the documents of the London Congress as a plenipotentiary representative of the Bolshevik faction, to which 60 thousand rubles were transferred. from the legacy of Savva Morozov, "a person who had the formal and moral right to dispose of money at his own discretion"<sup>5</sup>.

Raising funds and spending them on the affairs that the Bolshevik faction conducted, indeed, constituted an important part of the functions of the "troika". But she did not limit herself to them: she also led all the secret enterprises of the Bolshevik faction, and these enterprises were both diverse and versatile. Krasin was an exceptionally talented organizer-engineer. "Smart in all directions," is how Savva Morozov described Krasin, according to Gorky's story; and Krasin really created around the BC not even a trust, but a whole complex combine of all kinds of secret laboratories, workshops, printing houses, etc., serving not only Bolshevik, but also other, completely non-Social-Democratic "combat enterprises". Suffice it to say that Stolypin's dacha was also blown up by bombs made in the BC laboratories, and shells of the same origin were used during the expropriation in Lantern Lane. The development of the political line of Bolshevism at that time took place in a broader collegium

than this "troika". The largest party writers and practitioners of the movement were also involved in the discussion of issues, but it is very likely that they did not constitute a firmly fixed team, the composition of the participants

which would be precisely defined in the organizational order. Most likely, these were organizationally unformed meetings of the central workers of the faction, which the "troika" convened as needed. Since the "troika" was united in its sentiments, the acceptance of its proposals was ensured... It is quite possible that during this period the entire center of the Bolshevik faction, since it was somehow institutionalized, consisted of this one "troika".

\* \* \*

The London Congress (May 1907), having introduced a significant change in the inner-party situation, brought great changes to the structure of the Bolshevik factional organization. There were only slightly more Bolsheviks than Mensheviks: 105 Bolsheviks were opposed by 197 Mensheviks plus 4 "non-factional" who gravitated towards the latter. But on a number of issues the national Social Democratic groups (especially the Polish one) that had re-entered the RSDLP were closer to the Bolsheviks, and in alliance with them the Bolsheviks won a majority in the Central Committee. This majority was very fragile: it extended far from all questions, but the Bolsheviks, in any case, ceased to be a minority in the Central Committee. Nevertheless, even now the Bolsheviks did not think of dissolving their factional center. On the contrary, they expanded this center, gave it a strictly formalized organizational base and officially gave it the name "Bolshevik Center". 15 people have now been introduced to the new Center, namely: A. A.

Bogdanov, I. P. Goldenberg (Meshkovsky), I. F. Dubrovinsky, G. E. Zinoviev,

L. B. Kamenev, L. B. Krasin, V. I. Lenin, G. D. Lindov, V. P. Nogin, M. N. Pokrovsky, N. A. Rozhkov, A. I. Rykov, V. K. Taratuta, and I. A. Teodorovich and V. L. Shan-tser<sup>7</sup>.

G. Zinoviev was the only one of Lenin's closest associates of subsequent years who later made an attempt to explain the motives for this decision of the Bolsheviks: according to him, they did not believe in the possibility of long-term joint work with the Mensheviks in the new all-party Central Committee, where everything depended on the vote of the "Nationals", the reliability of which the Bolsheviks were not sure, and therefore decided to continue their work in preparation for the split.

"We decided," writes Zinoviev, "that we would work in the Central Committee and suffer as we were obliged to, but we would do the real work in our business center, for it was clear that this 'willingly marriage' with the Mensheviks would not last

long"8. There is every reason to believe that it was precisely these considerations at the then meetings of the Bolsheviks that officially substantiated the decision to strengthen and formalize their factional organization. But a careful analysis of the list of members of the new composition of the BC against the background of Lenin's further tactics in intra-factional relations makes us think that Lenin's behavior in this matter was also determined by considerations of a different order: he already at that time foresaw the possibility of a conflict within the Bolshevik faction and took measures to consolidate their positions against the positions of the other two members of the old leading Bolshevik "troika", against Bogdanov and especially Krasin.

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Such a conflict really came very soon - and it was he who determined the entire future fate of the BC. A complete

and comprehensive elucidation of the real causes of this conflict within the BC is possible only as a result, on the one hand, of a detailed analysis of the general evolution of the political and tactical thought of Bolshevism in the era of the revolution of 1905-1907. and, on the other hand, the clarification of personal relations between the leading figures of the Bolshevik faction, and above all, of course, between Lenin, Bogdanov and Krasin.

There is no doubt that within the Bolshevik faction 1905--1907

gg. there were significant disagreements on both

the issues of big politics and tactics, as well as on the tactics of inner-party struggle, i.e., the struggle against the Menshevik wing of the party. In the course of these disputes, Lenin by no means always had the majority of the faction on his side. There were many cases when he either remained in the minority, or, as one of the memoirists tells, he was forced "in full battle order" to move to enemy positions, without even bringing matters to a vote (he really did not like to remain in the minority, especially within his own own faction). This was also the case on major political issues: that is exactly what he did in December 1905 at the Bolshevik conference in

Tammerfors, when he considered it right to participate in the elections to the State Duma, but from the speeches of other delegates he realized that he would remain almost alone<sup>9</sup>.

An experienced strategist in the inner-party struggle, Lenin understood the significance of the historically formed inner-party faction collectives and, as a rule, treated the collective of his faction with extreme care. Since the initiative was in his hands, he went to splits in the ranks of his supporters only in cases of extreme necessity. If we take questions of big politics, such extreme necessity in 1908-1909. there were no disagreements between Lenin and the so-called "otzovists" and "ultimatists" (i.e., supporters of the "recall" of the Third Social Democratic deputies of the State Duma or the presentation of an "ultimatum" to them to change tactics) were at that moment ~~disagreements that separated him from them~~ <sup>disagreements that separated him from them</sup> for example, those majority of the Bolsheviks in December 1905 or August 1907. have incomparably more harmful (from his point of view)

consequences.

Thus, we have to consider it beyond doubt that Lenin's irreconcilable attitude towards Bogdanov and his group in 1908---1909. It was not caused by the sharpness of differences on general political issues. Especially wrong are the attempts to look for the main

cause of this conflict in Lenin's disagreement with the philosophical views of Bogdanov. The distinctive features of these views of Bogdanov were well known to Lenin since the early 1900s. If we are to believe his later accounts, Lenin already from that time considered these views to be erroneous and pointed this out to Bogdanov, but they did not prevent Lenin from accepting Bogdanov's political help, which was offered by the latter at the most critical period of Lenin's political biography: in 1904, when Lenin, who broke not only with recent colleagues on the Iskra editorial board, but also with the leading group of "Iskra" practitioners -

members of the Central Committee in Russia (headed by Noskov, Krasin, Krzhizhanovsky and others) - was politically almost alone. Without help



--- political, literary and material -- of Bogdanov and his friends Lenin would then not be able to set up his own literary organ, he would not be able to build his faction at all. Bogdanov, taking his side, politically literally saved Lenin. It was Bogdanov who at the beginning of 1905 returned Krasin to Lenin's side, together with whom he became the main force of Bolshevism in Russia in 1905-1906. A group of literary and political friends of Bogdanov formed the main staff of all kinds of legal Bolshevik publications in 1905-1908. Lenin later emphatically emphasized that as

early as 1904 he was stipulating his disagreement with the philosophical views of Bogdanov; there is no documentary confirmation of this evidence, but if it is correct, then in any case, there is no doubt that Lenin then edited his reservations in such a way that they only reinforced the main idea of his statements: recognition of the full possibility of the closest political union, despite the presence of philosophical differences. This was also indicated by the decision of the BC, adopted at the very end of the second period of its history, on the eve of the departure of the editorial staff of Proletary (Lenin, Bogdanov and Dubrovinsky) abroad (December 1907). Under these conditions, it is completely incomprehensible why literally two months after the adoption of the last decision, already at the beginning of 1908, Lenin's relations with Bogdanov "soiled to the extreme", and soon after; it turned out to be necessary for Dubrovinsky Bogdanov, a sharp revolt against Lenin inspired and prepared<sup>12</sup>.

This behavior of Lenin is all the more in need of an explanation because his opponents were by no means aggressive. The offensive was not carried out by them against Lenin, but by Lenin against them. They were looking for a compromise, were ready to make concessions, turned to mediators (Gorky tried to play this role) and made every effort to avoid a break, so as not to bring the matter to an open struggle. Lenin systematically and resolutely rejected their proposals, refused negotiations and mediators, and aggravated the situation, turning into a crime every unsuccessful formulation of his opponents and their supporters in Russia ... Lenin launched his attack on the Bogdanov group, however, only gradually, but the study of Lenin's documents and correspondence shows that

The cause of this gradualness was not Lenin's vacillations, but exclusively his striving to prepare each new step of his offensive as best as possible, to ensure his complete victory as accurately as possible. The decision - and a very firm one - to carry out a complete break with Bogdanov and his entire group, Lenin, was taken at the very beginning of his second emigration.

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Political differences and differences of opinion on philosophical questions between Lenin and Bogdanov undoubtedly existed, and they, of course, exerted their influence on Lenin. But both the pace of the rupture, and its forms (extreme personal sharpness), and the rupture itself in general were determined by divergences that lay on a different plane. Lenin tries to keep silent about her. Only very rarely does he break through fragmentary hints of this kind. His opponents talk more about this other plane, although they, too, try to speak about it with extreme restraint, also in allusions. This restraint is understandable: it was about the extremely delicate aspects of their common activities of the recent past, about which it was unprofitable for all of them to openly talk about. It was precisely this delicacy of this group of questions that was the reason for Lenin's intense efforts to transfer the dispute to political and philosophical ground. In the leaflet "To Comrades Bolsheviks", which was written by Bogdanov and published by the

"Forward" group in response to Lenin's statement about the dissolution of the BC (January 1910), Bogdanov wrote:

The Bolsheviks, who founded the Bolshevik Center at the London Congress, looked at it as an organization that, on the one hand, expresses the main ideas of the revolutionary wing of the party, developing them in print, on the other, unites various Bolshevik groups scattered throughout Russia, and manages, under their control, the material resources of the Bolsheviks. In these tasks, the entire purpose of the Bolshevik Center was exhausted; his rights were not subject to dispute while he fulfilled them; his rights ended from the moment he ceased to serve any of them. This is how the meaning of the Bolshevik Center was understood all Bolsheviks. Reducing the entire political role of the BC to the work of publishing printed organs

for the development of "ideas of the revolutionary wing of the party", Bogdanov considered the decisions of the IV All-Party Conference, (November 1907

G. ), which declared unacceptable "the existence of special factional centers competing in their functions with the Central Committee"<sup>13</sup>. In fact, political functions were much more extensive. But the most important thing in Bogdanov's words quoted above is Bogdanov's statement, which we emphasized, about the role of the BC as the body that manages the "material resources" of all Bolshevik organizations. It was, of course, not about the funds that came to the cash desks of local organizations in the normal manner, through all sorts of fees and voluntary donations: these funds were always hardly enough for the current work of local organizations, which, as a rule, did not even have the opportunity to send to Central Committee deductions required by the charter. It was about material

at all

of other origin, which, according to Bogdanov, amounted to "hundreds of thousands of rubles." The issue of spending these funds was the main reason

for the sharpest criticism that Bogdanov directs against the leaders of the BC. "Since he [i.e., BC], writes Bogdanov, "needed to influence the public opinion of the party, he tried to do this through monetary dependence, in which he

placed both individual members of the party and entire organizations, Bolshevik and not only the Bolsheviks. Over the past two years, not a single monetary report has been given to organizations, but hundreds of thousands have been spent. Attempts by some organizations to establish permanent control over the sums belonging to them met with an energetic rebuff from the BC and suffered a complete collapse. Thus, in ideologically, and in the material, and in the organizational sense, the BC became an uncontrolled arbiter of Bolshevik affairs, since they depended on foreign countries. The wording that Bogdanov uses testifies to his desire to be as careful as possible and to lift the veil as little as possible over the secret aspects of BC's life. He certainly made an effort not to give vent to his true moods. But the essence of his accusations is clear: he and his like-minded people stated that Lenin, hiding behind the BC firm, who ceased to reckon with the opinions of the organizations that created him,

seized at the disposal of his group "enormous sums of money" (the wording of the same leaflet) of the entire Bolshevik faction - and with these funds he worked to strengthen the position of his narrow circle and to corrupt the rest of the Bolshevik faction, to corrupt the entire party in general. This appeal was written by Bogdanov in March or even in April 1910, when

the whole irreconcilability of the conflict with Lenin was already revealed and the whole significance of Lenin's tactics, which sought at all costs to prevent the independent political activity of Bogdanov and his like-minded people, was revealed. In the same way, Lenin 14 should have taken these accusations no less sharply, and it was precisely these accusations that determined the general atmosphere of their relations.

The role played in this split by the question of "the property of the entire faction" also explains the reasons for Lenin's harsh comments about Krasin at the time. The latter did not take a definite position in philosophical disputes, although, apparently, he leaned towards the views of Bogdanov<sup>15</sup>. In political matters, Krasin was apparently closer to the boycottists, but he did not actively speak out<sup>16</sup>. Therefore, if the reasons for the rupture lay exclusively in the plane of philosophical and political disputes, then there would be no reason for a particular aggravation of personal relations between

Lenin and Krasin. But these relations became very aggravated, and Lenin wrote with irritation about Krasin as "a master of giving promises and rubbing glasses"<sup>17</sup>. This review is completely inexplicable if it were about Krasin as a political

figure, but it is more than understandable if we consider that he refers to Krasin as the Minister of Finance of the BC, who had difficult scores with Lenin, who took a responsible part in solving all the tangled cases carried out: BC to replenish its cash register.

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A correct solution to the question of the true causes of the conflict within the BC is impossible without clarifying the relations that have developed within it, and especially within its main core, the so-called "financial group" Lenin-Bogdanov-Krasin, as a result of the development of that side of activity that is officially was called the financial operations of the BC.

Very little is known about these financial transactions and the BC budget in general. The financial report of the BC has never been published anywhere. It is known that such a report was submitted to that expanded meeting of the BC, which alone was convened abroad in June 1909 under the name "conferences of the extended editorial board of the Proletary." But first of all, it was a report only for the period from December 1, 1907 to May 15, 1909, that is, it spoke only about the period that we have defined above as the last, third period of the BC's activity, when the main figures of the latter were already Abroad. But even during this period, neither the report itself, nor any of its individual numerical indicators appeared in the press either. The

specified meeting created for consideration of this report a special audit commission consisting of A. I. Rykov, M. P. Tomsy, N. A. Skrypnik and V. M. Shulyatkov, which presented to the meeting its opinion on the considered report; this conclusion was published in the minutes of the meeting, and from it it is clear that with the reporting of expenses for the period up to September 15, 1908, when a significant part of the expenses was made in Russia, the situation was extremely bad, because then "there were no accurate and detailed reports "; "many supporting documents" were not taken at all for conspiratorial reasons, and some others died during arrests. As a result, the decision of the audit commission is content with a dry statement that "the amounts indicated in the reports were received by the cashier and were spent on the needs of the faction." Only for the period after September 15, 1908, when the management of the cashier moved abroad, into the hands of Taratuta,

was the audit commission able to establish that "the technical accounting became satisfactory and clear"<sup>18</sup>. It should be noted that at that time

not only the BC, but also all other revolutionary and socialist organizations had to operate in the conditions of the underground; nevertheless, they have always tried to publish their financial statements, as much as possible, both in the expenditure and in the income parts<sup>19</sup>. BC not only did not publish any financial report in the then printed reports of the said meeting, but also did not include absolutely no numerical data in the detailed minutes of this meeting, drawn up for

archive, and this applies to both parts of the report, both incoming and outgoing. The editors of the "Protocols of the Meeting of the Extended Editorial Board of the Proletarian", published in 1934 by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, did not give any information on this issue, although this editorial office had at its disposal all the materials of the archives - both Lenin's personal archive and the archive of the Central Committee Bolshevik Party.

It is useful to add that even in 1910, when the BC was dissolved, no financial report or any information about its cash desk was published either. The Vperyod group pointed out this circumstance in a note devoted to the analysis of the monetary report of the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSDLP from February 1 to April 30, 1910. complete silence.

The reasons for such stubborn silence, of course, can by no means be explained by the need to protect the secrets of an underground organization from the police. The leaders of the BC had to do this because they hid the secrets of their financial report not only from the police, but also from the public opinion of the party to which they were then formally a member, but from which they hid a number of important aspects of their activities - in including all those who so enriched their cash register.

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Thus, no indications about its budget have come down to us from the BC itself: neither about the amount of funds received by its cashier, nor about their origin, nor about the items of its expenses. If we are able to fill this gap to a certain extent, then we owe this to separate scattered indications that slip through special historical literature, memoirs, etc. We emphasize that we take all the basic information from the literature of the Bolshevik camp and only for verification and additions, we attract literature of a different origin.

The BC cash desk had two main sources of its replenishment. This were, on the one hand, donations coming from

individuals or as a result of extensive collections, and, on the other hand, the amounts that the BC received as income from the expropriation carried out by the Bolshevik combat squads

in various parts of the country. Each of these sources brought very significant additions to the BC cash desk, but at the same time, each of them was the cause of very serious complications both within the Bolshevik faction itself and beyond its borders - between the Bolshevik faction and the central general party institutions.

Of the receipts of the first group, the most significant (and at the same time associated with the greatest friction) were two: the inheritance of N.P. in any case, they are calculated in tens of thousands of rubles.

The conflicts that unfolded around these receipts grew as a result of the embezzlement by the Bolsheviks of amounts that, in the opinion of their opponents, were to be transferred to the central general party fund. In its purest form, this essence of the dispute emerges in the case of American money. This money was received from collections held in the USA in the summer of 1906 in connection with the arrival of M. Gorky there. This trip was

organized by the Bolsheviks. Its main initiator was L. B. Krasin, but already during the organization of this trip (March 1906), the United Central Committee of the RSDLP, which included both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, was operating; and Gorky went to America with letters to the American Socialist Party, official letters from this Central Committee, and personal letters from Lenin, who was then one of the two representatives of the RSDLP in the International. The actual organizer of the trip was the Bolshevik N. E. Burenin, one of the active workers of the Bolshevik Central Fighting Group, chosen for this work by Krasin. unsuccessfully - by people who did not understand American conditions at all and thought only about making as much money as possible. Mistakes made in organizing this trip greatly helped the success of that campaign of persecution of Gorky, which was skillfully fanned by agents of the then tsarist embassy. The broad campaign of collections, carried out through channels not connected with the labor movement, was completely thwarted, and only after the organizers of Gorky's trip were convinced of the failure of their plans, they

appealed to workers' organizations. With the help of the American Socialist Labor Party, Jewish workers' organizations and the New York group of the RSDLP,

Gorky managed to break through the blockade that had been launched against him. It

was these organizations that raised the money. An exact elucidation of the history of this entire campaign and its financial results would require a special examination of the then American workers' press. But even a superficial acquaintance with the latter convinces us that this campaign was carried out as a general campaign of all groups of the RSDLP, and a particularly important role was played, on the one hand, by the daily Jewish newspaper *Forverts* and, on the other, by the New York RSDLP assistance group. "*For-verts*" at that time actually pursued the political line of the Bund, and the assistance group, although it also included Bolsheviks in its composition, was headed by certain Mensheviks (M. Romm, D. M. Rubinov and others), who Gorky's collections were supported and organized as collections for the benefit of the entire party. Never and nowhere, neither in the press, nor in the process of intra-organizational negotiations, did either Gorky himself or any of his representatives give a hint to the groups that supported and campaigned for these collections that the collections were being made for the needs of the Bolshevik faction. If such a statement had been made by them, none of these organizations would have taken part in such gatherings<sup>24</sup>.

Nevertheless, all the funds raised during this campaign, since they fell into the hands of N. E. Burenin, were sent not to the all-party Central Committee, which then included the Bolsheviks, but to the BC, which, under various pretexts, transferred them to the all-party delayed cashier. After lengthy and fruitless negotiations, the issue was put before the Audit Commission of the London Congress. The evasive answers of the Bolshevik representative in Berlin, in whose name some of the money had been transferred from New York, prevented the commission from reaching a decision; the case was referred to the Central Committee<sup>25</sup>, but this latter, which had a majority of Bolsheviks and Polish Social Democrats, despite all insistence, did not carry out any additional investigation.<sup>26</sup> The question was buried. The money remained in the BC cashier.



Ratuta ("Victor") achieved "through unacceptable threats"<sup>28</sup>. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, categorically denied these accusations, and, signed by Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Dubrovinsky, they published a statement stating that Taratuta "led this business together with us, on our instructions, under our control" and that they were all "completely responsible for this matter." Kamenev argued that the correctness of their version was confirmed by numerous documents,<sup>30</sup> which they could not publish for reasons of secrecy.

This question was raised at the plenum of the Central Committee in January 1910. We do not know the details, but it is known that the discussion ended with the adoption of the following resolution: implementation of the donation "was wrong, and especially wrong was the agreement to submit without the knowledge of the Central Committee for consideration by representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party the dispute between the BC and private individuals"<sup>31</sup>.

When evaluating this resolution, it must be borne in mind that it was adopted after the BC declared its readiness to dissolve itself and transfer all its funds to the cash desk of the all-party Central Committee. Under these conditions, it seemed to many participants of the plenum not only unnecessary, but also downright harmful to insist on a more decisive condemnation of the members of the BC and on emphasizing, as it seemed to them, an academic question of who exactly had the moral rights to Schmitt's legacy - - BC or the all-party Central Committee - since it still goes to the cash desk of the all-party Central Committee - If, nevertheless, the plenum, at which the decisive vote still belonged to the moderate Bolsheviks and people close to them, considered it necessary in a special resolution to fix their assessment of the behavior of the members BC as "wrong" and qualify their behavior as "ignoring the Central Committee", then this cannot but be regarded as an indicator of strong dissatisfaction with the unacceptable methods that BC used in the struggle for Schmitt's inheritance. Such was the state of the question in the pre-

revolutionary years. Now the considerations of the old conspiracy have disappeared, but none of those numerous documents which, according to Kamenev,

were at the disposal of the BC and allegedly proved the indisputable correctness of their interpretation of Schmitt's will, has not been published, although these documents should be kept in the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU. This arouses all the more solid suspicions, since even the Bolshevik memoirs establish indisputably that the second accusation brought against Taratuta at that time was quite correct: he actually threatened to kill those who would try to prevent the transfer of the Schmitt inheritance to the

Bolsheviks. This was told by S. P. Shesternin, an old social democrat from Ivanovo-Voznesensk, who did not play an active role in the Bolshevik movement, but was used by the BC as a person who occupied a solid social position to receive Schmitt's inheritance and take him abroad. In his memoirs "The Realization of the Inheritance after N.P. Schmitt and My Meetings with Lenin"<sup>32</sup> he tells, among other things, about the first meeting of representatives of the BC (Lenin, Krasin, Taratuta) with Schmitt's young brother and his lawyers. This meeting took place in Vyborg in the spring of 1907. The conversation proceeded in a completely normal manner, the parties clarified the position of the issue. Suddenly Taratuta jumped up and in a "sharp metallic voice" declared: "Whoever delays money, we will eliminate him." Lenin hurriedly "pulled Taratuta by the sleeve," and among the St. Petersburg lawyers who accompanied the young Schmitt "there was some kind of confusion." This was, Shesternin naively adds, "the only roughness" in all the negotiations, but it is precisely this that makes it clear why, a few days later, the lawyers reported that Schmitt's brother was waiving his rights to the inheritance, transferring these rights to two of Schmitt's young sisters. If Taratuta

(and, as we have seen, the entire Bureau of the BC at that time, headed by Lenin, assumed responsibility for his actions) allowed himself to make such frank threats at relatively large meetings, then there is every reason to consider the old stories of Andrikanis, the husband of the eldest of the sisters, to be correct. Schmitt, who argued that Taratuta "through unacceptable threats"<sup>33</sup> tried to get him to transfer the inheritance to the BC, and not to the Central Committee Kamenev, opposing Martov, argued that the dispute between the BC and Andrikanis was not about who Andrikanis should transfer Schmitt's inheritance to, but about what share of this inheritance Andrikanis can keep in his fa

Kamenev's version by no means refutes Andrikanis' story; on the contrary, it is she who makes the latter completely whole.

N. A. Andrikanis, a young Moscow lawyer, in 1905---1907. was a member of the Bolshevik organizations in Moscow and, as a Bolshevik, maintained relations with the Schmitt family. He married the eldest of Schmitt's sisters in 1907. At the same time, the BC involved him in the efforts to implement the inheritance<sup>35</sup>. In 1907---1908 Andrikanis was a member of the Bolshevik RSDLP Assistance Group in Paris; but at the end of 1908 he left this group, although he declared that he remained a social democrat. Socialist-Revolutionaries) ordered Andrikanis to contribute to the Bolshevik treasury either a third or half of the amount that his wife had received from the inheritance of N.P. Schmit<sup>37</sup>. Undoubtedly

it was at this time that the second series of threats from Taratuta, who should have been dissatisfied with this decision of the court, and Andrikanis' appeal to the Central Committee with a complaint about these threats, about the behavior of the BC in this matter in general, and his special indication of the unacceptable behavior of the BC, who is trying to turn Schmitt's fortune, bequeathed to the party, to factional needs. The text of this appeal by Andrikanis is not known in the press, but Kamenev defined it as an attempt to "sufficiently skillfully disguise the accusation of attempted assault on party property"<sup>38</sup>.

This accusation is, apparently, correct: the former Bolshevik Andrikanis approached the business of selling Schmitt's inheritance, of course, with selfish personal goals, trying to snatch as much of his share as possible. But the very possibility of such an approach was created by the self-serving factional game that was played around the BC legacy. In the quotation just quoted, Kamenev speaks of Andrikanis' attempt on party property. But at the time when Schmitt made his orders for the transfer of his property to the party, in the winter of 1906-1907, there was only one united RSDLP, with a common Central Committee, with a common Social Democratic faction in the State Duma, etc. Only this the united party owned all party property. BC had property

fractional. But the leaders of the Bolshevik faction also decided to seize party property in favor of their faction: they did the same with the American money collected for the Gorky fund, they did the same with the Schmitt inheritance. Andrikanis at the beginning of 1907 tried to fight against this and gave the all-party Central Committee information about the game played by the Bolsheviks. But the Central Committee, in which at that time the majority were the Bolsheviks together with their strong allies, the Polish Social Democrats, dismissed this message: he left the Bolsheviks to conduct this business, reserving only the right to return to the question of when the implementation of the inheritance would be completed, and only obliging the Bolsheviks keep the Central Committee informed of this matter. After that, Andrikanis was silent for more than two years. At this time, he was a member of the Parisian group of Bolshevik-Leninists, attended their meetings. Nobody bothered him. The BC took up it only from the end of 1908, after the sale of that half of Schmitt's inheritance, the rights to which passed to the younger sister, who married Taratuta, had already come to an end. In the spring and summer of 1909, the BC case against Andrikanis was heard by an arbitration court. The judges were persons of impeccable, according to party concepts, honesty - Natanson, A.Yu. a part - or a third, or a half. This decision can have only one explanation: Andrikanis apparently proved that the BC itself recognized his rights to the rest of the inheritance.

In emigration, indeed, there were rumors then that after the first revelations of Andrikanis, in 1907, he kept silent about this case because an agreement was concluded between him and representatives of the BC, according to which Andrikanis, for supporting the Bolshevik version that the inheritance was intended not for the entire party, but only for one Bolshevik faction, received the consent of the BC to leave part of the inheritance for personal benefit. In order to be able to appropriate the general party property, representatives of the BC paid Andrikanis a large compensation.

Undoubtedly, Andrikanis complied with the decision of the arbitration court<sup>39</sup>. But in the autumn of 1909, a new period of threats began from Taratuta, who sought in this way to wrest from the "lion's share",

remaining with Andrikanis, some more for the cash desk of the BC. It was these new threats from Taratuta that forced Andrikanis, shortly before the January plenum of the Central Committee, to turn to the members of the latter with a new complaint "about the unacceptable actions" of Taratuta. But even now Andrikanis did not complete the matter: it is very likely that the matter was hushed up, since the representatives of the BC concluded some kind of agreement with Andrikanis. Of course, to the detriment of the interests of the party.

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The second most important source of replenishment of the cash desk of the BC was income from the expropriation of state funds produced by the Bolshevik "military squads" and related groups. A wave of expropriation (they were then called abbreviated "exes") in 1906-1908. spread widely throughout the country. They were produced both by various revolutionary groups and by random detachments of people whom the revolution and unemployment knocked out of the normal rut. As a weapon in the struggle against the government, they were especially often used by organizations of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and the Union of Socialist-Revolutionary Maximalists, as well as a number of revolutionary national parties (Polish Socialist Party, Georgian Socialist Federalists, Armenian Dashnaktsutyan Party, etc.). Special mention should be made of the anarchists, who carried out propaganda in favor of the expropriation not only of state funds, but also from private individuals and widely developed the practice of this kind of speeches. In the ranks of the Social Democracy, the attitude towards expropriations was sharply different

between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. For the first time this dispute unfolded in April 1906 at a congress in Stockholm. The Bolsheviks, considering expropriations as one of the forms of "guerrilla fighting" against the government, recognized

allowable expropriation, but only of state funds, necessarily under the strict control of the party and so that the funds obtained in this way must be turned to the work of preparing the uprising. The Mensheviks, on the contrary, emphasizing the demoralizing effect of expropriation, called for "fight against the actions of individuals or groups with the aim of seizing money under the name or motto of the Social Democratic Party."

The Mensheviks considered the seizure of state funds possible only in one single case: if the power in the given locality

passed into the hands of the revolutionary authorities. In such cases, the Mensheviks recognized the possibility of confiscation of capital in the state bank and in government institutions, but only at the direction of these revolutionary authorities and under the condition of full accountability and publicity<sup>40</sup>.

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The Stockholm Congress adopted a resolution of the Mensheviks, which thus became a generally binding party decision on this issue. The London Congress in May 1907 confirmed this prohibition, supplementing it with a decision to dissolve all special combat squads and groups, and this decision was passed by an overwhelming majority (the Menshevik bloc with the Bund, the Polish Social Democrats and part of the Social Democrats of the Latvian Territory, while a significant part of the Bolsheviks abstained)<sup>41</sup>. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks, not only after the Stockholm, but also after the London Congress, continued to retain at least some of their fighting squads and carried out expropriations, and both political and directly practical leadership of these actions was in the hands of the main troika of the BC "financial group" of the latter, i.e. Lenin, Bogdanov and Krasin.

The Bolsheviks of the Urals, on the one hand, and Transcaucasia, on the other, developed a particularly broad activity in this area. Both the combat organizations created in these areas and the people who led them were completely different in type. The Ural Bolsheviks, headed by the three Kadomtsev brothers (Erasmus, Ivan and Mikhail), made attempts to create a mass workers' militia underground, developed far-reaching military-strategic plans for an uprising in the Urals, etc., and carried out their expropriations mainly to obtain funds for this work, and BC transferred a relatively small part of the income from their enterprises<sup>42</sup>. The group of Bolshevik militants of Transcaucasia did not set any big plans for the uprising and constituted a small but closely knit circle of desperately brave "remote good fellows" (Lenin called their leader S. T. Petrosyan-Kamo "Caucasian robber" and in this definition was not one good-natured joke, which

belonged not only to Kamo), who, with southern romance, were carried away by Lenin, lived from hand to mouth (a number of them died young of tuberculosis), but dreamed of making a big "ex", capturing 200-300 thousand rubles. and bring them to Lenin: take it and do what you know<sup>43</sup>.

It is important for us first of all to establish that all the work of these two groups was carried out under the direct supervision not only of the entire trio as a whole, but also of Lenin personally. For the Urals there is direct evidence in this spirit, coming, no doubt, from E. Kadomtsev. S. M. Pozner, in his comments on the "Minutes of the First Conference of Military and Combat Organizations of the RSDLP", states in a completely categorical form that "not a single important enterprise in the Urals was carried out without the knowledge of Lenin and Lyubich, I. A. Summer" (the latter was authorized by the BC for relations with the Urals, at the same time hiding behind the official internal party position of "agent of the Central Committee"). And for 1906-1907. in the Urals, the Bolsheviks carried out many dozens of "exes", mostly small robberies of state-owned wine shops, etc., but sometimes very large ones (during the expropriation of a mail train on Deme, near Ufa, in August 1906, over 200 thousand rubles). Of this money, as is now known<sup>44</sup>, 60,000 rubles were received by the BC cash desk. (through the same Summer). As for the expropriation in

the Transcaucasus, according to M.N. Lyadov, questions about all of them were discussed in the BC. Direct participation in the development of plans belonged most of all to Krasin, with whom, according to Lyadov, "Kamo was directly in love." "Here is a man," said Kamo, "he understands everything at a glance, he immediately gives such advice that predetermines the success of the whole business."<sup>45</sup> The total amount of money seized by the Kamo group must be estimated at approximately 325-350 thousand rubles, and the main expropriation on Erivan Square in Tiflis (June 25, 1907) gave no less than 250 thousand rubles. All these amounts were transferred to the BC. 250 thousand rubles, taken in Tiflis, were personally brought by Kamo and handed over to the headquarters of the business center in Kuokkala. Krupskaya writes that this money "could not have been used," since the numbers of five-hundred-ruble bills were known and reported by the government to the banks. But this is not entirely accurate: out of 250 thousand, there were only 100 thousand in five hundred r

were in smaller denominations, and their exchange did not present any difficulties. Lyadov drew a small scene at the headquarters of the BC, when Krupskaya and Bogdanov's wife were sewing five-hundred-ruble notes into Lyadov's vest, who took them abroad for an attempted exchange 46.

Schmitt's legacy brought the BC a total of about 280 thousand rubles, which were received by the cashier in installments in 1907-1909, military enterprises in the Urals and the Caucasus, even if we do not count the ill-fated five-hundred-ruble bills, gave a much larger amount. But far from all BC enterprises of this kind are known to us. The income

budget of the business center really amounted to many hundreds of thousands of rubles - in this respect, Bogdanov was absolutely right. Krasin was a real genius both in organizing enterprises of this kind, and in general in using all kinds of sources of funds. We have already pointed out that Stolypin's dacha was blown up by bombs made in the BC laboratories (August 25, 1906), they also played a decisive role in the famous expropriation in Lantern Lane in St. Petersburg (October 27, 1906). Both of these enterprises were organized by the Maximalist Social Revolutionaries. Oral tradition, firmly held in the social democratic circles of the pre-revolutionary years, said that it was precisely for this reason that a significant part of the sums of money seized in Lantern Lane fell into the hands of the BC, just as part of the money stolen by the Socialist-Revolutionaries oppositionists in the bank of the Moscow Mutual Credit Society in Moscow (April 1906). The matter did not end there. It is known that in 1906-1907. the Bolsheviks in St. Petersburg and Moscow were seriously

developing a plan to issue counterfeit money. Krasin returned to this plan in

1907 and ordered watermarked paper from Germany for printing counterfeit three-ruble notes<sup>47</sup>.

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The main trio of BC - its "financial group" consisting of Lenin, Bogdanov and Krasin - in 1906-1907. was a talentedly constructed apparatus for the "compulsory expropriation" in favor of the Bolshevik faction, not only of government funds, but also of sums earmarked for the general party fund. They were not shy about choosing methods: if only there would be a large income. No signs



which would give grounds to speak about the existence of any kind of disagreement on these issues within the "financial group" cannot be found not only for the period before the London Congress, but also for that half a year after this congress, when the political leaders of the BC continued to remain in Russia. But the absence of disagreements within the "financial group" should by no means be taken as proof of the absence of disagreements within the Bolshevik faction in general. On the contrary, it can be proved that there were differences of opinion among the Bolsheviks on this question, and very significant ones at that. The disintegration that the expropriations brought to the masses of the people in general, and to the ranks of the workers

organizations in particular, was so great that a negative attitude towards them penetrated into the environment of the Bolsheviks. The strict factional discipline which these latter had established prevented this negative attitude from breaking out. But at the London Congress its dimensions were revealed

The main struggle on this issue at the congress was fought not at the plenary sessions, but in the commissions, the materials on the work of which have not been preserved. Nor do the memoirists say anything about it, since the Bolshevik authors (almost the only ones who had the opportunity to publish their memoirs about this congress) prefer to pass over this question in silence. But according to the stories of a few of the congress participants who have survived to this day, we can establish that the congress commission that discussed this issue revealed the existence of significant differences within the Bolsheviks. A number of prominent Bolsheviks, during behind-the-scenes negotiations, stated that they could not openly denounce the practices hitherto applied by their leaders, since many of them shared responsibility for this past, but that they would fight against its use in the future. , insisting only on forgetting what happened in the past, since raising the question of the past will only aggravate relations. The situation was complicated by the fact that the question

of expropriations was raised as a special case of the big question of "guerrilla forms of struggle" against government terrorist measures, and the practice of guerrilla attacks on punitive police detachments, which dealt with

population during periods of popular unrest, was widely developed not only in the Baltic region (the movement of the "forest brothers"), but also in the Caucasus, especially in Georgia. I. G. Tsereteli recalls that Lenin then, in a private conversation, asked N. N. Zhordania the question of whether he would agree to expel from the party, as required by the resolution of the Mensheviks, those Gurian Social Democratic peasants who would attack the Cossacks who were raping in their home villages. As a result, the commission, which essentially approved the ideas underlying the Menshevik draft resolution, adopted a number of amendments that significantly softened its wording. And this relaxed project was proposed to the congress on behalf of four of the five main groups (except the Bolsheviks).

These memories of the then disputes in the commission and behind the scenes are fully confirmed by the analysis of the data recorded in the official minutes of the congress. Draft resolution proposed by the commission on behalf of four delegations (Mensheviks, Polish Social Democrats, Bund and Latvians), at a meeting on June 1

1907 was adopted by a majority of 170 votes to 35 and 52 abstentions. The general mood of the congress is characterized not only by this huge majority (66%) of those who spoke out against partisan actions; It is perhaps even more significant that only a very insignificant minority (only 13.6%) openly voted against the resolution, i.e., defended the practice of guerrilla attacks.

Since the vote was by roll call, it is possible to understand in more detail the mood of the Bolshevik delegates. Of the 35 people who voted against the resolution, more than half were Social Democrats from the Latvian Territory (18 delegates), where the partisan struggle against the punitive detachments was especially widely developed. There were only 17 Russian Bolsheviks among the opponents of the resolution, which is only 16.2% of the total composition of the Bolshevik faction of the congress (there were 105 Bolsheviks at the congress). To understand

the general mood of the Bolshevik faction, perhaps even more characteristic is another fact: despite the strict discipline that prevailed among the Bolsheviks at the congress, there were six Bolshevik delegates who cast their votes for the resolution, i.e., for the prohibition of expropriation, all of them these

the delegates were from the central industrial region (three from Moscow). The overwhelming majority of the Bolshevik delegates abstained from voting, and among the abstentions were such prominent representatives of the Bolshevik faction as A. P. Smirnov, then one of the leaders of the St. Petersburg organization; S. G. Shaumyan, then a well-known leader of the Bolsheviks in Transcaucasia; N. N. Nakoryakov, who was then the representative of the Ural Regional Committee of the Bolsheviks for the political "leadership of those fighting squads, which were described above<sup>49</sup>. We note, in passing, that among the abstentions was also K. E. Voroshilov, then a delegate from Lugansk, and a number of other provincial Bolsheviks. The mood at the congress was such that many of the recent supporters of "partisan action" during the days of the congress began to reconsider their attitude to the question.

This general mood of the Bolshevik faction of the congress, of course, was also reflected in the voting of the members of the BC itself, which, just in those days, was elected in a new expanded composition. Among them, there were no votes for the resolution of the commission, but only three members of the BC voted against the resolution, that is, in defense of partisan actions: Lenin, Dubrovinsky and Kamenev. It is useful to note here that among the rest of the Bolsheviks who then voted with Lenin, there were very few people who left any trace in the history of the Bolshevik movement. Only M. N. Lyadov, M. Tomsy and Em. Yaroslavsky. Among the rest there

were several minor figures of military organizations, for example, N. Skvortsov from Zlatoust<sup>50</sup>, E. Luganovsky from Nizhny Tagil, and others - entirely ordinary provincial workers who did not play any more or less noticeable role.

This was Lenin's isolation on this issue within his own faction, isolation all the more emphasized because, for random reasons, the other two members of the "financial group" did not appear on the voting lists: Bogdanov was at the congress with an advisory vote, and Krasin, who was arrested in Moscow, did not appear at all. was absent. But even if this accident is taken into account, the discrepancy between the position of Lenin and the position of the majority of the BC members was quite noticeable. Of the 15 members of the BC at the congress with decisive vo

11 were present (except for Krasin, Rykov and Shantser were arrested), of which 5 abstained from voting (Goldenberg Meshkovsky, Zinoviev, Rozhkov, Tara-tuta and Teodorovich), and three were not included in the list of those participating in the vote at all (Lindov, Nogin and M. N. Pokrovsky). Apparently, there can be only one explanation for their absence: they did not want their names to be on the list of those who abstained even from voting on the resolution condemning the expropriation, to whom they (regarding Lindov and Nogin it is known) were sharply negative, but at the same time, they considered it impossible to vote for a resolution of condemnation, since this would too emphasize the existence of a deep crack within the BC on such a painful issue. That is why they left the meeting<sup>51</sup> before the voting began: it was a common reception at that time. Thus, there were only 5 people

inside the BC of certain defenders of expropriation (Lenin, Bogdanov, Dubrovinsky, Kamenev and Krasin), and there were at least 8 people who either hesitated on this issue or treated expropriations with a greater or lesser degree of condemnation (the exact position of Rykov and Shantser is not known). Of course, the attitude to this issue was

sometimes influenced by random factors. A certain role was played, for example, by local conflicts around expropriation (apparently, it is in this direction that one should look for explanations for the position of Shaumyan, who belonged to consistent Leninists, but was forced to fight banditry and extortion, which Stalin planted in Baku). But the old truth about the presence of its regularity even in accidents fits very well with these random factors. The root cause of them all was the corrupting influence of expropriation on the destinies of the labor movement; and those elements of the Bolshevik faction who, more than others, were inclined to reckon with the interests of this movement,

they began to break with the expropriatory practice of the BC of 1906-1907. It is no coincidence that among those who abstained or evaded voting for a resolution condemning expropriation, there were so many Bolsheviks who, in subsequent

years belonged to the camp of "Bolshevik conciliators": Meshkovsky, Nogin, Lindov, Teodorovich, Rozhkov.  
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It was these future "conciliators" who, during backstage negotiations in London, made promises to put an end to the practice of expropriation, but these were all promises made without a master. The "financial group" was not going to reckon with either the "Bolshevik Compromisers" or the official decisions of the congress, and even with the new composition of the BC, it held in its hands the entire apparatus of the BC, and in particular all the threads of its secret enterprises. Everyone was soon convinced of this by the example of a large expropriation on Erivan Square in Tiflis (June 25, 1907), which was carried out by the Kamo group with the blessing of the "financial group". The blessing was issued after the London convention; especially after the congress, the "financial group" accepted from Kamo the "property" seized on Erivan Square and signed an agreement with the Kamo group on its implementation.

Lenin took a personal part in all these negotiations, and it is no coincidence that Krupskaya, every time she mentions Kamo, lists all the members of the "financial group"; emphasizing that Kamo "was passionately attached to Ilyich, Krasin, Bogdanov"<sup>52</sup> - to all three. The "financial group" conspired its enterprises not only from official all-party centers, but also from the plenum of the BC itself: this was the only way to interpret the obligation given by Kamo ("Caucasian group") to the "financial group" ("board of three") "under no circumstances "do not violate the general secret and do not transfer" the discussion of the case on the entrusted property to any party organization, do not allow such a discussion, do not participate in it. The wording of this treaty leaves no room for doubt that this ban also applied to the BC plenum - it, apparently, even more and above all, and the legal

accuracy of the wording makes one think that their authorship does not belong to Kamo, but rather to Lenin, who alone in the "financial group" went through the school of jurisprudence and at the same time had vast experience in the practice of internal party disputes, better than others foresaw possible complications in this area.

The political disagreements that shortly after the dissolution of the Second State Duma (June 3, O.S. 1907) lay between Lenin and Bogdanov did not in any way interfere with their friendly

We have no indication of differences in this last plane, and the joint work of their wives in sewing up Tiflis five-hundred-ruble bills into Lyadov's old waistcoat can rightly be regarded as a kind of symbol of the strength of this cooperation of theirs. More importantly, it was Lyadov's waistcoat, the very one whose name in the minutes of the London Congress in the list of defenders of the right to "exes" stood next to the name of Lenin; no less important is another fact that immediately after the London Congress, Dubrovinsky appeared in the central apparatus of the BC, who in London also voted along with Lenin on this issue of "exs".

These were, of course, details, but they were extremely characteristic both of Lenin's mood at that time and of the general atmosphere in the Business Center after the London Congress. Krupskaya explains Lenin's rapprochement with Dubrovinsky by Inokentii's "selfless devotion to the cause" and his "decisiveness in the struggle," while recalling both his personal participation in the Moscow uprising of December 1905 and his role in the Kronstadt uprising of July 1906. 53 These biographical notes are correct; Dubrovinsky was indeed distinguished by great personal courage and devotion to the cause. But we should not forget that Lenin took him to the office of the BC not after December 1905 and not after July 1906, although even then he already knew Dubrovinsky personally, but only from June 1907, after the London Congress, at which Dubrovinsky proved not his personal courage, but his readiness, together with

Lenin, to go even to the defense of the "exes". Lenin, of course, valued both "selfless devotion to the cause of the revolution" and "resoluteness in the struggle", but from his point of view this was not the main thing: he made his closest collaborators only those who showed their ability to become his faithful squire, and in May 1907, he was inclined to take as a measure of such fidelity the readiness to go with him to the end on the question of expropriations. Even closeness on major political issues was of lesser importance to him at this time. So, for example

in July 1907, they were politically much closer to him than Kamenev, who just at that time appeared in the press as Lenin's main opponent on the question of participation in the Third State Duma,<sup>55</sup> but Lenin did not choose them as his assistant in editing Proletary, and Kamenev, who, although he took a different position on the question of elections, but, as we saw at the London Congress, also voted with Lenin against the resolution banning partisan actions. In the period immediately following the London Congress,

when selecting the closest employees to work in the center

For Lenin, considerations related to the interests of the "financial group" played a decisive role in the central apparatus of the BC for Lenin. The personal relations between the members of this latter and their closest collaborators seemed to be the best. In any case, between Lenin and Bogdanov, who lived in the same common dacha "Vaza" in Kuokkala. After the London Congress, Dubrovinsky settled with them, and "Vase" finally became the headquarters of the BC.

There was only one point that makes one think that already then a certain crack was outlined in relations between the members of the "financial group". It was the appearance of V. K. Taratuta ("Victor") in a leadership position in the BC.

A lot of unpleasant talk and accusations have accumulated around this "Victor" since 1906. Not only Zemlyachka (R. S. Zalkind), who among the Bolsheviks has long been known as an extremely quarrelsome person, almost a squabbler by nature, but also such balanced people as I. A. Summer ("Lyu-bich") and a number of others (later, from 1908, Bogdanov began to play a prominent role among them), were convinced that Taratuta was a police agent provocateur. This accusation was wrong, and we now know what exactly gave external credibility to some of the evidence against Taratuta: among Lenin's closest associates in those years abroad there was indeed a provocateur - Dr. Zhitomirsky - "Fathers", who was guilty of extraditions, attributed at one time to Taratuta<sup>56</sup>. But in those years, no one suspected Zhitomirsky, and the scandalous stories of a personal nature, which were many in the biography of Tara-tuta, made accusations of betrayal plausible.

Lenin took this Taratuta under his special patronage from the moment when it became clear that Taratuta could play a big role in obtaining Schmitt's inheritance, and at the London Congress it was Lenin who made Taratuta a member of the BC and a candidate for the all-party Central Committee. This is in the history of the party. there was in general the only case when a person was elected to the central office, against whom charges were brought several times for his connection with the police; therefore, it is quite natural that his candidacy aroused serious objections, especially among the Bolsheviks, who were better than others familiar with the biography of Taratuta. But Lenin threw all his authority into the scales and insisted on being elected. Approximately to this time, Lenin's conversation with N. A. Rozhkov, which is extremely important for understanding not only Taratuta, but also Lenin, dates back. On the basis of the information he had about Taratuta in Moscow, Rozhkov described the latter as a "hardened scoundrel." Lenin did not dispute the characteristics, but insisted that this was precisely why Taratuta was an especially "irreplaceable person" for the Bolsheviks. "That's why he's good," Lenin

said, "that he will stop at nothing. Now, you, tell me frankly, could you give water for the maintenance of a rich merchant's wife for money? No? And I wouldn't go, I couldn't to overcome himself. And Victor went ... This is an irreplaceable person. "

For Lenin, such an approach to questions of elementary morality was generally characteristic. At every convenient or inconvenient occasion, he tried to impress his followers, especially among the youth, that "the party is not a boarding school for noble maidens" and that "some scoundrel can be useful to us precisely because he is a scoundrel"<sup>57</sup>.

Of course, by no means did Lenin take every "scoundrel" under his high patronage, and even more so, far from each of them he promoted to the composition of the central party bodies. The moral qualities of a party worker, from Lenin's point of view, should not have served as an insurmountable obstacle to his advancement to high positions in the party. But Lenin nevertheless nominated to such posts only those whose activity, from his point of view, was especially useful, moreover, in terms of the importance of the post to which he promoted the corresponding worker, and in terms of the amount of effort that he was ready to go to, overcoming the resistance of those around him. , Always



one can understand how much hope he has for his new candidate assigns how important a place he assigns to him in his plans.

Among all similar cases, the case of Taratuta was the most difficult in all of Lenin's vast party practice. From his conversation with Rozhkov quoted above, it is clear what enormous difficulties Lenin had to overcome. Rozhkov, of course, was not the only one who raised such questions, who at that time was distinguished by great complaisance in relations with Lenin. There were others with whom it was much more difficult to come to an agreement. From the intensity of the struggle that he was ready to endure on this issue, we can understand that in his plans for the future, Lenin assigned a very significant place to Taratuta. Here we return to the main question of the internal history of the BC - to the question of the relationship between Lenin, Bogdanov and Krasin.

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When summing up the results of the activities of the BC during its existence in Russia, one has to state that no signs of any significant differences within the "board of three" for the period before the dissolution of the Second State Duma can be found; and if Lenin, nevertheless, already at the London Congress took measures to get "his" candidates into the BC, then the reason should be sought in another plane.

Both of his colleagues in this triumvirate were too big individuals and too independent people for Lenin to hope to turn them into mere pawns in his hands. In those years, both of them, Bogdanov and Krasin, firmly stood on the positions of orthodox Bolshevism and were not only consistent supporters of the course of insurrection with all the relevant conclusions, but also staunch supporters of partisan actions, i.e., first of all, "ex". Both of them, especially Bogdanov, in whose mood there were many elements of primitive revolutionary romance, valued exceptionally highly and recognized his leading role, but they knew how to think independently politically, independently understood people and events and were able to defend their opinions, refusing them only after how they were presented with persuasive arguments. Therefore, while the "board of three" in the indicated composition was the governing body of the BC,

for all the extent of Lenin's personal influence, the leadership of the Bolshevik faction was collective leadership.

But Lenin was too authoritarian in nature to for a long time limit himself to the role of at least the first, but still only one among the three equal members of the ruling triumvirate. It is not known exactly who initiated the expansion of the BC at the London Congress of 1907 and by what motives.

guided by these initiators; in particular, it is not known exactly how Lenin felt about this reform, whether he supported it or not, but in any case he used it in his own interests: the selection of personnel personally connected with him and personally devoted to him by leading workers of the BC Lenin carried out in order to weaken his dependence from the rest of the members of the "college of three" in order to clear his way to the role of the sole leader of the Bolshevik faction. The absence of Krasin at the congress

helped him, because the main

The difficulty on Lenin's path to this goal was not Bogdanov, but Krasin.

Analyzing now, in a historical perspective, the political and social concepts of Bogdanov and comparing them with those of Lenin, it is easy to see that the very foundations of their approach to socialism were essentially different from each other, so that only the general atmosphere of the era of the first Russian revolution can explain their stay in ranks of the same Bolshevik faction. In 1904- -1907. Bogdanov fully agreed with Lenin in his conclusions about the tactics of Russian social democracy and about the methods of struggle against absolutism. Vremya, the popular organ of the BC, of which Bogdanov, together with Zinoviev, was the editor in 1906-1907, did not differ politically from Proletary, of which Lenin was the editor in those years. For every

kind of adventurous measures Bogdanov went with almost more readiness than Lenin, almost more willingly than the latter, clutched at the most risky plans. The basis was the subordination of all tasks to the main task of organizing a victorious uprising. "On the barricade, a recidivist burglar will be more useful than Plekhanov," according to V. S. Voitinsky, Bogdanov said at the time; and this biting phrase undoubtedly quite correctly reflected the fullness of the hegemony of the task of insurrection both over the consciousness and over the psychology of the then Bogdanov. But in essence

In his worldview, he was always a humanist to the marrow of his bones, and among the immediate tasks of the socialist movement, he always strove with particular perseverance to put forward to an important place the task of forming such a proletarian vanguard, which understands the great task of his class as the task of "gathering man", the bearer of a new "collectivist" culture. "Man," that is, a real

man capable of building a socialist society, "has not yet arrived," Bogdanov wrote in 1907, at the very height of his active work in the "board of three," but he himself is close, and its silhouette clearly looms on the horizon."<sup>58</sup> His views on this group of questions, of course, have been refined and complicated over the years; he approached them from different angles and, in accordance with this, emphasized different aspects of the problem, but at the heart of his solution to this problem remained until And in 1909, when during the conflict in the Council of the Capri School, he declared that throughout his life he had been fighting against two enemies - "against the authoritarian feeling and against the individualistic consciousness", moreover, "the most hated" for him it was the first - "authoritarian feeling"; and in 1920, when he declared the main task of cultural work among the proletariat to be "the struggle against fetishes", which from his point of view were "synonymous with inhumanity"<sup>59</sup> - he had in mind all the same great task of "gathering man." For Lenin, such an approach to the problem of the tasks of the socialist movement

was organically alien; "authoritarian feeling" he never hated; and one should be surprised not that later, in emigration, these differences came to a prominent place in factional disputes, but that in Russia, in 1906-1907, they did not play any role, they, apparently, did not exist at all. did not notice. The reason lay, of course, in the tense atmosphere of those years and in Bogdanov's desire to keep pace with his colleagues in the faction. But in emigration, when the tasks of summarizing the results arose, these differences could not but make themselves felt, and the struggle against Bogdanov was all the less difficult for Lenin because the problems that Bogdanov posed in those years could not help but seem problems of the distant future; specific

Bogdanov himself began to draw political conclusions from them only much later, proving with arguments from proletarian culture the need for the proletariat to put forward only those slogans that are consistent with the interests of the peasantry<sup>60</sup>.

With Bogdanov, Lenin parted ways forever already in 1908. Even after the revolution, he made no attempt to attract Bogdanov to work, although he did not veto his election to the Communist Academy. But with his influence in the Proletkult, Lenin waged a decisive struggle, and with the help of government decrees, he succeeded in removing Bogdanov from there. For his part, he did not look for a compromise, and then Bogdanov, who, left alone, in 1917 spoke in favor of participation in a coalition government, and after October considered the inevitable degeneration of the Soviet dictatorship into a new, unprecedented in history form of dictatorship over the proletariat<sup>61</sup>. In subsequent years, Bogdanov returned to his main specialty (medicine), worked a lot on the then completely unexplored problem of blood transfusion, performing extremely dangerous experiments on himself, from one of which he died in 1928. There were rumors in Moscow then that the game with death, which was present in these experiments, was a peculiar form of suicide. From repeated offers to write memoirs, he invariably refused and only occasionally agreed to give individual specific references; refused to write his memoirs about Lenin<sup>62</sup>.

With such significant differences in the basic premises, Lenin, of course, could reckon with the opinions of Bogdanov, since this was necessary to preserve the unity of the faction, but Bogdanov could not exert any significant influence on him. The break with him was comparatively easy for Lenin. Things were quite different with Krasin. The latter,

of course, could not compete with Lenin in the ability to outline the main line of big politics and consistently lead it through the complex interweaving of all sorts of intricate relationships. But he had a very lively, original and flexible mind, he was able to give witty formulations and create ingenious combinations, poured out well-aimed definitions that stuck to people and events. With its huge connections in the world of scientists, writers and artists, among the technical intelligentsia, even

in commercial and industrial circles, the Bolsheviks of the era of the first revolution were obliged, first of all and most of all, to Krasin, who knew how to impress in any society - from Savva Morozov to Vera Komissarzhevskaya, and his exceptional organizational talent allowed him to consolidate new acquaintances on the go, including each of them to their proper place in a widely ramified, but well-coordinated organizational network. Of course it was a network

almost exclusively technical

party apparatus. Krasin took little part in the political and even organizational construction. As he himself admits in his autobiography, this work did not appeal to him. But for the underground organization, the technical apparatus was of great importance: and as a result of the efforts, mainly of Krasin, the Bolsheviks in this area surpassed all other organizations of the revolutionary underground of that era. All this side of the work of the BC lay on Krasin, as well as the military, combat work, as well as all the worries about the finances

of the Bolshevik faction: the expenses of the BC were enormous, it had to not only support the entire huge central apparatus of the faction, but also almost completely cover the budget of the St. organizations of the Bolsheviks<sup>63</sup>, as well as to help the most important organizations in the province. Getting money to cover all these needs lay almost exclusively on Krasin, who was the BC finance minister. And the scope of this work, and the general practical turn of mind, and the many-sided life experience, and even well-aimed sharp words, Krasin could not but impress Lenin. V. S. Voitinsky is undoubtedly right when he writes that Krasin in those years was

generally the only person in the Bolshevik organization whom Lenin "treated with real respect"<sup>64</sup>. Perhaps it would be more correct to speak of even more: from Krupskaya's memoirs we know that Lenin had streaks of passion for one or another party worker. Usually such hobbies were very short-lived. Only "an affair with Krasin" survived all the tests of time and political differences. There are many reasons to believe that in 1906-1907, during the period of joint work in the "board of three", very often not Lenin, but precisely

Krasin led the rest, dragging them along the path of his always brilliant, but very often extremely adventurous plans. And it is very likely that when later, in 1911, Lenin wrote to Rykov, warning him against Krasin as "a master of giving promises and rubbing glasses", this warning should be understood in the light of a belated autobiographical confession of a man who himself has repeatedly cruelly he was mistaken, looking at the events through the glasses, "rubbed" to him by Krasin. Since 1908 they have diverged both personally and politically - and they have diverged

very far. Krasin's letters, published by his widow,<sup>65</sup> give a far from complete picture of this divergence. But Lenin continued to retain elements of his old attitude towards Krasin, and after the October Revolution he immediately began to make attempts to attract Krasin to work in a responsible post. Very interesting notes on this topic have been preserved in Trotsky's notes. As is well known, Krasin "greeted the October Revolution with hostile bewilderment, as an adventure doomed to failure in advance. He did not believe," wrote Trotsky, "in the Party's ability to cope with disruption. Even later, he treated the

methods of communism with ironic distrust." Lenin told Trotsky about his first attempts to attract Krasin, adding: "He rests - and the ministerial head!" But already by the period of the Brest peace, Krasin entered the work: the old leaven had an effect. However, he never denied himself the pleasure of harshly criticizing the economic policy of the dictatorship. Lenin obviously liked it. He "laughed merrily at the evil and well-aimed word of the enemy." Thus, subsequently, Lenin repeatedly quoted Krasin's "universal constipation,"<sup>66</sup> the definition that Krasin gave to the results of economic construction in the era of war communism.

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Against the background of these personal relationships in 1906-1907. deep behind the scenes of the BC, a struggle was unfolding for influence on the apparatus of the factional

organization. Lenin, of course, was the undisputed and universally recognized political leader of the Bolsheviks, although it is certain that not all of his factional actions met with general approval<sup>67</sup>. But he

far from being the same universally recognized and undivided master of the organizational apparatus of the BC. The official secretary of the latter, however, was N. K. Krupskaya, an obedient executor of all Lenin's instructions. It was to her that all the correspondence of the BC flocked, and it was she who received at safe houses everyone who applied to the BC. But first of all, another secretary of BC-M sat next to her. Ya. Weinstein ("Mikhail Sergeevich"), who was directly subordinated to Krasin, and it was to this other secretary (even Krupskaya does not call him the second secretary) that Krupskaya was supposed to transmit all that correspondence and send all those people who applied to the BC by cases related to the military and combat work of the faction, as well as in connection with all kinds of technical enterprises. And since in the Bolshevik organizations of that time military and combat work, as connected with the work of preparing uprisings, was regarded as much more important than general political work (after all, an uprising was considered as the "highest form" of the movement), then the proportion of those functions that lay on "another secretary", was in any case no less than the proportion of functions that lay on Krupskaya. In essence, from the point of view of the usual rate for the Bolsheviks of that time, the latter transferred all the most important and secret affairs of the BC to Krasin's decision. But it must also be borne in mind that the apparatus of the organizations under

Krasin's control was in general something like the second, more deeply hidden and more strictly secret floor of the complex underground building of the BC - with its own special addresses for correspondence, special appearances for visitors, with complex, multi-level passwords showing the position of a given person in the organizational hierarchy and the degree of his initiation into the secrets of special work ... Employees of these special organizations used general party appearances and addresses only in exceptional cases when they were unable, for one reason or another, to use the apparatus of their own appearances and addresses. And there is nothing surprising in the fact that moods began to grow in this milieu, a tendency to regard general Party work as work of a lower type in comparison with that which they, workers of military and combat organizations, are engaged in.

Already this role of Krasin, who was the undisputed leader of military and combat organizations, created for him a special position within the "board of three." But even more important was his role as cashier and finance minister of the BC. He firmly held the latter's cash register and most of the sources of its replenishment, not passing on these connections to anyone, not letting anyone into these affairs. This gave him the opportunity to strictly control the expenditure part of the BC budget, to check the validity of the requirements for the cash register with the eye of an experienced owner and decide which of them and to what extent should be satisfied.

It was this that created a particularly difficult position for Lenin. He was never satisfied with the role of only a political leader, who influences his audience only with articles and speeches, but always strove to keep in his hands the threads of organizational ties: he knew perfectly well that only in this way could one control those leading cadres of party workers who necessary for the functioning of any organization. Already in the spring of 1901, he promoted Krupskaya to the secretary of Iskra. "This, of course, meant," adds Krupskaya, "that all relations with Russia would be conducted under the close control of Vladimir Ilyich."<sup>69</sup> Since then, Lenin never released these threads; Krupskaya invariably remained the secretary of all those centers of which he was the political leader.

Better than others, he also understood the significance of the party fund, and therefore he also always tried to put it completely under his personal control. In 1906-1907. for the first time, the cash desk completely left his hands - Lenin could control it only through the "board of three", she is also the "financial group" of the BC. The most important connections were also gone. Lenin was no longer the master inside the BC - and it is against

this background that the whole significance of the question of Taratuta becomes

clear to him. Of course, a lot depended on the connection of the latter with the case of the Schmitt inheritance: as indicated above, the implementation of the latter brought about 280 thousand rubles to the cashier of the business center. And Lenin correctly calculated that by so resolutely supporting Taratuta and guiding him to such responsible posts in the Business Center and in the general Party Central Committee, he not only helps the latter to consolidate his position in those



which much depended on the implementation of the inheritance, but at the same time and more firmly binds it to himself personally.

The sister of Schmitt, who bequeathed his fortune to the Social Democratic Party, was not at all that "rich merchant's wife" for whom she could be taken, according to Lenin's words quoted above in a conversation with Rozhkov. . she was 18-19 years old) from a talented family of millionaires Morozov, who, following her older student brother

and, undoubtedly, under his influence, and then under the impression of his tragic death, she was carried away by the romance of the revolution. In those turbulent years, there were many of them. It was by no means an exception that for her this revolutionary romance included her personal infatuation with Taratuta, whose real biography (the "burnt scoundrel") she, of course, did not know, but whose position in the party hierarchy (first secretary of the Bolshevik organizations in Moscow, then a member of the Central Committee from the Bolsheviks) she undoubtedly knew and could not but impress. Lenin understood this perfectly. This is the key to explaining his insistence on promoting Taratuta to high positions in the party: by doing so, he raised the chances of Taratuta's marriage to Elizaveta Schmitt, and at the same time the "realization of the inheritance" of her late brother in the sense desired by Lenin. Soon he, apparently, personally became acquainted with E. P. Schmit, who in the summer of 1907 lived in Finland, not far from

Kuokkala, already together with Taratuta. In order to speed up the receipt of the inheritance (as a minor, she could not dispose of it before marriage), her fictitious marriage was arranged with A.M. Mr. H. P. Schmit began to sign all the paperwork that was necessary for the sale of her share in her brother's estate. In the case of Taratuta, Lenin placed a large bet, but the calculation was

accurate.

The immediate future showed that the role of Taratuta in Lenin's plans was not included in the framework of one "implementation of Schmitt's legacy." In any case, looking closer at him, Le

nin was convinced that he was quite suitable for services of a longer nature, and very soon set a course for more and more close involvement of Taratuta in the secret work of the business center, especially in cases related to the cashier of the latter. Full development of this "new course", which undermined the monopoly position of Krasin as an unlimited "owner" of the cash desk of the BC, refers to the last, third period of the existence of the BC, constituting one of the most important features of this period.

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Police repressions, which from the beginning of the winter of 1907-1908. attacked the revolutionary organizations that tried in 1906-1907. to create their bases in Finland, accelerated the development of events. The Petersburg police increasingly raided the border points favored by the revolutionaries. Krupskaya writes that the police hunted Lenin especially intensely and "looked for him all over Finland." This statement is completely untrue: no traces of a special hunt for Lenin could be found in the archives of the tsarist police, although they were studied with great diligence in relation to Lenin. The police did not specifically hunt for Lenin. The November and December 1907 police raids on Terijoki, Kuokkala, etc., were directed primarily against the Socialist-Revolutionaries associated with terror, and against the anarchist "Makhaevs" from the "Workers' Conspiracy" group - threads stretched from there to various expropriations and acts of economic terror (murders of engineers, etc.). Of the Bolsheviks, only M. Ya. Vainshtein, the secretary of the BC in the line of Krasin's enterprises, and some of the "militants", mainly those associated with the Latvian "forest brothers", were hurt. But, of course, it was clear that this was only the beginning, followed by sequels soon. Finland ceased to be more or less a safe haven. The period of "small emigration" (as revolutionary work with support bases in Finland was called) was ending, the time was approaching to go into "big" emigration, more distant from the borders of Russia.

"As usual," Martov wrote to Axelrod on December 10, 1907, "Lenin was the first to leave."<sup>71</sup> The latter, in general, with exceptional diligence kept himself from arrest, believing that without him - if the arrest would tear him out of active work for a long time - all development

internal party relations will go in other ways. Back in October, he climbed into the depths of Finland, to Helsingfors, and from there he obtained the decision of the BC on the need to transfer the editorial office of Proletary, the central organ of the BC, abroad. Lenin, Bogdanov and Dubrovinsky were elected to the editorial board, which ensured Lenin's decisive influence. At the same time, a ban was adopted on polemics in the pages of the illegal Bolshevik press on

philosophical questions - in legal publications, this polemic was recognized as permissible on the basis of the complete equality of the two main groups, i.e., both the orthodox Marxists of the Plekhanov persuasion and the supporters of Bogdanov. This last decision actually limited the influence of Bogdanov, since before that in legal Bolshevik bodies (in 1907 their main theoretical and political body was Vestnik Zhizni, a monthly magazine published in St. Didn't the "Bogdanovites" reign supreme? With these decisions in his pocket, on January 20, 1908, Lenin arrived in Geneva. The second emigration met with a gloomy: bad weather, bad

news, there were arrests of Bolsheviks abroad. On the very first evening, returning from Krupskaya after conversations with the Genevan Bolsheviks, Lenin dropped: "I have a feeling that it was as if they had come to lie down in a coffin." Of course, he did not lie down in the coffin, he did not lay down his arms, but, on the contrary, he began a new complex party

maneuver. But the third period in the history of the BC began, indeed, in an extremely difficult situation from all points of view: both in relation to the general political, and from the point of view of the internal party, and, finally, from the angle of personal relations outlined within the BC.

During the previous years, all the political calculations of both Lenin personally and the entire Bolshevik faction were built in the hope of an imminent and victorious uprising, which would immediately resolve all the painful questions of our time. Both politically and psychologically, it was an extremely gambling game, in which fighting squads, partisan actions and expropriations seemed to be big trump cards, and they were put into play, not caring about possible internal party complications on this basis. Expropriation on Erivan

square in Tiflis yesterday seemed to be a particularly successful move. Now it has become clear to everyone that the stakes on the uprising are beaten, that the movement is facing a long period of not only growing government reaction, but also the internal disintegration of the forces on which it relied. And for gambling, for the Tiflis trump cards put into play, one has to pay.

Two hundred five-hundred-ruble tickets, which Lyadov took out sewn into a vest, were not easy to exchange abroad. The inquiries that were made in advance gave reason to think that attempts to exchange through foreign banks could be carried out with success, that in any case, a wide announcement of the numbers of five hundred rubles had not yet been made, but it was clear that after the exchange of the first ticket, appropriate measures would be taken, and then all the other five hundred rubles will lose all value. And it was about a huge amount - about one hundred thousand rubles - and Krasin himself was called in to try to save them, who, with the help

of other "financiers" of the BC, developed a plan for the simultaneous exchange of five hundred rubles in a number of large centers of Europe. The Bolshevik youth was mobilized, and in the first days of January 1908, attempts at exchange were made in the banks of Paris, Geneva, Stockholm, Munich, etc. They all ended in complete failure; those who came to the banks with five hundred rubles were arrested; in some countries, searches and arrests of Russian emigrants began, from which some threads stretched to those arrested, and the situation in some of these searches and arrests showed a greater awareness of the police about the behind-the-scenes side of the matter. The press was full of sensational reports<sup>72</sup>. The real

reason for this complete failure was revealed only after the revolution: among the "financiers" involved in the development of the exchange plan were not only Taratuta and M. M. Litvinov, the future People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and then a representative of the BC in Paris, but also Dr. Zhitomirsky ( "Fathers"), Lenin's confidant in the affairs of Bolshevik groups in exile back in 1903-1904. and at the same time the main informer of the Parisian guards abroad on the Bolsheviks. Through him, the Police Department was aware of all Krasin's preparations and communicated well in advance with the foreign police.

Those arrested were entirely Bolsheviks, among them several who were widely known, such as, for example, Litvinov, who not long before the Bolsheviks had been appointed official secretary of the Russian Social Democratic delegation at the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart (August 1907): he now has, during the arrest in Paris, twelve five hundred rubles were found from among those stolen in Tiflis. The same five-hundred-ruble notes were found on a number of other prisoners, and the foreign press openly wrote that the Tiflis expropriation was the work of the Bolsheviks, and since at that time the RSDLP was formally a single party, about the internal relations of which foreigners were little aware, the foreign press Tiflis expropriation was generally declared a matter of the RSDLP. The situation was further complicated by the fact that shortly before these arrests, some

emigrants from Russia attempted small expropriatory raids in Switzerland, England and the USA. And quite serious was the threat of growing anti-emigrant sentiment in those Western countries where emigrants most often found shelter. Closely connected with this was the danger of complications with the socialists of the West, in whose memory there still lived memories of the harm caused to their movement by the "partisan actions" of the anarchists of the 1880s and 1890s. The expropriatory bias in the ranks of Russian socialists among the socialists of the West of sympathy in general is never in the wind

began, and at the beginning of 1908, in some places, the attitude of the latter turned into acute irritation in connection with the revealed attempts by the Bolsheviks to disloyally use the sympathies of foreign socialists for the Russian revolutionary movement<sup>73</sup>.

Under these conditions, it is quite understandable that reports of arrests intensified the struggle that had begun within the RSDLP around the issue of the Tiflis expropriation since the autumn of 1907.

A number of party leaders were dissatisfied with the excessive, in their opinion, softness of the resolution of the London Congress. "The lack of decisiveness in the condemnation by the congress of the so-called expropriations," as G. V. Plekhanov later wrote, was the main reason for the latter's refusal to be a representative of the party in the International Socialist Bureau. The role of the Bolsheviks in

The Tiflis expropriation soon became known, although there were no exact proofs at first, and this forced the Mensheviks to demand from the Social Democratic delegation of the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart already in August 1907 to issue a special declaration condemning the expropriation<sup>74</sup>. The Committee of Transcaucasian Organizations of the RSDLP, which was in the hands of the Mensheviks, almost immediately after the Tiflis expropriation set about investigation of this case and established not only the composition of the Kamo-Petrosyan group that carried out this expropriation, but also the names of those Bolsheviks who held prominent positions in the general party organization who were the political patrons of these expropriators: these patrons were headed by Stalin, who immediately left Tiflis after the expropriation and moved to Baku. But the investigation conducted in the Caucasus could not clarify the entire case in its entirety, since it was established that the main leaders and inspirers were in the center, where all the stolen money went. Attempts to raise the question in the Central Committee ran into resistance not only from the Bolsheviks, but also from the Polish Social-Democrats, who, it is true, at the London Congress were resolutely against expropriation, but now stubbornly declared that they refused to believe in the involvement of the leading figures of the Bolshevik faction in the Tiflis expropriation, committed after the Congress, in direct violation of its decisions. Already the first reports of arrests in Berlin (Kamo-Petrosyan and others) made a great impression on the

Central Committee, and, undoubtedly, the mood of the German Social Democrats had a significant influence: such members of the Central Committee as the Polish Social Democrats L. Tyshko and Yu. Yu. Marchlevsky, who had lived in Germany for many years and was closely connected with the German Social Democrats, could not but be especially sensitive to their sentiments. As a result, the Central Committee already on January 4 AD. Art. 1908 decided to declare that he "did not give any instructions to any of those arrested in Berlin

niya" (this was a response to reports of found paper for printing counterfeit three-rouble notes). At the same time, the Central Committee instructed the Central Foreign Bureau (CZB) to investigate all the circumstances related to these arrests.

The Central Committee was even more impressed by reports of arrests in Paris and other cities in connection with the exchange of Tiflis five hundred rubles. Under the influence of the latter, the Central Committee decided to send to the Caucasus a special delegation consisting of N.N. split in Baku, which was carried out in October-November 1907 by Stalin<sup>75</sup>.

Such a composition of the delegation was extremely characteristic of the mood of the Central Committee in the first weeks after receiving reports of arrests during the exchange of five hundred rubles. The Central Committee in January 1908 functioned as part of 8 people, of which three were Bolsheviks (Rozhkov, Goldenberg-Meshkovsky and Zinoviev), two were Mensheviks (B.I. Goldman ["Igor"] and M.I. Broido ["Yakov ", aka "Ro-mul"]) and one each from the Polish Social Democrats - A. Vershavsky (A. Varsky), from the Bund - Liber (M. I. Goldman) and from the Latvian Social Democracy - - Danishevsky

("Herman"). Since Varsky's behavior on the question of expropriations was vacillating and in the ranks of the Bolsheviks themselves there was no firm confidence in the possibility of fully defending the activities of the "board of three" (Rozhkov was especially hesitant on this issue at that time), and since, on the other hand, Lieber, just then very close to the Mensheviks, in questions of expropriations he completely went with the latter, then very often the voice of Danishevsky ("Herman"), who declared himself "non-factional" and "conciliator," acquired decisive importance, voting in a way that, in his opinion, demanded by the interests of the party. Often it was his voice that made decisions unfavorable to the Bolsheviks. And it was precisely the latter who put into circulation the joke about the "Germanization" of the Central Committee, which is carried out by its votes "Herman"<sup>76</sup>.

This composition of the Central Committee delegation, which guaranteed the objectivity of its examination, predetermined its position. Its attitude to the split carried out by Stalin in Baku can be judged by the fact that the Bolshevik conference in Baku in March 1908 appealed to the Central Committee "with a protest against the actions of its members, who used the name of the central institution not for unification and reconciliation, but for

narrow factional goals"<sup>77</sup>. And its attitude to the Tiflis expropriation is evidenced by the official announcement of the presence of both of its members at the meetings of the Fifth Ordinary Congress of the Transcaucasian organizations of the RSDLP, which, after hearing the report of the Committee on the

investigation carried out in connection with the Tiflis expropriation, adopted a resolution on "the exclusion from the organization of members party or groups of members who, since the London Congress, have taken part in expropriations, both personally and by conscious assistance in one form or another. or else declare their disagreement with this. It was easy for them to do this, since such a

statement would have been willingly published by Proletary. But not only N. N. Zhordania, but also Danishevsky did not do this, and this gives the right to believe that the latter was I agree with the above decision of the Transcaucasian Congress, in any case,

at its base.

The minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee, at which this delegation, upon returning from the Caucasus, made its report, are at our disposal.

not available, but it can be considered undoubted that this report caused strong discontent on the part of the Bolsheviks and was the cause of acute friction within the Central Committee. The essence of the decision adopted by the Central Committee can be judged by the following three facts that were connected with it.

The first was the publication by the Central Committee of a special statement in the press on the case of the Tiflis expropriation; this statement read:

"The Central Committee declares that the RSDLP can in no case be held responsible for the Tiflis expropriation, as well as for other expropriations. At the last party congress a resolution was adopted categorically prohibiting expropriations. party, then the party will take the most energetic measures against the guilty, in accordance with the resolution of the congress. The second was the protest of the Transcaucasian Committee against the decision of the Central Committee and the publication by it of a special leaflet in which the

Transcaucasian Committee accused the Central Committee of trying to delay the investigation of the Tiflis expropriation case.



Finally, the third was the withdrawal from the Central Committee of one of the two Mensheviks, who were then members of the Central Committee, with protests against the decision taken by the Central Committee on the case of the Tiflis expropriation, since this decision was affected by

the "system of obscuring" this case<sup>81</sup>. From a comparison of these three facts, it follows that the Central Committee at this meeting refused to approve the report of its delegation, canceled the decision taken by the Transcaucasian Congress, and adopted some kind of decision on an additional or verification investigation, which was never carried out. The text of the statement for the press, which outwardly sounded very resolute, in essence, in the situation at that time, was a simple cover for the Central Committee's hesitation to take any real step to fight the Bolshevik expropriators. In fact, the investigation

carried out by the Regional Committee of Transcaucasian Organizations established exactly the composition of the group that was the physical executor of the act of expropriation; the names of the persons who were her patrons and harborers before the party organization were clarified, as well as the fact of sending money to the BC. The accuracy of the data collected then is now indisputable: now they are confirmed by documents and memoirs published by historians. True, the threads that stretched from Tiflis, from the group of Kamo Petrosyan, to the BC and its leaders - to Lenin, Bogdanov and Krasin in their conspiratorial center in Kuokkala, remained unclear at that time. The entire group of questions related to the expropriator center of the Bolshevik faction remained unexplained. All these questions could really be clarified only by an investigation carried out by the Central Committee, if it wished to seriously investigate the role of the BC in the expropriations. But in order to investigate this group of questions, it was necessary not to cancel the decision of the Transcaucasian Congress, but, on the contrary, by approving it, to show the firm desire of the Central Committee to put an end to the existing evil. It was precisely this desire that the Central Committee did not have.

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In the emigration, which was more fully aware of the events connected, on the one hand, with the arrests of Kamo-Petrosyan in Berlin, and, on the other hand, with the history of attempts to exchange Tiflis five hundred rubles abroad, the struggle over these disputes is not only

took a more acute form, but also touched upon the main problems of social democratic construction. Sharp

indignation reigned in Menshevik circles. The role of Litvinov in the technical apparatus of the Bolshevik faction (purchasing weapons abroad, etc.) was widely known, and his current arrest with the Tiflis five soruble-kami proved the involvement of this apparatus in the expropriation of June 25, 1907. Uncertain information about the existence of a secret Bolshevik center, which is in charge of all their military enterprises, existed before. Now it became indisputable not only the existence of such a center, not only its role as an organizer of expropriations in general, but also the fact that it organized expropriations after the London Congress, which banned expropriations by a huge majority of votes. Based on this decision, official representatives of the party categorically denied her involvement in such acts; and at the same time, as it now turned out, the leaders of the faction, which played a decisive role in the general Party Central Committee, carried out such expropriations behind the Party's back. A situation absolutely impossible for the Party was created. "A group of inspirers, organizers and conniving at expropriation," wrote Golos Sotsial'

demokrata, the Menshevik organ, "sinks the party's prestige, discredits it in the eyes of public opinion and the proletarian parties." But this was not the end of the matter. The result of the expropriation was the formation within the party of an "unknown group" secreted from the party

and uncontrolled even by party public opinion, in whose hands are accumulated "significant funds obtained in a way forbidden by the party", and which "distributes this money at its own discretion", rendering those thereby influencing the policy of the party in the direction desired by this group. "If all this is true," concluded Golos Sotsial' demokrata, "and this, unfortunately, is exactly the case, then it means that something like the Camorra exists within the Party, a conspiratorial organization of the most harmful type, something in between a secret the central committee and a group of contractors of the bandit business".

The most implacable attitude towards the Bolsheviks in the Menshevik camp at that time was Plekhanov, who directly raised the question of the need for an official break with the Bolsheviks. As already noted above, while still in London, he protested against the congress's too soft attitude towards the expropriatory adventures of the Bolsheviks. Now he insisted on posing the question point-blank.

"Have you read about the Berlin story?" he wrote to Martov as early as December 9, 1907, immediately after receiving the first reports of the arrest of Kamo-Petrosyan. I ask you to write to me, what do you think about this? Later, after the arrest of Litvinov and others, when the full significance of these

events became clear, Plekhanov suggested that the Menshevik leaders abroad appeal to the Mensheviks in Russia, "CLICK THE CRY" WITH THE CALL TO UNITE TO START FOR THE SAKE OF

social democratic principles above of Bolshevik Bakuninism". He believed that there was every chance of success in this struggle, with one obligatory condition:

"Only one must, of course, speak to the end and renounce that fear of the Bolshevik Marya Alekseevna, which has always distinguished the Mensheviks and which has never been the beginning of wisdom. The beginning of wisdom is exactly the reverse behavior, complete fearlessness."<sup>84</sup> For

Plekhanov, in this last case, it was a merciless criticism of the Bolsheviks, not only for expropriations. "Bolshevik Bakuninism" he called their entire course of insurrection, all their tactics of "outburst"<sup>85</sup>, and considered it necessary in this struggle to go to the most extreme conclusions, without stopping

before the formal rupture of organizational ties. Among the other representatives of the leading group of Mensheviks abroad, the mood was different. Martov stood closest to Plekhanov on this question; but, of course, the differences concerned only the question of forms and organizational conclusions: the need for the most resolute struggle against the expropriator epic was recognized by everyone without exception. The situation was extremely tense.

The decision of the Central Committee to transfer the investigation of this whole matter into the hands of the Central Bureau of Foreign Affairs (CZB) to some extent defuse this tension: since the CZB had an overwhelming majority of Mensheviks (five Mensheviks against two Bolsheviks)<sup>86</sup>, confidence was created in the possibility of revealing the truth along the way. internal party legitimacy. The huge majority that was created at the London Congress against expropriation seemed to give a guarantee that the same majority would be in the Central Committee for taking the necessary measures against the Bolsheviks who violated this resolution.

G. V. Chicherin took over the main work of the investigation. From the very beginning, the Bolsheviks put up all sorts of obstacles to the investigation. The larger ones, in view of their position in the party, usually refused to give any kind of explanation: at that time they claimed that they had received such a directive from the leaders of the faction. Others gave evasive and apparently incomplete explanations. But the mood of a wide range of sympathizers was favorable for the investigation. The Germans also willingly testified - it was with their help that it was established that Krasin personally ordered the paper for printing fake three-rouble notes. The role of the latter was generally outlined with sufficient completeness. There were indications regarding the role of Bogdanov. Of the "board of three," only Lenin remained outside the field of view of the investigation: he was more prudent than all the others.

The Bolsheviks who were part of the TsZB, that is, Aleksinsky and Zhitomirsky, sabotaged the investigation from the very beginning from within the TsZB. Later, when the investigation passed entirely into the hands of the Bolsheviks, Zhitomirsky told in his testimony how they did it:

"The atmosphere was factional, it was necessary to hide a lot from the comrades and the Mensheviks (because the Mensheviks carried out agitation against the Bolsheviks) and hide even from the Bolsheviks and from Kohn, because his sympathies were on the side of the Mensheviks. For example, the paper got to the warehouse through a well-known comrade "But we didn't tell Kohn this. I didn't know this myself, and when I even found out, I didn't tell Kohn, knowing Kohn's Menshevik sympathies, I was afraid that it would become popular throughout the party."

Aleksinsky, who at that time was especially close to Lenin, waged a particularly vicious campaign against the TsZB and the nature of its investigation. In a series of letters to the Central Committee, Aleksinsky argued that the matter was of a factional nature and that the majority of the members of the Central Armed Forces, as Mensheviks, were not only a party to this matter, but also that, due to their Party experience, they were not competent enough to sort out those Party secrets that they become known to them in the course of the investigation; he especially insisted on the non-conspiracy of the order of investigation, which was instituted by the TsZB and which, in his opinion, made it possible to reveal these secrets to the tsarist police. The fact that the latter learned about all these secrets through none other than the second representative of the Bolsheviks in the TsZB, Zhytomyr, became

known only much later.

Despite all the insistence of Aleksinsky, the Central Committee, which operated in Russia, continued to confirm the authority of the TsZB. True, at a meeting on April 1, 1908, after hearing a letter of protest from Aleksinsky ("Comrade Peter"), the Central Committee made the following decision: that the Central Committee received a complaint testifying to the non-conspiratorial conduct of the case, and that in view of this the question arose whether it would not be desirable to set up a special commission to conduct this case, subject to all conditions guaranteeing the impartiality of the investigation"<sup>88</sup>. But this proposal, accepted at the insistence of the Bolshevik members of the Central Committee, was not supported by the national Social Democratic organizations, whose

representatives in the Central Committee then played a decisive role. This is evidenced by a private letter from L. Tyshko to Aleksinsky dated April 11, 1908, which gives reasons for his refusal to support Aleksinsky's proposal to remove the TsZB from the investigation.

"Here, in a few words, is my opinion about your conflict in the Bureau over the investigation," we read in this letter. "I fully understand your position psychologically, but politically, in my opinion, it is untenable and can harm the party. i.e. the Central Committee and the party, it is necessary to crush the head of the hydra of insinuations, slander,

whispers and gossip that surround this case. There are comrades who want to make political capital out of this and make it an arena for factional struggle. Therefore, it is precisely the participation of the Bureau in the investigation that is necessary, since the Bureau in part represents the circles of the most ardent accusers. The participation of the Bureau will best give the Central Committee the opportunity to "spoil the game" for some comrades who wish to fish in troubled waters. Compared to this consideration, all others are secondary. The party spirit and factionalism of the investigation are not terrible, I do not consider

I conceal myself as a Party member, and besides me, there would be another comrade whom you would hardly consider a Party member. Finally, the accused comrade, if at the end of the investigation he considered it necessary, could demand an additional investigation, but, in essence, it would not come to that at all. More importantly, non-conspiracy, but you won't keep secrets anyway, but on the contrary, by eliminating the Bureau, you will only give new food

for gossip on the sidelines and create a lot of myths. that he and his friends, even at that time, were not yet convinced that the leaders of the Bolshevik faction had nothing to do with the Tiflis expropriation and that accusations of this kind were dictated by the desire of the opponents of the Bolsheviks "to fish in troubled waters." How did they coordinate this confidence with absolutely indisputably established facts, which they could not have been unaware of from the modern press, are now almost impossible to understand. But since they were sure that the accusations leveled against the leaders of the Bolshevik faction were incorrect, since the position of Tyszko, who proved the need to involve the Central Security Bureau in the conduct of the investigation, was, of course, indisputable: it was precisely this path that was the most correct in order to "crush the head of the hydra of insinuations, slander," etc. But now we know that this confidence was completely wrong, that the reality was much worse than

even thought the most extreme accusers from the Menshevik camp, and that a more or less objective investigation should not have "crushed the head of the hydra" of slander, but, on the contrary, should have revealed what kind of game the Bolsheviks were playing behind the back of the party and at its expense. Aleksinsky knew this, and especially well

those who stood behind him, that is, Lenin and Bogdanov, knew. They could not but understand that the discovery of the truth would hopelessly compromise both their faction and them personally, and they made every effort to prevent such a discovery. They needed to disrupt the investigation at all costs, and to do this, first of all, wrest it from the hands of the Central Security Bureau.

This struggle as a united front of the entire Bolshevik faction for the disruption of the investigation of the Tiflis expropriation case was intertwined with a complex struggle within this faction, where the process of separating a new grouping of pure Leninists from the old Bolshevik bloc, as it had developed during the years of the first revolution, began. This separation marked at the same time the beginning of a new stage in the development of the great concepts of Lenin, who, in the very first days of his second emigration, had to keenly feel the attitude of foreign socialists towards the expropriatory adventures of the Bolsheviks. In connection with the attempts to exchange Tiflis five-hundred-

ruble bills in Geneva, Dr. N. A. Semashko was then arrested, who played a significant role in the emigration of subsequent years as a devoted Leninist under the pseudonym N. Alexandrov, and after the revolution became People's Commissar of Health. He had no direct relation to the exchange - his arrest was caused by the fact that one of the participants in the exchange received letters to his address. Semashko was a distant relative of Plekhanov, to whom Semashko's wife turned for help. Plekhanov, an old-timer from Geneva, had wide acquaintances there, and, as Semashko later wrote, "his one word was enough to clear up the misunderstanding." Nevertheless, Plekhanov refused to help. "Well, well," he replied, "with whom you will lead, you will gain from that"90. Then Lenin tried to intervene in the matter, who turned to a familiar socialist deputy. Usually, the latter did not refuse help to emigrants, especially when a well-known socialist, a member of

the Bureau of the Socialist International, such as Lenin was then, applied. But now Lenin ran into a refusal.

"I remember," recalls Krupskaya, who told about this episode, "in what half-surprised, half-contemptuous tone Ilyich conveyed the words of the Swiss deputy, who said that they

the republic has existed for hundreds of years, and it cannot allow the violation of the right of property."

This presentation by Krupskaya is undoubtedly not entirely accurate: the Swiss socialist deputy, whose program included the item on the socialization of the instruments of production, of course, did not defend the inviolability of the right to property in general. He did not deny the possibility of alienating this property by way of legislative measures, as the program of his own party spoke of, but was against the "violation of property rights" in the form of robberies of the type that, according to Lenin's directive, was committed on Erivan Square in Tiflis. The difference between these two types of "violation of property rights" could not but be clear not only to Lenin, but also to Krupskaya. All the more interesting is her account of the impression made on Lenin by this conversation of his with a Swiss socialist. "The struggle for a democratic republic was the point of

our then program, the bourgeois democratic republic began to emerge especially brightly for Ilyich now as a more refined than tsarism, but still an undoubted instrument for the enslavement of the working masses. The organization of power in a democratic republic in every way contributed to the fact that all life through I think," adds Krupskaya in conclusion, "if he had not survived the revolution of 1905, had not survived the second emigration, Ilyich

would not have been able to write his book *The State and the Revolution*. The impression made on Lenin by the refusal of a Swiss socialist deputy to help a Bolshevik who was

arrested in connection with attempts to exchange the Tiflis five-hundred-ruble notes. In her memoirs, she was misunderstood. Concepts, it nevertheless accurately captures the shades of his moods. That is why her



remarks about the conversation with the Swiss socialist are of particular interest.

The path of Lenin's political development was very difficult. Elements of Russian originality were firmly embedded in the attitude of the young Lenin. The idea of a minimum program, an important link in which was the demand for a "bourgeois democratic republic," was central to the entire grand conception of Russia's development paths from the very moment the "Emancipation of Labor Group," the founder of Russian social democracy, arose. Lenin did not come to this concept, which completely rejected Russian originality, at once. He accepted it not without great internal resistance. Only after his first trip abroad in 1895 and personal meetings with Plekhanov and Axelrod did Lenin fully accept it. And from that moment on, it was good or bad, another question, that determined the boundaries of his political searches.

But an important element in this concept was the ability to respect the significance of what the Russian revolutionary rebels of earlier eras so willingly called the "gray everyday life" of the labor movement of the West - the ability to appreciate the calm "prose" of the mass movement in comparison with the seeming "poetry" of the heroic blows of individual personalities. . From the memoirs of the same Krupskaya, we know that Lenin did not have a real understanding of these features of the working-class movement in the West even before, but if we compare his statements about this movement before 1905 with statements after 1908, then we can easily see that the

observation Krupskaya is quite correct. Theoretically, even after the first Russian revolution, Lenin remained for a number of years on the basis of the old concept of development, defended the idea of a minimum program, and even put forward the slogan of a "bourgeois democratic

republic" with particular perseverance - he officially leaves these positions only at the very end of emigration, only completely on the eve of the revolution of February 1917. But from the very beginning of his second emigration, he begins to look more and more haughtily on the European working-class movement in general and on the leaders of the socialist parties of the West in particular,

in a semi-contemptuous tone," which Krupskaya first noticed in him after his conversation with a Swiss socialist deputy. The significance of this story by

Krupskaya is all the more important: it shows that the beginning of Lenin's psychological break with the labor movement in the West was in direct connection with the expropriator epic BC 1906-1907 that this break grew out of the clashes that Lenin then had with the socialists of the West, who considered this kind of activity unacceptable. But this psychological break with the working-class movement of the West was the starting point of the whole great process of Lenin's development from the old minimalist concepts "Labor Emancipation Groups" to the new maximalist concepts of October 1917 - to pure Leninism.

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Krupskaya is right when she says that "without surviving the revolution of 1905, without surviving the second emigration, Ilyich could not have written his book *State and Revolution*." This formula only needs to be concretized, putting in place of indefinite algebraic signs concrete arithmetic values, which are given by the same Krupskaya: this character of Lenin's development was influenced not by the revolution of 1905 as a whole, but by the epic of "partisan performances" organized by the BC; the last, decisive impetus for it was given not by the "second emigration" in general, but by the clash with the European socialists in connection with the attempts to exchange the Tiflis five hundred rubles. Both the theory ("*State and Revolution*") and the practice of Lenin in 1917 were a direct

offspring of the theory and practice of the "board of three" of 1906-1907. Such is the great political result of the activity of the BC in 1906-1907.

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It is necessary to emphasize now, and with all perseverance, that this great conclusion from the experience of Bolshevik activity in 1906-1907. Lenin began to be revealed in the press far from immediately. It is possible that he himself realized it only gradually. All the more valuable is Krupskaya's story, which makes the historian alert and notice in Lenin's words and deeds those elements of his new conception that begin to break through to the surface here and there.

However strong the impression of the conversation with the Swiss socialist, however great the indignation against the latter, Lenin did not go ahead against these sentiments, as he often did in internal Russian disputes. He did not get involved in an open struggle to defend those aspects of the Bolshevik policy of the revolutionary years that passed along the line - the "board of three". Undoubtedly, he understood the impossibility of a political defense of an activity in which there were so many non-political admixtures. Only this can explain the fact that he not only consciously abandoned attempts to defend her, but also clearly made it his task to evade political responsibility for her activities. In any case, not only did he never speak out on these issues in the press, but also at closed party meetings, at conferences and at plenums of the Central Committee, when the debates approached these delicate topics, Lenin, under one pretext or another, transferred the "honor" of responsible speeches to others, making every effort to ensure that outside observers get the impression that the initiative role in this kind of activity did not belong to him and that he only went along with his colleagues out of factional solidarity. It is no coincidence that at the plenums of 1908-1910, when accusations of direct involvement in expropriatory adventures were directly or indirectly brought against a number of leaders of the Bolshevik faction, as far as we know, such accusations were never thrown against Lenin personally, although, as now it is documented that his direct participation in the leading activities of this kind was very great. He knew how to hide his tracks. A little later, in the autumn of 1908, Lenin outwardly even joined the ranks of party leaders who fought against the

expropriator epidemic and began a campaign in Proletary to expose the harmful influence of "exism" on workers' organizations. True, the fire of its criticism in Proletary focused exclusively on the expropriations of anarchist or especially "Lbov"<sup>92</sup>, whose members openly acted as non-Party combat detachments (although the latter had left the Bolshevik squads and maintained friendly relations with them to the end). The activities of purely Bolshevik party squads, for example, the Southern Urals (mainly the Ufa region), created

the Kadomtsev brothers,<sup>93</sup> who were the true promoters of "exism" in the Urals, and even more so the activities of the "Caucasian group" of Kamo-Petrosyan, who played the same role in Transcaucasia on the pages of Proletary and all publications in general edited by Lenin, coverage, of course, did not find.

Viewed from this angle, the activities of Lenin at that time were objectively nothing more than an attempt to get out of the impasse into which the Bolshevik faction had been led by the

activities of the "board of three" by shifting political responsibility to others for those acts in which he took a decisive part. Lenin himself. It is from this point of view that the split within the BC, which was carried out by Lenin in 1908-1909, should be considered.

The ideological and political platform for this split was chosen by Lenin with precise calculation and "with a premeditated intention" to show the world that he is breaking with that wing of Bolshevism, which combines the desire for a philosophical revision of Marxism in the field of theory with a stubborn desire to preserve the boycottist and adventurist elements of the old Bolshevik tactics 1905-1907 Lenin, of course, knew well what he was doing, and basically this platform really correctly singles out the most characteristic elements of the position of that group of yesterday's closest associates of Lenin, from whom he sought to dissociate himself, and to lay responsibility for the aspects of their recent common activity that were inconvenient for him. he set as his task. The only thing that did not correspond to the truth was Lenin's desire to obscure in every possible way his own active role in the creation and application in practice of this old Bolshevik tactic, his attempts to resign himself responsible for what he did, placing it exclusively on others, who in many ways were only his students and followers. This showed that in all this Leninist split the aim was not a real revision of the old Bolshevik tactics, but only a tactical maneuver in order to keep oneself out of the blow by directing this latter on others, and to preserve for oneself the possibility of even more shameless maneuvers in the future.

But ideological and political questions by no means exhausted the content of the great game that was then waged by

Lenin. At the forefront there were disputes about "Machs and Avenarius", articles were published refuting the arguments of the "boycottists" and "otzovists", etc., and behind the scenes there was a fierce struggle for influence in the BC, which, translated into the language of the real balance of power struggle for the right to dispose of the secret capital of the Bolshevik faction. And it is only against the backdrop of this last struggle that many riddles become clear that lead the researcher astray, operating with materials on the only ideological and political conflict open to the outside world between Lenin and the group of Bogdanov, Krasin, Lunacharsky and others. ", she is also a "financial group ", undoubtedly

took place already in the first days after Lenin's arrival in Geneva: then the first meeting of the members of this collegium took place abroad, and during it the question of the situation that had arisen in As a result of the latest failures, attempts to exchange Tiflis five-hundred-ruble notes, on the one hand, and attempts to

issue counterfeit three-ruble notes, on the other. In both of these attempts, if you approach them from a purely business point of view, there was so much presumptuous adventurism and ill-conceivedness that Lenin - a man of a deadly practical grip - could not fail to notice this. It is very likely that it was during these days that Lenin first saw Krasin in a light that was new to him—as "a master of giving promises and rubbing glasses."<sup>95</sup>

And there is no doubt that it was precisely at this moment that Lenin had to come out - he could not help but come out - against the proposal of risky adventures, especially abroad. Of course, not because he now went over to the camp of principled opponents of such adventurism, but simply because now he had to see more clearly and more concretely all the dangers associated with it, on the one hand, and could not help but lose his former almost unlimited confidence in lucky star of their main initiator, on the other.

In particular, there is no doubt that it was Lenin who at that time should have insisted on the cessation of all further attempts to exchange the Tiflis five hundred rubles. This last conclusion is supported by the following considerations. In January 1908, during arrests during attempts to exchange, about 50 such tickets fell into the hands of the police.

The organizers had at least 150 left in their hands. It is known that both Krasin and Bogdanov were optimistic about the possibility of success of new attempts in this direction, and later, indeed, both of them made such attempts. Bogdanov organized an attempt to exchange them in North America. But this attempt ended in failure. Krasin went the other way: after a series of complex experiments, he managed to "correct" the numbers of five-hundred-rouble notes so completely that he sold a technically certain number of these tickets, despite the fact that by that time all banks in the world had already installed the strictest control over Russian five-hundred-ruble bills<sup>96</sup>. Thus, out of that "board of three" which in 1907 concluded an agreement with the "Caucasian group" of Kamo and which therefore considered itself entitled to dispose of the

sums obtained during the expropriation in Tiflis, only Lenin after January 1908 had no relation to attempts to sell the surviving five hundred rubles. There is also no doubt that it was Lenin who dictated the decision of the BC of June 1909 (after the removal of Bogdanov, Krasin and their supporters), which contained the statement that the BC "has nothing to do with this money"; as well as. there is no doubt that not without his approval, after the January plenum of the Central Committee, the burning of all those five-hundred-ruble bills that by that time the Leninist BC was able to collect<sup>97</sup> was carried out. In other words: Lenin not only did not take part in the later attempts to exchange five hundred rubles,

but was also

in the camp of those who fought against the renewal of attempts at such an exchange.

In the light of these facts, one can hardly doubt that already from the first meeting of the "board of three," that is, from the end of January or the beginning of February 1908, Lenin began to fight against attempts to further use the Tiflis five-hundred-ruble notes; and there are many reasons to believe that the disputes on this very issue were the cause of the appearance of the first deep crack in personal relations between Lenin, on the one hand, Bogdanov and Krasin, on the other, a crack that grew the faster, the clearer the difficulties became for Lenin, that arose for his political

work as a result of exposing the expropriatory adventures of the recent past. To an outside observer it might

have seemed at the time that this split within the "board of three" aggravated Lenin's position. In the second emigration, he went with relatively large plans, as literary, publishing, party and political activities. Proletary was to become a regular weekly with a literary department headed by Gorky. When these plans were being made in Finland, the condition of the BC cash desk seemed to be very stable (only shortly before this cash desk received 150,000 rubles seized during the Tiflis expropriation in small denominations); the prospects are very encouraging. The disappointment was all the more difficult when, already in February-March, crisis symptoms began to emerge. As early as March, a note of complaint about financial difficulties began to sound as a constant in Lenin's letters. The arrest of Krasin in Finland (March 22, 1908), despite his imminent release<sup>98</sup>, of course, greatly worsened the situation, especially since it was more difficult for him to mobilize his financial connections from emigration, where Krasin was forced to go. However, Krasin's sources of legal income began to dry up long ago. In April, interruptions begin with the regular release of Proletary. In a letter from Lenin to Gorky dated April 19, a completely alarming signal: "They are howling in Russia from lack of money ..."

In this whole picture, as it emerges from Lenin's correspondence and other documents, one point is the least understood: despite this impending financial crisis, Lenin, who usually well understood the importance of the financial base for the success of political work and often made compromises in order to ensure this base, this time he absolutely adamantly headed for a break with Bogdanov - of course, perfectly understanding that this would be at the same time a break not only with Krasin, i.e., the Minister of Finance of the BC, but also with Gorky, whom Lenin highly valued and cooperation with which he highly valued, and with many other prominent representatives of the "old guard" of Bolshevism. The reason for this extreme intransigence of Lenin will be fully understood only after we have established that precisely at this

At that time, Lenin's new allies, who replaced the old Bolsheviks such as Bogdanov and Krasin, were finishing work in Moscow on the implementation of the first part of Schmitt's legacy, which was supposed to bring about 190 thousand rubles to the BC box office. in a completely full-fledged currency that does not require any risk when exchanging. Lenin was aware of this work - both from Shesternin, who acted in Moscow as a trusted person of the official heiress, and from Taratuta, who, together with his wife, this heiress, was waiting for money in Paris. The danger of disrupting this operation was negligible: Shesternin was a completely reliable person, personally connected with Lenin; Taratuta was now firmly attached to the latter. Under these

conditions, the elimination of the conflict with Bogdanov and Krasin did not improve, but, on the contrary, would greatly worsen the situation: if an agreement with Bogdanov and Krasin had been reached, the BC would undoubtedly restore Krasin's financial dictatorship under the supervision of the "board of three"; it was in these hands that Schmitt's capital would then pass; the continuation and aggravation of the conflict created an interregnum at the top of the Bolshevik faction, which was extremely beneficial to Lenin, since he had a majority in the editorial board of Proletary, on the one hand, and received actual control over Schmitt's legacy, on the other. True, the

demands for an agreement were becoming more and more insistent on all sides. "Restoration of the unity of the Bolshevik faction" was demanded at that moment not only by the Bolshevik groups in exile; not only the leading group of Bolshevik writers, which at that time Gorky gathered to himself on Capri, who took the split at that time to heart and stood completely on the side of Bogdanov and Krasin; in the same sense, "Petersburg friends"<sup>99</sup> also wrote to Lenin, under such a pseudonym, undoubtedly, the members of the BC, who were in St. Petersburg, headed by Rozhkov, Goldenberg-Meshkovsky, Lindov, and others, appeared. they were obligated to only one thing: it was necessary to carry out the desired and even necessary split in such a way that outwardly the responsibility for it fell not on him, but on opponents. He had extensive experience in this area, he was quite confident in his abilities. The course towards a split was taken abruptly, although it was disguised with falsely peaceful phrases.



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On the twentieth of May 1908, Lenin received a message that the first part of Schmitt's legacy is implemented, all documents issued and Shesternin travels with them from Moscow to Paris for their presentation to the formal heiress. I had to hurry

By chance, this coincided in time with Bogdanov's big essay on "the adventures of a certain philosophical school", which was scheduled for May 28 in Geneva: Bogdanov was going to criticize Plekhanov at it ... This was perfectly into Lenin's hands. Formally, according to the agreement that was in force in the editorial office of Proletary, Bogdanov had all the rights to such a speech. But, of course, it created an equally undoubted right for any member of the editorial board to counter-speak. And between these "other" members of the editorial board, between Lenin and Dubrovinsky, there has long been complete unanimity on this issue. "Both the one and the other," Krupskaya recalls, "highly appreciated Plekhanov ... Both of them believed that Plekhanov was right in the field of philosophy, and believed that in the field of philosophical questions it was necessary to strongly fence off Bogdanov, that now the struggle on the philosophical front has taken on special significance. From the very beginning of the second emigration,

Lenin cultivated Dubrovinsky in this direction, in which, from 1903-1904. there were "conciliatory" moods - the desire to build a bridge for rapprochement with the Mensheviks and restore party unity. Lenin took advantage of this mood for his own purposes, turning Dubrovinsky into a battering ram for crushing the ties that maintain the unity of the Bolshevik faction. "Ilyich saw that no one understands him so well, from a half-word, as Innokenty. Innokenty came to dine with us, and for a long time after dinner they thought over plans for work, discussed the situation that had arisen. infected Innocent with his "philosophical binge," as he put it.

When he considered it necessary, and when it was a question of a useful person, Lenin knew how to disregard time, to firmly hammer his thoughts into the heads of his interlocutors, to bind them firmly to himself. For those years, Dubrovinsky became Lenin's most useful assistant. True, he did not completely abandon his

own assessments, from their special shades in approaches to issues and people. But in that period, in 1908-1910, it was even useful to Lenin: with his reputation as an "old conciliator," Dubrovinsky had access to places where a person with a reputation as an "irreconcilable Bolshevik" could not penetrate. Basically, he worked in the direction that was then especially beneficial to Lenin. It was this that made the latter cherish him, diligently and carefully hammering his plans into his head and concepts.

With these relations, it was easy for Lenin to come to terms with Dubrovinsky on the question of speaking out against Bogdanov. Dubrovinsky agreed to take over this speech: Lenin sketched out the theses that should be followed, and around May 25 he set off: first to Paris to consolidate his influence on the fate of Schmitt's capital, and then to London to work at the British Museum on with his philosophical book against Bogdanov, which was already widely known in the circles of the Bolshevik emigration and talk about which more than once covered up completely non-philosophical aspects of Lenin's activities.

Lenin's calculation turned out to be quite correct. The speech of Dubrovinsky, who sharply attacked Bogdanov in his own name and on behalf of Lenin, in the circles of the Bolshevik emigration, which was not privy to the details of behind-the-scenes relations, made the impression of a bombshell and gave the first impetus to isolate the faithful "Leninists" from the "Bogdanovites": Lenin this isolation itself was beneficial, and especially the fact that it took place in his absence, and therefore did not require loss of time. Even more beneficial for him was the reaction of

Bogdanov, who, in the form of a protest against Dubrovinsky's speech, announced his resignation from the editorial office of Proletary, which Lenin and Dubrovinsky hurried to take advantage of, under the pretext of a lack of literary forces, immediately co-opted Zinoviev's editorial office. The latter, who had lived in St. Petersburg until April and was a member of the collegium of the Central Committee there, was Lenin in advance, back in late April or early May, summoned to Geneva under the pretext of a lack of literary forces in Proletary, and now firmly took the place of secretary of the editorial board.

Bogdanov, apparently believing that, due to his former position in the BC, it would be impossible to remove him from the editorial board, over the next months he negotiated his return to the editorial office, but Lenin and Dubrovinsky conducted these negotiations in such a way that the return became less and less possible. .

As a result, a meeting of members of the BC, held in August 1908, authorized Bogdanov's "voluntary" withdrawal from the editorial board, replenishing it with a Muscovite Shantser ("Marat"), who, however, was an opponent of Lenin (especially in matters of organizational policy), but did not occupy combat position; in philosophical matters he did not share the views of Bogdanov and, due to illness, was generally not very active. All this made him a very accommodating representative of the opposition in the editorial board, who considered himself a minority, while Bogdanov, at every opportunity and inconvenience, emphasized that the Bolshevik

Some delegation at the last broad general party conference (August 1907) elected him, and not Lenin, as a speaker to defend the tactics that they considered correct (boycott of the Third State Duma). But this representative of the opposition appeared in the editorial office only in September 1908, and during the three decisive summer months, when the meeting of the members of the BC and the plenum of the Central Committee were prepared and held, the editorial board of Proletary, which was then the only formal representation of the BC abroad, consisted precisely only from Lenin and his reliable allies, Dubrovinsky and Zinoviev.

Having collected full notebooks of excerpts from the works of philosophers in the British Museum (these notebooks were printed in Lenin's collections), as well as having successfully completed business with Schmitt's capital, at the end of June Lenin returned to Geneva. The first wave of stormy indignation and sharp conversations caused by Dubrovinsky's speech against Bogdanov had already become a thing of the past by this time. It was possible to take up the organizational consolidation of new relations. In addition to Zinoviev, Lenin summoned Vorovsky from Odessa to work in Proletariat. At the same time, at the persuasion of Lenin, Taratuta moved to Geneva. About the latter, Krupskaya cautiously writes that he "began to help in economic affairs and corresponded with other centers abroad as secretary of the Foreign Bureau of th

"102. This definition is not entirely accurate: the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee was created only later, at the plenum of the Central Committee at the end of August; Taratuta was not included in its composition either then or later. But the economic affairs of the BC were actually transferred into his hands from the very beginning almost completely (this was formalized in August), and he generally became one of Lenin's closest and most

trusted collaborators, especially in preparing and holding upcoming meetings. V. V. Vorovsky, whom Lenin especially cherished as a literary force, refused to come. A second letter was published to him with an attempt to persuade Lenin to still work for the "Proletary" and come at least only to the conference. In it, Lenin gave an interesting characterization of the then situation in the way he wanted to paint it to people whose cooperation he valued. It is dated July 1, 1908, i.e., a few days after Lenin's return to Geneva:

"We have a difficult situation," we read in this letter, "a split with Bogdanov is imminent. The true reason is resentment at criticism in abstracts (by no means in the editorial office). Now Bogdanov is looking for all sorts of disagreements. I brought God's boycott into the light, together with Aleksinsky, who scandalously recklessly and with whom I was forced to break off all relations. They are building a split on empirio-monist-boycott grounds. The case will blow quickly. A fight at the next conference is inevitable. Rascal is highly probable.

I will withdraw from the faction as soon as the line of "left" and true "boycottism" takes over. I called you, thinking that your quick arrival would help calm me down. In August of the new style, we certainly count on you as a participant in the conference. Be sure to arrange so that they can go abroad. We will send money for the trip to all the Bolsheviks. In the localities, let's give a slogan: give mandates only to local and active workers. We kindly ask you to write for our newspaper. We can now pay for articles and we will pay carefully.

Quite recently, Lenin argued that there were differences only on philosophical questions, which "under no circumstances should be confused ... with party affairs"; quite recently he argued that "we must carry on our factional cause as before amicably: in the policy that we have pursued and carried out for

during the revolution, none of us repented. This means that it is our duty to uphold and defend it before the Party. We can only do this all together" ( letter to Gorky dated April 19, 1908). Now the situation is changing. True,

Lenin still exposes his opponents as the initiators of the split, who allegedly "seek out all sorts of disagreements", but defend the common "party cause" Lenin now agrees only on the political platform he considers correct. He declares this openly. If his point of view does not win, he will "leave the faction". Lenin knew that Vorovsky was an opponent of the boycott, and therefore he was persuading him " be sure to "come to the conference, which in August will decide this question. "We will send money for the trip to all the Bolsheviks," he reassures and adds: "We can now pay for articles and we will pay carefully." In the last phrase is the very essence: the financial crisis is over, there is enough money, and he, Lenin, manages it.

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It was not possible to convene an all-party conference for August, as Lenin wanted. It is not even entirely clear whether concrete steps were actually taken in this direction: the arrests carried out in St. Petersburg in April-May 1908 put almost all the active figures of the Central Committee at that time out of action. True, most got off with light punishments. Only Rozhkov, who was responsible for cases in Moscow in 1905-1906, was sent there and went to Siberia to settle on trial, but Zhordania, whose signature was under the Vyborg Appeal, shared the fate of the rest of the "Vy-Borzhites". The rest got off with either administrative exile or simply expulsion from the capital. In the circumstances of previous years, such arrests would not have had a great impact on the functioning of the Central Committee, but the summer of 1908

was completely different. The general disintegration of party organizations, which began immediately after the dissolution of the Second State Duma, now took on the character of an especially mass phenomenon and came close to the central institutions of the party. Previously, these latter were surrounded by a highly branched periphery, from where it was easy to draw reserves to fill the cracks resulting from police raids. Now the raids have become more frequent, and

the blows inflicted by them, or rather, hit the target (provocation made more and more firm nests in all revolutionary organizations); and the periphery thinned out so much that it became more and more difficult to find replacements. As a result, the gaps formed

after the spring arrests turned out to be unfilled. The broken collegium of the Central Committee was not restored; and from April to autumn the Central Committee in Russia did not actually function. Of the old workers of the Central Committee, only Meshkovsky survived, who concentrated his work on the social democratic faction of the State Duma, and M. (I. Broido ("Yakov")), who, after his protest against the glossing over of the Tiflis expropriation case, however, at the insistence of friends, returned in the Central Committee, but in fact, he also completely went into the work of helping the Duma faction. And the Social Democrats, who served the Social Democratic faction of the State Duma, helping their Duma work, at that time the police did not touch: their turn came later. All

this forced Lenin to refuse to convene a conference, but helped his main task: the reorganization of the central party committee in such a way that the latter fell under the direct control of Lenin's group. Instead of a conference, a plenum of the Central Committee was convened (August 24-26, 1908). It was preceded by meetings of members of the BC, which for Lenin and for the fate of the party were at least as important as the meetings of the official plenum of the Central Committee: these meetings of the BC actually predetermined the outcome of the plenum. It was impossible to arrange

a full meeting of the BC, not only because more than a third of its members wandered through prisons and exiles. There were only 9 members of the BC abroad, but there is no exact information about them, whether they were all at the meeting in August 190, 8. This meeting, although it played a decisive role in the development of the BC, was never published anywhere at all no message, and its meaning now has to be restored from scattered remarks that come across in various sources.

In any case, it is known that out of the 9 members of the BC who were behind border in August 1908, five joined Lenin's camp

(Lenin himself, Dubrovinsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Taratuta), and four ended up in the camp of Bogdanov and Krasin (Bogdanov, Krasin, M.N. Pokrovsky and V.L. Shantser). True, not all of them were equally ready to go to extreme conclusions from the growing conflicts - to the point of agreeing to an open split. Some were marked by "conciliatory" individual moods known in viles (for example, Pokrovsky did not share the "boycottist" moods of Bogdanov, and even before 1912-1913 Kamenev was considered a "Bogdanovite" on philosophical questions). This forced Lenin to maneuver, but basically the balance of power had already been determined: Lenin had the majority. On the other hand, a terrible threat hung over both groups

in the investigation of the expropriatory activities of the BC, which was carried out by the Central Foreign Bureau under the authority of the Central Committee and which by this time had already come close to the question of the personal role of such central figures of the Bolshevik faction as Bogdanov and Krasin. An open split in the Bolshevik faction, no matter how disputes it may be formally masked, would inevitably bring to the judgment of the general party centers questions related to the real reasons for this split, and a more or less open discussion of these reasons would inevitably lead to a cruel political and organizational split of the entire Bolshevik wing of the party, to the discrediting of all its political activities, to the personal discrediting of its leaders, to whichever of the internal groupings they may belong. Of course, none of them wanted this - Lenin even less than Bogdanov. They could not break openly with each other and had to continue to drag together the heavy rattletrap of responsibility for the past. With the numerical balance of forces within the faction, this boiled down to the fact that Bogdanov, who by this time could not but begin to understand the basics of the "double bookkeeping" of Lenin's party-political game (it was Lenin who introduced this term into the literature, of course - on a different occasion), I was forced to help the latter... In such circumstances, Lenin held this meeting of the BC. His first act was the formal liquidation of the old "board of

three", "financial group", and the official assignment of the functions of managing the capital of the BC to people, wholly and completely to him

devotees. Therefore, a new "financial commission" of the BC was elected at the meeting, which included Zinoviev (the editorial board of Proletary), Krupskaya (secretary of the BC), Kotlyarenko (transport) and Taratuta (cash desk). Fifth, Zhitomirsky<sup>104</sup> was introduced to the commission, whose functions in the commission are not entirely clear (he was not a link between this commission and foreign groups, since the plenum of the Central Committee was preparing to replace the CZB with the new Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee, in which

Zhitomirsky was not scheduled, as well as later, in 1911-1912, he was not introduced into the Bolshevik Foreign Organization of the RSDLP), but who now fell into the very center of the secret work of the BC.

There are many reasons to believe that this dismissal of the old "board of three" and the election of a new "financial commission", which was a real intra-organizational coup in the BC and, moreover, carried out by such an insignificant majority, caused many sharp clashes at the meeting. There is no doubt that it was from this meeting that the struggle between Lenin, on the one hand, and Krasin and Bogdanov, on the other, began, which was accompanied by extremely heavy mutual accusations. But the true essence of which is still unknown. Police sources say that at the time Lenin's group accused Krasin of having "arbitrarily withheld 140,000 rubles" of factional money obtained from the Tiflis expropriation. These police reports deserve the most careful attention, not only because the police then had good sources of information about the internal life of BC<sup>106</sup>, but because it essentially coincides with those fragmentary indications of the causes of acute internal conflicts that are contained in documents published by historians. .

According to these latest data, this central conflict reached its peak at the beginning of 1909, and at a meeting of the Board of the BC on February 23, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Taratuta (Lenin was absent at this meeting) "brought a ready-made resolution" in which Bogdanov and Krasin "were declared appropriators of party property and slanderers" subject to exclusion from the faction<sup>107</sup>.

What exactly did these three members of the BC, who acted clearly with the consent of Lenin, see "appropriation of party property and



slander" from the documents published by historians is not visible, but it is more than plausible that it is this gap that should be filled by the police report already cited above about 140 thousand rubles, which Krasin allegedly "arbitrarily withheld" from the amounts received by the BC from Tiflis expropriation: this figure, indeed, exactly corresponds to the amount that Kamo handed over to the members of the "college of three" in Kuokkala in July or August 1907 - if from the total "income" from the said expropriation (the total amount of stolen money was then determined in official reports approximately 250 thousand rubles) exclude those 100 thousand rubles in five hundred rubles that were not suitable for sale.

This explanation, i.e., the assumption that the accusation of "appropriation of party property" brought by the Lenin group against Bogdanov and Krasin, referred to their refusal to give a new financial commission an account of spending the sums received by the BC from typhus

Lisian expropriation, is, indeed, the only possible explanation for the cause of this accusation: it could only be about such "party property", the source of which could not be named openly, but which at the same time was so large as to justify a sharp conflict between such prominent and until recently so close to each other party leaders. For the period after the London Congress, such an income to the cashier of the BC under Krasin was only one income from the Tiflis expropriation, and its transfer to the "board of three", as we now know, was bound by the obligatory condition "under no circumstances to transfer the discussion of the case on the received property to any party organization" (Kamo's statement). Both Krasin and Bogdanov (as we know from the latter's letters) considered themselves morally bound by this last obligation. In 1908-1909, when Kamo was already in German prisons and was waging an exceptionally difficult struggle there against extraditing him to Russia for trial and execution (at that time it seemed beyond doubt), any violation of this condition must have seemed to Bogdanov and Krasin especially inadmissible,<sup>108</sup> since the publicity of any behind-the-scenes details could have a harmful effect on Kamo's position.

That is why both Bogdanov and Krasin did not consider it possible to give any explanation whatsoever on the merits of the accusation leveled against them of "appropriation of party property" and were especially indignant at the behavior of Lenin, who, as the third member of the "board of three", at one time accepted participation in the conclusion of an agreement with the "Caucasian group", and now not only allowed that his closest associates (Zinoviev, Kamenev and Taratuta) demanded Bogdanov and Krasin to give them an account of the spending of these sums, but also clearly supported them, or rather even incited them to intensify aggression in this direction. For no one, of course, had a shadow of a doubt that it was enough for Lenin to say one word for the three of his faithful adjutants to refuse to attack Krasin and Bogdanov.

The severity of personal irritation of Bogdanov and Krasin against Lenin at that moment was determined by the fact that they considered his behavior personally

dishonorable. It must be added that neither Lenin nor his assistants, of course, considered Bogdanov and Krasin to be people who were capable of turning the "appropriated party property" into their personal benefit. It is characteristic that even the head of the St. Petersburg Security Department did not blame the latter for this, who, in the note of March 28, 1909 quoted above, wrote about the alleged use of this money by Krasin "for the propaganda of otzovism."

Lenin, of course, knew Bogdanov and Krasin better than General Gerasimov, head of the Security Department in St. Petersburg, whose signature was on the said note. He, undoubtedly, was also aware that Bogdanov and Krasin refused to transfer the remaining part of the Tiflis booty for party needs, since they considered it necessary to keep it for expenses related to the struggle for the life of Kamo, whom they considered a kind of nugget hero, and others. arrested participants in the expropriation. Why, under such conditions,

Lenin still allowed Zinoviev, Kamenev and Taratuta to sharpen the struggle against Bogdanov and Krasin in such a way, remains not entirely clear. Apparently, from his point of view, this was necessary in order to break up the old "board of three", that is, to create a formal justification for the formation of a new one,

completely obedient financial commission, which will receive the right to uncontrollably dispose of Schmitt's capital.

Thus, at the heart of the main conflict that blew up the "collegium of three" and aggravated internal relations in the BC in general to the extreme, lay the question of the right to dispose of the "dark money" that the BC had at its disposal.

In order to put an end to this side of the conflicts, it must be added that at that meeting of the members of the BC, which took place on June 21-30, 1909 in Paris and is known as the "Meeting of the extended editorial board of the Proletary-", an attempt was made to sum up and eliminate all conflicts, which tore apart the BC in 1908-1909. A special "conflict commission" was elected, which consisted exclusively of those members of the BC who, during the winter of 1908-1909. lived in Russia and did not personally participate in the struggle around the BC abroad. This commission included Goldenberg-Meshkovsky, Dubrovinsky and Rykov, for whose consideration the conflict within the old "board of three" was referred, and they even received for familiarization the secret correspondence between Lenin and Krasin, which not only has not yet been published, but , apparently, has not been preserved. As a result of its work, this commission proposed to the BC meeting to adopt the following resolution:

"Having become acquainted with a number of conflicts between the Bolsheviks who took part in the intra-factional struggle of recent months, the commission proposes to the expanded editorial board of Proletary: a) to recognize that these conflicts between revolutionaries, who have worked hand in hand for a long time, can by no means be put at the expense of anyone ill will, but are entirely explained by the inevitable irritation of the parties in the heated atmosphere of the factional struggle, and each of the parties was subjectively guided by ideological and party motives;

b) to demand the cessation of all arbitration and other courts, as leading to a hopeless squabble, sowing confusion and disorganization; c) call on all comrades involved in these conflicts to eliminate, as far as possible, all personal clashes through private explanations.

When analyzing this resolution, it must be borne in mind that this commission consisted only of Lenin's supporters, who shortly before that had actually thrown Bogdanov and Krasin out of the BC, who had not personally arrived at the meeting - clearly out of unwillingness to participate in the discussion of controversial issues; that for the same reasons Pokrovsky was not present at the meeting, although he disagreed with Bogdanov and Krasin politically, he supported them on internal party issues; of Lenin's opponents at the meeting at that time there was only one Shantser, who was already seriously ill. All the more revealing is this resolution and its vote. Since all

the conflicts were based on the accusation of Krasin and Bogdanov of "appropriating party property," the resolution, which did not even consider it necessary to even mention this accusation in essence, was objectively, of course, a dissociation from him, and only tried not to justify, but although would only explain the behavior of those who made this accusation by referring to the "heated atmosphere of factional struggle." Lenin, of

course, understood this meaning of the resolution and tried to protest against it. He pointed out that there was absolutely no mention of his conflict with Krasin in the report. He was supported only by Taratuta, who spoke of "the need to discuss and eliminate the conflict" with Krasin. The minutes of this BC meeting are generally extremely incomplete. They are especially brief in the transfer of debates on the reports of the conflict and revision commissions. But the attitude of the meeting to this question was already revealed in the fact that Zinoviev, immediately after Taratuta's speech, proposed closing the debate, and this proposal, despite Taratuta's objections, was accepted. The meeting, by a majority of 8 votes to one (Lenin), adopted the resolution of the commission. Lenin specified his dissatisfaction, declaring that he "reserves the right to a dissenting opinion." This statement, of course, only emphasized the conference's negative attitude towards Lenin's behavior

in the Krasin case. Since 11 people took part in this meeting - 8 members of the BC and 3 delegates from the seats - two clearly abstained from the vote: they should have been Taratuta and, most likely, Kamenev. Lenin did not have full support even from the entire trio of his faithful assistants from emigration<sup>110</sup>.

The significance of this decision was emphasized by the simultaneous adoption of a decision on the case of the debt of the BC of a certain AI Umnova, a wealthy woman who sympathized with the Bolsheviks. De

but that was of no interest in itself. It acquired significance only because of its connection with the Lenin-Krasin affair. Umnova was one of those people from whom Krasin, when he was a BC cashier, made short-term loans, sometimes quite large ones, in difficult moments for the cash desk. Since that time, his debt to Umnova remained several thousand rubles. Krasin confirmed the correctness of her claim and insisted that the new financial commission of the BC should pay this debt to her, but this new financial commission and Lenin personally refused to pay, demanding that Krasin make the payment from the funds that he allegedly withheld. There was a rather sharp struggle around this issue, since Umnova was supported by some of the Bolshevik emigrants, prominent figures in the military and combat organizations associated with the BC, who were aware of this old debt. The commission offered to pay Umnova's debt, however, with the proviso: "trying to get a discount." This proposal met with objections. Taratuta twice insisted on a substantive discussion of this issue, but this proposal was twice rejected. Lenin asked to be

recorded in the minutes that he "makes a special statement on this issue" (this document was not found in the archives). In the voting, only Lenin voted against the commission's proposal (Kamenev and Skrypnik abstained)<sup>111</sup>. This second defeat of Lenin, who was beaten twice in a row on the same question, emphasizes with particular clarity that the defeat was not accidental, that even at this conference of political like-minded people, his methods of struggle against

yesterday's closest friends met with condemnation. The meeting so definitely considered him wrong that even the trio of his permanent adjutants of that time - Zinoviev, Kamenev and Taratuta - could not stand the test and evaded direct solidarity with him. Thus, we can sum up this group of conflicts: their exact content in the then formulations is still unknown to us.

unknown, and it is quite possible that it will never become known,

since all the participants passed away, apparently without leaving their memories, and the most important documents, most likely, were destroyed. But the main lines of these conflicts still manage to be established. The main thing that blew up the "Board of Three" was the leading core of the BC of 1906-1907. - and then the whole BC, i.e. the old Bolshevik bloc of the era of the revolution of 1905, was nothing more than a dispute over the division of "dark money" that fell into the disposal of this BC.

The illegal (we are talking about illegality from the point of view of the intra-Party constitution) method of obtaining this money forced the people who had this money at their disposal to concentrate this right of disposal in the hands of a

small, very closed group of persons, which in its type became more and more , as Martov correctly defined back in those years, something "in between a secret central committee and a group of contractors in a bandit business." The internal development of this group proceeded along the path of sharp conflicts and splits, mutual intrigues and accusations, in which, of course, the "most adapted" to such a struggle prevailed. This turned such a center into a factor in the moral decay of the environment. But at the same time, the colossal material resources that one BC had at its disposal, with their skillful use, provided enormous opportunities to influence the movement as a whole.

The first convincing proof of the correctness of this dual role played by the BC was brought by the nearest plenum of the Central Committee, which met on August 24-26, 1908.

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At the meeting of the BC in August 1908, these acute conflicts, which were disintegrating the old BC from within, were still far from fully revealed, their tension was still relatively low. Lenin skillfully dosed his movement to power: the old "board of three" had already been abolished. Bogdanov and Krasin have already stopped playing leading roles in BC. The leadership had already passed into the hands of the new four (Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Taratuta), which a little later Bogdanov called a secret "anti-boycott center"<sup>112</sup> operating behind the back of the BC, but under its firm. The cash register - and this was the most important - was already completely under Lenin's control. But fiction

The unity of the Bolsheviks still continued to be useful to Lenin and he supported it. The representative of the "Bogdanovites" was not only a member of the narrow editorial board of Proletary, but also a member of the new financial commission. At the plenum of August 24-26, the Bolsheviks appeared as a single faction, with Lenin and Bogdanov at the head. Of course, Lenin directed the entire internal party game, but Bogdanov gave him every possible helped.

This plenum did not discuss a single political issue, did not adopt a single political decision, but it played an enormous role in the history of the party: it was from it that the transition of the general party center under the control of Lenin began.

The questions that were on his agenda can be divided into two main groups: on the one hand, they were questions about the functioning of the Central Committee under the new conditions that had arisen in Russia as a result of the general collapse of party organizations and the recent failures of the members of the Central Committee, and, on the other hand, the other, issues related to the investigation of the expropriation case in Tiflis. On both Le

Nin won a victory, which became possible only because he received help from representatives of the social democratic parties of the Latvian region and Poland. The behavior of the representatives of

these parties at the August 1908 plenum was significantly different from the behavior of the representatives of these organizations in the Central Committee, as it functioned in the winter of 1907-1908: at that time, these representatives, although they were politically aligned with the Bolsheviks, strove to preserve independence in matters of internal party relations. and each such question was considered from the angle of the interests of the party, without taking the position of defending at all costs the factional interests of the Bolsheviks. Now, on the contrary, the representatives of these organizations have completely entered the orbit of Lenin's policy.

For the Social Democrats of the Latvian Territory (that was then the official name of the Social Democratic Party of Latvia), this change in the behavior of their representatives was determined by the change of representatives themselves as a result of the struggle of various groups for influence on the leading institutions of their party. In June 1907, the Bolsheviks won at the Second Congress of this party, but almost immediately after the congress, the Latvian Bolsheviks split into two groups:

supporters of "boevism" (as advocates of expropriation were then called in Latvia) and opponents of participation in elections to the State Duma, on the one hand, and opponents of "boevism" and supporters of participation in elections not only to the State Duma, but also to local self-government bodies, on the one hand, another.

The position of this second group of Bolsheviks was close to the position of Lenin, who at that time opposed the boycott of the State Duma, but differed from it in that this group in the Latvian region really waged a decisive struggle against the supporters of "boevism", speaking openly against them and not renouncing establishing contact with the Mensheviks to carry out this struggle. In the winter of 1907--1908. It was this group of Bolsheviks that played the leading role in the Central Committee of the SDLK, and it was precisely this group of Bolsheviks that was represented in the general Party Central Committee by Danishevsky, who considered it right to extend the decisive struggle against "boevism" to all other organizations of the RS

"Boevism" in the Latvian region was then very widespread. At the London Congress, more than half of the Latvian delegates voted with Lenin against the resolution that prohibited expropriations. Supporters of "boevism" were especially numerous in exile, where all the participants in the armed uprisings and all kinds of "partisan actions" of 1905-1907 were supposed to hide. It was these emigrants - "militants" who held a special secret conference in May 1908, at which, according to the then report of the SDLK Central Committee,

a "whole plan for a disorganization campaign" was developed, that is, a campaign to seize power in the party. The Central Committee responded by excluding the participants in the said conference from the party. The third congress of the SDLK in December 1908

approved this exception<sup>114</sup>. But the Latvian "militants" have long been firmly connected with the leaders of the "battle groups" of the BC and played a large role in the work of the Bolshevik Military Technical Bureau of 1905-1907. So, among those involved in the case of the Bolshevik laboratory in Kuokkala (1907), almost half were Latvians from the former "forest brothers"; materials on the history of this bureau, published by S. M. Pozner, are full of Latvian names<sup>115</sup>. These ties continued, of course, to be preserved in exile. Separate Lytysh "militants" were attracted by Krasin to participate already in



the first attempt to exchange five hundred rubles<sup>116</sup>. Even more significant was their participation in attempts to exchange the same five-hundred-ruble notes in America, arranged by Bogdanov in 1909-1910. almost exclusively through some Latvians.

The Latvian "militants", who in May 1908 developed a "whole plan for a disorganization campaign" against the Central Committee of the SDKP, not only politically supported the positions of the Bogdanov-Krasin group, but, undoubtedly, were organizationally connected with them. Translated into the terminology of general party relations, their activity in the spring and summer of 1908 was nothing but a conspiracy of the Latvian "Bogdanovites" against the Latvian "Leninists" (who, developing in the same direction as Lenin, were not only more daring in their rejection of the old Bolshevik policy of boycott, but also more sincere in their break with "boevism" - drew in practice more decisive practical conclusions from this break). Only against

the background of all these facts does the significance of the invitation to the August plenum of the Central Committee of the RSDLP Kramarsky as a representative of the Central Committee of the SDKP become clear. In his position he belonged to the camp of the Lettish boycottists, the "militants"<sup>117</sup>, he lived in exile and was in no way affected by the moods that determined the evolution of the SDKP Central Committee in 1907-1908. towards a more and more decisive break with the boycottists and the "militant" elements of the Old Bolshevik legacy. Whether Kramarsky belonged to the number of participants in the May conference "of the militant-conspirators, we were not able to establish exactly, but politically, according to all his views, he would have been in their camp. In investigating the Tiflis expropriation, he, of course, could not take the position that Danishevsky occupied in January-April, which was undesirable for both Lenin and Bogdanov and Krasin. does not appear - neither at the general party conference of the RSDLP, nor at the plenum of

the Central Committee in January 1909, their organizers (they were Leninists) did not invite representatives of the SDKP Central Committee at all<sup>118</sup>.

Things were different with the Polish Social Democracy. The general position of this party remained unchanged; there were no changes in leadership positions. The same persons remained its representatives in the general Party Central Committee. But their behavior has changed radically. Just four months earlier, in April 1908, Tyshko had argued quite convincingly to Aleksinsky that, from the point of view of the interests of the party, the investigation into the case of the expropriation in Tiflis should be left in the hands of the Central Bureau of Labor with its Menshevik majority, since only in this way would it be possible to repel attacks by slanderers spreading rumors that the party majority is trying to cover up the perpetrators of this expropriation. Now, on the contrary, the same Tyshko helped Lenin and Bogdanov to pass a resolution on the withdrawal of the investigation from the hands of the TsZB and its transfer to a special commission appointed by the Central Committee. did not present any report to anyone. The only thing that the member of the BC put at its head (Zinoviev) cared about was the seizure from the hands of the persons who had carried out the earlier investigation of all documents that proved the leading participation of the members of the BC both in organizing this expropriation and in exchanging the money seized at that time<sup>119</sup>.

Especially in order to emphasize precisely this nature of the work of the future commission, Lenin passed another decision at the plenum that was related to the investigation of the expropriator epic: on the appointment of a party trial of Martov and another Menshevik, Semenov, secretary of the Paris Assistance Group, on charges of "violation of the security conditions of the personnel of the Central Committee", which was brought against them by two members of the BC - Bogdanov and Taratuta. This decision, which has no precedent in party history, is of particular interest, among other things, because it shows with what measure of shamelessness Lenin considered it possible for himself to act then, to what extent he felt himself to be the master in the Central Committee. The crime of Martov and

Semyonov was seen in the information about the involvement of Bogdanov and Taratuta in an attempt to exchange the Tiflis five-hundred-ruble note, which they included in the testimony they gave to the representative of the Central Reserve Bureau. This Bureau of Investigation led to

as a representative of the Central Committee of the party on an official order and authority of the latter, and all members of the party loyal to the Central Committee were obliged to help this investigation by reporting

all information relevant to the case. The information given by Martov and Semyonov was correct - now it is absolutely indisputable. However, Bogdanov and Taratuta did not accuse Martov and Semyonov of providing incorrect information, they only stated that the information provided by the latter was "a violation of their security conditions." But the Central Committee, which adopted in January 1908 a decision

to investigate the case of the Tiflis expropriation, consisted of adults who understood that finding out the implication of anyone. was to cases related to the Tiflis expropriation, inevitably entails some kind of "violation of security conditions" for the persons concerned. no matter what precautions are taken. The Central Committee considered itself entitled to do this, since it was about members of the Party, with this title covering up such activities that the Party Congress and the Central Committee considered hostile to the interests of the Party. If among such party members there were members of the Central Committee, then it was all the more important to find out the truth in order to protect the party from the harmful consequences of their actions.

As a result, it turned out that the plenum of the Central Committee in August 1908 appointed a party trial for those party leaders who loyally fulfilled their party duty by telling the party representatives acting on behalf of the Central Committee the truth about the anti-party activities of two Bolsheviks (who were also members of the Central Committee), moreover, the task of the court was deliberately placed to cover up this anti-Party activity.

In the light of the foregoing, Lenin's behavior at the plenum in August 1908 acquires special significance. Lenin knew that Martov and Semyonov were telling the truth, although they knew only a small part of the whole truth, and precisely because it was true, Lenin sought to continue the investigation as quickly and decisively as possible. He could do this only when he was completely sure that at this plenum he was guaranteed a majority. It must be added that in the same

resolution - on the party trial of Martov - the latter

a criminal act, namely "exposing ... secrets ... threatening the most important material interests of the party." It was about Schmitt's legacy, and the authors of the resolution, headed by Lenin, declared this legacy to be a proper entry into the party, because only in this case it was possible to speak of "the most important material interests of the party." But the plenum, of course, was not informed that more than half of this inheritance had already arrived at the cash desk of the BC and that the leaders of the latter, headed by Lenin, were making large expenditures from this money, having no intention of transferring this property to the party. Lenin and his

colleagues quite deliberately appropriated property for the benefit of the BC, which, obviously for them, should have been transferred to the entire party. The

management of the BC in the all-Party Central Committee at this plenum was revealed with unprecedented cynicism, and there is no doubt that the reason for such behavior of Lenin and other Bolsheviks was Lenin's absolutely firm confidence in the full support of not only a "Latvian", a supporter of expropriation, who supported other expropriators by virtue of a kind of factional solidarity, but also on the part of the Pole Tyszkowski, who opposed expropriation both at the London Congress and fought against the expropriation fad in Poland. On what was Lenin's confidence based?

At the basis of the general attitude of the Polish Social Democrats towards the various groupings of the RSDLP lay, of course, the then view of Rosa Luxemburg, their chief theoretician, of the Mensheviks as the most dangerous enemies of the Polish Social Democracy. This view of R. Luxemburg was especially strengthened after the Mensheviks, beginning in 1907, began, in her words, "to patronize the Polish Socialist Party"<sup>120</sup>, i.e., they began to openly come out in favor of uniting with the so-called "Left" - - with the workers' wing of the PPS, which then broke with the "revolutionary faction", the nationalist wing of this party, headed by Piłsudski.

But this general assessment of the Mensheviks was valid even earlier, in the winter of 1907-1908, when Tyszkowski defended the correctness of transferring the case of the investigation of the Tiflis expropriation into the hands of the TsZB. During the period

between April and August 1908 no change took place in this respect. Therefore, the real reasons for the change in Tyszko's behavior should be sought not in the field of ideology and high politics, where R. Luxembourg played a decisive role, but in the field of practical politics, in the field of internal party relations and intrigues, where Tyszko himself was almost completely in charge. In order to immediately enter into this group of relations, it would be correct to recall one moment in the relations between the Bolsheviks and Tyshko, which opens up the debate at the BC plenum ("the extended edition of Proletary") in June 1909, during the discussion of the report of the revision commission. During the discussion, one of the members of this revision commission, M. P. Tomsy, spoke, who, as the only "proletarian from the machine tool" at this plenum, generally behaved with a large degree of independence. In his speech, he, among other things, stated that "The Audit Committee was struck by the excessive and intermittent support given to national organizations. As if the Poles want to come with us for money. I raise the question of abolishing subsidies to national organizations, because many local organizations have been abandoned in our country. "There were few debates

on the report of the audit commission, as well as on the report of the conflict commission - in any case, little about them was preserved in the minutes. But Tomsy's remark caused a whole Zinoviev spoke out in defense of the national organizations as Tomsy's main opponent: "A refusal to give subsidies to national organizations," he said, "would be contrary to the resolution on the tasks of the Bolsheviks in the party (Laughter. Marat asks that it be entered in the minutes)."121 Tomsy and in this laughter, with

which the BC plenum met Zinoviev's parade phrase about the "tasks of the Bolsheviks in the party", which he put in direct connection with the issuance of permanent subsidies to the Tyshko group, not only the reasons for issuing these subsidies were revealed, but also the true attitude of the BC leaders to the leaders Polish Social Democracy: in the 10 months that separated the August plenum of the Central Committee from the June plenum of the BC, the connection between the behavior of the Tyszko group and the amount of subsidies from the secret Bolshevik funds became clear. To carry out the "tasks of the Bolsheviks in the party", that is, to become the master in the apparatus of the latter,

really could only with the help of Tyszko's group. But for this help it was necessary to pay constantly and much. Tyszko's help was used, but his group was treated with ill-concealed contempt, and they were very eager to get rid of the need to work with him<sup>122</sup>.

But having paid Tyshko for support, Lenin tried to use the situation as fully as possible and, not content with the decisions he desired on issues related to the investigation of the Tiflis expropriation case, forced Tyshko to pass a number of general decisions on the procedure for the work of the all-party Central Committee in the future. The main thing in these decisions was the transfer - both actual and formal - of the leadership of the work of the Central Committee abroad, which in fact put the Central Committee under the control of Lenin. For the first time in the history of the party, the plenums of the Central Committee were announced as the governing body, which could only be held abroad. To conduct work in Russia, a narrow collegium of the Central Committee was created, which had the right to conduct only "current work." The composition of this collegium was defined as 5 people - one each from the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Poles, Letts and the Bund - and Lenin got the Poles to agree to elect their representative (or rather, deputy representative, but the representative himself never appeared in St. Petersburg) Dubrovinsky. This election was enshrined in the official resolution of the plenum, and thus the Bolsheviks had an actual majority in the Russian collegium of the Central Committee, because this collegium never met in its entirety, and it was Dubrovinsky who conducted all its current work until the end of 1908. At the same time, to represent the "interests of the Central Committee abroad," the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee

was created, consisting of three people, namely Zinoviev, Tyshko and Noah Ramishvili (Menshevik), that is, also with a majority assigned to the Bolsheviks. If we add that the official treasury of the Central Committee was at that time chronically empty and that only the Bolsheviks had the material ability to pay people who devoted themselves entirely to party work, then the mechanics of Lenin's seizure of the central apparatus of the party becomes quite clear. In the matter of this seizure, the help of the Poles was an indispensable condition - it

was undoubtedly stipulated in the agreement that was concluded between Lenin and Tyszko before this plenum.

Bogdanov, in his address "To Comrades Bolsheviks", which was issued in early 1910 on behalf of the Vperyod group in connection with Lenin's statement about the dissolution of the BC, characterizing Lenin's methods of activity, indicated that the latter "since he needs to influence the public opinion of the party," tries to do this "by way of monetary dependence, in which he places both individual members of the party and entire organizations - Bolshevik and not only Bolshevik." Bogdanov relates this activity of the BC in corruption of the party only to the last two years of the existence of the BC, to 1908-1910, when Bogdanov was already in opposition and did not exert a decisive influence on the policy of the BC. In reality, corruption also took place in 1906-1907, when Bogdanov was a member of the supreme "board of three" and took a decisive part in the direction of all the activities of the Bolshevik faction. While this harmful activity of Lenin was directed against other factions and against non-Party workers' organizations (trade unions, etc.), Bogdanov did not notice its harmful aspects - in any case, he did not pay the necessary attention to them ... But in essence Bogdanov's instruction is, of course, correct. It was in the second emigration, after 1908, that Lenin unfolded the work of corrupting the party by bribing "both individual members of the party and entire organizations, Bolshevik and not only Bolshevik" with such systematicity and on such a scale as never before.

Very little is known about this side of the activities of the BC and Lenin personally. In a special statement that Bogdanov and Shantser submitted on June 1, 1909 to the BC, they provided some data on such activities of the BC in relation to the Bolshevik organizations that took a political position that was undesirable for Lenin, and in carrying out these financial repressions, the BC did not stop at the fact that delays in receiving regular BC subsidies have at times led to police failures<sup>123</sup>.

Bogdanov, of course, knew about the financial basis of Lenin's agreement with Tyszko. And, undoubtedly, he had this agreement in mind when he wrote in 1910 that Lenin "through monetary dependence"

Rumps "not only Bolshevik" organizations. Having appropriated Schmitt's capital, which had been bequeathed to the party, Lenin, with their help, first of all attracted the Tyshko group to his side, thereby securing for himself from the autumn of 1908 the possibility of controlling all the general party centers. Notes

1 Social Democratic  
1894--1917.

Bibliographic index / Ed. Lenin Institute under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Vol. 1. 1931. This appeal of the Vperyod group is registered under No. 1078; the authorship of Bogdanov is also disclosed there.

2 See: Minutes of the meeting of the expanded edition of "Proletary" (hereinafter: Minutes of the "Proletary") / Ed. Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. 1934. S. 264, approx. 1. See also: Lenin V. I. Works. 2! ed. T. XIV. S.

507 [5th ed. T. 47. S. 177]. 3 Zinoviev G. History of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (hereinafter: History of the RCP(b). Petrograd, 1923. P. 124

4 It is very characteristic that I. Stalin is not among the delegates to the Stockholm Congress who signed this appeal, although he was at that congress: he is one of the few Bolshevik delegates who did not sign this appeal.

5 Protocols of the Fifth Congress of the RSDLP / Ed. Marx Institute--Engels-Lenin. 1935. S. 631. This person was M. F. Andreeva. 6 Gorky M.

Collected works. M., 1952. T. 17. S. 54, 7 Protocols of the "Proletary". S. 264, approx. 1 8 Zinoviev G. History of the RCP (b). P. 129. 9 Goldman-Gorev

B. I. Behind the scenes of the first revolution // Historical and revolutionary bulletin. M., 1922. No 1. S. 17.

10 At the Third All-Party Conference, August 3-5, 1907. without exception, all the Bolshevik delegates, 9 people, spoke out against Lenin, who considered it necessary for the participation of the Social Democrats in the Third State Duma, and put up as a speaker from the faction not Lenin, but Bogdanov, who was a supporter of the boycott of the Duma.

11 In this presentation, we rely on the dates of Lenin's acquaintance with Bogdanov (see Lenin's letter to Gorky of February 25, 1908 // Lenin V. I. Works. 4th ed. T. 13. P. 412). But N. Valentinov Volsky in the book. "Meetings with Lenin" (Chekhov Publishing House. New York,



1953 P. 320) makes a significant correction to these dates, referring the beginning of Lenin's meetings with Bogdanov not to the summer, but to the beginning (February) of 1904. N. Valentinov's testimony, as a rule, is very accurate (in a number of points they can be objectively verified), they can be trusted, but the transfer of the date of Lenin's acquaintance with Bogdanov to February, and perhaps even to the end of January 1904, is extremely

important for Lenin's biography, since it proves that the decision to write "A step forward, two steps back" (namely, this moment should be considered the starting point for Lenin, who began work on the formalization of Bolshevism as a special faction) Lenin came only after the beginning of

meetings with Bogdanov. 12 This is also clear from the memoirs of N. K. Krupskaya "Lenin" (1932, pp. 138, 143--144).

13 Communist Party of the Soviet Union in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee. 7th ed. T.

1, M., 1954. S. 184. 14 Lenin's responses to these accusations are almost absent in Lenin's writings and in other materials about him. There are many reasons to believe that the reason lies in the strict censorship to which all Leninist materials published in the USSR are subjected. Only scattered hints slip through. From this point of view, of particular interest is Lenin's letter to Zinoviev (autumn 1909), when Lenin wrote his article "On the faction of supporters of otzovism and god-building" as a response to the "Report" by Bogdanov and Krasin on their removal from the editorial board of "Proletary". Sending the end of this article to Zinoviev, Lenin explains that he is not sure "whether it would be better to screw it all up by answering Bogdanov with just a couple of lines about his gossip about 'the property of the entire faction'. Decide!" (Lenin's collection. Vol. XIII. P. 173. This letter is not reprinted in the Works of Lenin (4th ed.).) In Lenin's article, the question of "property" is indeed devoted to only one and a half lines (Lenin V.I., Works. 2nd ed. Vol. XIV. P. 160), but it is not entirely clear whether this should lead to the conclusion that the article was shortened Zinoviev.

15 In the unpublished notes of L. D. Trotsky there is a record that Meshkovsky-kiy-Goldenberg told him that Krasin "and according to

philosophical views adjoins "to Bogdanov. The conversation with Meshkovsky refers, apparently, to 190-9.

16 Such a conclusion has to be drawn from one remark thrown in passing in the memoirs of N. K. Krupskaya. Talking about the beginning of the "war on the new front," Lenin's war with the boycottists after the dissolution of the Second State Duma, she writes: , without entering the cottage, he thoughtfully walked away ... Yes, there was something to think about "(Memories of Lenin / Partizdat. M., 1932. P. 119).

17 Letter from Lenin to Rykov dated February 26, 1911)1 // Lenin V.I. Works. 4th ed. T. 34. S. Z89.

18 Protocols of "Proletary". pp. 128--129. It must be added that it is this conclusion of the audit commission that L. B. Kamenev means in the book. "Two Parties" (2nd ed. L., 1924, p. 161), when he writes that the control of the cash desk of the Bolshevik Center "was entirely in the hands of representatives of local organizations who periodically checked the expenses of the Bolshevik Center", and that for the last time, in May 1909, representatives of these local organizations acknowledged that "all records have been checked and expenditures have been approved." A comparison of the original text of the conclusion of the revision commission with the exposition given by Kamenev provides an example of the inaccuracy of the quotations

from this book by Kamenev. 19 For example, the financial report of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, which operated from May 1906 to May 1907 (the so-called Stockholm or Menshevik Central Committee) was presented to the London Congress in 1907 and published at the same time [see: London Congress of the RSDLP. Full text of the minutes Paris, 1907 C 440-441; Protocols of the Fifth Congress of the RSDLP. 1936. S. 630--631]. Similarly, their financial statements for 1906 and 1907. published the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in Party News (see: L. I. Snnridonovich,

Revolutionary Movement in Russia, St. Petersburg, 1914, Issue 2 C, 390 401). 20 No printed

signed "member of the party" in the first collection "Forward" (July 1910 C 59--63).

21 Note "On the faction of Vperyodists", in No. 15--16 of the Social Democrat, September 30-October 12, 1910, p. 10. A note without a signature, but it is included in the Works of Lenin (2nd ed. Vol. XIV. P. 346--351).

22 Hillquit Morris. Loose Leaves From a Busy Life. 1934 P. 110--114. 23 His memoirs of a trip with Gorky to America were published in Novy Mir (Moscow, 1940, No 6, June), reprinted in the collection: Gorky in the Memoirs of Contemporaries (M., 1955, pp. 223--240) . Burenin's general memoirs "From the Life of the Bolshevik Underground" were published in Moscow (1933) with a preface by Gorky (this preface was reprinted in the last collected works of Gorky. Vol. 26. 1953. P. 110--114). 24 Many

aspects of the behind-the-scenes organizational side of this campaign can be established from the books of minutes of meetings of the New York RSDLP Assistance Group, which have been preserved from the second half of the 1890s. and are at the disposal of the editors of these materials, as well as materials about the then arrival of Gorky, collected by D. M. Rubinov (including letters and unpublished manuscripts of Gorky). In many ways, for the activity shown in this particular campaign, the Central Committee of the RSDLP in the fall of 1906. moved the New York group from the category of "promotion groups" to the category of full-fledged party groups. Among newspapers, besides "Vorverts", also The Worker, New York Call u New York Volkszeitung took part in the

collection campaign. 25 Protocols of the Fifth Congress of the RSDLP. 1935. P. 632. 26 Martov L. Saviors or

Abolitionists? Paris, 1911. S. 3, approx. 27 Yaroslavsky Em. Essays on the history of 204. 28 / Martov L. Saviors or abolitionists? pp. 20-21. 29

Kamenev L. Two parties. S. 184.

30 Ibid. pp. 181.

31 This resolution was not included in the official notice of the plenum. It was first published by Martov (Saviors or Abolitionists? S. 21). Not only was the accuracy of the text not disputed, but Kamenev, having reprinted it (in the book: Two parties, p. 181), confirmed its correctness. For reasons of conspiracy, Martov omitted the names

Shmit and Andrikanis, the husband of one of Shmit's sisters, with whom the Bolshevik Center had a trial. The full text of the resolution is unknown. 32 Shesternin S.P. The implementation of the inheritance after N.P. Schmit and my meetings with Lenin // Old Bolshevik. M.

1933. T. 5 (8). P. 153. 33 Yury Martov. Savors or Abolitionists? P. 20. 34 Kamenev

L. Two parties. 183. 35 Police sources record the fact of Krasin's arrest on May 1, 1907 at Andrikanis's apartment in Moscow (Tsyavlovsky M. Bolsheviks: Documents on the history of Bolshevism from 1903 to 1916 of the former Moscow Security Department. 2, Zd. Zadruga, 1918, C 209). At that time, the congress of the RSDLP was meeting in London, but Krasin was

not present at it. 36 Martov spoke about this in his testimony at the

investigation in the Taratuta case. 37 Shesternin S. L. Decree. op. P. 156. This corresponds to the instruction of Kamenev, who said that Andrikanis "left the lion's share of the property" (quoted: Kamenev L.

Two parties, p. 182). 38 Kamenev L. Two parties. C 183. 39 This is supported by the following considerations: in June 1900, the Center's box office, as was announced at an extended meeting of the editorial board of Proletary, had about 125,000 rubles in total. (Protocols of Proletary, p. 131). In January 1910, at the plenum of the Central Committee, the Center, according to its data, had an amount that should be determined at approximately 200-210 thousand rubles. (he assumed obligations to hand over 475 thousand francs to the "holders" at different times, 30 thousand francs remained in his hands for publishing activities, about 20 thousand francs were allocated to cover various obligations of the Center, etc.) In other words, after the June meeting of the Center, its cash balance increased by 75-85 thousand rubles,

which is approximately the amount that Andrikanis, by decision of the court, had to transfer to the Center (half of the 190 thousand rubles). 40 CPSU in resolutions, T.

1, 1954. S. 108--109, 129--131. 41 Protocols of the

Fifth Congress of the RSDLP. 1935 S. 608--609. 42 On the activities of the Ural military organizations, see: On the history of military organizations in the Urals (compiled according to the stories of E. S. Kadomtsev, O.

proletarian revolution. 1925. No 7 (42). pp. 99--111; Protocols of the First Conference of Military and Combat Organizations of the RSDLP / Under. ed. S. M. Pozner / Ed. Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. 1032. S. 341--343 "The memoirs of E. S. Kadomtsev, published as a separate brochure in 1947, do not give anything new. The story about the plans for an uprising in the Urals intersects in an interesting way with the corresponding pages of A. Bogdanov's utopian novel "Red Star" (1908), simultaneously confirming the correctness of E. S. Kadomtsev's stories about them, and Bogdanov's acquaintance with these plans.<sup>43</sup> The literature

on the Kamo group is rich, although it is extremely insufficient. Gorky (M., 1934) and the article by S. Medvedeva-Ter Petrosyan "Comrade. Kamo" in the journal "Proletarian Revolution" (1924. No. 8--9. S. 117--148), as well as Krupskaya's memoirs (Memoirs of Lenin. 1932. S. 116, 161--102, etc.). Valuable indications are given by M. N. Lyadov in the notes to the mentioned book by Bibineyshvili and in the obituary on the death of Krasin (Proletarian Revolution. 1926. No 11. P. 11--12).

44 Ibid., 1926. No 7 (42). P. 111.

45 Ibid. 1926. No 11 (58). P. 11.

46 Bibineyshvili B. Decree Op. pp.

129--130. 47 Voitinsky V. Years of victories and defeats. Berlin, 1924, vol. 2, p. 104; Y. Martov, article in the "Socialist Bulletin" (signed "M."). 1922; No 16. P.

8. 48 We sum up these results of the work of the commission of the London Congress on the basis of the stories of the prominent Social Democrats R.

A. Abramovich and I. G. Tsereteli. 49 Proletarian revolution., 1925. No 7 (42). 104. 50 Later he joined the "Vperiyod" and

lived as an emigrant in Paris. 51 The presence of all of them at this meeting on established by protocol. 52

Krupskaya N.K. Memories of Lenin. pp. 116, 161. 53

Ibid. 139. 54 N.

A. Rozhkov agreed with Lenin on the issue of elections, and Lenin entrusted him with the final word on his report at the St. Petersburg Conference in July 1907 (Rozhkov's speech at the evening

Istprof // Materials on the history of the professional movement / Ed. AUCCTU. M., 1907. T. IV. S. 41).

55 See the pamphlet N. Lenin and Yuri K[amen]ev "For and Against the Boycott", 1907. Kamenev's article "For the Boycott" is reprinted in the collection of articles of the latter: Between two revolutions / Ed. New Moscow, 2nd ed. M., 1923. S. 234--243.

56 It was Zhytomyrsky who handed over Kamo to the German police, whose arrest in Berlin at the end of 1907 seemed to be particularly hard evidence against Taratuta. Kamo himself was convinced of the traitorous role of the latter. 57

Voitinsky V. Years of victories and defeats. T. 2. P. 103. Sermons on the topic "politics cannot exist without dirt" were generally common for Lenin (see, for example: P. A. Garey, Memoirs of a Social Democrat. New York, 1946, p. 423). 58 Bogdanov A. New world. 3rd ed. 1920. S. 40 (1 ed. published in 1907 G).

59 Bogdanov A. Elements of proletarian culture in the development of the working class / GIZ. M., 1920. S. 68

60 Ibid. 182. Bogdanov argued that in social political blocs the vanguard (i.e., the proletariat) puts forward slogans, but he must remember that "the limit of possible slogans" is "their acceptability for the most backward parts of the bloc" (i.e., for peasantry). It was written during the

colors of "war communism", in the year of enthusiasm for the "armies of labor" (1920). In the literature of 1908-1914. hints of a divergence on this no line yet.

61 These thoughts are most clearly formulated by A. Bogdanov in pamphlets and books: Lessons from the First Steps of the Revolution. M., 1907 (for the coalition government); Questions of socialism. M., 1918; Course of political economy. T. 2. Issue. IV. General theory of capitalism. M., 1924 (section "Military-economic formations"). See also the articles about Bogdanov by N. I. Bukharin "Towards the Congress of the Proletkult" (Pravda. 1921. Nov. 22) and "Collectivist Liquidationism" (Pravda. 1921. Dec. 10); and Sergei G. "Unenviable happiness" (Communist's Sputnik, M., 1923. No 24), which contains excerpts from the letters of Bogdanov himself and a group of his supporters who called themselves "collectivists". There is no doubt that it was from this group that the communist opposition arose.

group "Working Truth", which performed in 1922-1923. with a special platform and several appeals (see: Socialist Bulletin. Berlin, 1923. No 3).  
62 In 1922, the author of

these lines turned to Bogdanov through N.N. M. Gorky, Yu. O. Martov, B. I. Nikolaevsky and N. S. Rusanov (one volume was published). Bogdanov replied that the time had not yet come to write the whole truth about that period ...

63 According to V. S. Voitinsky, who was then a member of the St. Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks, this latter in the winter of 1906-1907. received "t BC not less than 2-3 thousand rubles per month (Voitinsky V. Years of victories and defeats, vol. 2. S. YuZ). 64 Ibid., p.

104 65 Leonid Krassin: His Life and Work. By His Wife Lubov Krassin. London [no code].

66 Trotsky L. Portraits of revolutionaries / Moscow worker. M., 1991. S. 224--225. 67 On

this issue, Lenin occupied a place on the extreme flank among the Bolsheviks: considering it impossible to work together with the Mensheviks, he headed for a split and often deliberately aggravated the situation. Thus, during the elections to the Second State Duma, Lenin persuaded G. A. Aleksinsky to make a break with the Mensheviks in the workers' curia of St. Petersburg. And only Aleksinsky's categorical refusal to embark on this path prevented a formal split at that time; Aleksinsky, an extreme "Menshevik", nevertheless considered the split at that time unnecessary and harmful. 68 A weak reflection of

these sentiments was the report of I. Kh. with an indication of the incorrectness of such assessments and the danger of such sentiments (Lenin V.I. Works. 4th ed. T. 12. P. 374--375).

69 Krupskaya N.K. Memories of Lenin. S. 45 70  
Ibid. P. 120 71

Letters from P B. Axelrod and Yu. O. Martov. Berlin, 1924, p. 176.

72. For the names of those arrested and other details, see the book: Bibinshvili B. Kamo. pp. 132--136.

73 The most striking example was the story of a special paper made by a German factory in the late autumn of 1907 by order of Krasin and handed over to the warehouse of the German Social Democratic publishing house in Berlin, where it was found by the German police during searches in December 1907. examination of the German Imperial Bank, according to its special watermarks, this paper was intended for the manufacture of Russian three-rouble notes. Krasin, who spoke to the German Social Democrats as a representative of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, of course, did not inform them of the nature of the paper being deposited, and both the head of the publishing house and the representatives of the Vorstand of the Social Democratic Party then had big troubles with the German police (see Martov's article in Socialist Vestnik, 1922 No. 16) 74 The full text of this declaration is unknown to us. There is a mention of it in the resolution of the Paris Group for the Assistance of the RSDLP (Voice of the Social Democrat, 1908, No. 3, March). 75 Notes to the Letters of Axelrod and Martov, p. 184 (the compiler of these notes was B. I.

Nikolaevsky, they were edited jointly with L. S. Zederbaum-Dan and F. I. Dan), the sending of the delegation of Zhordania-Danishevsky to the Caucasus is attributed to the autumn of 1907. This date was then is indicated

according to the memoirs of F. I. Dan, but from the article by T. Ankudinova "From the history of the Baku organization of the Bolsheviks" (Proletarian Revolution. 1941. No. 4) it is clear that this commission conducted its survey in Baku in February 1908. In February, both its members were present at the Fifth Congress of the Transcaucasian organizations of the RSDLP. Thus, there is no doubt that the decision to send this delegation to the Central Committee or its Bureau was made no later than the end of January 1908 AD. Art.

76 Zinoviev G. History of the RCP (b). P. 129. 77

Proletarian revolution. 1941. No 4. P. 69. 78 Voice of the

Social Democrat. 1908. No 3, March. The names of those expelled for conspiratorial reasons were not published - they were specifically reported by organization. Among them was the name of Stalin, but the role of the latter in the activities of the Kamo group in general and in the Tiflis



expropriation on June 25, 1907, in particular, was later greatly exaggerated: as far as it can be established, Stalin was aware of the nature of the activities of this "party group", came to her safe house for political reports and covered her in front of the local party organization, but its leader was not in any way. All relations with the "board of three" BC group conducted directly through Kamo, who was personally connected with Krasin since 1903--1904. Stalin played no part in these relations; In fact, he wasn't even aware of it. 79 Proletarian (Geneva). 1908. No. 23, March 11. Statement is

appeared then also in the foreign socialist press.

80 This leaflet of the Regional Committee of Transcaucasian Organizations is unknown to us, we know about it only by decision of the plenum of the Central Committee of January 1909 [VKP(b)] in resolutions and

decisions. T. 2. M., 1935. S. 137]. 81 This Menshevik was MI Broido ("Yakov"). At the same time, he wrote a detailed letter to Axelrod about the conflict in the Central Committee, but this letter has not been preserved and is known only from a mention in Martov's letter (Letters of

Axelrod and Martov, pp. 183--184). 82 This and the following quotation are taken from the article "Isn't it time to put an end to it?", published in Nos. 1-2 of Golos Sotsial-Democrat, February 1908. Yu. O. Martov was the author of the article, but it appeared in print in a very softened form (see Axelrod's letter to Plekhanov dated February 26, 1908 in the book: Correspondence of G. V. Plekhanov and

P. B. Axelrod. M., 1925. T. 2. S. 2. 57). 83 The Social Democratic Movement in Russia. ed.

A. N. Potresov and B. I. Nikolaevsky. T. K. L., 1928. P. 175. 84 Plekhanov's letter to Axelrod of January 29, 1908 // Correspondence of Plekhanov and Axelrod. pp. 250--251. 85

Plekhanov had in mind that variant of Bakuninism, which in the history of the Russian revolutionary movement is associated with the so-called "southern rebels" of 1875-1877. and with European attempts at "direct action" in 1867-1878. (articles by Kropotkin in the Bulletin of the Jurassic Federation, an attempt by Costa, Kravchinsky and others in the Italian Romagna, etc.). 86 Of the

Mensheviks, the CZB included G. V. Chicherin (secretary of the CZB),

B. A. Buchholz, A. I. and M. F. Nazaryev-Petrov, V. K. Seryezhnikov; from the Bolsheviks - G. A. Aleksinsky and the provocateur Zhitomirsky ("Fathers"). 87 Kohn is Oskar Kohn, a

German Social Democrat, a lawyer invited by the defender of the arrested Kamo-Petrosyan. The "famous comrade" through whom the "paper" (that is, paper for making fake three-

rouble notes) got to the warehouse is Krasin. 88 Unpublished minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee of

the RSDLP dated March 19 (April 1), 1908. 89 From the unpublished minutes of the

Central Committee of the RSDLP dated December 29, 1907 (January 11, 1908), it can be seen that the Central Committee decided to instruct Tyshko "to take part in the Berlin investigation in as a member of the Central Committee. We have no information about who exactly was the second member of the Central Committee who received such an order, at our disposal, just as there is no i) information about the limits of authority of these members of the Central Committee who were entrusted with participation in the investigation.

90 Semashko N. From the memories // Proletarian revolution. 19. 21. No 1. P. 175.

91 Krupskaya N.K. Memories of Lenin. 143. 92 Of the articles and notes by Proletary directed against the Lbovites, the most interesting are the correspondence on the situation in Perm (Proletary. Ural workers' movement", printed under the signature "Worker 3" (1909 No. 45, May 25). 93 Both older Kadomtsev brothers - Erasmus, a former officer, and Ivan, a former high school student, the main organizers of squads and leaders of the

expropriation in Ufa in 1906, who then played a prominent role at the First Conference of Military and Combat Organizations of the RSDLP and in the Central Military combat bureau, in 1908. -1917. lived as emigrants in Paris, were part of the Bolshevik assistance group there and were considered true-believers "Leninists". Their younger brother, Mikhail, a former pupil of the cadet corps and an active member of the "teams", was in hard labor in those years. After the revolution, they were all members of the Bolshevik Party.

94 To give the impression that he was breaking with the expropriator wing of Bolshevism was especially important to Lenin for reasons of his inner-party strategy. This was necessary not only to improve relations with the Polish Social Democrats, who, despite all the "flexibility" of their behavior towards the Bolsheviks, it was important to be able to say that the Bolsheviks' expropriatory adventures were already over, but also because the high stakes in Lenin's game was the desire to attract Plekhanov to the number of his allies, whose sharply negative attitude towards expropriations was widely known. 95 Letter from Lenin to Rykov dated February 25, 1911 // Lenin V.I.

Works. 4th ed. T. 34. S. 389.

96 In the literature, this episode is known from the story of M. Lyadov in the publication: Leonid Borisovich Krasin (obituary) // Proletarian Revolution. 1926. No 11 (58). S. 1(R). Krasin by this time, according to the Police Department, had 38 five-hundred-ruble bills (Bolsheviks, p. 39), but it is not known for sure whether all of them were sold or only part of them. Krasin, who acted in agreement with Bogdanov, partly transferred the money received from this operation to the Vperyod group for its publishing activities. The rest was spent on organizing assistance to Kamo-Petrosyan and other arrested members of that "Caucasian group" which in 1907, while transferring booty from the Tiflis expropriation, concluded an appropriate agreement with the "board of three", that is, with Lenin, Bogdanov and Krasin. The last two considered themselves morally bound by this agreement to the end, especially because just at that time both Kamo himself and a number of other participants in the Tiflis expropriation were in prison under threat of execution, often in extremely difficult conditions, but none of them entered on the path of issuing to the government the secrets of the "board of three" known to them. All assistance to them was carried out by Bogdanov and Krasin. Lenin, the third member of the "board of three", saw the question of

moral obligations differently. The epic of the Tiflis expropriation will not be complete if we do not add that in 1911, after three and a half years of wandering in German and Russian prisons

mothers and psychiatric hospitals, Kamo managed (not without help received from Bogdanov and Krasin) to escape from Tiflis

hospitals. Abroad, he also saw Lenin. There is a story about this meeting by Krupskaya, all the more characteristic, the more undoubted the desire of the narrator to portray Lenin's behavior in a favorable light. Kamo, writes Krupskaya, "was terribly tormented by the fact that a split had occurred between Ilyich, on the one hand, and Bogdanov and Krasin, on the other. He was passionately attached to all three. told him about the state of affairs. Camo asked me to buy him almonds. Sat in our Parisian living room-kitchen, ate almonds, as he did in his homeland, and talked about his arrest in Berlin, about years of simulation, when he pretended to be crazy, about manual Ilyich listened, and was deeply sorry for this selflessly brave man, childishly naive, with a warm heart, ready for great deeds and not knowing what kind of work to take after escaping. His projects were fantastic. Ilyich did not object, carefully tried to put Kamo on the ground, talked about the need to organize transport, etc.

"

In conclusion, since Kamo had only a light summer coat, "Ilyich brought him his soft gray cloak, which his mother gave him and which Ilyich especially liked ... A conversation with Ilyich," Krupskaya adds, "Ilyich's caress calmed Kamo a little" (Krupskaya N.K. Memories of Lenin. S. 161--162). These concluding lines, clearly

designed to soften the impression on the informed reader of the nature of Lenin's reception of a man who suffered exceptionally much, to a large extent through Lenin's fault, do not correspond to reality: Kamo did not calm down in any way, but soon went to Georgia to carry out a new expropriation (the plan of which he developed with Krasin - he also remained true to himself), was arrested when trying to carry it out, was sentenced to death, from which he was saved by the amnesty of 1913. After the revolution, he was a Bolshevik, died in 1922 in an accidental accident.

97 In addition to a number of indications in memoirs (see, for example, Krupskaya N.K. Memories of Lenin. P. 157), there is a message about this burning in the circular of the Police Department dated July 4, 1910: "Recently: a full meeting of the ZBTsK was held from 1) Mark (A.I. Lyubimov), 2) Igor

(B. I. Goldman-Gorev), 3) Tyshko, 4) Ionova (F. Koigen), 5) Latvian. The bureau discussed the following questions: ... 2 About the burning of all five-hundred credit notes left after the Tiflis expropriation of 1907, and burned all those credit notes that could be collected, but 38 remained with engineer Krasin "(Bolsheviks. P. 39). 98 There are many

obscure moments in the history of Krasin's arrest and release at the time. According to the documents of the Police Department, it is clear that the police knew his involvement in the Tiflis expropriation and their role in exchanging five hundred rubles; Zhitomirsky knew about it); on the basis of this information, the Police Department demanded his arrest in Finland, but did not provide the Finnish authorities with evidence of these accusations within the month required by Finnish laws - apparently due to unwillingness to discover the source of their information. these data, the Police Department not only did not report them to the Prussian police, which would not allow Krasin to live in Berlin, but also did not prevent Krasin from returning to St. Petersburg in 1913. 99 Lenin's letter to Gorky dated March 24, 1908. 100 Krupskaya N.K. Memories of Lenin. P. 139. 101 The dates of Lenin's travels that we indicate

here do not quite coincide with those given in the appendices to his Works, especially to the second edition. The "chronological outline" of Lenin's biography in these works is not only very incomplete, but also not always accurate. Krupskaya's book also contains many errors. In particular, she describes Dubrovinsky's speech as a speech at

the report not by Bogdanov, but by Lunacharsky. This is completely untrue. Lunacharsky's report was later, neither Dubrovinsky nor any other of Lenin's supporters spoke at it (after the clash at Bogdanov's report, further speeches were no longer needed for the task that Lenin set). Krupskaya's mistake, which she herself was not at any of these reports, is quite understandable, although it is not clear where exactly she got some details from (see: N. Krupskaya, Memories of Lenin, p. 143-

-144). There is also a report of some agent in the affairs of the Police Department about Dubrovinsky's speech (see: Korden V. Comrade Inokentiy / Ed. Poltkatorzhan. M., 1930. P. 76).

102 Krupskaya N.K. Memories of Lenin. P. 142. 103

Lenin V. I. Works. 4th ed. T. 34. S. 345. 104 This

composition of the new "financial commission" of the BC, elected in August 1908, publ. in the book: Protocols of "Proletary". S. 284, approx. 127.

105 See the report of the head of the St. Petersburg Security Department dated March 28, 1909 (Bolsheviks, p. 22).

106 In addition to Zhitomirsky, who, as indicated above, was a member of the "financial commission" of the BC abroad, the central informants of the police on the Bolsheviks at that time were L.E. Serova-Langvald, who was the technical secretary of the Bureau of the Central Committee in St. Bureau (see: A. Golubkov, From the era of reaction // Proletarian revolution. 1928. No 9. P. 125 and others), as well as M. I. Bryandinsky, who was in 1909-1911. "technical agent of the Central Committee" in Moscow (Bolsheviks. S. XVIII---XIX and others). 107

Application submitted by Bogdanov to

the extended edition

"Proletary" May 31, 1909 (Minutes of "Proletary", p. 162).

108 Krasin at that time directed all attempts to help Kamo. It was on his advice, passed on to Kamo through the defender O. Kond, that Kamo decided to try to simulate insanity (Medvedeva-Ter-Petrosyan S. Comrade Kamo // Proletarian Revolution. 1924. No 8--9. P. 131).

109 In any case, the editors of the "Protocols of the Proletary" in a special note stipulated that "this correspondence is not available in the archives of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute" (p. 281, note 107). 110

Protocols of "Proletary". pp. 123--125. 111

Ibid. P. 124. 112

Ibid. 161. 113 In a

statement addressed to the BC ("extended edition of the Proletary") dated June 1, 1, 900, Bogdanov names Shantser a member of this financial commission (ibid., p. 166). 114 Brief but

meaningful story about relations within the social democratic organization of the Latvian region for 1907-1908

gg. given in Stepan's article "On the Tactical Turn of the Social Democracy in the Latvian Territory" (Voice of the Social Democrat, 1909, No. 15, June, pp. 15-16). 115

See: Fighting group at the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) / Ed. S. M. Pozner / GIZ. M., 19, 2(7).

116 Jan Straujan, a Latvian militant in exile, was arrested while trying to exchange money in Stockholm. See his memoirs "Combat Reality" (Ed. Old Bolshevik, Moscow, 1935); He is. On the history of the forest brothers // Old Bolshevik. 1933. No 3. S. 232--239. 117 At the London

Congress of the RSDLP, Krams-Kronberg voted for admissibility of expropriation (Protocols of Proletary, p. 610).

118 The official announcement of this conference states that the SDLK was unable to attend "due to police conditions". This message evoked a strong protest from the SDLK Foreign Committee, which by that time had freed itself from being captured by "militants" and notified the party organs in a special letter that "at

the party conference, the social democracy of the Latvian region was not represented, not because of police conditions, but because, To our deepest regret, neither the Central Committee of the SDLC nor its Foreign Committee were informed by the Central Committee of the RSDLP about the conference" (Voice of the Social Democrat, 1909, No. 12, March, p. 15). 119 The Plenum also

included a Menshevik in this commission, but he personally appointed N. N. Zhordania as such, who at that time was in prison. Decisions of the plenum published: VKP(b) in resolutions. T. K. M., 1936. S. 122--126.

120 From a letter from R. Luxemburg to Tyshko dated August 10, 1909 // Protocols of "Proletary". P. 260. The letter emphasizes the negative attitude of R. Luxemburg to the "Tatar Marxism" of the Bolsheviks, only in order to sharpen the recognition of the "Meks" (a more dangerous infection for the party), against which R. Luxemburg was then ready to go to the union even with "Tatar Marxism".

121 Protocols of "Proletary". pp. 129-130.

122 There is a letter

Ganetsky, a Polish Social Democrat from a group that stood in opposition to the Tyszko group, where, according to Trotsky, it is reported that at the plenum of the Central Committee in January 1910 "Lenin proposed to arrange a final meeting without Tyszko." Lenin clearly wanted to free himself from dependence on Tyszko, which, however, did not prevent him from using Tyszko again in 1911.

123 Protocols of "Proletary". pp. 165--167. B. I.

NIKOLAEVSKY On the

biography of Malenkov and

the history of the

Communist Party of the USSR CHAPTER 1 "At the foggy dawn

youth...

when Malenkov began his communist career, his defenders emphasized that he came from a working-class family, and they wanted to see in this, if not an excuse, then at least an explanation for his rudeness, which stood out even against the Bolshevik background of those years when such rudeness was common and tavern jargon was intensively cultivated in conversation by Stalin, passing them off as the plebeian style of the Soviet revolution. But the usual life of the average working-class family in old Russia was far from being as rough as it was sometimes tortured. are to be depicted. Of course, there was a lot of primitiveness in him, caused primarily by a low standard of living, although primitiveness does not always give rise to rudeness. More importantly, the reference to Malenkov's working-

class background is not correct at all, since Malenkov did not come from a working-class family. True, later he studied at the Rabfak, but neither he himself, nor his father, nor any of his relatives in general, ever stood behind a working machine. Malenkov, indeed, came from the plebeian ranks of old Russia, but they were by no means the workers, not the proletarian ranks. His father was a peasant-kulak (in the real, and not in the Bolshevik sense of the word) and a prasol-buyer, a real "spider-eater", robbing the whole district, which Malenkov the son did not look like.

only in appearance.

It was from his father that Malenkov the son inherited the basis on which his present appearance grew. But that was just the foundation. Inheritance received from the past, Malenkov-son to such an extent



developed and multiplied that its present distinguishing features would generally be more correctly considered not inherited, but acquired. He did not bring his current rudeness and boundless cruelty from his father's house, but brought up in himself in the apparatus of the Soviet dictatorship, in his offices and dungeons. And if they are characteristic of anything, it is not for the working life of old Russia, not for old Russia in general, but for those new relations that the Communist Party has nurtured in the apparatus of the dictatorship. In her, in this rudeness, that feeling of boundless contempt for people, for human lives and for human dignity, for everything human in man in general, which, of course, existed in embryo in old Russia, but which only now, under the Soviet

dictatorship, filled the entire life of human society.

Malenkov was a product of this milieu. It was she who created it, processing it in her own image and likeness, fitting it to the style she developed. His rudeness made such an impression on observers because it was inextricably linked with ruthlessness and cruelty, with complete inhumanity.

There is no official information about the origin of Malenkov and about the early years of his life. From Soviet biographical information, we only know that he was born on January 8, 1902 (then it was December 26, old style, 1901, that is, the second day of the old Russian Christmas) in Orenburg, and that at the age of "18 years old he volunteered for ranks of the Red Army and from 1919 to 1922 he was a political worker of a squadron, regiment, brigade, political department on the Eastern and Turkestan fronts, "and he formally joined the Communist Party in April 1920. This is all that official Soviet sources say about childhood and youth Malenkov. There is not a word about his parents, or about the school where he studied, or in general about what he did during the first 18 years of his life, before joining the Red Army.

Malenkov, by origin from the peasants of the village of Dedovo, located relatively close to Orenburg, to the northeast of it. If in the mid-1860s. it had 212 households with 2114 inhabitants, then a quarter of a century later, by the beginning of the 1890s, it had grown to 528 households with 3700 inhabitants. Church, school, post office and

telegraph, three water mills, two fairs a year, a weekly market on Saturdays - these are the official data about this village at the end of the 19th century, when a railway was built that connected the region with the centers of the country and gave a powerful impetus to its development. Accurate data on the development of the village in later years are not at our disposal, but it was at the beginning of the 20th

century. its greatest growth falls. Malenkov's father belonged to the number of the most prosperous peasants of the village and not only ran a peasant household, but also was a pradol merchant, kept a small shop, it seems he had a mill, bought and sent flour, fish, eggs, cattle, butter, etc., to the city for sale. - everything that the Orenburg village of that time was rich in. To all appearances, he was a typical representative of the rural merchant bourgeoisie that was then emerging, with great initiative and an indefatigable thirst for profit. The region was rich, almost untouched - at the very borders of the Bashkir nomads, the plunder of the lands of which was then still in full swing. Malenkov's father also traded with the Bashkirs. He could not have large capitals. The more there was a desire to create them. A predator of the era of primitive accumulation, with a strong grip, with an inability and unwillingness to understand the means, education, he does not

had, but he was endowed with natural ingenuity to the highest degree. And the fact that he sent his eldest son, Georgy, to study in a provincial city, giving him to the best secondary educational institution that existed then in Orenburg (there were many of them - two gymnasiums, a real school, two cadet corps, a Cossack cadet school, commercial school, teacher's seminary, theological seminary, etc.) showed that he understood the benefits of education: not many of the people of his career did that at that time. In the gymnasium - it was the first

men's gymnasium in Orenburg, Malenkov-son first appeared in the autumn of 1912 and, having passed the exams brilliantly, entered the second grade immediately. Almost from the very first days, he advanced with his abilities, memory, and ability to work. His memory was brilliant - he remembered everything he heard forever, he easily grasped new thoughts, he knew how to draw conclusions. But he kept on not only with his memory, but read a lot, he worked.

Almost from the very first year he was promoted to the place of the first student in the class - and so he went to the end, becoming a recognized candidate for the gold medal.

He studied in all subjects with a round five: in history, and in literature, and in foreign languages, but his favorite subject was mathematics. He liked to tinker with the solution of complex problems, going far beyond the limits set by the teacher. He wrote well, and in the senior classes the teacher of literature almost constantly forced him to read aloud to the class the essays he had written, exposing them as exemplary in style and clarity of thought. Was a good friend. If asked, he did not refuse to help those who needed it; helped solve

a problem, analyzed a complex theorem, explained a difficult place in a textbook. But there was always a certain chill in his behavior. He definitely kept aloof from the general life of the class, did not take part not only in the usual gymnasium tricks and pranks, but also in sports games, which almost all classmates were fond of. At least his school friend, now recalling those years, no matter how he rummaged through his memory, could not remember Malenkov as a participant in their gymnasium games, just as he could not remember him dancing at gymnasium balls. Restrained, even somewhat withdrawn, always neatly dressed, a little lumpy in appearance, chubby and already at that time with a hint of a double chin, Malenkov got along with few people in the class and in general in the gymnasium. True, over the years there has been a small group of young people with whom he communicated more than with others. But there was no true friendship between them either. Malenkov obviously had some kind of special life of his own, into which he tried not to let any

of his comrades in the gymnasium. This life has been associated with

the life and work of his father, to whom Malenkov the son was very attached, but of whom he was clearly somewhat ashamed. Once, during the war years, on a winter evening, Malenkov said that he must see his father. With a friend, he went to an inn, near the bazaar, to a tavern of the third category "with the right to bring his own drinks." Low, smoky ceilings, dim light from kerosene lamps with poorly cleaned windows, heavy, stale air that hit your nose when you entered from a frosty street. Market day was apparently

successful, and now, over a bottle of intoxicating, there was a summing up. The disputants, apparently, carried out some kind of general operation and now disagreed about the norms for dividing the common profit. The expressions exchanged between the disputants were not among those legalized by the practice of the British Parliament, although they were undoubtedly very colorful. Under low ceilings, they sounded even more weighty than usual in life. Somewhere in the corner it came to a fight, and only with difficulty more balanced could prevent a general dump. Malenkov did not wait for the opportunity to

    speak with his father, who was one of the central figures among those arguing. He handed him the bundle he had brought and, exchanging a few phrases, hurried to take his comrade away. For some time Malenkov walked in silence, obviously putting his thoughts in order. Then he threw a few remarks about "our lack of culture" and how "we still have a lot to learn." It was felt that these thoughts had long been painful for him.

    He was undoubtedly burdened by what he saw, he was ashamed of his father, and at the same time it was felt that this particular environment was a truly native environment for him, that he was well versed in matters that worried her, he was used to its atmosphere from childhood. , became related to her From an early age, he accompanied his father on his business trips, visited the Bashkir steppes with him, knew the breeds of horses, varieties of wool, food prices. Even in his gymnasium years, they met him at city bazaars, at peasant carts with products, he looked, felt with his fingers, tried on his tongue, asked the price. and father. One of the distinguishing features of the gymnasium was a very diverse composition of students in relation to both social and national. Most of these were the children of officials and officers, for whom the gymnasium had been created almost a century before: in a city like Orenburg, it could not be otherwise. After all, it was an "ear city" that Moscow attached to the exits from Central Asia and made it the center for its service people, who were paving the way further and further to the southeast. Since the construction of the railway, especially

after 1905, among the students, people from other strata of the population began to play an increasing role - the children of merchants, wealthy artisans from the city outskirts, and wealthy peasants. There were no Cossacks in this gymnasium - just at that time, on the eve of the World War, the third men's gymnasium was founded, in the creation of which Cossack associations played an important role, and all the children of the Cossacks moved there from the first gymnasium

A noticeable group among the students were children of representatives of national groups of the indigenous inhabitants of the region: Kazakhs and Bashkirs. Attracting children from influential families of the aristocracy of various national groups included in the empire to Russian schools was generally an old rule in the outskirts. In relatively recent years, it was necessary to recruit such students into the gymnasium almost by force, in the order of a kind of duty. At the beginning of the 20th century. it was no longer necessary to resort to violence in this area: the understanding of the role of the Russian school as a factor of familiarization with a common culture was becoming more and more widespread, among the Kazakhs and Bashkirs their own national intelligentsia had already begun to take shape, and an increasing number of people who wanted to study voluntarily knocked on the doors of the Russian school from non-Russian national groups. There were young people not only, and not even so much, from the ranks of the native aristocracy, but also the children of intellectuals, merchants, and t

There were students from Kazakhs and Bashkirs in the class with which Malenkov was walking. Among them there were also overgrown lazy people; and when, for example, Malenkov was in the 4th grade, that is, in the first year of the war, a lot of talk in the gymnasium was caused by the discovery of the fact that one of the Kazakh classmates already had several wives and children. The other side was more important: the students of this group brought to the class an acquaintance with the other side of the life of the region, in which both the Bashkir and the Kazakh national movement began. There was especially much talk about the latter in 1916, when the Kazakh uprising came close to Orenburg.

Two of the Kazakh high school students, Kidras Yulmukhamedov and Ugten Bulibaev, belonged to the small group of four classmates that Malenkov kept to. Characteristically, all four participants were children of people connected in one way or another with trade, and were themselves interested in it. These topics were the main

conversations in which Malenkov took an active part, although he spoke very little about his father's affairs. It is not superfluous to add that both of these Kazakh high school students later went with the Bolsheviks, and in the 1920s. played a certain role in the life of the region.

Personally, Malenkov during that period of great interest in political events were not detected. About the revolutionary movement

and about the revolutionary parties in the gymnasium then generally knew little, or had little interest. Malenkov was among the least interested. He spoke openly about this, declaring that he was not interested in politics and that he wanted to be an engineer and would make every effort to get into the Tomsk Technological Institute after high school. Malenkov did not show his sympathy for the

revolutionary movement, and even more so for Bolshevism, even later, in 1917-1918, when events sharply posed this question before everyone. In Orenburg, these events took place more rapidly than in many other parts of the country. Undoubtedly, the diversity of the national composition of the population exerted its influence. National conflicts, although not yet fully developed, sharpened social antagonisms. Questions were posed, perhaps more simplistic, more primitive, but hands were more easily drawn to weapons. Bolshevik sentiments also appeared in the gymnasium. There were reports from local Bolshevik leaders, and a cell was

created from high school students. Many went to watch and listen, far from being only those who sympathized. Malenkov was not among them. Nobody ranked him among the camp of sympathizers. On the contrary, it seemed that he gravitated towards the camp of opponents. And when in December 1917 - January 1918 the first armed clashes with the Bolsheviks began in Orenburg and the leader of the "whites", the Cossack ataman Dutov issued an appeal calling for the creation of "working squads" from the student youth to strengthen the anti-Bolshevik rear, Malenkov among many other high school students joined this movement. However, he did not show much activity. This episode was generally very short. Nevertheless, he took part in the work on the railway, and, replacing the striking workers, cleared the tracks from snow, unloaded the wagons.

The events of the revolutionary time, of course, brought disorder into the life of the gymnasium. Classes were intermittent. Both students and teachers were not up to "them" when fighting was going on around. At the end of 1918, when the Reds again reached the outskirts of the city, it was decided to hold an accelerated graduation, which was destined to be the last graduation in the history of the old Orenburg male gymnasium. There were no real exams - there was no time for them. The commission decided on the feedback of the teachers, and decided, of course, very condescendingly. "Certificates of maturity" were received by everyone without exception, who was in the eighth grade. This was the class in which Malenkov went. The last thus he graduated from the gymnasium and received all the relevant rights, including the right to a gold medal, which he firmly counted on: it ensured admission to the Tomsk Technological Institute.

he was not given out: there was no time for minting medals. But in the gymnasium books, he was registered as a gold medalist of the 1919 graduation: the last gold medalist, whose name was to be written on the old gold board hanging in the act

hall.

The graduation act, at which diplomas were presented, took place no longer in Orenburg, but in Troitsk, a county town in the northeast of Orenburg, where in early January 1919 the Cossack government, military and government institutions, all the "elite" of old Orenburg migrated, including the high school office.

## CHAPTER 2 The

### Genesis of the "Soviet

Tashkenters" The official Soviet biography of Malenkov says that in 1919 18 years old

As a young man, Malenkov volunteered for the Red Army and then for the next three years was a political worker. What prompted him to do so? What motives could push on this path that Malenkov, whose years of youth we have just met? First of all, it is necessary to establish that Malenkov turned 18 only in January 1920. Therefore, if Soviet biographers talk about the entry

of 18-year-old Malenkov into the Red Army in 1919, then we can only talk about the autumn of 1919, in extreme cases about the end of summer. This circumstance is important for the biography

Malenkov. Orenburg, as indicated above, was one of those cities in Russia where the civil war began earlier and took on extremely acute forms earlier than in many other regions of the country. The armed struggle in the city and outside the city began in November 1917 and continued without interruption until the end of the summer of 1919. The city changed hands several times. The Reds occupied it for the last time on January 22, 1919. But this was by no means the end of the struggle for Orenburg. Having received reinforcements, the Whites launched a counteroffensive, all the more fierce because in the city the Reds carried out cruel reprisals against everyone who supported the Whites in one way or another. The "Red Terror" was declared, and every night there were executions. The Whites rushed to the city, among other things, because almost everyone had one of their relatives, friends or relatives in prison, waiting for reprisals, and the Reds fought with the same ferocity, knowing that if the wheel of military happiness turns over and the whites take the city, then the same fate awaits not only themselves, but also their relatives, their loved ones. Over the next 5-6 months, the city was in a position almost besieged, almost encircled, with a thin line of communication by rail. The fighting went on the outskirts of the city, even in its suburbs.

The situation changed only in June-July, when the great spring offensive of Admiral Kolchak was finally broken, and the Whites, having suffered cruel defeats in battles on the line of the Ural Mountains, near Ufa, Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk), Zlatoust, etc., catastrophically quickly rolled back, deep into Siberia. After that, it was the turn of the whites near Orenburg.

After organizational preparation, Frunze, then appointed commander of the front in Orenburg, in August 1919 gave the order to go over to the decisive offensive. It unfolded with lightning speed: the defeat of Kolchak in the Urals broke the will to fight even among the Orenburg group of whites. Nobody believed in the possibility of victory. Pressed to the sands of the Karakum, the remnants of the whites capitulated to the mercy of the winner. Only small detachments of the irreconcilable, led by the Cossack ataman Dutov, left in horse ranks through the hungry steppes to Chinese Turkestan. On September 13, 1919, the Reds, advancing from Orenburg, connected with the Reds, moving from Tashkent. "Orenburg traffic jam", almost two years



blocking the road to Turkestan, was knocked out. "It's done!" Frunze wrote in the order given to him on this occasion. "The way to Turkestan is clear." With these events, the

great civil war for the Orenburg Territory was over, and it was at this time that Malenkov volunteered for the Red Army. He skillfully chose the time. When the scales fluctuated and participation in the civil war was associated with great risk and required readiness for great sacrifices, he did not take part in it on either side (of course, except for such participation in the episode with the "working squads" of the ataman Dutov). He volunteered for the Red Army only when the big struggle was over.

Undoubtedly, another consideration also influenced Malenkov's decision. The Reds won, immediately after occupying the region, they began its general cleaning. Just from the end of the summer of 1919, the purge of those areas where Malenkov was from began. Before that, the Reds had not looked at the homeland of the latter at all, and the revolutionary committees, food requisitions, the extortion of "grain surpluses", repressions against "class aliens" and "socially dangerous", etc., were a novelty there. The family of Malenkov, his father, a kulak and a rural merchant, could not "not fall under attack. There was only one way to avert the threat, and it was to

Malenkov the son resorted to him: becoming a political worker of the squadron, he turned Malenkov the father from a "class alien" element into Soviet.

The need for such political workers was then exceptionally great. The great civil war was over, but the region was far from being calm. The White movement was crushed because it did not have strong enough and broad enough support from broad sections of the Cossacks and other labor elements of the population of the region. But in these layers there were almost even fewer stable sympathies for the Reds. The first steps of the latter increased the number of dissatisfied. The anti-people essence of the communist dictatorship came to light with ever greater certainty. And it was not at all uncommon that the village, which only yesterday met the Red detachments, and sincerely met them, with bread and salt and the ringing of bells, today drove out the food detachments.

The authorities felt very restless, and from the end of the summer the Bolshevik Orenburg began to form punitive cavalry detachments capable of moving quickly along the steppe country roads. Volunteers were taken into them - easily, without strict verification, leaving those taken to prove their loyalty to the dictatorship in practice. Political workers assigned to such detachments had to follow this, these Chekists mounted on horses ... It was this job that Malenkov

chose for himself with from the very beginning of his Soviet career - even before he formally joined the Communist Party (he did this in April 1920, approximately 6-8 months after the start of his career as a political worker). But Orenburg was only the beginning of Malenkov's Soviet career,

and a very brief one at that. Already at the end of 1919 he was in Turkestan, in the capital of Fergana, the richest cotton-growing region of the country. The "Tashkent" period of his life began. This term in Russian literature has long had a figurative meaning, which must be remembered when writing a biography of Malenkov. The accession of Turkestan, carried out in stages during the 1860s-1870s, was marked by the revelation in the then Russian reality of a new type, which was immortalized in literature by the Russian satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin under the name of "Tashkent". This is the most striking type of colonialist, not only for Russian literature, rushing for easy money on the ways of robbing the newly conquered region. With indignant strokes, Shchedrin outlined his appearance, which also revealed the inner essence of people of this type: a wolfish grin of teeth, burning eyes, prominent cheekbones and the death grip of a predator that would rather die than release what was squeezed between its jaws ... A representative of that

part of the Russian intelligentsia, whose task was to serve the people, not distinguishing between Hellenes and Jews, Shchedrin put all the pathos of his anger into exposing this type of predator, whose activity, if the Russians themselves had not fought against him, would have put the stigma on the Russian culture, Russian business in general...

At the Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR in October 1952, speaking of literature, Malenkov spoke with great insistence about the need for a Soviet Shchedrin, who, with the same force and

passionately, like Shchedrin of the last century, would fall upon the dark sides of the Soviet era... If such a Shchedrin could come in our days, then one of the first he would have to draw the image of a "Soviet Tashkent citizen" who brought the "communist basis" under his "Tashkent" practice and specialized in the transfer of outlying natives from the primitive nomadic state in stages to the communist paradise. At the same time, the new Shchedrin would not forget

to point out that the first exemplary nursery of this breed of "Soviet Tashkenters" was the very political department of the Turkfront, in whose staff the same young Malenkov set his first records, who in adulthood yearned for the Soviet Shchedrin. This Malenkov was then a very small man, the fifth spoke in the

Soviet chariot. But this chariot was already rolling along the high road of Soviet history. The old Russian power in Turkestan was maintained not only and even not so much by the direct violence of the military garrisons stationed in the region, but by the fact that it established and maintained order in Turkestan, providing the necessary minimum conditions for the economic and cultural development of the region. There were many shortcomings, mistakes and outright crimes in the activities of the Russian administration planted in the region. But for the region, which for centuries before lived in the conditions of the Asian Middle Ages and was also divided into a good dozen independent khanates, the orders brought to the region by the Russian administration were a huge step forward. The peoples inhabiting the region were far from being satisfied with these new orders. Opposition moods held strong not only among the indigenous population of the region, but also among Russian newcomers, whose number was growing rapidly. In the elections to the State Duma, Turkestan invariably voted for left-wing candidates. The sentiments of the young national movements, whose formation proceeded at a rapid pace, were also democratic. There were many unresolved problems and poorly smoothed out contradictions, but they gradually appeared in the order of the day, and elements for their peaceful resolution were growing in life.

The revolution has extremely sharpened the complex web of these national, social and political contradictions, placing them all at once on the order of the day of urgent modernity.

There were no Bolshevik organizations in Turkestan before the revolution, but after the revolution, from the summer of 1917, the Bolshevik elements began to find favorable ground, especially among the soldiers of the local garrisons, and many fellow travelers poured into the organization. There were few old Bolsheviks with theoretical baggage and political experience in these organizations. It was not they who became the leaders of the organizations, but usually unknown people - either young fanatics, or enterprising businessmen, or even political adventurers of a dubious type. The primitive slogans that the Bolshevik center then threw from the capital into the depths of the rearing country were repeated here in a much more primitive, coarsened form.

After the October revolution in the capitals, the Bolsheviks came to power in Turkestan as well. In essence, it was a dictatorship over the edge of the garrisons of the occupying army. Some support was provided by some urban workers. Small groups of individual young intellectuals from the nationalities of the indigenous population of the region were also drawn here, who hoped to achieve the state independence of Turkestan through the collapse of the country caused by the Bolsheviks. But these were only small details that did not change the main essence of the picture: the Bolshevik power of the first two years in Turkestan was the dictatorship of the garrisons of the occupying army, which was cut off from their centers.

Cut off from the center for two years, the Bolsheviks tried to pursue the same policy of uniting armed people, who constituted a small minority in the population of the region, who, by means of mass terror, relying all the time on armed force, tried to force the country to change not only political forms of government, but also the very foundations of economic relations, and from a privately owned economy based on individual property, to pass to a state economy, led precisely by them, by this small armed minority. The difference from other parts of Russia consisted only in the fact that in Turkestan this armed minority was even smaller than in most other regions of the country, and therefore, in order to stay in power, it had to resort to acts of terror more often, to carry them out in cruder forms. to make them even more widespread.

The anti-peasant edge of this policy, which was very clearly seen in the center, was all the more emphasized in Turkestan because the social contradiction here was intertwined and supplemented by a national contradiction.

The results were very bizarre and hard to bear even for the Bolsheviks. The Turkestan experiment of the Bolshevik dictatorship looked like an evil caricature: the foundations of the Bolshevik all-Russian experiment were preserved in it, but they were given such a caricatured form that the experimenters refused to recognize their own work. An attempt was made to place all responsibility on local

organizations.

A special commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party was sent to Turkestan, which arrived in the region immediately after the establishment of the railway connection. Safarov, one of the members of this commission, in his book "The Colonial Revolution (Experience of Turkestan)", citing really interesting material about the management of the Bolsheviks in the region in 1917-1919, in the following phrases sums up the general result "Colonial

criminality was bizarrely intertwined with Bai interests. All methods of feudal-usurious exploitation and class oppression were transferred under the Soviet roof. The personnel of the holders of power changed somewhat, the old forms of police-fiscal organization remained"<sup>1</sup>.

Local communists, especially non-Russian communists, wrote even more harshly. X. Burnashev, one of the communist leaders in Ferghana (i.e., just the area where, as we will see below, Malenkov worked during the first period of his stay in Turkestan), the Soviet policy of 1918-1919. defined it as a policy of "bratty guardianship of the local national economy, accompanied by food robbery."

"All attempts," he wrote, "by a few workers' organizations to invest appropriate content in the October coup, were completely erased in the nightmarish chaos of shameless robberies, violence, bullying by the dictatorial Soviet city over the village, doomed to everything by the will of the Soviet

hardships of indemnities, confiscations, forced labor and military service"<sup>2</sup>.

The inevitable result of this malicious "bungling" was a massive resistance movement of the local population, especially the non-urban population. It must be emphasized that attempts at resistance were also made by some groups of the Russian population. In particular, there were a number of actions by the workers. But of course, the struggle of the rural population, almost entirely non-Russian in its national composition, was of primary importance. This movement, called the Basmachi, was basically the movement of the local peasantry, who resisted the experiment on them by the dictatorship of Frunze, who was then commander of the troops of the

Turkestan Front, in his

in an order dated May 23, 1920, he gave the following assessment to the Basmachi:

"The local government [in the Ferghana region in 1918-1919] did everything possible for the first time of its existence to alienate the working population, instead of attracting wide circles of the working and peasant population, European and native, to power. The leading bodies of power were seized by groups of adventurers who wanted to fish in troubled waters. Instead of the nationalization of production, there was an open robbery not only of the bourgeoisie, but also of the middle strata of the population. Instead of protecting the Muslim poor from the various, impossible abuses were committed against them. The units of the Red Army troops operating here in the hands of some leaders turned into defenders of revolution and the working people into an instrument of violence "hell. On this basis, a movement was created, known as the Basmachi. Basmachi are not just robbers: if it were so, then, of course, they would have been done away with long ago. No, the main forces of the Basmachi were hundreds and thousands of those who were somehow hurt or offended by the former [Soviet] government: seeing no protection anywhere, they went to the Basmachi

and thereby gave them unprecedented strength "<sup>3</sup>. This decisive criticism of the past was needed by the central communists who came to Turkestan as victors at the end of 1919 in order to absolve themselves of responsibility for this past. In no case did they want and could not (often quite sincerely could not) admit that the evil was not at all in the "bungling" of local communists, but in the criminal fallacy of the main political

line taken by the central leaders of the Communist Party. And that it was precisely this main line that forced, and could not but force, the communists in the localities to embark on the path of "goofy" experiments. But the essence of the matter was not at all in dissociating ourselves from what had been done in the recent past, but in outlining a policy for the future.

The development of this issue was carried out both at the center, in Moscow, and locally, in Turkestan, and a certain division of labor was established: in Moscow they were mainly busy looking for a theoretical solution to the problem, and in Turkestan they thought most of all about practical measures that would correspond to the interests of the dictatorship .

In Moscow, the Turkestan problem was viewed as a special case of a large general problem - the path of development of communism in backward countries: what should the communists do if, as a result of certain conditions, they found themselves in power in countries where there is still no industrial proletariat of their own and where pre-capitalist forms of production still dominate

venous relations? The dispute was about whether the capitalist stage of development is necessary for such backward peoples and countries, or can they come to communism on non-capitalist paths of development, jumping over the capitalist stage?

Translated from the language of abstract formulas into the language of Soviet reality in 1920, the question was as follows: if the capitalist stage of development is necessary, then in such economically backward regions as Turkestan, where significant masses of the population live in conditions of patriarchal-clan relations and where there is absolutely no of its industrial proletariat, the Soviet dictatorship must renounce interference in the economic life of the region, leaving freedom there for the development of capitalist forms of production. And since there are many economically backward regions like Turkestan in Russia, this meant creating centers of capitalist restoration everywhere within the Soviet organism. It was possible not to draw this conclusion only if the general possibility of development towards socialism, bypassing the capitalist phase, was theoretically recognized.

This question was put before the Comintern at the Second Congress of the latter in the summer of 1920, Lenin was the speaker. The problem was new to the vast majority of delegates, especially delegates from other countries. The question was not raised to a great height, its far-reaching significance for the destinies of not only Russian but also world communism was not even outlined. Lenin himself, apparently, did not aspire to this. As a result, in the adopted resolution, the Congress recognized the possibility of a non-capitalist path of development for backward countries, subject to the obligatory condition of active assistance from countries where the proletariat was already in power, firstly, and a cautious, long-term policy of dictatorship, secondly. The

main political conclusion to which this decision was bound was correctly formulated by Stalin in his article summing up the work of this congress in the field of the national problem. "From cavalry raids on the part of the 'immediate communization' of the backward masses of the people," he wrote, "it is necessary to move on to a prudent and well-thought-out policy of gradually drawing these masses into the general channel of Soviet development"<sup>4</sup>.

The theoretical discussion of the issue at the congress was blurred, but the fundamental significance of the decision was exceptionally great: if the October uprising and the then seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in Russia laid the foundation stone for the domestic policy of the Soviet dictatorship, legalizing the principle of violence by a minority against the majority within a given country, then the decision of the Second Congress of the Comintern on the

question of a non-capitalist path of development became the main stone for the foreign policy of the dictatorship, although still in an extremely cautious form, but it established the principle of the possibility of building the Soviet system, relying on a force external to a given country, a given

Communist practice in Turkestan was guided by this theory developed in Moscow. The Turkestan Commission of the Central Committee of the Party, somewhat later transformed into the Turkestan Bureau of the Central Committee, became the highest party body in the region. Local organizations, as guilty of the mistakes of 1917-1919, were subjected to a brutal defeat. Their more or less significant workers of all-Russian origin, if they did not fall for their activities under more



severe punishments, were evicted from Turkestan to other regions of the country in the order of party discipline. The Communists of national groups could not, of course, be expelled. But they were severely curtailed in their rights and were actually deprived of the right to hold positions that gave them real power over the armed forces, over punitive bodies, over key positions in the economy. In particular, they were completely denied access to more or less responsible posts along the line of the Cheka--GPU. The main body

of the Soviet dictatorship in the region became the political apparatus of the Turkestan Front, those units of the Red Army that came to Turkestan as victors from the center. The decision on this was undoubtedly made in advance, even before the transfer of the headquarters of the Turkfront to Tashkent. The third conference of communist organizations of the 1st Army of the Turkistan, which met at the end of 1919, before this resettlement, decided that it was necessary for army communists not only "to enter all the party and Soviet institutions of Turkestan to direct party and organizational work", but also "start correcting the policy of the Turkestan comrades". More specifically and in detail, the question of the tasks and tactics of this work was developed in the decisions of the congress of political workers of the Turkfront, which took place in Tashkent in June 1920. This was

nothing more than the establishment of the actual and even formal dictatorship of the political workers of the Turkfront, i.e., the occupying army, not only over the edge in general, not only over

the apparatus of the Soviet power of the region, but also over the entire communist movement in Turkestan. To complete the picture, it must be added that this dictatorship of the political workers of the Turkfront was also extended to the organs of terror. Safarov specifically emphasized in his book: "Since the Turkestan Cheka has so far served mainly as an instrument of personal-group rivalry and instead of fighting counter-revolution, cases have been started in it against objectionable persons, all emergency punitive activity

willy-nilly concentrated in the Special Department Turkfront"<sup>5</sup>. As we can see, there

have been very few changes in the social support of the dictatorship: both during the years of the "Orenburg traffic jam" and

after its elimination, the Bolshevik dictatorship in Turkestan was the dictatorship of the occupying army. The only difference was that the composition of this occupying army had changed, and the place of the old regiments formed back in the pre-revolutionary years was occupied by regiments formed by the personnel of political officers who had gone through the school of the civil war. This apparatus was well disciplined, did not allow any self-will, and accurately carried out the policy that the center prescribed for it. From that moment on, the Turkestan region became the arena of a great experiment, the distinctive feature of which was the complex game of the Soviet dictatorship with the population in the political, social and national spheres; a game played by the communists with exceptional perseverance and cruelty. The dictatorship pretended to give big concessions to national - not Russian - groups of the population in the planes of religious-national and social-everyday relations. All over Turkestan, "conferences of non-party people" were held, in which the authorities especially tried to attract the most prominent representatives of the Muslim clergy and wealthy strata of the non-urban population. Such conferences were arranged with theatrical solemnity: the first rows in the hall and the seats on the presidium were invariably occupied by "honorary old men" in bright oriental robes, turbans, etc. Decisions were made to restore the land rights of the Muslim clergy and national duties in favor of the latter. They tried to introduce mullahs to the local Soviets. Representatives of national groups were persistently invited into the ranks of communist organizations, and Muslim communists were not charged for visiting mosques, they turned a blind eye to their preservation of harems, etc. Of course, economic benefits were widely used, they were given complete freedom of trade in the bazaars, handicraft and trade enterprises, they even tolerated trade with foreign countries, etc.

But all this was only external. They did not contain any genuine concessions either to the respective national groups or to the democratic sections of the population in general, in the sense that the communists did not let the slightest bit of real power out of their hands.

which, under the guise of these ostentatious concessions, at that very time was carrying out feverish work to create its own durable and efficient apparatus, capable of

become an obedient tool in the hands of the dictatorship and suitable for all sorts of foreseen and unforeseen accidents.

The official network of Soviet institutions, formally listed as having all the power in the region, actually did not have any power, it was only tolerated for the time being. But behind the scenes, an apparatus appointed from above of the actual holders of power was being built, who, it is true, rejected "cavalry raids on the part of the immediate communization of the region," but who were least of all opponents of forced communization in general. On the contrary, they worked in the name of just this communization. They only knew its difficulties, they knew that it would be possible to introduce it only in a tough struggle against the vast majority of the population of the region, and therefore they conducted "cautious and thorough preparations", in the words of Stalin, for the "gradual involvement" of the peoples of the region in the "general channel of Soviet policy ". This complex

internal political game was further complicated by the introduction of elements of the big foreign policy game into it. Even before moving to Turkestan, the 3rd Conference of the Communist Cells of the 1st Army of the Turkestan Front (it met in Orenburg in November 1919) included "support for the revolutionary movement in the countries neighboring Turkestan" in the list of the most important and priority tasks of its work in Turkestan. First of all, it was, of course, about India, about anti-English movements: anti-English notes are especially characteristic of the entire foreign policy of the Soviet government in those years. It was for these reasons that the policy of the Turkestan representatives of the central government at one time sounded notes of sympathy for the pan-Turkic and even pan-Islamist movements, the wind of which the Soviets sought to take into their sails, directing it exclusively against the British Empire.

The point was not only that pan-Turkist ideas were then openly preached by some of the Muslim ministers who held important positions in the regional government. Even more important was the general policy setting pursued by the Turkcommission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which, since November 1919, became the supreme body

power in Turkestan. This policy was such that the local population at first perceived it as a policy directed against the Russians. D Furmanov, the head of the political department of the Turkfront in the first months after the liquidation of the "Orenburg traffic jam", was undoubtedly an observant person and in his diary, in notes for himself, he tried to frankly summarize his impressions. In March 1920, he rode on horseback from Tashkent to Verny (now Alma-Ata) and recorded on the way. "Decrees of the central

government (at least on land) are here in the village  
are refracted in such a way that now everything and everything belongs to

Muslims lie, that only Muslims are in power and should be, and the newcomers must get out on their way ... It must be shown, - adds Furmanov, - that some Muslims are communists ... in their hearts they completely agree with this ugly interpretation "6.

This game with the Pan-Turkists culminated in the agreement that Lenin concluded with Enver Pasha, the leader of the extreme, most aggressive wing of the Turkish chauvinists, who adhered to the pro-German and anti-English orientation during the First World War. In the autumn of 1920, a congress of the peoples of the East was convened in Baku, which was an attempt by the Comintern to lead the movement of the peoples of the East against British imperialism. Zinoviev openly declared this at the congress, and the whole congress was generally held under the slogans of a holy war against Great Britain. Enver played a big role in it, and after the congress, Lenin concluded a secret agreement with him, by virtue of which Enver undertook, uniting all Turkestan Basmachi under pan-Turkist slogans, to take them on a campaign to India<sup>7</sup>. These adventurous plans collapsed, and moreover, sooner than could be expected. In

Turkestan, where Enver arrived in the autumn of 1921, he was enthusiastically received, but by that time his mood was far from the desire to pay the bills that he issued in Moscow. True, there were calls for a holy war, but they were not calls to go to India for the ghazawat against the British. Instead, Enver himself went over to the Basmachi camp and tried to lead them for a holy war, but already against the Bolsheviks.

True, Enver did not succeed on this path either, just as he did not have lasting success in almost all the convolutions of his confused life. Soon he died, hacked to death in a fight with a detachment of special forces, of the same type, the "political worker" in which Malenkov began his career. Enver's corpse was buried unidentified somewhere on the side of one of the back roads of Eastern Bukhara, and only later, according to his watch, which was picked up by one of the participants in that fight, it became known whose head was then blown off by a dashing blow of an unknown "Chonov"<sup>8</sup>.

Enver's adventure confused many cards

in the already complicated game of the Bolsheviks. The Basmachi movement, which in essence never stopped, flared up with renewed vigor and captured almost the entire "paradise. Soviet power held on only in the cities - the whole village (kishlaks) did not recognize it, did not follow its decrees, did not obey its orders. The Basmachi ruled there The disparate detachments of which each acted at their own risk and fear. The authorities rushed from one extreme to another. Non-party conferences, at which the Communists played fraternization with the mullahs,

were interspersed with public executions in the bazaars of captured Basmachi and their relatives, who were declared hostages. The punitive organs worked tirelessly. The "Budyonovites" were urgently brought from the Polish borders, who "combed" the restless areas with fire and sword. All operations were led by the command of the Turkfront and its tried and tested political department.

The results were not long in coming: famine struck - a terrible one that claimed millions of human lives. A number of areas were deserted. But the Soviet government held on, from year to year showing more and more perseverance, more and more tenacity, and lowered the power of its apparatus of power and suppression deeper and deeper into the people's ranks. The top leadership of the ruling party considered these results as proof of the correctness of the diagnosis and the possibility of "gradual involvement" of the region in the general course of Soviet

development. A small episode from Stalin's biography, which is extremely characteristic both for him personally and for the entire era, dates back to this time. In the autumn of 1921, at a meeting of the collegium of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, headed by Stalin at that time, a representative of the Bashkir Republic, who had just arrived in Moscow, made a report on

Everyone listened to the terrible story with deep emotion. In one place, one of the listeners burst out a remark: "But it's one horror, what's going on!" Stalin, who was leading the meeting, cut short:

"Horror, this is when it comes to an individual. When it comes to millions, this is not horror, but statistics ... Comrade, continue your report!" The

speaker was no longer interrupted, and if in 1921 the Soviet government turned to the Americans for help, then Stalin was not to blame. Later, when he became the "owner" of the country, the terrible "statistics" marched indefatigably through the richest, most lucrative regions of the country, and he never reckoned with the number of those who died.

Malenkov served in Turkestan in the 2nd Turkestan Division, stationed in the Fergana Valley, in the former Khanate of Kokantskom, having headquarters in the city of Skobelev, the former New Margelan, and now the city of Fergana. It was a very small town, in which, according to the 1897 census, there were only five and a half thousand inhabitants. Later, on the eve of the First World War, the city grew greatly, as the administrative center of the region was transferred to it. This transfer was due to the exceptionally mild, healthy climate for which the area where the city is located was famous. But even after this transfer, the number of residents of the city of Fergana did not exceed ten thousand.

The population was divided into two groups: the local population, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Tajiks - merchants and cotton growers, and the alien population, Russian - officials, military, merchants. They lived apart, almost without touching each other. This continued after the revolution. The 2nd Turkestan division, which came to the region at the end of 1919, occupied all the buildings that belonged to the old tsarist garrison. The commissar of this division was a certain Sukhov. A man of intelligent mind, an enterprising, staunch communist from the Left SRs. Malenkov became something of a personal secretary under Sukhov.

An entire division with a long military history in the Fergana Valley was stationed far from by chance: since 1918 this valley has been one of the main, if not the main, center of the Basmachi movement. The entire economic life of this region from pre-revolutionary years depended on cotton growing, which developed especially rapidly during

last decade before the First World War. The October Revolution brought complete ruin to this area: the Bolshevik decree on the confiscation of all stocks of cotton, in whose hands they would not exacerbate, played were, huge role V an anti-Bolshevik movement, although the basis of the crisis was the complete destruction of transport, which suspended the export of cotton to the central provinces, where it was processed. As a result, the entire agricultural population of the region, who lived mainly by cotton growing, joined the Basmachi.

The political department of the 2nd Turkestan Division, as soon as it arrived in the region, immediately launched a broad propaganda among the population, sharply dissociating itself from the "perversions of the Bolshevik policy" committed by the former rulers of the region, urging the Basmachi to abandon the hopeless struggle. All members of the Basmachi detachments, of course, were declared a complete amnesty on the condition of immediate disarmament. This campaign in Ferghana was directed by the same Sukhov, the political commissar of the 2nd Turkestan division, whose secretary was Malenkov. He was then very young - just in Ferghana he

turned 18 years old. The campaign for the disarmament of the Basmachi went on at first with great success. People were tired of the war and dreamed of peace, of a peaceful life. Local Muslim communists, attracted to this work by the Turkfront, went to the mountains, where the Basmachi rebel detachments were holding, and their assurances made a strong impression. They undoubtedly themselves believed that the representatives of the central government who had come from Moscow really bring peace and a fair solution to the region national disputes. But very soon, by the spring of 1920, the situation began to change dramatically. The illusions of the population quickly disappeared. Words of ne

the rulers of power sounded, however, not as it was before the arrival of the plenipotentiary representatives of the center; in the plane of national relations, the new government flirted with the population of the region, but the general policy, in its socio-economic basis, was almost worse than before. It was carried out, in any case, more rigorously. As a result, very soon from the "Muslim units" of the Red Army, where all the disarmed Basmachi were enrolled, an ever-growing desertion to the mountains began. Decision on

the transfer of these units to Tashkent led to their refusal to obey the order. The personal intervention of Frunze, the then commander of the Turkfront, however, prevented an armed uprising, but the Basmachi uprisings, which had begun earlier, in the spring of 1920, again assumed large proportions. On May 15, Frunze ordered the commander of the 2nd Turkestan division to "immediately begin decisive action" against the Basmachi, who had recently made two major attacks on parts of the division. Soon the 2nd division was transferred from Fergana to the southeast, to guard the border with Afghanistan. And when the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs Chicherin, in one of his speeches, reminded England of the Russian bayonets that again shone on the heights of the Pamirs, he had in mind the bayonets of the 2nd Turkestan division. Afghanistan was then the center that supported the Basmachi movement in Turkestan and especially in the mountainous regions of the Uzbek and Tajik Soviet republics bordering on it<sup>9</sup>. The 2nd division fell to the fight against the Basmachi in these areas, until that time there were very few surveyed and hard-to-reach. Basmachism here held on especially stubbornly. It was this area that was chosen as a stronghold for Enver Pasha's movement. The Gissar valley, the regions of the Vakhsh and Pyanj rivers, the mountain slopes of the Western Pamir - everywhere, in all the nooks and crannies of this wild and majestic land in its wildness, large and small detachments of the 2nd Turkestan division visited. For the region, these detachments carried far from peace. The center of the Hissar region in the old days was a small town. Dushanbe differed from ordinary villages only in size: at the turn of the 20th century there were about 500 houses in it, almost entirely of adobe saklya. In 1920-1922. Dushanbe changed hands several times, withstood sieges, and was the scene of fierce battles. And when, on July 14, 1922, detachments of the Red Army finally entered it, only ruins remained from the town, in which several sick and hungry residents huddled<sup>10</sup>. Only later, Dushanbe, converted into Stalinabad, turned into a large industrial and cultural center, became the capital of the Tajik Republic CHAPTER 3 Moscow students in 1922-1924.



In 1922, Malenkov was demobilized from the Red Army (then many were demobilized in connection with the end of the civil war) and, having moved to Moscow, entered the Moscow Higher Technical School. Later, he liked to say that he was always drawn to engineering, in which he saw his vocation from his youth. Much speaks for the fact that Malenkov really had such a craving, and his gymnasium plans to enter the Tomsk Technological Institute, which he shared with friends, undoubtedly corresponded to his true moods.

At that time, Soviet Russia, to use the language of the editorials of the time, entered a period of "difficulties in the recovery period." They were big and sharp. Not only because we had to start with infinitesimal values. In the center was the problem of relations between the city and the countryside, although many others were intertwined with it, more private, but sometimes even more acute. In

the winter of 1920-1921, during the disputes that later grew into a discussion about the trade unions (this pseudonym covered the end of the great struggle of the communist trade unionists against the plans of Lenin and Trotsky to turn the trade unions into organs of dictatorship to monitor the workers), Lenin in private conversations with he never tired of repeating to his closest friends: "Not in this, not in the trade unions, the essence of the moment is the essence of what the village will tell us in the spring!"

There was no need to wait for spring: disputes about trade unions unfolded when the village was already beginning to speak, and a little later, from January 1921, fires of peasant uprisings flared up in Siberia and the Urals, through the Tambov forests and across the Ukrainian steppes. In February, workers' strikes in large centers began to echo with them, leading the country to an uprising in Kronstadt, where the peasant line of protests closed with the line of workers' protests. The dictatorship was forced to retreat. And only the exceptional maneuverability of Lenin saved the Bolsheviks. Hastily, Lenin jettisoned the policy of "war communism" based on the desire for coercive regulation of the entire peasant economy, and proclaimed the NEP, the New Economic Policy, which recognized the peasant's right to the freedom of his individual economy. "The peasant corrected us," Lenin said then, promising

"seriously and for a long time" to abandon communist experiments on the countryside. But the struggle between the dictatorship and the countryside was far from over. She was just entering a new phase, more protracted, but no less merciless.

From that moment began the process of restoration of the country's economy. But he went through great difficulties. The industry worked with great interruptions. Relations with the countryside were not good. At that time, much was written about "scissors" - about the growing discrepancy between the prices of products in the city and the countryside. It was difficult for them not to disperse: no matter how weakened the village was during the years of the civil war, it quickly raised the plowing to 80% of the pre-war time, and iron production by the end of 1922, as P. Bogdanov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, then reported at the Congress of Soviets, accounted for only 4% of pre-war production. To raise production, the leaders of industry needed state assistance, but the state could not give it: from the report of the People's Commissariat of Finance Sokolnikov at the same Congress of Soviets, in December 1922, it became known that the income part of the state budget

then amounted to only 1% of its expenditure side. Under these conditions, the discrepancy between the prices of urban and rural products could not be reduced. It had to

grow, and the discontented village could not but react to it. The problem of relations with the countryside also lay at the basis of all disputes within the Communist Party. It was during these years that the main groupings of the next decade began to take shape at the top of the Communist Party: a grouping of supporters of a policy that takes into account the needs of the peasantry, goes towards its interests; and a grouping of supporters of the accelerated industrialization of the country by methods of state violence against the countryside, supporters of the use, as Sokolnikov then said, of the methods

of "military-feudal exploitation of the countryside." Lenin called for caution. "Remember the bond with the peasantry," he warned, "remember that we are riding a tired peasant horse and that attempts to jump over on a proletarian trotter, the inability to live with a peasant horse would mean proof that the proletariat is a bad, inept, inexperienced master."

But Lenin at that time was already a seriously ill person and could not, did not have the strength to carry his views through the web of party chancelleries, which were already headed by Stalin. And soon after Lenin passed away, however, having written a will demanding the removal of Stalin, but no longer being able to insist on carrying it out. The voices of others who thought in the same direction sounded far from being so

authoritative, although there were many big party workers among them. Frunze, the recent commander of the Turkestan Front, having traveled around the Ivanovo region in the summer of 1923, warned of the growth of anti-Soviet sentiments there: "Obviously," he concluded from his observations, "we have crossed those limits that are politically acceptable." But the Ivanovo region, with its peasantry, which almost organically merged with the workers of textile factories, during the first years of the revolution was one of the most pro-Bolshevik-minded regions of the country. Even more disturbing for

the authorities were the impressions made by AI Rykov, then chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, from his trip in the summer of 1924 to the Volga regions. Observations convinced Rykov that the reasons for the dissatisfaction of the countryside lay far beyond the "scissors", even far from the economy alone: the village already realized that it was also dissatisfied with the political dictatorship of the Communist Party. She took this dictatorship as she saw it.

"There is no election in the management of the village," Rykov summed up his observations, "the bosses are all newcomers, appointed; upon arrival, they first get a good apartment, farm, cows, pigs and other delights. The bosses live apart from the population, furnish themselves all the attributes, so that a mere mortal without recommendations and not behold the authorities"<sup>13</sup>.

Rykov spoke of the unbearability of such a situation, especially for a country where there are 100 million peasants for five million industrial proletariat. He was especially persistent in speaking about the inadmissibility of attempts to establish a "dictatorship of factory life. "We production" over all interests in the country's economic have a political dictatorship of the proletariat," he warned at the Thirteenth All-Party

conferences, but not the economic dictatorship of the factory. These are two completely different things!"

The position of the Russian peasants on the Volga, as we see, was not much different from the position of the peasants - dekhkans in Fergana. Their sentiments towards the communist dictatorship also differed little. And the village reacted to the policy of the latter as best it could and could: already in 1924, the sown area was reduced by 15%, and in the next elections to the Soviets, the village responded to the policy of the dictatorship with the almost complete expulsion of communists from the lower bodies of the Soviet apparatus, including the

Soviets and the county. others. This crisis in relations with the countryside could not but affect the mood of the city, whose working strata of the population in Russia have always been firmly connected with the countryside. In the

In the end, it was under his influence that the mood of students in higher educational institutions, that is, the environment into which Malenkov found himself in the fall of 1922, also took shape. All the higher educational institutions of the USSR were then overcrowded, especially the higher educational institutions in Moscow. A mass of young people poured in from factories and plants, from trees. There were many demobilized, participants in the world war and the civil war. Many came insufficiently prepared, sometimes almost illiterate. For them, special departments were created, the so-called workers' faculties - workers' faculties, where they were admitted without any certificates or exams. They were filled mainly by young people who came on business trips of various trade unions and factory committees, communist organizations, rural Soviets, etc. The knowledge of the young people of this group was often completely insufficient, and they caused great difficulties for professors, reducing the level of their audiences. But sincere desire to learn from this youth was usually in abundance. They lived in bad conditions, spent the night almost on the streets, were starving and getting cold, among them there were catastrophically many sick people<sup>15</sup>. But, as long as they had enough strength, they "gnawed the granite of science

with their teeth," as Trotsky said about them just at that time. They came to the walls of educational institutions with the moods of the milieu from which they came out - from the workers, peasants, raznochinnyy lower classes of "uplifted Russia". These sentiments were not uniform. Many internal antagonisms were woven into them. The country was tired of the civil war and re

inner world, but was densely saturated with elements of discontent. These contradictory moods brought young people to universities; and the atmosphere in them was far from peaceful, far from calm. In 1920-1922.

there were a number of conflicts at the universities and other higher education institutions in Moscow caused by the government's attempts to destroy the autonomy of higher education. The policy of the communists was sharpened against the democratic students. Back in the summer of 1919, Professor M.N. Pokrovsky, then Deputy People's Commissar of Education for Higher Education, openly declared to the delegates of the St. First of all, public student organizations<sup>16</sup>.

The political actions of the students, which then took place under democratic slogans, especially unnerved the government. In the spring of 1921, the authorities responded to gatherings and demonstrations with which Moscow students reacted to the beating of political prisoners in Moscow prisons with the early closure of the university and forced, by the forces of the Chekists, the eviction of students from government dormitories, throwing things out into the street, with the

forced sending of entire groups students to train stations for deportation to their homeland, etc. Central student associations were liquidated in 1919-1920, the authorities did not allow new elections to the councils of elders, but grassroots organizations, such as course committees, all kinds of cultural and help associations, etc. d., still holding on. And a significant part of them was in the hands of independent students.

There were many student circles, some of which were a front for uniting active opponents of the dictatorship. Among the students there were also party groups of already driven underground, but not yet destroyed democratic and socialist parties. They published their own underground organs addressed to the youth: Narodniks ("Aspiration"), Mensheviks ("Young Proletarian", "Young Deed", etc.), etc., organized their own circles, held secret congresses. There were quite a few opponents of the dictatorship among the professors—democrats and liberals—who

stubbornly defended their right to think freely and express their thoughts freely. Their audiences were especially crowded.

The dictatorship then had little experience in dealing with such opponents. From the very beginning, its apparatus was ferocious in reprisals against participants in all kinds of uprisings. But he has not yet penetrated deep into the masses of the people. In the network of his observation, he absorbed by no means all segments of the population. In particular, he had neither the skills nor special bodies to oversee higher education institutions. Methods for combating students have not yet been worked out.

From the point of view of the authorities, the situation was especially aggravated by the fact that among the ranks of communist students, who were supposed to serve as the main support of the dictatorship in universities, the mood was also far from always quite favorable. There were a lot of communist students in Moscow at that time,<sup>17</sup> but not all of them were willing to turn into an obedient tool of the dictatorship. In addition to the official party organizations, which could only include members of the party, Komsomol organizations were working in the universities, access to which was much freer, as well as broad associations of "proletarian students" that adjoined the communists. The consciousness of common interests with other students among the workers of all these organizations was far from eradicated, relations between communist and non-communist students were often close; and in student movements, especially when they arose on purely academic grounds, many students who politically sided with the communists sometimes went along with

their non-communist colleagues, took part in meetings, filed petitions, occasionally even ended up in prison

That was how matters stood in higher education in the spring of 1922, when Stalin became general secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and began carefully, but firmly, to pick up the reins of party management. Considering now from a distant historical perspective, his activities, one cannot help but admit that from his point of view he led the work as a skillful strategist, able not only to correctly outline shock tasks, but also to find ways to solve them.

During the first years, he interfered little in big questions of principle and politics, leaving others to argue on these topics, especially since it was precisely on these big and therefore difficult questions that others

came into conflict with each other, made mistakes and created enemies for themselves. Stalin first focused his attention on strengthening and expanding the political and police apparatus of the dictatorship, the need for which at the top of the Communist Party was recognized by everyone. Even to the problems of big politics (for example, the national question in the Caucasus), he then approached from this angle. And this is precisely what allowed him, gradually expanding the range of his activities, to become more and more complete "master" of the entire central apparatus of the party, more and more powerful director of the general policy of the terrorist apparatus of the state. He began the task of merging the party with the state from the side of the GPU. Among these first "achievements" in this last area were the decisions adopted by the All-Party

Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in August 1922 on Zinoviev's report, which established the need for the party in the very near future to master the "commanding heights" in "the press, higher education and in cooperation". It is not difficult to understand why precisely these positions were put in the first place: these were "commanding heights" that opened up the possibility of influencing the broad masses of the people, the most active sections of the latter. With regard to higher education, the significance of the decision was deciphered two years later, by the resolution of the Thirteenth Party Congress, in May 1924, where it was stated that mastering higher education is especially important because "new commanding cadres are coming out of this school." The problem of personnel for Stalin was already then the main one.

As a result of this decision, a special department for higher education was created in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, at the head of which Stalin put Molotov, already then a faithful executor of Stalin's instructions. The first act of this campaign against higher education was the expulsion abroad in the autumn of the same 1922 of a large group of professors, together with writers and leaders of cooperation:

schenie those very "command positions" that the conference of the CPSU (b) decided to take. The selection of professors expelled from the environment was carried out according to a well-thought-out plan; only professors of the liberal-democratic camp were expelled, who took part in the public life of universities and stood out as active defenders of academic autonomy. At the head

expelled from Moscow was Professor M. M. Novikov, the last rector of the university, during whose elections a minimum legality.

This expulsion completed the process of decapitation of higher education, which had already lost a large number of scientific workers during the years of the revolution - some of them died of starvation and deprivation, some of them went abroad. The faculty of social sciences was especially empty. The government decided to eliminate lectures by non-communist professors, and the faculty itself was generally to be abolished: these sciences were to be studied only in communist universities. At the same time, systematic work was begun to attract students. In view of the importance which the party attached to the formation of new "leading cadres", a department of the Central Committee took over the leadership of this work. Observers from the center were planted in the Party and Komsomol organizations of the universities. Special "combat squads" were created from communist students and workers' faculty, the leadership of which was entrusted to especially proven communists. These "teams" were entrusted with monitoring what was happening in the universities - for all student organizations and circles, for individual students, etc. Not a single meeting of a single legal circle could take place without an "observer" from the "team". All unreliable and simply dubious were taken into account. All course councils were completely placed under the control of the communists. Moscow

higher technical the school - MVTU - in the student vernacular of those years, simply a "technician", at the workers' faculty of which Malenkov entered in 1922, was then making a general path of development. The years after the end of the civil war were the years of the rapid heyday of the school. Founded almost a century before, still in serf Russia, in 1835, the Moscow Higher Technical School before the revolution was known as one of the best higher technical institutions of this type in Russia, but the number of students in it was never significant, fluctuating between 500 and 700 people. . After the revolution, young people flooded into it. In 1921-1922. the number of listeners rose to 6-8 thousand and continued to grow rapidly. In the second half of the 1920s. it reached 12-15 thousand, and MVTU became



the main supplier of qualified technical youth for the construction of the era of the first five-year

plans. Somewhat later, this school was disaggregated, and some of its departments were turned into independent institutions. 1920--1922 and at MVTU were very stormy. The

rector, elected by the professorship with the participation of student representatives, Professor Yasinsky, was not approved by the government, which appointed its candidate. This violated the very foundations of autonomy, and the professors responded by going on strike. The previously politically passive MVTU students supported the professors this time. The general meeting of students was very stormy, with speeches about the need for political freedoms, without which the development of student independence is impossible. In this spirit, a resolution<sup>18</sup> was adopted.

This movement was not successful. The elected rector was never approved, and in the fall of 1922 he was among those exiled abroad, and the school was placed under the especially vigilant supervision of the dictatorship. But among the students a fairly stable majority was created, opposed to the Soviet dictatorship, and since the school was overflowing with people from the working environment, who returned to their factories after graduating from the school, the authorities were especially nervous about their moods. All course organizations were in the hands of independent students. There were many different circles in the school, opposition literature was widely circulated, reports about the life of the school got into the foreign press.

This is precisely why Molotov and his department of higher education in the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from the very beginning paid special attention to this school and why, undoubtedly, on the initiative of this secretariat, government repressions hit the students of the Moscow Higher Technical School first of all: already in the autumn of 1922. At the very beginning of the academic year, i.e., almost simultaneously with the deportation of recalcitrant professors abroad, the GPU carried out arrests of almost all the members of the academic section of the Moscow Higher Technical School<sup>19</sup>. Only after that, the communist students were able to seize the course organizations of the Moscow Higher Technical School and begin preparing the purge. It was here that "military squads" were created earlier than others to monitor the students. It is here that the development of

a system of bribery by the communists of individual students, and they bribed not only scholarships, but also places in hostels, the opportunity to work in laboratories, the right "and preferential receipt of textbooks, which were then in dire need, etc. But all these

measures were only preparation for The summer of 1923 was a particularly hard time for the dictatorship.

The rise in prices gave impetus to the development of a strike movement among the workers. It was especially

widespread in Moscow, where underground organizations took part in this movement. both socialist (a group of social democrats "Plekhanovites" who published a permanent magazine "Our Life"), and opposition communists (especially the "Working Group" created by Myasnikov, a Bolshevik worker who in 1918 assassinated Grand Duke Mikhail). This last fact particularly alarmed the Communists, and the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which met in September, devoted much attention to this movement. A special commission was appointed to investigate the events, but this commission, headed by Dzerzhinsky, did not so much ascertain the causes of the movement, but looking for the culprit. In the report of this particular commission, for the first time, the question was raised of combating communist oppositions by measures of police and party-police terror, all members of the party were obliged to inform the party organs about all opposition groups, etc. But the search for a solution only in

this direction was far from satisfactory. everyone, even from those who held positions at the top of the party apparatus, and on October 15, 1923, the Central Committee received a memorandum signed by 46 prominent communists, headed by Preobrazhensky, Osinokiy, Serebryakov and others, who sought the cause of the strikes in the bureaucratization of the party apparatus, in its separation from the working masses. A discussion arose about the need for "intra-Party democracy" ...

Soon Trotsky intervened in the struggle, who introduced a new element into the dispute, supplementing the question of "intra-Party democracy" with the question of the need to rejuvenate the leading cadres of the party by nominating representatives of the younger generations to responsible posts. "Our first thought," Trotsky chimed at the time, "is

be about youth, for it is the future." These speeches by Trotsky brought a special passion to the debate. The abstract formula of "internal party democracy" was now filled with quite concrete content. mobilization of "underground members", etc. The establishment of a high length of party work in pre-revolutionary times as a prerequisite for holding leading positions in the party apparatus not only limited the rights of young people, but also was a legal basis for the control of the center over the party apparatus in the field. Relying precisely on this condition, the secretariat of the Central Committee began to carry out the practice of "recommendations" from the center of candidates for secretarial posts in local organizations, a practice that soon degenerated into appointments. All over the country, searches were made for "old Bolsheviks", Bolshevik participants in the pre-revolutionary years, even if they then moved far away from the movement, and the doors of the Party opened wide for them. Trotsky's speeches were beaten exactly factions v to this practice. As expected, he was enthusiastically welcomed by the youth, especially in that part of it where there was a high

interest in political issues, and above all, the student communist youth. Trotsky's public speeches invariably ended in demonstrations in his favor. He was greeted and escorted with applause, carried out in his arms, etc. During the elections to the Moscow conference in December 1923 - January 1924, the communist students voted for Trotsky: he received 6594 votes in the higher education cells of Moscow, against 2790 votes cast for the Central Committee

But it was precisely these speeches by Trotsky that pushed away from him those who, not directly supporting the opposition, were looking for a compromise solution to the conflict. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Tomsy, who even then were far from enthusiastic about Stalin's organizational methods and therefore, during negotiations with the opposition in the autumn of 1923, tried to look for ways to an agreement, were now cast aside in the direction of rapprochement with Stalin. This turned out to be the main feature of Trotsky, who well guessed the mood of the faceless masses at rallies, but could never coordinate his speeches with

moods of the party headquarters, he never knew how to use the personal relations between the leaders. With these characteristics of his, Trotsky was able to blow up organizations, but he could not conquer them from within. And his whole stake in the struggle of 1923-1927. was introduced within the framework of the struggle to conquer the party apparatus from within, for the explosion of this apparatus would necessarily lead to the explosion of the dictatorship. This made Trotsky's defeat inevitable; and he really was defeated on the very first round of the struggle, in January 1924.

The opposition was successful only among the student youth, who accounted for approximately one-fourth of all members of the CPSU(b) in Moscow. In the remaining parts of the party organization, in the cells of workers, employees and the military, the overwhelming majority voted for the Central Committee against the opposition, which turned out to be in the minority at the Moscow regional conference, and then at the all-party conference. Of course, the struggle could have been continued further, but at that time Lenin died, whose death caused a psychological breakdown in the moods of wide circles of party members. The Central Committee took advantage of these moods to take the craving for unity into its sails. The need to rally all forces - this slogan became a shock, but under its cover, Stalin pursued a policy of destroying the opposition, hitting the most ardent youth first of all<sup>20</sup>.

A general purge of students in the universities began as early as the autumn of 1923 under the mute talk of "intra-Party democracy." At first, only non-Party youth were purged, and all communists, both Stalin's supporters and Trotsky's supporters, took an active part in this purge. It was carried out with merciless cruelty: as Lunacharsky, the then People's Commissar of Education, later reported, up to 30,000 students<sup>21</sup> were expelled from universities, i.e., no less than 20-25% of their total number. They were expelled from universities mainly for their origin, and mainly the children of peasants and the intelligentsia fell under the blows. The purge was full of tragic episodes, many were arrested and deported, there were many cases of suicide. The main lists for expulsion were compiled by higher education communist cells. Everything was led by communist students, often from those who at the same time applauded Trotsky's slogan "the road of youth."

It is quite natural that the non-Party student masses were sharply opposed to all the Communists, against the "Trotskyists", probably even more sharply than against the "Stalinists", since the beautiful phrases with which the "Trotskyists" trumped up in this situation could not help but seem especially hypocritical, mocking. And it is even more natural that this non-party student mass even gloated when they learned that the spearhead of the purge in the future would be directed against members of the communist groups themselves. Of course, there was nothing left of a united student front on the basis of protecting common academic interests. The official task of purging

communist organizations in higher educational institutions was "the party's self-purification of socially alien elements,"<sup>22</sup> but from the very beginning the element of expulsion of oppositionists was also introduced into it. The purge was carried out by special commissions composed by all-party organizations in the corresponding districts of Moscow, that is, by the same party apparatus, against whose "bureaucratic degeneration" the oppositionists raised their voices.

The situation was so unequivocal that even then the communist press sounded notes of doubt: whether the purge would turn into a reprisal against the oppositionists. The chairman of the Central Control Commission, Soltz, who led the purge, saw fit to issue a statement emphatically rejecting this possibility.<sup>23</sup> But the presence of this element in the purge was undeniable. Up to 30% or more of communist students were purged, and the percentage of those expelled was especially high where the students voted for Trotsky. Materials for cleaning were also invited to be supplied by non-Party people, that is, those who had just before been the object of the most severe purge by the people with whom they now had the

opportunity to settle scores. There could not have been too many elements of revenge for friends and relatives who suffered from the purge. CHAPTER 4 Malenkov at the

Moscow Higher  
Technical

School Malenkov, having arrived in Moscow in 1921, entered the Moscow Higher Technical School and plunged into the thick of these events. What was his personal role in them? From the official biography, we only learn that he "at the end of the civil war, studied at the Moscow Higher Techn

worked as secretary of the all-university cell of the CPSU (b) "24. Malenkov then lived in the room of his wife, Valeria Alekseevna Golubtsova, also a student at the Moscow Higher Technical School, who was a more prominent figure in youth circles than Malenkov. She was 2-3 older than him years, was an older resident of Moscow, where she had wider acquaintances. She combined her studies at the Moscow Higher Technical School with work in the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in the department of Molotov, for which she

compiled summary reviews of the situation of party organizations in the province. It was this work in the secretariat of the Central Committee and gave her the opportunity to get a separate room in the old Patchwork Hotel, on Tverskaya, which in those years was at the disposal of the Central Committee and was called the second House of Soviets. This old hotel, in a house in the middle of the 19th century, with low ceilings and creaky painted floors, in the early 1920s it was almost the main center where communist bohemians, party and party journalists, "Sverdlovsk" students and candidates for "red professors", ordinary workers of party organizations, occasionally even workers of the workers' faculty with good connections huddled, some of the "old Bolsheviks" who did not find a proper application

Golubtsova was very popular in this environment: she was a very kind, sympathetic person, many turned to her with various requests, and she really helped many. More in trifles, but often in everyday very important trifles. Later, she worked in the women's department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was well acquainted with both Krupskaya and Alliluyeva-Stalina. She became the director of the Molotov Energy Institute in Moscow and a member of the Moscow Council, where she was elected for the last time on February 22, 1953. gymnasium,

the best mathematician in the class, Malenkov had all the rights and opportunities to be accepted into the school as a full student, without the help of the workers' faculty, which was needed by "promoted" without a secondary education. If Malenkov nevertheless preferred to follow the "line of the workers' faculty, then he could do this only out of a desire to hide part of his past -" kulak "origin.

What such a concealment of the truth promised him, Malenkov knew not only theoretically: he himself took part in the purge of non-party students at the Moscow Higher Technical School, when they most diligently hunted for the same "kulak sons" and "priests' daughters" like him. With a communist who "deceived the trust of the party" and, hiding his origin, "fraudulently crept into its ranks," the reprisals were even more decisive, even more merciless. It is easy to understand what exactly Malenkov had to experience under these conditions. Malenkov, of course,

did not want to die; and since he already knew quite well the backstage mechanics of the party apparatus, he understood that the only way to save him was through obtaining the support of this apparatus: those who became useful and necessary to him. The party apparatus at that time was in great need of such people: under the guise of phrases about the need to preserve the unity of the "monolithic Leninist party", in the midst of the campaign to conduct the "Leninist recruitment" of new party members, Stalin began his first purge of the party ranks in Moscow and Leningrad from all kinds of opposition. First of all, the purge was directed against the student youth: here most of all there were elements generated by the "disturbed elements" of the revolution, and Stalin, with a revolutionary phrase on his lips, set his first task to bridle this element. The purge was carried out according to a well-thought-out plan: first of all, they "purged" the

executive bodies of student organizations, removing from them not only open oppositionists, but also those who were infected with "rotten liberalism", i.e., not being oppositionists themselves, recognized the right the existence of differences of opinion in the ranks of the party on the immediate questions of program and tactics. With particular care, the "rotten liberals" were expelled from secretarial posts, even if this "rotten liberal" was a person with great services to the party in the distant and recent past. In their places, people were sometimes even completely unknown, having no merit, but wholly in the hands of the central apparatus - Stalin and his closest associates - and ready by faith

and truly serve this apparatus.

It was at this time that the old elective bureau of the "common university cell of the CPSU (b)" at the Moscow Higher Technical School was cleared, and a new one, chosen by the central apparatus, was put in place of its former secretary, who was walking with the opposition. It turned out to be Malenkov, who was given exclusive powers to carry out the purge<sup>26</sup>. As just such an appointed secretary of the "university cell of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" at the Moscow Higher Technical School, Malenkov prepared and carried out the spring purge of 1924 among the communists of this school. Exact figures about it are unknown, but it is known that, on average, for all communist cells of all universities in Moscow, from 25 to 30% were expelled from the party and that the purge at the Moscow Higher Technical School was particularly cruel. True, opposition sentiments could not be expelled from the school, and in 1927, in the midst of the last round of the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, the main meeting of the oppositionists (under the chairmanship of Kamenev under Trotsky as the main speaker) was arranged precisely at the Moscow Higher Technical School. But the bureau of the cell, and even more so the entire the apparatus of its secretariat invariably and firmly remained in the hands of the "solid" Stalinists. The decisive role in all this struggle for the Moscow Higher Technical School was played by Malenkov,

who, by his work as secretary of the "university cell of the CPSU (b)", proved that he possesses many of the qualities necessary for an organizer of a large scale. It was not at all just to show the utmost ruthlessness in the persecution of the oppositionists and the "socially alien element." Malenkov developed these talents to the utmost extent, but they were by no means uncommon. People ready to do this work, the dictatorship even then had in abundance. Much more important were other traits that came to light in Malenkov. First of all, it turned out that he had the talent to understand well the people he met and quickly find among them "the right people for the right thing." In general, this is one of the main difficulties in the work of a great organizer. No one, even if he is seven spans in his forehead, will be able to do all this work that is needed for the cause. There is always a need for assistants to whom it would be possible to transfer this or that part of the work. And a lot often depends on how well these helpers are chosen. And it was this talent to quickly determine the abilities of people and find among them reliable a



Among the then closest Companions of Malenkov were Malyshev, Pervukhin, Saburov and others. In the mid 1920s. they were Malenkov's peers and his closest collaborators in the purge of the "university cell of the CPSU(b)". Especially close was V.

A. Malyshev, later Colonel General, one of the leaders in the creation of atomic and hydrogen bombs. He was Malenkov's assistant in secretarial work at the Moscow Higher Technical School, and then, when Malenkov went to work in the secretariat of the Central Committee, his successor in this secretarial post.

Decisions of the Twelfth Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of August 1922. about the expulsion abroad of writers and professors "out of tune with the era" were an open declaration of war against those groups of democratic intelligentsia who, although they did not accept the Soviet dictatorship, were ready to introduce their opposition to it into the legal framework of the Soviet constitution. These were extremely important decisions, since they rejected in principle cooperation with elements oriented towards the peaceful and gradual evolution of the Soviet authorities.

But these decisions left open the question of the relationship between the dictatorship and the technical intelligentsia, and this question more persistently knocked on the windows and doors of Soviet reality. For the dictatorship, it was much more complicated and more difficult than the question of the attitude towards "groundless" intellectuals-ideologists. The latter could be loaded onto steamships and sent abroad - tsu - without disturbing the normal course of life in the country. It was impossible to deal with the technical intelligentsia—engineers, chemists, technicians, professors of the exact sciences, and so on, since the economic life of the country depended on them. The Bolsheviks did not have

their own communist technical intelligentsia. All communists with a technical and engineering education were mobilized by the Bolsheviks from the very first days of the latter's coming to power and thrown into responsible work in industry. All major roads were open to them. They were willingly nominated for the posts of directors and heads of the largest industrial enterprises, for the posts of heads of trusts and central departments, and nevertheless, according to a questionnaire that was carried out by the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks in the winter of 1922---1923, from 1306

directors of factory enterprises subordinate to the Supreme Council of the National Economy, there were only 16 communists with higher education, and with an average - 5527. And the point was not at all that the communists did not want to take on such work, but that communists of this qualification did not exist at all in nature: five years later, at the end of 1927, after much effort had been made to By attracting engineers and technicians to the party, there were only 751 people with a higher technical education in the Communist Party - for almost 1.2 million members and candidates<sup>28</sup>.

Under these conditions, the communist dictatorship, from its very first steps, had to build with the hands of non-communist engineers and technicians. Such specialists from the non-communist camp filled the entire apparatus of the economic dictatorship, from the bottom to the very top. We had to reckon with this and listen to the opinions of this technical intelligentsia, take into account their moods when developing our economic

politicians.

The dictatorship consciously went for this and, since it was not a question of determining the main lines of economic policy, but of applying these main lines in practice, it even encouraged the involvement of the upper groups of the technical intelligentsia in the discussion of these issues. For this, the dictatorship allowed the creation of a special Business Club, whose members consisted of all the major specialists who worked in Soviet institutions, headed by Palchinsky, von Meck and other business engineers from the group of leaders of the pre-revolutionary Society of Manufacturers and Breeders. This club enjoyed the patronage of all communist business executives: not only Krasin, Sokolnikov and Bogdanov (then chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy), but also Dzerzhinsky himself, who at that time devoted his main forces to economic work. All these communists were not only ordinary attendees of the Club's meetings, at which its prominent members made business-like criticisms of various aspects of the dictatorship's economic policy, but they themselves made presentations on these topics at such meetings, trying to test their conclusions under the fire of business-like criticism of specialists from the camp. class opponents.

All this, however, was done behind closed doors, reports of reports and discussions on them were not published, and only news reports in Economic Life and other economic bodies recorded the facts of such meetings. It was necessary to hide information about the internal life of the Business Club all the more carefully since the attacks for "agreement" with specialists from the camp of recent big figures of really "militant capital" came not only from the ranks of openly opposition groups like the "Workers' Opposition", but also from many communists, did not belong to the opposition at all. All the more important was the tolerance of the dictatorship to the fact of the existence of this Business Club, which played the role of a surrogate for the political association of the top of the old technical intelligentsia, who went to work in Soviet bodies.

But in addition to this elite, many thousands of non-Party engineers, technicians and other representatives of the technical intelligentsia who had not been

Business club. The economic crisis of 1923 and the political controversies it generated brought them out of their state of political inertia. At the beginning of 1924, a congress of engineers was held in Leningrad, convened by the then still existing trade union of engineers. At this congress, judging by the report of Zinoviev at the Thirteenth Congress, the CPSU (6), three different groupings emerged on the question of attitudes towards Soviet power: Zinoviev characterizes the first group as a group of "honest supporters of the Soviet government, sincerely desiring to work with us" and not placing any conditions that do not speak of any changes in policy, Zinoviev defines the second group as a group "who want to work, but put forward material interests" and spoke about the need to increase the wages of technical personnel; finally, the third was a group of engineers who "posed political problems." Zinoviev, of course, greatly welcomed the first of these groups, was ready to meet the desires of the second, but decisively fell upon the third, which he defined as the "vanguard of the new bourgeoisie" and as the political basis of the "Indian summer of Menshevism", the strengthening of whose influence among the students Zinoviev admitted in this speech

(especially among the students, from which the technical intelligentsia grew). This third

group of technical intelligentsia really posed a great danger to the dictatorship, for it put forward the question of political freedoms and human rights in the first place. The representative of this group, who spoke at the Leningrad congress, admitted that the technical intelligentsia could not "come to terms with the communists" and this explained the lack of genuine pathos in the present work of engineers. What is the reason for this phenomenon? - he put the question and gave an answer to it: "Communists, as materialists,

consider it necessary and necessary to give people first of all the basic necessities, but we intellectuals find that human rights are needed first of all. Here is our main program. This is the whole strength. Now we do not have these human rights, and until we get them, we will be inert... a slogan under which we can work. And for this we need human rights. And as long as we do not have human rights, our work will always be bound, will always be inert "29. This is how Zinoviev quoted the engineer's speech. And having quoted it, he attacked the speaker and that part of the technical intelligentsia who are in solidarity with him. He urged the party to meet the professional demands of engineers, to improve their

real position, to guarantee against futile persecution, but in no case to make political concessions: "they will never see such rights as their own ears without a mirror in our republic." Instead, he proposed that every effort be made to create "red specialists," a communist technical intelligentsia.

This last slogan in the "university cell of the CPSU(b)" of the Moscow Higher Technical School fell on well-prepared ground. The task of training "red engineers" here has

become another. CHAPTER 5  
Stalin's

personal secretariat

the head of operations to purge universities, especially to purge them of "Trotskyites". And there is no doubt that the exploits of Maleikov in this area played a decisive role in deciding whether to attract the latter to work in the apparatus of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and in Stalin's personal secretariat, which determined a lot in the behind-the-scenes mechanics of the entire "Stalin period" "Soviet dictatorship. Having seized power in November 1917, the Bolsheviks not only did not have a definite plan of action; not only did they not know exactly how they would build their dictatorship in the country, but they did not even think through the question of what particular principle they should base this construction on. Lenin's reasoning that if before the revolution "130,000 landowners" could govern the country, pursuing a policy hostile to the interests of the masses, then it will be easier for "240,000 Bolsheviks" to retain power, who will rule in the interests of the people, as well as all other considerations developed by Lenin in his pamphlet *Will the Bolsheviks Retain Power?* (September 1917), were demagogic phrases suitable for the meetings of the sultry autumn of 1917, but by no means a serious attempt to outline the main lines of conduct in the event of victory. The phrase that the Soviets were the "new form of the dictatorship of the proletariat" (or "the proletariat and peasantry" discovered by Lenin: these variants in the wording of the formula depended on the composition of the audience) was often repeated in those days, but even the most general principles for constructing this form of dictatorship no one has yet been clear. Lenin himself in this respect did not

exceptions.

In particular, all questions related to the problem of building and the role of the Communist Party, its place in the general apparatus of the dictatorship, its relations with the official apparatus of the Soviet state, remained completely unclear, and history made this group of questions the core problem of the entire large process of internal development of the Soviet dictatorship. . In the first period after the seizure of power, the Bolsheviks from their party organizations poured

into the Soviets, filling their various responsible bodies. They never had more or less skilled workers in great abundance, and therefore their party organizations quickly became depopulated, especially when the civil war

diverted many of the best party workers to the front and the Red Army. No one understood exactly why, in fact, special party organizations are needed when there are official bodies of the Soviet dictatorship nearby, not just headed by the Bolsheviks, but in general, in fact, they consist only of them and possess "the full revolutionary power in the localities." There was a spontaneous process of merging, the politically leading role invariably ended up in the hands of Soviet organizations, and party organizations, in so far as they survived, turned into auxiliary bodies.

In the provinces, where the Communists had relatively fewer forces, the position of the party organizations was especially bad. The withering away of organizations was still the lesser evil. From the communist point of view, the situation was much worse in some of these places where party organizations continued to exist, opposing themselves to Soviet bodies. In such cases, as the delegates at the Eighth Party Congress (March 1919) reported, they often "stuffed all sorts of rubbish" (Osinsky's words), which not only "became outrageous and pursued a Bashi-Buzuk policy" (Lenin's words), but also indulged in "revelry, bribery, robbery" (Nogin's words), so that representatives of the center who visited there sometimes had to regret that they did not have prison cars at their disposal in order to send entire party committees to Moscow (Sosnovsky's words)<sup>30</sup>. The party at that time did not actually have a central

organization. At the same Eighth Congress, it was established that during the whole of 1918, from the moment the government moved to Moscow and until the Congress of Soviets in December, there was not a single meeting of the Central Committee of the party, and all decisions for the Central Committee were taken by Lenin and Sverdlov together, of which the first was then the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and the second - the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. It goes without saying that all the statements of such a center of the party fully supported and covered the policy of the Soviet government. There could be no hint of a divergence between the policy of the

All the organizational work of the party center at that time rested on Sverdlov, just as the central leadership in the construction of a common Soviet apparatus of dictatorship rested on him. He was undoubtedly a talented organizer, with

with great energy and initiative, with the ability to understand people and navigate the situation, but as an organizer of the old type, as he developed in the revolutionary underground, he transferred pre-revolutionary skills and techniques into the practice of the revolutionary years. He did not like official protocols, transcripts of clerical office work. With all the more or less major party (and therefore Soviet) leaders, when they got to Moscow, Sverdlov tried to meet personally, personally learning from them about the situation on the ground, personally giving them oral instructions on what to do next. He knew many of them from pre-revolutionary times, met with them at work in the underground, in prisons, of which there were a lot in his biography, at stages

These reminiscences could not but bring a touch of personal intimacy into business party conversations, and a phenomenal memory allowed him to keep their content in his head, only occasionally making understandable notes to him alone in his notebook. The memory of this Sverdlov's notebook has been preserved in the annals of the Bolshevik Party as the memory of the document that best characterizes the primitive patriarchal relations of that "good old time" when so much was built on the basis of personal enthusiasm and personal trust. The death of Sverdlov in March 1919 marked the end of that period - the Sverdlovsk period

- of internal party relations. The new secretary of the Central Committee, elected to replace Sverdlov (he was N. N. Krestinsky), had not only to eliminate many of these patriarchal relations (he did not have those extensive personal connections that helped Sverdlov so much), but also paid much attention to the development of a new Party Rules adjusted to the new situation. In the process of working on this statute, the foundations of that new concept of the general role of the party and its relations with the Soviet apparatus were outlined, which, gradually taking shape, soon became the official concept of the party.

This new concept was based on two principles that complemented each other: the first established the need for a separate existence of party organizations from all-Soviet organizations and their strictly formalized functioning from top to bottom, and the second demanded from all

Communists working in Soviet government bodies, including the highest ones, are fully subject to the decisions of the respective party organizations. "In all Soviet organisations,"

read a special resolution of the Eighth Party Congress, "it is absolutely necessary to form Party factions that strictly obey Party discipline." Party Charter adopted by the Eighth Party Conference

(December 1919), consolidated and concretized this decision:

"Factions, regardless of their significance, are entirely subordinate to the party. On all issues on which there is a legal decision of the corresponding party organization, the factions are obliged to strictly and unswervingly adhere to these decisions. The committee has the right to appoint any member to the faction and withdraw from it, without fail notifying faction about the reasons for

such a measure. In matters of its internal life and current work, the faction is autonomous. In the event of a significant disagreement between the party committee and the faction on any issue within its competence, the committee is obliged to consider this issue a second time with representatives of the faction and make a final decision subject to immediate execution by the faction.

Candidates for all the most important positions in the institution or organization in which the faction works are nominated by the faction together with the corresponding party organization. In

the same order, the movement from one positions to another"<sup>31</sup>.

The principle of the primacy of the party organization over all other organizations and organs of the Soviet state was already quite clearly expressed in these decisions taken in 1919. And its consistent application in life necessarily led to the establishment of the dictatorship of communist party organizations over the entire apparatus of the Soviet state. It was precisely this that was the main reason for the antagonism between the communists, who carried out responsible work in various Soviet, economic and other bodies of the Soviet government, on the one hand, and the communists, who occupied leading positions in the party apparatus, on the other. This antagonism has become the main antagonism,



who determined the main lines of the processes of internal development of the Communist Party in the USSR, the processes of formation of the ruling stratum in the Soviet state in general

It is all the more important to have a correct understanding of this basic antagonism, since it was precisely this antagonism that Stalin took as the basis for developing a grand strategy for his struggle for power, and it was on this basis that he waged his struggle for the next decades. This antagonism first appeared in the very first years of the establishment of the Soviet dictatorship, but it began to play a particularly significant role in the era of the New Economic Policy. De

It was not only that the Soviet dictatorship, as a rule, from the very beginning sought to appoint people who had at least minimal work experience to the posts of responsible leaders of the Soviet economy and, in general, to posts associated with the so-called organic work through the government apparatus. of this kind in the pre-revolutionary years, and who therefore naturally tended to take more into account the interests of the cause as such. cultivate in oneself this tendency to take care of the interests of the cause, to think about the practical results of one's work. On this basis grew the main feature of the Communists, who occupied responsible positions in the Soviet apparatus of governing the country. It makes no difference whether it was the management of industry, agriculture, military affairs, the administrative apparatus, etc.: they were more and more critical than other communists, they treated all kinds of risky experiments, they all demanded a more careful attitude to everything that obligated to big changes in the way they run their business. People with such a mentality, of course, in intra-Party groupings could not but take moderate positions. It was in their midst that the concepts of a gradual weakening of the dictatorship and an agreement with the peasantry as the main social force of the country, even the concept of "lowering power on the brakes to the peasantry"

took shape. It was from their midst that the demands in the field of foreign policy came from the path

communist adventures to switch to the path of a consistent policy of agreement with the democracies of the West.

A completely different psychology developed among those communists who were completely at work in the party apparatus. In the very process of this work, they were brought up, and could not but be brought up, in them the desire to put the interests of expanding and strengthening this party apparatus at the forefront, the desire to subordinate all other problems to the task of increasing the role of this apparatus in the general life of the country. This party apparatus had nothing to do with the organic construction of life, it did not perform any socially useful function in it at all, but its claims were enormous: it strove to dictate its will to the whole country, strove to occupy the position in it of nothing and no one unlimited, sovereign "master". At the head of it, as a result of a kind of natural selection,

communists were selected, of a completely different type than the type of communists that were characteristic of the first mentioned above.

groups: as a rule, these were people who in the pre-revolutionary years had nothing to do with the organic life of the country, but were entirely occupied with organizing the revolutionary struggle against the old system, "professional revolutionaries" from party organizations, workers who had broken with their profession, sometimes journalists are "newspapermen", more often "people without certain professions", as the old statistics recorded them, and almost always people without extensive knowledge, but usually with great pretensions. They themselves were inclined to consider themselves "ideologists" called upon to guard the "purity of party principles"; and the dictatorship of party organizations over the apparatus of the Soviet state was achieved precisely in order to "consistently" and "principally sustainedly" put these "party principles" into practice, completely disregarding the situation of time and place and not caring about the consequences that their actions will bring for countries. That is why they were supporters of all kinds of experiments, often the most risky ones, the very ones that the communists who held responsible positions in the state apparatus were so afraid of.

In the party they were all grouped, of course, on the extreme flank, they were opponents of any weakening of the dictatorship within the country, especially against concessions to the peasantry, and supporters of the continuation of the policy of all kinds of adventures outside. Of course, one should not simplify or vulgarize the situation. If, in a trend, these groups were sharply opposed to each other as groups, the very foundations of whose approach to all problems of the country's development were determined by their fundamentally antagonistic position in the very structure of Soviet society, then one should by no means conclude that this antagonism already existed then. realized by the people who made up these groups, and even more

so realized by all of them. In the first years of the NEP, which we are now talking about, in the years when Stalin began his career as the General Secretary of the Central Committee, only a few understood the significance of this antagonism. Apparently, this question was first raised by Krasin, in the press, on the eve of the Twelfth Party Congress, and then at that congress itself, in April 1923, who openly attacked the "newsmen" who had seized power in the party, but continued to approach state problems as "newsmen". At the congress, he launched a whole program, demanding "that in the very state and leading party apparatus and production workers and business executives, of course, party members, at least the same share of influence should be assigned to newspapers, writers and pure politicians"<sup>32</sup>. He did not have success, and from that moment his party career was actually over. Intra-Party struggle has great features, and success in it requires not only the ability to correctly see

the big lines of development, but also the ability to guess exactly what part of the truth about these lines of development can be assimilated by those cadres of Party leaders who have the right to participate in the development of Party policy. . In those years, these cadres were completely unprepared to assimilate the harsh truth. In the disputes of those years, the entire group of issues related to the problem of the degeneration of the party in a country with a one-party dictatorship system. touched upon very rarely and always only in passing. Both the defenders of the official party majority and the communist oppositionists of all shades were clearly afraid to think about it. The reason is that

transferring the dispute to this plane made it impossible to compromise the dispute, and subjectively, all the participants in the dispute, almost without any exceptions, were striving for a compromise: bound by memories of the recent past, of the struggle that they had so recently waged together against a common enemy, they lived in the hope of the opportunity to find a common language in the new environment.

But the entire argument was generally conducted under conditions that predetermined its outcome: it was conducted in front of an audience of members of party organizations alone. The country did not take part in it and could not take it. "Production workers and business executives," as Krasin called them, were not united by a common center, did not have the opportunity to jointly think through their conclusions: the party did not allow factional associations and meetings, did not allow the publication of factional organs. And the most important thing was that they, addressing the audience of members of party organizations, had to call on them to limit their own rights. Their opponents did not need to create factional centers, since they were already united by the common work of servicing the party apparatus, and turning to the audience of party organizations, they called it not to self-restraint, on the contrary, to more and more expansion of its rights. The outcome of the struggle was a foregone conclusion - because it remained within the framework of the party organizations. The party apparatus could not but be in favor of its dominance over the state apparatus. A disruption could only occur if the opponents of the dictatorship of the Party apparatus appealed to the country, to the non-Party masses. But then there would come a disruption not only of the dictatorship of the party apparatus, but of the entire system of the Soviet dictatorship in general, which all communists feared without distinction of shades.

Stalin was elected to the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee on April 3, 1922. From the very first days, two main elements appear in his organizational policy: the desire to consolidate the party apparatus, on the one hand, and the desire to increase its share in the general life of the country, on the other. .

There is no need to add that all this was permeated with concern for strengthening the personal position of Stalin himself. In the matter of consolidating the party apparatus, Stalin was not interested in cleaning

him from those party workers who, taking advantage of their position, were engaged in "bribery, robbery and reckless actions." The activities that were carried out during the first year of Stalin's tenure as General Secretary did not aim to prosecute communists who committed common crimes, but, on the contrary, to remove such communists from the general jurisdiction that was established for all citizens of the USSR. As Shkiryatov, a representative of the Central Control Commission, reported at the Twelfth Congress in April 1923, it was during this period that the central institutions of the party concluded an agreement with the GPU, as well as with general civil and military tribunals, that the investigation of communists who committed ordinary crimes, should be carried out not in a general manner, not by the usual investigative bodies of the Soviet state, but by special party investigators appointed by party organizations and acting on party instructions. Having completed their investigation, these party investigators made reports to the party control commissions, and the latter decided what to do with a member of the party who had committed an ordinary crime. Not always the result of such a report was bringing the guilty to trial. Already in that same report at the Twelfth Congress, in April 1923, Shkiryatov openly admitted that it was at that time that the

Central Control Commission established a practice according to which not all communist criminals, whose guilt was established even by party investigators, were brought to justice. If, Shkiryatov reported, "having familiarized himself with the court material, they saw that it was not in the interests of our party to put a comrade in the dock, that there was no material behind him that would allow, from the point of view of the party, to put him on trial"<sup>33</sup>, then the central organs of the party intervened to communicate with the appropriate judicial authorities for the dismissal of this case. Since both the GPU and the judiciary were headed by the Communists, and since negotiations with them were conducted by Stalin, the General Secretary of the Central Committee, or on his behalf, it is natural that there could be no refusal. The withdrawal of the Communists from general jurisdiction was legalized in this way. In the future, until the very "Yezhovshchina", only in exceptionally rare

In cases where it was "in the interests of the party", members of the Communist Party appeared before the general Soviet court as defendants. As a rule, their cases were decided by party instances. The fate of members of the Communist Party could be decided only by the organs of the party apparatus. As in a medieval feudal society: only equals in

origin could judge a nobleman, only nobles.

In the future, this principle was extended to a number of other aspects of life. As a result, the Communist Party turned into an association of people who were in the country in a particularly privileged legal position, sharply different from that of other citizens. Communists who were party members and had a membership card became a special privileged class, fenced off from the rest of Soviet society by a no less high wall of privileges than members of the privileged classes were fenced off from the rest of the world, for example, in feudal society. The reverse side of this system, which was fully developed under Stalin, was the

colossal growth in the dependence of the individual communist on the party apparatus, which manages all the affairs of the party organizations. The individual communist has ceased to be a free man, has lost the right to dispose of himself, his own strength, his time. All communists were "registered" by the party organizations and were at the disposal of the latter, that is, they could be "mobilized" at any moment and sent to the work for which the party organization deems it necessary to send them, and to where they were sent. It recognizes it necessary to turn it, regardless of whether the "mobilized" want to accept this appointment. Privileges to the "ruling stratum" of the communists were not given for nothing. They were paid for with their personal freedom.

The significance of this group of Stalin's reforms is quite clear: he sought to turn the Communist Party into a monolithic whole, living a life isolated from the whole outside world, completely subordinate to the party apparatus. At the same time, through the creation of a special department in the apparatus of the party secretariat, which distributes party workers, Stalin achieved consolidation

this department of the party and turned it into an obedient instrument of his politicians.

In its infancy, such a "special department" existed even earlier, before Stalin came to the post of general secretary. This department was then called Uchraspreded, that is, the Accounting and Distribution Department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Stalin was dissatisfied with the rights of this Uchraspreded and the practice of its work, and in the winter of 1922--1923 he developed a plan for its reorganization. This plan was not then approved by the majority of the Central Committee, led by Zinoviev and Kamenev. Nevertheless, at the Twelfth Party Congress, Stalin came up with this plan, appealing to the provincial workers. In his report, he argued the need for reform.

"Until now, things have been conducted in such a way," Stalin said, "that the affairs of the Regional Distribution Committee were limited to the registration and distribution of comrades in the Ukoms, Gubkoms and Regional Committees. Beyond this, the Regional

Distribution Committee, simply speaking, did not poke its nose." Stalin considered it necessary to put an end to this practice and "poke his nose" much deeper. "Now," he said, "when the work has gone deeper, when we are heading for specialization, when it is necessary to study each worker in detail ... The administrative distribution center can no longer be closed within the framework of the Ukoms and Gubkoms ... It is clear that the leading role The party should express itself not only in issuing directives, but also in placing people in well-known posts who are able to understand our directives and who are able to carry them out.

To this end, Stalin proposed reorganizing the whole business of accounting and distributing party forces, greatly increasing the rights of the central distributive body, i.e., ultimately, Stalin himself. Despite the fact that the majority of the Central Committee, as already mentioned, was against this proposal, it was adopted by the congress. The provincial delegates supported him, although the proposal increased the rights of the center and in many respects was disadvantageous for them. The explanation for this victory of Stalin, important also because it was already known about his conflict with Lenin, should be sought in the fact that Stalin quite definitely connected his struggle for the centralization of accounting and distribution of party forces with the struggle for expanding the rights of the party in the field of state control. and economic apparatus. Its resolution proposed to turn

"special attention to the management and expansion of accounting and distribution organs, both at the top and at the bottom, because these organs are now acquiring colossal and paramount importance, because this is the most real means of keeping all the threads of the economy and the Soviet apparatus in the hands of the party"<sup>35</sup>.

Zinoviev, Kamenev and other leaders of the center already understood at that time how dangerous a large concentration of power in Stalin's hands and began their struggle (still very cautious) against such a concentration. But the provincial delegates, to the detriment of whose rights Stalin's proposal was directed most of all, supported it, because this proposal secured a huge expansion of the rights of the party apparatus as a whole in its striving for dictatorship over the Soviet and economic apparatus. Stalin launched the general offensive of the party

apparatus in this last direction with great perseverance and consistency. He led him along two main lines. First of all, through the Uchraspred (shortly after the Twelfth Congress, the Uchraspred was renamed Orgraspred - the Organizational Distribution Department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee). Was in a hurry

work on the creation of communist factions in all organizations and institutions that only existed throughout the country, including centers of cooperatives, trade unions, economic organizations, people's commissariats, etc. reports on their meetings, etc.; and everywhere I found people who, for reasons most often of personal career, were ready to criticize the policy of the Communists, who officially headed the relevant organizations or institutions, as insufficiently "party-compliant" and containing deviations from party decisions and "party principles." The "party apparatus" of the Orgraspred registered all such critics and extended communication lines to them, thus creating a dense network of its agents who informed the center about all the zigzags and fluctuations in the work of the Soviet and economic apparatus and helped the Orgraspred to find weak links from its point of view<sup>36</sup>. This is how the cadres of communists were created and linked into a whole, who received the name "party activists" in the language of that time.



In essence, if translated into the language of political groupings, in this form the process of forming the cadres of the faction of supporters of the dictatorship of the party apparatus over the apparatus of the official Soviet state took place, but the faction of a very special kind: which was grouped around the existing party apparatus, at all stages of development defended the interests of the latter and blindly obeyed the orders coming from the heads of this apparatus. The second line of this party

apparatus was the line of party control commissions, which just at that time (1922-1923), on Stalin's initiative, were completely reorganized and merged with the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (RCI). The Twelfth Congress, which decided on this reorganization, gave the reorganized CC enormous powers along both party and Soviet lines. They were entrusted with not only "surveying and studying the causes of crimes, mismanagement of leaders and employees of state apparatuses, combating the system of bribery," etc.; not only "checking the substance of the work of leaders and employees of state and economic bodies, assisting the state and the party in the selection of personal leadership", etc., but also working out the general question of "reorganizing the state apparatus on new principles." In all their activities, the congress proposed to the commissions to place at the forefront the concern for "ensurance in all respects of the party line in the activities of all Soviet bodies"<sup>37</sup>. Endowed with enormous powers, having the right to enter into all the details of the activities of all Soviet organizations and bodies, the control

commissions became a very important factor in the offensive of the party apparatus, especially if their activities were closely coordinated with the activities of the Orgraspred: cadres of "party activists" sent into the mainstream of the work of control commissions, became a constant threat to the communists who headed the organs of the Soviet apparatus. Denunciations to these commissions became a kind of school in which the tops of the party apparatus "trained activists" from the bottom of the party in the matter of persecuting opponents. From the very beginning, the personnel of the leaders of these control commissions ensured friendly cooperation with the Orgraspred: especially

an important role in this regard was played by Shkiryatov, deputy chairman of the Central Control Commission, who was in charge of its secretariat. He was a loyal assistant to Stalin from the very first days of the latter's arrival to the post of general secretary and until his death. The

secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks became the center from which Stalin led this offensive of the party apparatus against the Soviet apparatus. Even before Stalin came to the post of general secretary, the secretariat had grown into a large and complex machine. Everyone has already forgotten about the times of Sverdlov, when they huddled in 2-3 rooms with several employees. As of March 1, 1922, there were 705 permanent paid employees in the apparatus of the Central Committee. Complaints about ever-increasing bureaucracy have become commonplace. The secretariat's internal machine was, indeed, extremely cumbersome, the functions were not clearly distributed, no one knew exactly what his duties included and how far his rights extended. There were many attempts at reorganization in order to streamline the work of the apparatus, but they were not successful: there was no owner who would

lay his hand on the work of the secretariat. Stalin showed himself to be such a "master". He did not at all carry out reductions in the apparatus. The number of employees under him grew all the time, at the beginning, however, only slowly. After the first year of his work, by March 1, 1923 there were 741 of them, by December 1, 1925 - 767. But from the very beginning Stalin led a cruel purge of the composition of these employees. Of course, from the very beginning there were certain groups of workers who firmly held their positions, but for the majority shifts were made 2-4 times a year. The turnover of personnel was enormous, during the first year of his secretariat, 1,498 people were removed from the apparatus of the secretariat, in the year and a half between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Congresses (from April 1924 to November 1925) - 7 person.

In the beginning, Stalin himself supervised the selection of employees. In general, he took all more or less significant workers only after personal acquaintance with them. Often he personally gave orders

of the dismissal of this or that employee, although there was no visible fault behind it. Of course, such punishments fell first of all on persons suspected of sympathizing with the opposition. But often the victims were also people who were not involved in any opposition, who never sympathized with the oppositionists, but

guilty except for a certain independence of character. It was at this time that an anecdote developed, which at that time had a great success among the employees of the secretariat of the Central Committee:

"There is alarm in the secretariat of the Central Committee: Stalin has locked himself in his office, does not go anywhere, does not receive anyone, even gave the order not to connect him with anyone by phone. He only walks from corner to corner and sucks on the phone. and expect big events. Finally, Stalin calls his personal secretary and gives the order: "There, on the second floor, in a large room to the right, Petrov, who is sitting at the third window. He looks askance at something when I pass by. I don't believe him, I need to change. The selection of personnel for the secretariat for Stalin was, indeed, a big problem, and, moreover,

selection from a special angle: did anyone look askance at him, Stalin. The people who looked at him critically were not suitable for work in the secretariat. In parallel with the selection of personnel, the work of the secretariat was streamlined, and harmony was introduced into its organization. Already in the first year of Stalin's secretariat, a scheme was drawn up for organizing the apparatus of the secretariat, to which many private changes were later made, especially additions, but which lasted throughout the entire period of Stalin's struggle for power. The secretariat was divided into 8 departments, each of which, in turn, was divided into sub-departments. For each department, and later sub-department, detailed instructions were developed, approved by Stalin himself: they drew precise boundaries between the areas of competence of various departments and sub-departments, defining the tasks and methods of their work. Each department had its own secretariat, which had to be constantly aware of all the work of the department, in all its main lines. From these secretariats, the threads of communication stretched to the central bureau of the entire secretariat as a whole, which in this way, through the secretariats of the departments, could always be aware of all the details of the work of each department, could control it, could correct it. The department secretaries were effectively agents of the central bureau to supervise the work of the departments. In real life, it is true, this harmonious scheme often functioned not without interruptions, but a much greater harmony than before was indeed introduced into the work of the secretariat.

From the very beginning, the Organizational and Distribution Department (Organizational Distribution Department) began to play the most important role in the life of the entire secretariat, which was entrusted with functions not only registration and distribution of party workers, but also maintaining contact with local organizations, developing guidelines for them, monitoring the activities of party factions in central Soviet institutions, studying the personal composition of communists working in various people's commissariats, trade unions, economic bodies, etc., issuing and accounting forms of party cards, etc. Following the example of the secretariat of the general party Central Committee, Orgraspreds were created under the Central Committee of national parties, at all regional committees and regional committees, which, in turn, produced a kind of inventory of party forces. Their work was coordinated with the work of the central Orgraspred. It was established who exactly has the right to dispose of workers of various categories. Very soon, all more or less qualified party workers were registered, and a special dossier was compiled for each of them, where all kinds of materials were

collected about this worker as a member of the party, as an employee of one specialty or another and as a person. All these dossiers were kept in the archives of the central Orgraspred. In the archives of the local Orgraspreds there were dossiers only on grass-roots workers, which they alone could dispose of. All workers on an all-party or regional scale were listed as "registered by the Central Committee" and only the Orgraspred of the Central Committee secretariat could control their fate. But the rights of this latter were practically unlimited, and he had the opportunity to send any people's commissar or plenipotentiary to "grassroots work", somewhere in the provinces. No protests could help, because the Orgraspred made its decision, of course, with the knowledge, and often even at the initiative of Stalin.

It is easy to understand that the spearhead of the activities of this Orgraspred was directed primarily against opponents of the policy that the secretariat of the Central Committee defended, against the "oppositionists" of all shades, with groups of which the Communist Party was overflowing in the 1920s. All of them are both "left" (Trotskyists) and "right" (Bukharinites), representatives of the "workers' opposition", supporters of the "democratic

centralism", etc. - were "registered" by the Orgraspred and appropriate notes were made in their dossier. When the time came for reprisals, it was enough to make inquiries in the file cabinet.

secretariat, created back in 1922-1923 on the initiative and plan of Stalin. It was headed by persons chosen by Stalin himself, personally subordinate to him and dependent only on him. Not always the same content. It is necessary to know that this secretariat was not always the same organization in life, did not always perform the same functions. Therefore, when it comes to this secretariat, it is necessary to determine exactly which period and

which it is a part of the apparatus of this secretariat that is meant.

Stalin began to create his personal secretariat as early as 1918, when he was People's Commissar for Nationalities (Narkomnats). Stalin transferred this secretariat with him to the secretariat of the Central Committee when he became the general secretary of the latter. He gradually deployed it, bringing it to the maximum size both in terms of the number of employees and in terms of the role that he played during the preparation of the "Yezhovshchina" and during its implementation. The apparatus of the secretariat was greatly reduced after the Eighteenth Party Congress (March 1939) and especially during the war years, when many of its parts merged into the apparatus of the official secretariat of the Central Committee or into the apparatus of the State Defense Committee. This apparatus began to grow again after the war, especially from 1949-1950, when at the top of the dictatorship there was an increasingly aggravated struggle over major issues of both foreign policy and domestic policy (aggregation of collective farms, etc.), a struggle that

continued after Stalin's death. The period now in question, the period of the first decade of Stalin's tenure as general secretary, 1922-1932, was a period of rapid growth of the personal secretariat and the formation of its main cadres.

The functions of the personal secretariat then grew rapidly. They included both the conduct of Stalin's personal correspondence and the processing of those materials that came to Stalin as the general

to the Secretary of the Central Committee on all issues raised before a decision in the Politburo. Both of these features were of great importance. From the very beginning, Stalin made it a rule that every letter addressed to him personally should be considered by the secretariat and that the author of the letter should receive one or another answer, under which Stalin's name would stand. He needed this to create popularity, and since there were a lot of letters, and more and more over the years, the department of the personal secretariat, busy answering letters received, grew into a whole

special bureau. Stalin strove to come to the Politburo already oriented in the essence of at least the most important issues. Therefore, under the personal secretariat, a large apparatus of referents was created for all the most important questions of the life of the state and the party. The vast majority of these were young "red professors", specialists in their respective fields, who combined considerable erudition and ability to work with the presence of great careerism. All the doors of the relevant government bodies were opened before them, the best specialists were at their service, obliged to give them all the necessary information. and explanations

and their main task was to find weaknesses in policy and practice of those departments, questions about the activities of which arose before the Politburo. For many of these referents, this work in the personal secretariat became a springboard for jumping to a higher rung of the Soviet hierarchical ladder, but many of them broke their necks on this ladder. Both of

these aspects of the work of Stalin's personal secretariat occupied a prominent place in the general life of the secretariat, but still they did not constitute its main content, which makes it impossible to understand the era without understanding the role of the secretariat. This main content was that side of his activity that would be most correctly defined as the role of a behind-the-scenes lever, with the help of which Stalin not only set in motion the entire apparatus of the secretariat of the Central Committee, concentrating its efforts on the struggle for the dictatorship of the party apparatus over the apparatus of the Soviet government, but also strove at all stages of this struggle to introduce elements of the struggle for the establishment of more and more complete, total dictatorship of Stalin personally over the party apparatus itself.

As he always did and in everything, Stalin had in mind not only the struggle, which at that time was already the current stage in the development of relations within the Soviet dictatorship, he did not think only about those opponents who were then already his open enemies. He conducted his work on two planes, and waging an uncompromising struggle against his open opponents, at the same time he was preparing to fight against those of his then allies who, in his opinion, could or should have become his opponents or enemies tomorrow, at the next stage development of a dictatorship. He had a lot of ability to look ahead in these matters, he brought up the habit of wearing stones in his bosom against his current allies for a long time. Inside the party apparatus,

which in the 1920s. acted as a united front for dictatorship over the state apparatus, there was by no means complete unity, and not all of the supporters of this dictatorship of the party apparatus were ready to go to complete submission to Stalin. A sharp struggle in this plane unfolded later, after all the "opposition" groups of the 1920s were defeated, and the dictatorship of the party apparatus was consolidated. This date should be taken as 1930. But cracks within the bloc of supporters of the dictatorship of the party apparatus began to appear much earlier, and Stalin, through his personal secretariat, prepared positions for this new stage of the struggle in advance, formed cadres of suitable executors in advance.

This formation of cadres was not an easy task; Not only because the work was extremely responsible, but and because the methods used in its conduct were often very risky and went far beyond the limits established by the most flexible rules of human society. To qualify for this work, especially to qualify for leading positions in it, the performers had to have very special qualities, to be completely free from the desire to reckon with even the minimum set by the ten commandments of Moses. Stalin successfully coped with this task. The people he selected for leadership positions in his secretariat turned out to be at the level

tasks facing them and withstood the test of time for loyalty to Stalin. If we do not talk about Malenkov, who began to play a large role in this secretariat only much later, already in the 1930s, the main figures of Stalin's personal secretariat were two people - I.P. Tovstukha and A.N. Poskrebyshev. Both of them so firmly connected their biographies with the activities of this institution that it was they who were barely blowing to keep in mind when it comes to Stalin's personal secretariat in the era of 1920-

x years.

It is very characteristic that there is very little information about both of them in the literature, even less about Poskrebyshev than about Tovstukha, although Poskrebyshev's role was much longer (he disappeared only in March 1953, at the time of Stalin's death)\*. Ivan

Pavlovich Tovstukha (1889-1935) was the first organizer and head of Stalin's personal secretariat even before the latter took the post of secretary of the Central Committee. In the drug commissariat Tovstukha was with an advisory vote at the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party (March 1919). True, the People's Commissariat of Nationalities was then one of the most seedy people's commissariats, where no one aspired to work, but the speed with which Tovstukha made his career there still shows that from the very beginning he enjoyed Stalin's great confidence. This conclusion is fully confirmed by the fact that from December 1921 to April 1922, Tovstukha, leaving work in the People's Commissariat of National Affairs, completely goes to work

as head of Stalin's personal secretariat. Under these conditions, it is quite natural that Stalin, immediately upon his assumption of the post of secretary of the Central Committee, transfers Tovstukha to the apparatus of the secretariat of the Central Committee and appoints him as his assistant with the official title of "assistant secretary of the Central Committee"; such a rank before Stalin did not exist in the apparatus of the Central Committee.

\* In the work of D Volkogonov "Triumph and Tragedy" it is indicated that Poskrebyshev was removed from work with Stalin in November 1952 - Note. Yu F.

Tovstukha was apparently the first to be given it, and this naturally strengthened his position. As an assistant



Secretary of the Central Committee Tovstukh became the head of the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which, as mentioned above, was created by Stalin to manage the work of all departments of the secretariat. At the same time, Stalin makes Tovstukha first an assistant to the head (Shkiryatov was then the head), and then, from 1924, head of the secret department of the secretariat of the Central Committee, which was responsible for investigating all kinds of accusations and reports that came to the Central Committee and related to leaders, party figures and the Soviet apparatus .

This secret department was created when the Central Control Commission did not yet exist and anticipated its functions in relation to the most prominent Soviet figures. After the creation of the Central Control Commission, the secret department of the secretariat should have been dissolved in the apparatus of the Central Control Commission, but Stalin insisted on preserving it, turning this secret department into a particularly secret supra-supreme body of supervision over party and Soviet institutions and figures, which checked the materials and then decided whether to transfer them to CCC or not.

Tovstukha was the actual creator of this secret department, initiating the compilation of its secret archive and card index, which soon became a terrible weapon in the hands of Stalin. Close affinity with Shkiryatov, the first head of this secret department, who later moved to the Central Control Commission and became head of its secretariat and archive, greatly facilitated this task for Stalin.

Great efforts were made to replenish this archive. examination  
Special commissioners kept the provincial and metropolitan  
archives of the old, pre-revolutionary police institutions looking for materials that could compromise Stalin's present and future opponents. Entire expeditions were sent to distant places of Siberian exile. Materials were collected even more diligently about the so-called everyday corruption of Soviet dignitaries, many of whom, having seized power, showed a great craving not only for everyday conveniences, but also for things much more reprehensible. Materials of this kind in the secret archive were intertwined with materials on the political reliability of the persons concerned, on their connections with the oppositionists, on their careless conversations and harsh comments. All this was recorded and taken into account. It was not at all about making these materials public.

or bring them to the attention of the relevant party authorities. Stalin collected his archive in order to keep compromised party leaders in his hands with threats of exposure and force them to take positions that are beneficial to Stalin in the inner-party struggle, to refrain from speeches that would be dangerous for Stalin.

In common parlance, this kind of technique is called blackmail. Blackmail was one of Stalin's favorite methods of inner-party struggle, and the task of the archive of the secret department was to collect materials for the mass use of blackmail in the inner-party struggle, to put this blackmail on a kind of scientific basis. The matter was, of course, treated as a top

secret. The most "precious" materials were not transferred even to the secret archive of the secret department of the secretariat of the Central Committee, but were kept in special safes of Stalin's personal secretariat. But in the party the existence of this secret archive and Stalin's blackmailing methods were widely known. Trotsky, in his articles written in connection with the trials of 1936-1938, said that rumors about this archive "through a system of communicating vessels" reached him while still in Moscow; he knew that "all the facts discrediting Soviet dignitaries are collected by Stalin with scientific thoroughness and constitute a special archive, from which they are extracted in parts, to the extent of political need."

Stalin resorted to the help of this archive more than once, and with great success for himself. The most striking, one might say, classic example of such success was the story of Kalinin, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. There is a

story about it in Trotsky's article. In one of the Soviet humorous magazines in 1925, a cartoon appeared depicting the head of the Soviet state in a very intimate setting. The resemblance left no room for doubt. In addition, in the text, very unbridled in style, Kalinin was called by the initials "M. I." I could not believe my

eyes, Trotsky recalls. -- What it is? I asked some people close to me, including Serebryakov (shot in 1937). "This is Stalin giving the last warning to Kalinin.

"But for what reason?"

- Of course, not because it protects his morality. Kalinin must be resting on something."<sup>39</sup> Kalinin really

"resisted" for a long time and did not want to follow Stalin, whom he had known from the Transcaucasus and had little confidence in him. The words that Kalinin threw about Stalin in 1925-1926: "Stalin will lead us all into a ditch!" In his moods, Kalinin belonged to the most "peasantophile" minded members of

the Politburo and for a long time walked along with the "rightists" headed by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy, strongly objecting especially against any anti-peasant measures. But just at that time, Kalinin showed an senile attraction to young actresses, which was also very widely discussed in Moscow at that time. It was reported that agents of Stalin's personal secretariat managed to get some photographs that were very unpleasant for Kalinin, and under the

threat of their publication, as well as reprisals against the artist with whom Kalinin was connected, Stalin forced Kalinin to refuse

opposition.

Voroshilov was apparently in the same position. In any case, in the same articles of Trotsky there is the following remark: "In 1929, during the break with the right-wing members of the Politburo—Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy—Stalin succeeded in keeping Kalinin and Voroshilov on his side only by the threat of discrediting revelations."<sup>40</sup> Kalinin and Voroshilov were

the most prominent of the party leaders whom Stalin brought to their knees with the help of his secret archive. But they were far from the only ones. Better evidence of the usefulness of this method of struggle for Stalin could not be imagined. The position of Tovstukha, the creator and first head of this archive, grew rapidly. From the work of leading the Bureau of the Official Secretariat of the Central Committee, he quickly withdrew, almost in 1922-1923, transferring this work to Poskrebyshev, who just then began to quickly advance and concentrated all his efforts on work related to the secret archive, and on large intrigues that

this connection was woven by Stalin (adviser to the expert under whom Tovstukha

became)<sup>41</sup>. This is not at all contradicted by the fact that Tovstukha v. At this time, he began to play an increasingly significant role in the "scientific" activities of the Communist Party, taking the post of assistant director of the Lenin Institute. This "scientific" work of Tovstukha was essentially nothing more than the introduction of blackmailing methods of work of the secret Stalinist archive into the work of the Lenin Institute. After Lenin's death, the institute became the most important center for collecting materials on the history of the communist party and the revolution. By special decrees, all citizens of the USSR, and in particular all members of the Communist Party, were obliged to hand over to this Institute the originals of all documents emanating from Lenin or related to his activities. Only the Institute was supposed to keep these documents, and he decided which of them should be published. Such documents then had not only historical, but also great actual political significance: the dead Lenin was canonized, and quotations from his articles and letters played the role of arguments beyond dispute. Lenin's comments about party workers made or ruined reputations. But Lenin left a lot of unpublished manuscripts and notes, thousands of letters to different people. Among them were many very unfavorable for Stalin, Lenin's attitude towards whom in the last year of his life was defined as sharply negative. A number of such documents, the existence of which is definitely known, were buried in this archive.

The Institute under these conditions became a center of great political significance. Tovstukha, appointed

there in November 1924 as deputy director, played the role of "Stalin's eye" in the life of the Institute. He became the head of the archives of the Institute, and all newly incoming documents were concentrated in his hands. He was the first to get acquainted with their content, which gave him the opportunity to lay hands on materials whose publication, from Stalin's point of view, was undesirable. Some of them have disappeared altogether. On the contrary, those of the documents that, in terms of content, were unfavorable for Stalin's opponents, were published in the next queue, if

only delaying their publication did not seem useful for the purposes of political blackmail.

In this area, Tovstukha felt like a pike in water. A man in poor health, embittered and vindictive, very vain and with great pretensions, but with very modest talents, Tovstukha, it seemed, was created by fate itself for the work that Stalin entrusted to him. Closed and uncommunicative, avoiding new acquaintances, he looked at everyone he met with distrust, looking for weaknesses in them. Healthy, cheerful people annoyed him, it seemed, just because they were healthy and cheerful. About the second of the main figures of Stalin's personal secretariat, about Alexander Nikolaevich Poskrebyshchev, there is even less data in the literature than about

Tovstukha. Even his appearance, people who personally met him, draw in different ways. The very possibility of such discrepancies is ultimately explained by the persistence with which Poskrebyshchev kept a low profile until the end of his life, preferring the title of Stalin's personal secretary to all other positions that were not difficult for him to occupy. Poskrebyshchev's biography for the early years of his life, until his appearance in the secretariat of the Central Committee, is completely unknown, although he has been a member of the Central Committee of the party since 1934,

was a deputy of the Supreme Council of the first three convocations (1937, 1946 and 1950), was a member of Moscow Soviet, etc. He was born in 1891, joined the Bolshevik Party in 1917, after the revolution. He graduated from the Institute of the Red Professorship in Moscow and, apparently, had some relation to it later. In the minutes of the congresses of the CPSU (b), starting from the Twelfth Congress, his name

invariably on the list of delegates with an advisory vote,

admitted to the congress as senior officials of the secretariat of the Central Committee. The fact that he was elected to the Supreme Soviet invariably from the Belebeevsky district of the Bashkir Republic, where he each time made trips to report to the voters, usually speaking as a meeting of the Belebeevsky in front of the machine-building plant<sup>12</sup>, apparently, follows considered as evidence of some connection

with this region: his candidacy, undoubtedly, belonged to the number of central ones, whose "appropriation"

was carried out by the secretariat of the Central Committee (through the Central Election Commission). And in these cases, the center, as a rule, considered the connection of this candidate with the corresponding district - either by origin, or by his former party work. But this rule was not mandatory.

When exactly Poskrebyshev began working in this secretariat and who exactly recommended him to Stalin, it is not known exactly. There are indications that Kaganovich was the first to pay attention to him, but the accuracy of this indication does not inspire much confidence. There is nothing implausible in it, since in the early 1920s. Kaganovich worked in the secretariat of the Central Committee, traveled a lot around the country, representing the Central Committee at various regional and regional party conferences and congresses. He really stood out for his ability to mark capable people who, in terms of mood, were suitable for the type that later formed the backbone of the Stalinist "apparatus". A number of provincial workers, later promoted to the top of the party, were Kaganovich's "godsons". Soon

after Stalin took the post of general secretary, Poskrebyshev was already working in the secretariat of the Central Committee and soon attracted the attention of Stalin, who by the beginning of 1923 made him head of the administration of the secretariat. In this capacity, Poskrebyshev appears in the list of advisory votes at the Twelfth Congress, and then one of the two (together with Tov-stukha) leaders of that Secretariat Bureau, which was created by Stalin to coordinate the activities of various departments of the secretariat, as indicated about Poskrebyshev in the minutes of the Thirteenth Congress ( May 1924).

Tovstukha about this time goes entirely to work in the secret department and at the Lenin Institute, after which all organizational work both in the official secretariat of the Central Committee and in Stalin's personal secretariat falls on the shoulders of Poskrebyshev. He almost never made public appearances; in the press, his name, if mentioned, is very, very rare. But his behind-the-scenes role has been already since the mid-1920s. becomes huge. Of course, he works all the time under the direct supervision of Stalin himself, along the lines whose direction is outlined by the latter. But success depended not only on the choice of the general line of the party, but also on the dexterity with which this line was applied in practice. And this largely depended on the

Poskrebyshev. He was a real organizer-practitioner, with whose hands the Stalinist party apparatus was built and who directed the practice of the struggle of this apparatus against all kinds of opposition groups, on the one hand, and against the government

apparatus led by the Communists, on the other. The position of the Stalinist group was then especially

difficult. It was undoubtedly opposed by a huge majority not only in the country, but also in the Party, even in the circles of official leaders of Party organizations. She kept herself solely by dexterity of maneuver and the ability to separate opponents. The struggle was not for life, but for death, and in the struggle all means were considered permissible.

Poskrebyshev turned out to be the right person for this method of struggle. CHAPTER 6 STALIN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER The

crystallization of the

apparatus of the

ruling party into a complex machine for managing a totalitarian state and the simultaneous degeneration of the leading cadres of this apparatus into a special ruling stratum of the newly emerging Soviet society took place against the background and in the forms of an intensified struggle within the party for the main lines of its policy. In essence, these were just different sides of the same large process of building a new Soviet society on the basis of a new state economy and the search for a policy that would meet the needs of this new economy and the interests of this new ruling stratum.

The years that determined the outcome of this struggle at its first decisive stage were the years of Lenin's illness, 1922-1923, when he could only occasionally personally interfere in the work of the central organs of the party and government, and 1924-1925, when The first result of the struggle for "Lenin's legacy" was emerging. These years were undoubtedly the most difficult years on Stalin's path to autocracy. The crisis of the big politics of the dictatorship then was intricately intertwined with an acute crisis in personal relations between its leaders. And at the top of this dictatorship, intricate regroupings took place at an accelerated pace, and the processes of formation of new ideological concepts created to serve

the needs of the ruling party, exercising the totalitarian dictatorship of a small minority over a country of many millions, were littered with memories of old disputes that arose in those ancient times, when this party was still a small émigré group. Stalin went through these years under constant threat of failure, all the

while balancing, as if on a knife blade. He had never been so close to the complete collapse of all his plans as at this time. It

seemed that everything was up in arms against him - both personal relations, and big politics, and the international situation. He stood almost completely isolated among the leaders of his own party. Basically, he won, of course, because he firmly took a course towards the party apparatus as the main support of the totalitarian dictatorship of the party over the country and his personal dictatorship over the party. Now, from a historical perspective, it is clear that the Soviet dictatorship in Russia could only be sustained on this basis, and that an attempt to build it on any other socio-political pillar would long ago have led to its catastrophic breakdown. He won as the leader of this party apparatus. But his personal qualities also played a huge role in this victory: exceptional flexibility, the art of complex behind-the-scenes intrigue, and even that peculiarity of his nature, which Lenin, according to Krupskaya's story, defined as the complete absence of the most "elementary human honesty" in both political and in personal relationships<sup>43</sup>.

Without understanding the main lines of the political and personal struggle of this critical period, it is impossible to understand the meaning of all subsequent stages in the process of internal development of the dictatorship. Having set the task of establishing his own personal dictatorship over the party that rules the country dictatorially, Stalin was indiscriminate in choosing the means of combating his opponents. The content of big politics in the period when he was going to power, he was relatively little interested. In these matters, Stalin could be very flexible, even accommodating, as long as the matter did not concern the point that was the only important thing for him at that time: the question of power - the power of the party over the country and his personal power over the party. From the moment when any question of this group appeared on the order of the day, Stalin's compliance disappeared, and the initiator of raising the questi



Stalin's worst enemy. In political matters he could remain a complete adherent of Stalin; this did not change matters: he fell into the group of irreconcilable enemies of the latter. In the

last period of his life, when he took a closer look at Stalin, Lenin defined his relationship with his work colleagues with two remarks that complemented each other: "This cook cooks only spicy dishes." And in those cases when the correlation of forces began to make these culinary experiments of his dangerous, Stalin, in the words of the same Lenin, resorted to a roundabout maneuver: "he would make a rotten compromise and deceive"<sup>44</sup>. The significance of this compromise lay in the fact that it created the possibility, under its cover, behind the partners' backs, to continue secretly the work of preparing "spicy foods". That is why Stalin, when he was not strong enough to destroy the enemy, so willingly entered into compromising

misses: they gave him the opportunity to buy time to strengthen his positions by tying the hands of his opponents, who approached them like honest people with the intention of fulfilling them. These compromises were "rotten" only for Stalin, giving him the opportunity to calmly gain strength to deliver his treacherous blow. With those who began to understand the

treacherous basis of his character and tried to fight against him, Stalin was merciless. He did not forget insults and did not forgive. He knew how to wait patiently, postponing the settling of accounts until a favorable moment. All the more cruel was revenge when such a favorable opportunity came. Boris Bazhanov, who during precisely these critical years worked in Stalin's secretariat and had the opportunity to observe him closely, gave a very correct assessment of his character:

"The main features of Stalin's character are, firstly, secrecy, secondly, cunning, and thirdly, vindictiveness. Stalin never shares his innermost plans with anyone. He very rarely shares his thoughts and impressions with others. He is silent a lot. In general, he doesn't talk unnecessarily. He is very cunning, he has ulterior motives in everything, and when he speaks, he never speaks sincerely. He never forgives insults, he will remember ten years and in the end he will get it done "<sup>45</sup>.

Revenge generally played a huge role in Stalin's life. There was a case "when he himself admitted this. This episode came down to us in Trotsky's broadcast, to whom Kamenev told about it two or three years later, when he turned from Stalin's closest ally into his enemy.

"In 1924, on a summer evening," writes Trotsky, "Stalin, Dzerzhinsky and Kamenev were sitting over a bottle of wine (I don't know," Trotsky adds, "whether it was the first bottle), chatting about various trifles until they touched the question of what each of them loves most in life. I don't remember what Dzerzhinsky and Kamenev said, from whom I know this story. Stalin said: "The sweetest thing in

life is to mark the victim, to prepare the blow well." and then go to sleep." Knowing the situation in the

summer of 1924 and the events in which these three interlocutors were participants, it is not difficult to understand what exactly was discussed in the conversation, which Stalin ended on such a high note.

Soon after Lenin's death, his widow N. K. Krupskaya sent a package to the Politburo with those of the manuscripts left after him that were of current political interest. Among them was Lenin's testament with remarks about a number of leading party officials, but with one specific practical conclusion: Lenin insisted on removing Stalin from the post of general secretary of the Central Committee of

the party, since, as Lenin was convinced of this, he was a person who was not loyal to the party. relations with others and capable of abusing the immense power that the position of general secretary gives him<sup>47</sup>. Krupskaya officially asked that this testament be read out at the party congress, for which it was intended by Lenin, but the majority in the Politburo spoke out against the announcement at the congress and in general against giving it wide publicity, believing that such publicity could upset the work of the central institutions of the party, which just then, in the situation created after the death of Lenin, it seemed dangerous. There was, of course, some truth in this, but Lenin wrote his testament because he recognized it as necessary in the interests of the party, as he understood them, to upset the work of the central apparatus of the party, which Stalin created and which Lenin seemed dangerous for the normal development of the party. .

Around the question of the publication of the will, a dull behind-the-scenes struggle began. At the congress, which met at the end of May, the will was not read out. Only the members of the presidium were acquainted with it<sup>48</sup>. But it turned out to be impossible to hide the will from the members of the newly elected Central Committee, and at its first meeting, on June 2, 1924, this will was announced. There is a detailed account of this meeting in the memoirs of Boris Bazhenov, who was the secretary at the meeting.

The text of the testamentary letter was read by Kamenev. "There was a painful silence," writes Bazhanov, "Stalin felt small and miserable. He went up to the podium of the presidium and sat down on the steps at my feet (I was sitting on the right wing of the elevation for the presidium, this meeting was held in the meeting room of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee). I looked closely at his face; despite all the Stalinist restraint, it was clearly written on his face that the stake of his life was being played.

The first to speak was Zinoviev, who defended Stalin. In the "voice of an old woman," he assured the meeting that "Ilyich's posthumous will" must, of course, be law, but in this case, "as we are pleased to state," Ilyich's "fears" about "our General Secretary" "did not come true," work inside the Central Committee is quite friendly, etc. He was supported by Kamenev, who also persuaded the Central Committee not to carry out Lenin's will.

"The plenum was silent," Bazhanov continues. "Trotsky did not utter a sound, although he tried to portray the greatest possible contempt with facial expressions, gestures, silence itself, with everything he could." This

behavior of Trotsky was apparently dictated by the feeling of disgust with which he generally treated the personal struggle at the top of the dictatorship; and he pursued this tactic with pain

by our consistency, thereby actually refusing to interfere in the struggle against Stalin precisely at those decisive moments when his word could influence the confused majority of the Central Committee. It was this behavior of Trotsky that saved Stalin at that time. But it is enough to know at least a little about the nature of the latter to understand that it was this silent contempt that Stalin never forgave Trotsky, never forgot about him.

There is no doubt that it was Trotsky that Stalin had in mind on that summer evening when, in a conversation with Kamenev and Dzerzhinsky, he, always extremely reserved and reserved, threw out a frank phrase about "sweet revenge", which allows us to look deep into the recesses of his innermost moods. . She also made a great impression on Stalin's interlocutors at the time, especially on Kamenev.

The latter had known Stalin for a long time, back from Tiflis with his circles in the early 1900s; I met him later, in underground work and abroad, and during the First World War, in the Yenisei exile, I spent a lot of time talking with him, introducing him to the history and life of the West. Kamenev had many traits of an old Russian intellectual. He was a well-read man, with a good memory, with the talents of an entertaining storyteller, and he was very fond of while away the long Siberian evenings at the samovar, in front of a small audience of attentive listeners. Stalin belonged to the latter. He himself did not like to read. The serious book seemed to tire him by its thickness alone. But he always knew how to listen to a living story, lightly sucking his invariable pipe and only occasionally inserting remarks that showed the narrator that his words fell on fertile ground. In this way, Stalin generally learned a lot and from many, especially in later years, showing his individuality mainly in the ability to weed out useful wheat grains from unnecessary tares.

That winter, when Stalin was a frequent visitor to Kamenev (it was the last winter of the old, pre-revolutionary Russia), they both lived in Achinsk, a small county town in the Yenisei region. Kamenev was then working on Machiavelli, was going to write a book about him and was studying the late Italian Middle Ages. It seemed unexpected that Stalin was greatly interested in these stories of Kamenev. An old volume with a Russian translation of *The Sovereign* was found in the local library. Kamenev himself worked on the originals, and as an exception to his rule, Stalin diligently studied the book, turning to Kamenev for more and more political commentaries and historical references.

All this gave Kamenev reason to think that he knew Stalin well and had the right to look down on him a little, almost

as a student, especially since Stalin sometimes

willingly played this role: as long as and when it was profitable for him. Lenin said of Kamenev that he had the ability to pose interesting questions, but he added that he was by no means brilliant at finding answers to such questions. Kamenev did not have the ability to understand people at all. All the more he should have been struck by Stalin's phrase about sweet revenge, which, indeed, should have smelled on his interlocutors with the strong aroma of the Asian Middle Ages.

For a Russian intellectual like Kamenev, even if he grew up in the Transcaucasus, this Middle Ages seemed to be a thing of the past: the intelligent strata of the multinational Transcaucasian society, in which the Kamenevs revolved, themselves basically went through the same path of Europeanization as the Russian intellectuals, and therefore differed little from the latter. Stalin did not belong to this layer. Half Georgian, half Ossetian in origin, he came from the very bottom of this multinational society and continued to keep in touch with these bottom classes, and the process of Europeanization almost did not penetrate there. Their customs and customs were kept there, their own laws reigned, which were still connected by thousands of threads with the distant past and in which elements of primitive romance coexisted in harmony with the traditions of semi-abreism, semi-banditism. For this world, the Asian Middle Ages was not at all a distant past, but a full-blooded present.

It was from this world, saturated with elements of the Asian Middle Ages, that Stalin emerged, whose distinctive feature, as a prominent figure in the Bolshevik underground in pre-revolutionary Transcaucasia, would be most correctly defined as an attempt to bring into the practice of revolutionary organizations the traditions and skills characteristic of the remnants of this Asian Middle Ages. Much more was known about these features of Stalin's pre-revolutionary activities in the circles of the old leaders of the Bolshevik Party than was recorded by Stalin's biographers, and it was from these circles that the most deadly stories for Stalin came. It was not at all about

organizing the expropriation of state money on the steamer "Nicholas I" in Baku, on Erivan Square in Tiflis, etc. True, it was precisely for these last acts that Stalin was in

At one time, he was expelled from the Social Democratic Party by a special party court, which was created by the Transcaucasian Committee of the Party, but the Mensheviks sat in this committee (formally, the party was still united at that time and included both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks), who are completely different from the Bolsheviks, looked at the question of the admissibility of the expropriation of government money. As for the Bolsheviks, their secret factional center, which at that time consisted of Lenin, Krasin,

Bogdanov-Malinovsky and others, approved Stalin's expropriatory adventures and received part of the sums obtained in this way into their central treasury. The old leaders of the Bolshevik organizations then blamed Stalin for his completely different deeds, namely the organization of blackmail extortion from the Baku oil owners, the murders of party workers who were indignant at this activity, the denunciations of the tsarist police against their opponents in the Bolshevik organization, and much more<sup>49</sup>.

These aspects of Stalin's "activities" were especially widely developed in the period 1907-1909. in Baku. The center of the then very young oil industry, the Baku region at the beginning of the 20th century. experienced the fever of the "epoch of primitive accumulation." Almost every week, here and there, oil gushers gushed, and Baku's "black gold" literally flowed in streams along the unpaved streets of the fields, sometimes creating miserable fortunes for accidental owners of oil-bearing areas in a few days. There was a fierce struggle for oil and around oil. State power was still weak in the region, its apparatus had not yet penetrated deep enough, had neither the authority nor the physical strength to defend the rights of legal owners provided for by laws. Therefore, along with the government police, the owners of the crafts had to take care of the protection of their rights on their own. Given the diversity of the population (according to official data of that time, representatives of 30 national groups worked in Baku), this was an extremely difficult matter. Each owner of the crafts necessarily had a detachment of armed bodyguards, and the larger his crafts were, the larger his squad was. The Armenian owners had squads, naturally, of Armenians; Muslim owners - from Muslims.

In the region, a huge mass of the population of which were Muslim Azerbaijanis, Azerbaijani combatants played an especially important role. Personnel for them was supplied by the Azerbaijani village, which continued to exist until the beginning of the 20th century. with the socio-economic, political and domestic relations of the Asian Middle Ages: with the landowners-beks, with detachments of bodyguards, with the huge role of the Muslim clergy. In pursuit of easy money, young people from these squads also went to the city, often in whole groups, led by the younger sons of impoverished beks. So in groups they often got hired by Muslim oilmen, but in essence they remained typical representatives of the Asian Middle Ages, the Transcaucasian version of the medieval Italian "bravies", who were ready to "honestly" work for everyone who "honestly" paid them. They lived their own special lives, had their own organizations, their own aristocracy: the category of the latter included

those who already had bloody reprisals against their rivals - "kochi", in Azerbaijani. Of course, they had no desire to introduce their functions within the framework of one protection of someone else's property, and they easily switched "from defense to attack", primarily because employers did not always demand only one protection from their bodyguards. In what was then Baku, the practice of unauthorized seizures of other people's plots of oil-bearing lands flourished, sometimes, seizures with an armed hand. In 1907, during the period when Stalin was in Baku, a lot of noise was caused by the attempt of the oilman Rytsky with the help of 500 armed Muslim combatants to seize the fields of the Rothschild firm. This operation failed, because the piece was too large, and the government authorities sent two companies of soldiers to remove the invaders. But smaller operations of this kind were commonplace, as by law the actual ownership of the fishery for more than 24 hours made the invaders the actual owners of the site; and the rights of the former owner could be restored through the courts, which could drag on even for years<sup>50</sup>. But it is easy to understand that the "Kochi" were by no means inclined to limit their operations against other people's property only

operations on behalf of others. The theft of oil from oil pipelines and oil storage facilities flourished in Baku. It was delivered so well that there were several oil refineries in the city, about which it was known that they work almost exclusively on such stolen oil. The gangs of kidnappers have always been associated with the "Kochi" organizations. As a result, a special and by no means small layer of armed thugs-bandits formed in Baku, united in various groups and clans, which played a very significant role in the backstage life of the region: on one side of their activity they helped the guardians of elementary order in the city and were closely connected with the authorities. government police, and on the other hand, they were no less closely connected with the underworld, playing a leading role in the life of the criminal underground.

Stalin's innovation was that he built a bridge between the Bolshevik organization and this world of half-bandits, half-policemen. The combat squad under the Bolshevik Committee existed even earlier, before the appearance of Stalin in Baku. He did not create it, but he replenished it with representatives of this world of half-bandits, half-policemen. It was with their help that he carried out his operations to extort money from the oil owners, under the threat of setting fire to their fields. It was with their help that he fought against the opponents of the Bolsheviks from other political parties, both all-Russian and national. They also became his reliable support in the struggle for power within

the Bolshevik organization, and in this struggle, Stalin did not stop at either anonymous denunciations to the police on the most dangerous of his opponents, or even physical reprisals against them. Stalin's connections with the leaders of this world were so strong that it was possible to use them even later, during the years of the civil war: the so-called Bolshevik uprising on April 28, 1920 in Baku, which facilitated the entry of the Red Army into Azerbaijan, was more an uprising of these "kochi" than the movement of workers. Machiavelli, with whom Stalin, with the help of Kamenev, became well acquainted just on the eve of

his exit from the nooks and crannies of the pre-revolutionary underground to the big arena of activity as one of the leaders of the Soviet dictatorship, undoubtedly had



great influence on Stalin. I couldn't help giving it, especially since the latter was prepared for this by all his past. But this influence was very peculiar. Stalin had to perceive Machiavelli, of course, largely through the glasses of his teacher, Kamenev. This latter did not have time to write books about Machiavelli, although he continued to collect materials for it almost until the end of his life. If his papers have survived, then someday it will be possible to understand in detail the conclusions that Kamenev came to when studying the era and personality of Machiavelli. But we can establish his main political conclusion even now: in 1934, quite shortly before his last arrest in connection with the assassination of Kirov, Kamenev, then Gorky's closest assistant in charge of the Academy publishing house, published the first volume of Niccolo Machiavelli's writings with his preface, in which he gave a general assessment of the role of Machiavelli in the development of the political thought of "European society for four centuries." This preface is an exceptionally interesting document of the Stalin era. "A master of political aphorism and a brilliant dialectician," writes Kamenev, "drawing from his observations a firm conviction in the relativity of all concepts and all criteria of good and evil, permitted and unlawful, legal and criminal, Machiavelli made from his treatise (we are talking about the same "Sovereign", the Russian translation of which Stalin so diligently studied in Achinsk. - B.N.) a catalog of rules that is striking in its sharpness and expressiveness, which the ruler of his day must be guided by in order to win power, keep it and victoriously resist all attempts on him. This is far from being a sociology of power, but on the other hand, because of this recipe, the zoological features of the struggle for power in a slave-owning society based on the domination of a wealthy minority over the working majority come out.<sup>51</sup> Kamenev himself did not consider this characterization of Machiavelli exhaustive. This is supported

by the reservations contained in the same preface. But that one. the fact that it was precisely this side that he considered it necessary to emphasize in the press shows that it was precisely this side that he had to bring to the fore in his conversations with Stalin. The latter was never interested in the theoretical problems of state studies and the history of political thought, but throughout

in his nature, he should have been interested in a "catalogue of rules" that could be useful to a person leading a struggle for power. Especially if these rules are based on the premise of the relativity of all concepts and all criteria of good and evil. It seems that Kamenev wrote his preface not without a hidden thought to remind Stalin (he, of course, knew that his preface would be read to him) how useful their Achinsk conversations were for him.

But an attentive reader of Machiavelli, Stalin, of course, was not content with a simple assimilation of the rules established by the diplomat of the Florentine Middle Ages. He knew the practice of the Asian Middle Ages too well for reading Machiavelli not to push for comparisons, for attempts to draw parallels and make additions. The phrase about "sweet revenge" showed in which direction these replenishments were going. Caesar Borgia was also not a soft-hearted example of forgiveness, but he was still brought up in the tradition of revenge up to the seventh generation. The "catalog of rules" worked out by the condottieri of the Italian Middle Ages was amended in the clumsy handwriting of the Baku "kochi". The "cook" was really going to "cook only spicy dishes."

A true understanding of Stalin came to Kamenev late, in the dock, when in August 1936, over the head of the judges, he turned to Stalin with a request to spare not himself, but only his son, who had never been involved in the political activities of his father. But Stalin would not have been Stalin if he had granted this request - and Kamenev's son, a young chemist who often sat next to Stalin at the evening samovar in Achinsk, died after his father during the years of "Yezhovshchina"<sup>53</sup>. In the Asian Middle Ages they took revenge before

seventh tribe.

Only with a great delay did the correct understanding of Stalin come to Lenin. In the attitude of the latter towards Stalin during the revolutionary years, an element of duality was felt. Lenin had accurate information about Stalin's exploits in the pre-revolutionary underground, and not only from political opponents, not only from the Transcaucasian Mensheviks, who then expelled Stalin from the party. Warnings were also sent to Lenin by some of the prominent Transcaucasian Bolsheviks whom Lenin knew personally and from

whose opinion he was to be considered. Lenin did not take these warnings seriously. From an early age he

held that "in Marxism there is not a grant of ethics" and as early as 1894-1895. argued about this with Struve and Potresov<sup>54</sup>. From this he drew the practical conclusion that in political struggle "the end justifies the means," and he was not at all inclined to renounce those of his followers who gave an overly broad interpretation of this principle. On the contrary, he especially valued them and more than once frankly explained what considerations he was guided by in this.

In the memoirs of prof. V. Voitinsky, now a well-known American economist, and in 1905-1907. a prominent figure in the Bolshevik organizations, one episode is given that is extremely interesting from this point of view.

"Rozhkov (this was a professor of Russian history at Moscow University, who was then a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee. - B.N.), writes Voitinsky, "told me that once he drew Lenin's attention to the exploits of a Moscow Bolshevik, whom he characterized as Lenin answered with a laugh: "That's why he's good, that he will stop at nothing. Now, tell me frankly, could you go to the maintenance of a rich merchant's wife for money? No? And I wouldn't go, not could have overpowered himself. But Viktor (Taratuta) went away. He is an indispensable person."<sup>55</sup>

With such "irreplaceable" people, who "stop at nothing" if it was beneficial for the Bolshevik organization ("Victor" then received a large amount of money for this organization), Lenin willingly surrounded himself. In the case with Stalin, the situation was, of course, much more complicated, since the actions that were blamed on him did not concern his personal life, but his activities as the head of the party organization, which he almost split. And such actions in the biography of Stalin were not at all exceptions. Other stages of his career were full of similar conflicts, including a large number of sharp clashes in prisons and in exile, the details of which should have become known to Lenin, in any case after 1917 and, moreover, from people whose organizational experience Lenin trusted so much that it was they who were entrusted with the leadership of both

branches of the apparatus of the dictatorship - Sverdlov (through the party) and Yenukidze (through the

Soviets). To this was added the fact, which had begun to emerge, of the presence in Stalin's views of such features that forced Lenin, sometimes very sharply, to put him in his place. Records of this have been preserved in the official minutes of the Bolshevik Central Committee. "If the Central Committee took the point of view of Stalin,"

Lenin said during the disputes about the Brest Peace, "then we would be traitors." international socialism".

At the basis of these "features" of Stalin's views lay his complete indifference to the main goals of the communist movement. If we have in mind positive ideals, then Stalin was never a communist at all, since even those few elements of humanism that were preserved in Lenin were always alien to him. Stalin extended Lenin's nihilism in regard to ethics to all generally positive tasks of the communist program. From the very beginning, he came to this camp charged with only one negative electricity of repulsion from the "old world", to take an active part in the destruction ("to the foundation") of which he aspired. Lenin, no doubt, perfectly understood this, as he also understood the fact that Stalin's so-called "political realism" actually concealed his complete political nihilism. But from a narrowly practical point of view, these features of Stalin were very useful, since they allowed him to see those weaknesses of the enemy that eluded the attention of communist observers, and even more useful was Stalin's ability to play on these weaknesses of the enemy.

Stalin deployed this talent of his during the years of the civil war, becoming in fact the main leader of all work behind enemy lines. Rykov pointed out this side of Stalin's behind-the-scenes activities in a conversation with an American journalist, whom he treated with great confidence, acquainting him with many behind-the-scenes aspects of the life of the dictatorship. "While Trotsky's great oratorical talent," said Rykov, "supported idealism and kindled the revolutionary fervor of the Red Army, Stalin was engaged in poaching behind the scenes.

fight on any side, both for the tsarists and for the revolution. In those years, there were battles when entire regiments, brigades and even divisions moved from one camp to another. Others went into battle under the tsarist banners and went over to the Reds, and vice versa. We owe a number of our victories to Stalin's dexterity in decomposing the enemy. "57

Lenin undoubtedly highly valued the latter as an organizer and sometimes even specifically requested his opinion (as, incidentally, he asked for the opinions of his other closest collaborators), but undoubtedly also that at the same time he was afraid of Stalin. That is why Lenin nominated Stalin to the highest posts in the party leadership, up to a place in the Politburo, and more than once gave him the most responsible assignments, but stubbornly did not let him take the post of secretary of the Central Committee, i.e. did not agree to transfer to him the functions of executive power in the

party. And Stalin was eager precisely for this power. It must be admitted that he had a lot of data for secretarial work. Of course, he had many shortcomings, but he was a good organizer, knew how to understand people, and from this angle he was much higher than those whom Lenin put in a secretarial position after Sverdlov (apparently, Krestinsky was the only exception.) And yet, until April 1922, anyone but Stalin was elected secretary of the Central Committee.

Given the position that Lenin occupied in the party, there is no doubt that it was he who did not let Stalin take the helm of the party machine. Stalin had many other opponents in the leadership headquarters of the party who fought against his elevation, but it was Lenin who decided the issue, and there is no doubt that, in doing so, he was guided by the fear that Stalin would direct his "innate passion for intrigues" to inter-party relations, will, by its intrigues, introduce disintegration into the party leadership. Stalin, of course,

saw this role of Lenin and made every effort to overcome the hostile wariness of the latter. He conducted this work along two lines: on the one hand, he tried at every step to prove to Lenin his complete solidarity with him and his readiness to be guided in everything by his instructions. And at the same time, on the other hand, he tried to slander Lenin against those whom he considered his rivals, primarily against Trotsky.

The few letters from Stalin to Lenin that have made their way into the press (as is known, Stalin was generally extremely reluctant to give permission for the publication of letters and documents about his past) provide convincing

examples of this. A study of the documents shows that Lenin not only tolerated these slanders, it is very likely that he even encouraged them to some extent: otherwise Stalin would have been more careful in his game ... Bukharin later said that Stalin's main strength was that he is a "genius dispenser", i.e., he understands better than anyone what arguments can best poison the minds of his interlocutors, pushing them to actions that are beneficial for him, the "genius dispenser".

Undoubtedly, despite the warnings, Lenin succumbed to the influence of Stalin's skillfully dosed slander. The latter's

behavior in relation to Trotsky was quite definite: carefully, but persistently, he sowed the "evil seeds" of the suspicion on the Bolshevik elite that Trotsky was rushing with plans for a military-Bonapartist coup, and precisely for this purpose he selects around him people who are personally devoted to him. "Stalin never spoke about this publicly," Rykov told the above-mentioned American correspondent in 1925, "

but at meetings of the Politburo and in intimate party circles, he exaggerated this topic in every way.

"59 Of course, Stalin conducted these conversations behind Trotsky's back, but the rumors about them nevertheless reached the last. He

tried to explain himself to Lenin. "I am only interested in one thing Trotsky asked, "Could you, even for a minute, admit such a monstrous idea that I am picking people up against you?

"Nothing," Lenin replied. It

was as if some kind of cloud had dissipated over our heads,"60 adds Trotsky, who neither then nor later understood the full force of the "evil seeds" of Stalin's slander. intrigues" brought Stalin many more victories on the front of the struggle for power over the party than on the front of the struggle against the external enemies of the Soviet dictatorship.

The decisive moment was the election of Stalin as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, which took place on April 3, 1922, immediately after the Party Congress. The position of the party during this congress was very difficult. The absolutely catastrophic condition of many local organizations, revealed by the purge of 1921, showed the urgent need for urgent measures to restore order in the party apparatus. The former composition of the secretariat of the Central Committee was clearly unsuitable for this (at that time it included Molotov, Yaroslavsky and Mikhailov). It was necessary to put at the head of the secretariat a smart and decisive person, capable of putting things in order with a strong hand. In the commission that discussed this issue, the majority leaned towards the candidacy of I. N. Smirnov, an old Bolshevik worker, who, as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the 5th Army (under the command of Tukhachevsky, bore the brunt of the struggle against Kolchak), and then chairman of the Sibrevkom, showed a huge organizational talent and a great ability to understand people, to exert the necessary influence on them. During the Eleventh Congress, he worked as the secretary of the party organization of Petrograd and at the same time was at the head of the Northwestern Bureau of the Central Committee. In party circles, he enjoyed great prestige and wide sympathy. He was considered a direct and open person, firm and fair.

From all these points of view, Smirnov was a suitable candidate, but he had one big "but" behind him, which outweighed everything: he was a really strong and independent person, courageous enough not only to have his own views, but also to defend them even against Lenin himself. Shortly before that, he withstood a big conflict with representatives of the Cheka in Siberia, preventing them from arresting E. E. Kolosov, a prominent Siberian Social Revolutionary, for whom the Chekists were really hunting. Smirnov with him

was personally acquainted through pre-revolutionary exile, and now, in order to save him from arrest, he settled him in his own apartment ("They won't come to arrest you here, I vouch," he said with a grin), and then sent Kolosov to Moscow with a reliable companion. From

Lenin's point of view, even more dangerous was the independence shown by Smirnov in a question that went beyond

internal party disputes: in Siberia in 1920-1921, as chairman of the Sibrevkom, Smirnov openly showed himself to be an opponent of the anti-peasant policy that was then pursued by the Central Committee of the party, and fought against it, entering into conflicts with special representatives of the center. The events of that time justified Smirnov's position: the Siberian peasantry responded to the introduction of a surplus appraisal, the creation of committees of the poor and other measures of the central government with an uprising in the winter of 1920-1921, which had a huge impact on Lenin's sharp turn to the NEP. Nevertheless, Lenin did not like Smirnov's

independence. To Stalin, whom he also knew through exile, Smirnov had a very negative attitude, and Stalin answered him in the same way: they were too different people. It is possible that it was precisely because of his repulsion from Stalin that Smirnov began to draw closer to Trotsky, although he never shared those views that were characteristic of specific

"Trotskyism." Undoubtedly, it was precisely this independence of Smirnov that determined Lenin's attitude towards him: just at the time of the Eleventh Congress, Lenin was especially anti-Trotskyist, placing on Trotsky a large share of the responsibility for the turmoil in party affairs. Lenin suspected that Trotsky was secretly continuing to carry on factional work, and it was by this that he explained the latent oppositional sentiments that were often felt at the congress. It is very likely that this was due to the influence of Stalin's slander; The coincidence of the streak of the greatest irritation against Trotsky with the nomination of Stalin for the post of secretary of the Central Committee by Lenin, of course, was not an accident ...

Lenin, of course, did not reach the standards that Stalin later established, but he also preferred to have around him people who need to be convinced only about particulars, who follow him unquestioningly in big questions of politics. He considered this especially necessary for the post of general secretary of the Central Committee, and that is why he made every effort to fail the candidacy of Smirnov and put Stalin through, against whom there were many objections from different sides. Of course, Lenin was confident that he could personally control the work of Stalin, neutralizing its harmful



sides. This, too, was affected by the enormous arrogance so characteristic of him.

At the very first meeting of the members of the newly elected Central Committee, on the evening of April 2, 1922, the question of the secretariat arose. A number of people named Smirnov's candidacy, and he would undoubtedly have been elected if Lenin had not intervened in the discussion. The latter said a lot of flattering things about Smirnov, but proved that the party would be able to use his abilities to the fullest by returning him to Siberia, where things went very badly after him. For those who knew Lenin, it was clear that he had decided on no account to admit to the secretaries of the Central Committee a person who might openly go over to Trotsky's camp tomorrow, but he did not want to talk about it directly, since he himself repeatedly declared the need to expel him from the party

practice all the memories of the recent discussion. Rejecting Smirnov's candidacy at this first meeting of the members of the Central Committee, Lenin did not name his own candidate, and only answered a direct question with a promise to name such a candidate tomorrow. It is very likely that at that moment the question had not yet been finally resolved for him. It is known that Zinoviev especially insisted on the candidacy of Stalin, who, from his own experience in the Petrograd organization, had already managed to convince himself of the peculiarities of Smirnov and went over to the camp of admirers of Stalin's organizational talents. At night, after the first meeting of the members of the Central Committee, Lenin had a long conversation with Stalin. Obviously, it was this conversation that allowed Lenin to overcome all hesitation. And the next day, April 3, at the first official meeting of the Central Committee, he proposed to elect Stalin as secretary. This candidacy surprised many, since many of the members of the Central Committee knew about Stalin's past. But Lenin's authority was so great that

Stalin was elected without controversy. So Stalin came to power over the apparatus. In escorting Stalin to this post, Lenin was sure that Stalin would pursue the organizational policy of the party in full agreement with him, with Lenin. Apparently, it was this question that was the subject of a great nightly conversation, and it is more than likely that it was this bitter experience of his collusion with Stalin that Lenin had in mind when a year later, in nego

go to an agreement with Stalin, who "will conclude a rotten compromise and deceive" (as he deceived Lenin). Lenin's

illness helped this deception. His health seemed strong. All the more striking was the news of the first blow, which came less than two months after Stalin's election. Stalin even then belonged to that breed of "happy" whose "enemies" die when it is profitable. After Stalin was elected secretary of the Central Committee, Lenin ceased to be useful to him - he began to become dangerous. Stalin skillfully used the situation. A "troika" was formed in the Politburo, which, in addition to Stalin, included Zinoviev, who thought that he was leading Stalin, and Kamenev, who went with the flow. In the

beginning, cautiously "dosing out" measures in the field of economic policy, the "troika" prepared an "offensive on the rails of the NEP"<sup>61</sup> against private capital in trade and industry. In the field of organizational construction, Stalin, with feverish haste, led the "shaking up" of the leading personnel of the party apparatus, occupying all responsible places with his creatures. From the very first steps, he showed that he had carefully read Machiavelli and, in any case, "the mechanics of the struggle for power," in particular its "zoological" features, as Kamenev later defined them, he thought through very consistently. And Lenin, indeed, quickly "cured" from a tolerant attitude towards Stalin, on a number of specific examples, making sure

to what extent the latter's lack of "elementary honesty" can reach. This question was the most painful for the last months of Lenin's life, who saw the connection between the personal question about Stalin and the big problem about the main line of the policy of the dictatorship. Lenin knew, especially after the second blow, after December 16, 1922, that death was at the threshold and that the end could come at any moment. Doctors prescribed rest and demanded that he stop reading newspapers, stop meeting with party friends, stop talking about topics that excite him so much, and any excitement can become fatal. Lenin resolutely waved it off. "Don't you understand," he said to the doctors, "that I'm even more worried when I can't talk about it?" He limited his meetings to those closest to him, refused to meet people

which irritated him, reduced his reading of everyday material, concentrating the rest of his strength on what he considered the main, main thing. But he thought only about him, about this main thing, and from both ends he

burned the remnants of the candle of his life. From the adventurous arrogance, which until recently was so characteristic of his "experimentation" (he liked to quote the words of Napoleon: "First you need to get involved in a serious battle, and then you'll see"), now there was no trace left. He painfully acutely felt the responsibility for the "experiment" he had begun so irresponsibly and puzzled over the question of how to navigate the ship of the dictatorship in order to save it from wreckage. Two themes stood for him in the center. On the plane of big politics, he more and more sharply brought to the fore the problem of relations between the dictatorship and the peasantry, demanding from the dictatorship such a policy that would ensure the possibility of full cooperation with the peasantry. This thought was the only great political thought which Lenin laid down as the basis of his famous testament. He was absolutely categorical in asserting that the policy of agreement with the peasantry

It is an ultimatum condition for the preservation of the new system that a policy that undermines such an agreement will inevitably lead Soviet power to disaster.

Agreement with the peasantry—this idea must become the defining idea of the entire policy of the dictatorship. Lenin did not agree with the conclusion drawn by Rykov from the same premise, who spoke of the need for a retreat and transition from the fundamental positions of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", which were occupied by the Bolsheviks in October 1917, to the positions of the "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry", as they were defined. the Bolsheviks in 1905. Lenin, who spent the entire revolution and civil war under the slogan of "immediate socialism", organically could not accept this conclusion. But for the future, he resolutely rejected a policy built on violence against the peasantry. His thought struggled with the problem of how the Soviet dictatorship could combine the socialist character of its common tasks with a policy of sincere agreement with the peasantry, which, in its sentiments, was not socialist. Lenin sought a solution to the problem in revising "our entire point of view on socialism." "Earlier,

- he wrote, - we put the center of gravity and had to put it on the political struggle, the revolution, the conquest of power, etc. Now the center of gravity for us is transferred to peaceful organizational "cultural" work. As the main task of this cultural work in the countryside, it is necessary to promote cooperation, which should make "the transition to the new order as simple, easy and accessible as possible for the peasant"<sup>62</sup>. A large "cooperative plan" was taking shape in Lenin's head, a

schematic outline of which he gave in his notes "On Cooperation" (January 1923). But precisely because the idea of an obligatory agreement with the peasantry became the main socio-political conclusion of Lenin in his constructions, the importance of questions of organizational construction of the party grew to absolutely exceptional proportions: the policy of agreement with the peasantry should be designed for a long period of time; she led the party along a path on which dangers were inevitable from all sides; the chances of success largely depended on whether people on the captain's bridge of the Party ship combined the firmness of the helmsman's hand with fidelity to the basic idea of this policy, with fidelity to the idea of agreement with the peasantry.

The question of what kind of policy the party should pursue was thus inextricably intertwined with the question of who is capable of pursuing the right policy? Half seriously, half jokingly, Lenin called these groups of questions "leaderology" and was able to discuss them for hours with those whom he considered politically closest to himself. The conclusions he

came to were disappointing: he did not see a person who could become the central figure for the entire system of dictatorship, taking his place in it.

himself.

It was during these months that Lenin revised his attitude towards Trotsky and to a large extent rehabilitated him from the suspicions that Stalin sowed with evil slander. In matters of big politics, Lenin very often felt himself in complete solidarity with Trotsky, but he also saw that relations had developed between the latter and other leading figures of the dictatorship's headquarters, which made it extremely difficult to work together harmoniously. Not in such a sharp form, but dangerous cracks crawled around other

responsible party and government officials. And the more closely Lenin looked at these cracks, the more frankly those whom he summoned to talk about the situation told him, the more clearly all the dimensions of the danger that grew out of Stalin's "evil seeds" were outlined to him.

It was clear that this was the root of evil. Until this evil work is brought to an end, no significant improvement is possible at the top of the dictatorship. All other questions of "leaderology" were only of secondary importance. It will be possible to start gathering forces, to start regrouping them only after the main source of disintegration has been eliminated - Stalin, whom he, Lenin, had himself made General Secretary of the Central Committee just a few months before. The last

months of Lenin's life are filled with anxiety around this issue. He saw more and more clearly that it was necessary to liquidate Stalin as a party leader. But even with all the influence of Lenin, this was not an easy task. Stalin skillfully pursued his line, braiding the party elite with intrigues and slander. Just as Lenin himself had been entangled a year before, so now many of the members of the Central Committee and the Politburo are entangled in Stalin's nets. Lenin began to hurry especially after the second blow (December 16, 1922). Even before the doctors gave him permission to read newspapers and engage in party affairs (December 29), he insisted on calling a stenographer to him and one of the first materials dictated to her the first half of the will demanding Stalin's removal from the post of General Secretary (December 25). He wanted, in any case, that this order of his to the heirs would now be fixed on paper. When

his situation improved a little and it became clear that fate was giving him another small respite, Lenin concentrated all his efforts on formulating the main ideas of his political testament and on preparing to carry out the main idea of his testament organizationally. In view of the dexterity with which Stalin entangled those around him, Lenin decided that simply from him

wandering is not enough, what is necessary, as Krupskaya told Trotsky, is to "destroy Stalin politically"<sup>63</sup>. Lenin systematically collects materials on Stalin's activities, preparing a "bomb", which he decided to "detonate" against Stalin on

party congress. This "bomb" was supposed to completely liquidate Stalin, and Lenin lived in one hope: to hold out until this congress, which had already been convened for April. He

did not hold out... Stalin had his own agents who watched the mood in the camp of his enemies, primarily Lenin's mood, his negotiations, his plans. It is possible that he did not know everything, but he knew enough to understand what a terrible threat hung over him. And at the same time he knew that Lenin's health was deteriorating, that he had only a few days left to live, and that every acute excitement could prematurely break the thin thread of these few days. It is hard to believe that this was just a mere accident: it was on these days that Stalin, with more and more growing rudeness, answered the questions of those who turned to him, as secretary of the Central Committee, personally or by telephone for information and other information for Lenin. It ended with the fact that on one request by telephone, with which Krupskaya turned to him, Stalin answered with the rudest abuse, interspersed with "swearing." This answer, of course, became known to Lenin. Lenin became indignant, worried a lot and dictated to the stenographer a letter to Stalin with a statement about breaking off all personal relations with him. This letter is unknown in the press, since Stalin and his agent carefully destroyed all documents unfavorable to him. But we know its content: in it, Lenin called Stalin's behavior the behavior of an eastern satrap intoxicated with power, wrote that Stalin was unworthy to be in the ranks of the Communist Party<sup>64</sup>.

This letter to Stalin about breaking off relations with him was the last letter dictated by Lenin. The unrest associated with this episode cost Lenin dearly: on the same night he became worse, then the third stroke came, he lost the ability to speak, the right side of the body was paralyzed. Then came a slow dying, stretching for ten months.

When these events were discussed, Stalin usually responded by admitting his "rudeness." "He was born that way," he added, and in this many saw an excuse for him. There is no doubt about the presence of elements of rudeness in his nature. But the question does not end there. Stalin was rude by nature, but he did not always show this side of his nature, but only when he wanted to be

rough. He knew how to superbly control himself, at least during the period when Lenin was dying. When

getting acquainted with the biography of Stalin, completely excluded one has to admit the assertion that he could lose sa

power over the simple questions of Lenin's wife. The rudeness of nature does not explain his behavior. The point is not a loss of self-control, but a conscious game: Stalin deliberately spoke rude things to Lenin's secretaries and deliberately rudely insulted his wife, trying to make all this known to the sick Lenin, whom such behavior of Stalin could not but lead to indignation. Lenin was a very restrained and secretive nature, but it was precisely from such calculated rude actions that he came into a state of cold fury, close to a nervous illness. And in the then state of Lenin, this degree of nervous tension could not but lead to a blow.

Stalin knew people well, or rather, weak, vulnerable places in people. He could not but know this side of Lenin. And the insult that he inflicted on Lenin's wife was his deliberate and calculated move, the task of which was to excite Lenin in such a way that a new blow would happen to the latter, for only such a blow could prevent the catastrophe from the "explosion of the bomb" that Lenin had prepared against Stalin. Stalin deliberately insulted Krupskaya in order to kill Lenin - this is the conclusion to which the analysis of the data known so far on the situation preceding Lenin's death leads to. From a historical perspective, this end of Lenin was a retribution for the rule "the end

justifies the means", with which he approached the matter of political struggle in general and the question of involving Stalin in party work, in particular, "irreplaceable" people capable of "stopping at nothing" In the name of achieving important practical results, which Lenin picked up in his entourage, at the decisive moment they did not stop even before stepping over Lenin's corpse.

It was at this time, in 1925, that Malenkov appeared in the secretariat of the Central Committee and at the same time in Stalin's personal secretariat. It wasn't an accident. People like Malenkov, with experience in military KGB work in Turkestan, "Soviet Tashkenters" in all their

skills just at that time became especially necessary for Stalin. It was undoubtedly the most difficult year on his tortuous path to a one-man dictatorship. And Stalin passed it, all the time balancing on the blade of a knife, under the constant threat of a breakdown. He had just dealt the decisive blow to Trotsky. And, having removed him from the post of chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, he actually disabled this most dangerous and strong of his opponents in the struggle for a leading role in the party. But this victory almost became a pyrrhic one for him: for those who watched Stalin closely during the months of persecution of Trotsky, it became more and more clear how dangerous he was for those around him and how right Lenin was, who placed at the center of his will the demand for the removal of Stalin from post

of General Secretary of the Central Committee. During the year that passed after the death of Lenin and was filled with the struggle against Trotsky, the main features of Stalin's nature, his complete promiscuity in means, combined with boundless lust for power and malicious vindictiveness, came to light with complete obviousness for those who worked alongside him in the leading party organs. Placing at the center of his aspirations the task of establishing his personal dictatorship over the party that rules the country dictatorially, Stalin stopped at nothing in the fight against his opponents. With more or less significant disagreements, joint work with him was impossible. His methods of action in relation to colleagues at work were described by Lenin in passing remarks. "This cook prepares only spicy dishes", and when he encounters strong opponents, in which his culinary exercises become dangerous, Stalin concludes a "rotten compromise" so that, under the guise of this compromise, behind the partner's back, he secretly continues preparing the same "spicy dishes". That is why Stalin easily made all sorts of agreements, easily made all sorts of promises: they tied the hands of opponents who approached them as honest people, and he used them to choose a convenient moment for a treacherous strike. As the same Lenin spoke about him, Stalin was a man who lacked "elementary honesty." With those who fought against him, he was merciless. Offenses did not forgive and did not forget. He knew how

to wait patiently, postponing revenge until



opportunity, but revenge was all the more cruel when such an opportunity arose ...

Zinoviev and Kamenev

were aware of these features of Stalin's nature, although, in all likelihood, not with such completeness as Lenin. Stalin's rapid rise to the post of general secretary was not at all to their liking. The resistance which he offered to their attempts could not fail to show them that an enemy was growing in his face, who would soon become dangerous to themselves. But the needs of the struggle against Trotsky, who seemed to them the most dangerous opponent, forced them to push the question of Stalin into the background. It must be clarified that Trotsky, too, had far from warm feelings for them, he was not a meek lamb and knew how to deliver very sensitive blows, at times provoking Zinoviev and Kamenev to fight. This was the nature of the book he published in the autumn of 1924 about the "Lessons of October".

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In January 1925, from the moment Trotsky was removed from the post of chairman Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, the question of him has lost its sharpness,

and Kamenev and Zinoviev immediately made an attempt to go over to the offensive against Stalin. Undoubtedly, Kamenev's proposal was of a provocative nature, when he proposed the candidacy of Stalin during the discussion of the question of Trotsky's successor to the post in the Revolutionary Military Council. This proposal was not accepted, since Stalin decisively rejected it. But Kamenev's goal was, of course, clear to Stalin. It is from this moment that the friction within yesterday's "triumvirate" turns into an increasingly intense struggle, at first behind the scenes, then openly. Stalin's position was extremely difficult, although there is no doubt that he prepared for this struggle in advance. The main difficulty, from

his point of view, was that in the then Politburo there was literally not a single person whom Stalin could more or less rely firmly. And the struggle was primarily for the majority in the Politburo. The Politburo then included seven full members (not counting six candidates<sup>66</sup>), who, if we discard Stalin himself and Trotsky (who stood completely apart and was an opponent of Stalin), fell into two groups: Zinoviev and Kamenev, on the one hand, and Rykov, Bukharin And

Tomsky, on the other. Even then there were significant differences between them, but these differences were more in theoretical constructions and in political sentiments than in specific conclusions for current policy.

The Rykov group especially insisted on expanding the NEP in the direction of granting greater freedom of development to the individual peasant economy in the field of domestic policy and on freeing the country's foreign policy from the need to reckon with the interests of the development of the Comintern and the preparation of a world revolution. This liberation was then an indispensable condition for economic construction in the country. It was precisely these points that Rykov directly put before the Politburo as a condition for his consent to take the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars after the death of Lenin. The basis of his entire policy was the idea that he then often expressed at responsible meetings: since the revolution did not occur in the West, for Russia, which alone is to build socialism can not, the next step is, as he formulated, the problem of lowering power on the brakes to the peasantry. In this regard, he thought more consistently and spoke more openly than even his closest associates Bukharin and Tomsky, definitely linking economic concessions to the peasantry with the need to foresee concessions in the near future.

political

Zinoviev and Kamenev shared Rykov's idea of the impossibility building socialism in Russia alone, by the forces of of the Russian working class, but they were inclined to look for a way out of this situation in a completely opposite direction, concentrating attention on the interests of the Comintern, on questions of assistance to the communist movement of the West. That is why they were especially sensitive to all kinds of changes in foreign policy, but relatively easily agreed to concessions to the peasantry, not only economic, but even political. At the plenum of the Central Committee in the autumn of 1924, under the influence of the uprising in Georgia, Zinoviev proposed to legalize the creation of a non-party peasant faction in the Soviets, both in the center and in the regions, and give it the right to publish its own newspaper. As for economic concessions, Zinoviev and Kamenev approved of the "course towards the richest

village"<sup>67</sup>, taken in the spring of 1925 by the Fourteenth Party Conference and then by the Third Congress of Soviets

These differences, of course, were the cause of a number of internal frictions in the Politburo, but they did not create insurmountable obstacles to joint work. Neither Zinoviev and Kamenev, nor even Trotsky, objected to the conditions that Rykov set upon his appointment to the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars,<sup>68</sup> and almost until the very end of 1925 Kamenev worked in unison with Rykov as his deputy chairman of the Council of

People's Commissars. There were no political grounds for a sharp struggle in the Politburo, and in essence, Zinoviev and Kamenev, starting this struggle, set themselves not a political, but an organizational task: the removal of Stalin from the post of general secretary, that is, the fulfillment of the very testament of Lenin, which they just a few months before, they themselves were buried. In many ways, this is precisely why they now did not have the inner strength to openly explain the true motives of their behavior; for this, they would have to not only admit to the mistake they made in the spring of 1924, when they vouched to the Central Committee for Stalin's loyalty, but also to repent that they then covered up Stalin for the sake of a joint struggle against Trotsky. A year later, after the Fourteenth Party Congress, they did it, but they did it like weak people, that is, piecemeal and belatedly, in such a form that their statements could no longer impress the party. During the decisive period of the struggle within the Politburo in 1925 they not only did not openly develop this demand for the removal of Stalin, not only did they not make an attempt, relying on Lenin's testament, to unite all the elements striving for the improvement of intra-party relations, but they also made every effort to deny the fact that their struggle was personally against Stalin, avoided criticizing the latter's organizational practices and were silent about Lenin's will, which, despite everything, continued to be a strong trump card in their hands. Meanwhile, only with such a formulation of the question did

they have a chance to defeat Stalin, since there was not a single person inside the Politburo who would not already then be essentially an opponent of Stalin's organizational methods, who would not be critical of his personal qualities. In a conversation with Trotsky for another year

Bukharin had said two times before: "Stalin's first quality is laziness. The second quality is irreconcilable envy of those who know and can do more than he does. He led underground moves under Ilyich."<sup>69</sup>

Relations with Stalin at that time were already extremely tense with Rykov, who spoke almost openly about the "gangster" methods of the latter's party work<sup>70</sup>. As for Tomsky, he reacted to Stalin earlier than others and more sharply than others from his group, perhaps in connection with the sharp personal clashes that they had at meetings of the communist faction of the congress of trade unions in 1921. Therefore, there are many reasons consider that if the question of Stalin's organizational methods were put before the Politburo in its pure form, not bound by political problems, but independently, as a question of creating preconditions for the normal functioning of the party collective, then there would be no one in the Politburo who would like to come out in defense of Stalin. From this, of course, one should not conclude that the dictatorship could maintain the unity of its ruling head for a long period. There were too many internal contradictions in the country, and therefore the explosion of the old elite was inevitable. But this explosion would

have come in some other form. In any case, in 1925, the unification of this elite to eliminate Stalin would have been quite possible and not at all difficult. It was only necessary to firmly and definitely take the appropriate course, isolating this organizational question from all questions of external and internal

politicians.

Zinoviev and Kamenev took exactly the opposite path: they were silent about Stalin's organizational methods and the specific features of his nature and tried to prove the existence of serious disagreements. The main object of their attacks was the Christian-Janophile wing of the party. The main accusation that was brought against him was the accusation of "underestimating the kulak danger." The own position of this "new opposition" (as the grouping of Zinoviev and Kamenev soon began to be called) was very vague and ambivalent. They recognized that the main task of the day was "the development of the productive forces of the countryside" and agreed that "it is necessary

to create a situation in which they would not write down anyone who is more or less tolerably

runs his own business. But at the same time they sounded the alarm about the "kulak danger." "The kulak in the countryside," Zinoviev insisted, "is more dangerous, much more dangerous than the Nepman in the city... The rural kulak elite from the first moment lay claim not only to profiting, to save, to live by usury, but to From the very first moment he lays claim to a political role, to the role of an organizer of rural public opinion. The "new opposition" did not

make specific proposals at this stage of its formalization; she did not indicate which policy should replace the one she criticized, and Bukharin was quite right when he pointed out in one of his speeches of that time that her behavior was based on "skepticism and nothing but skepticism"<sup>72</sup> --- disbelief in the possibility of achieving what - or success in the matter of construction without the help of the world revolution, in the imminent arrival of which they also did not believe. The sharper became the attacks of Zinoviev and Kamenev on the official policy of the dictatorship at those points where the dictatorship tried to make further concessions to the peasantry, especially to attempts to substantiate this policy theoretically, to attempts to prove that, by pursuing a policy of concessions, the Communists at the head of the government continue to Lenin's policy. And since Bukharin wrote and spoke on these topics more often and more than others, who not only in his writing style was inclined to sharpen his formulations, but also in his method of thinking was distinguished by greater independence of thought than other communist authors, very soon it was Bukharin who became central target of all attacks.

Very soon, the "new opposition" began to try to lay a "sociological" foundation for its political criticism and moved on to the topic that has always been the most sensitive for the dictatorship, the topic of the class degeneration of Soviet power and the Communist Party. If this question was put into print with only one edge, pointing to the ongoing process of "flooding the lower floors of Soviet power by the petty-bourgeois peasantry" (Kamenev), then behind the scenes of an open political struggle, at closed meetings of like-minded people, in private conversations with sympathizers, Zinoviev's closest squires went much further and claimed that

The "petty-bourgeois element" in the countryside not only "flooded" the state apparatus, but also subjugated the Party apparatus to itself. Records of conversations that were conducted on these topics by P. Zalutsky, then a member of the Central Committee and one of the secretaries of the party organization of Leningrad under Zinoviev, who in 1925 saw the main trouble in the fact that "the state apparatus captured the Central Committee of the party, and

puts pressure on it and dictates his policy to him. He explained: "In Moscow there is a huge layer of state officials, a mass of new and old bourgeoisie. All this puts pressure on our party, creates public opinion in it. We do not lead the bureaucracy, but together with the

bourgeoisie determines our consciousness"74. Zalutsky himself was an average Bolshevik among the workers, without original thoughts (two or three small pamphlets remained from him, he himself died during the years of the "Yezhovshchina"). The thoughts that he expressed in such conversations were clearly not his own: the leaders of the Leningrad organization of that time thought so, and the estate in them, in this primitive "sociological justification", should look for the key to understanding the "new

Zinoviev and Kamenev, since they refused to directly raise the question of the removal of Stalin for those features of his nature, about which Lenin wrote in his will, and made an attempt to bring their dispute with him before the public opinion of the party as a political dispute, they had to take into account the moods his environment, and in this environment the most influential group was the top of the party organization of Leningrad. This elite was so influential for the "new opposition" that the latter was often called the "Leningrad opposition" then. But in Leningrad, the process of the transformation of the party organization into a bureaucratic

apparatus, due to a number of conditions, began earlier and proceeded at a faster pace than anywhere else in the country. In accordance with this, the basic antagonism between the communists employed in the party apparatus and the communists from the state apparatus came to light earlier and more sharply. The top of the party apparatus here trumpeted phrases about the "rebirth" of the state apparatus the more willingly, the further the process of its own bureaucratic rebirth went. "A break from

masses "in the party organization of Leningrad for its top was sharper than in other parts of the country. There were many ceremonial conferences convened there (the last "Zinoviev" conference in December 1925 was the twenty-second in a row, that is, an average of three per year), they were arranged very solemnly, decisions were invariably made unanimously, Zinoviev especially liked the form of "open letters" either to Trotsky, then to the Moscow organization, then to the party in general, but behind this front facade there was a far from solid construction. Bukharin called the order then prevailing in the Leningrad organization "a combination of demagoguery with sergeant-major methods of managing the party."<sup>75</sup> But nowhere was their combination brought out in such a defiant form as in

noviev". At the same time, all the pathos of the sergeant major's demagoguery was directed against the state apparatus, that is, against people who saw the mechanics of a crude staging well. Zalutsky only repeated those phrases that were commonplace for the entire circle of Zinoviev. The social

system of the then emerging new Soviet society, on which the "new opposition" tried to lean, was the same stratum, whose sentiments Stalin aspired to become. But the latter approached his goal more carefully, diligently preparing each step along this path, carefully checking the cadres who were supposed to Zinoviev was much more reckless. True, the top of the party apparatus was closely connected with him, but he had no support in wide circles of party members, He did not enjoy wide sympathy here. Under these conditions, he could not win. with its strategy and tactics, the "new opposition" not only did not weaken the position

of Stalin, not only did not contribute to the creation of a united front of all opponents of the latter's organizational policy, but, on the contrary, completely split the top of the "old guard" of Bolshevism, which is only one, provided that they speak in solidarity, could still at that moment dump Stalin on the path of an intraorganizational decision. The latter could only reap the fruits of the "stupid

diplomacy" (Stalin's expression) of their opponents and, contributing to the aggravation of the dispute between them, pushing the foreheads of the sergeant-major demagoguery of the "new opposition" with the "concealers of the kulaks" from the Rykov group, create for itself the position of a "third force" that does not identify itself with any of the arguing parties, but stands above both of them, sees the weaknesses of each of them and acts as the supreme arbiter, defending the interests of the party as a whole against all those who turned out to be guilty of mistakes and "deviations" ... This is exactly how Stalin behaved and (led, and his speeches at the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925 cemented his position as supreme arbiter.

But the defeat that Stalin inflicted on his opponents in 1925 was not only a defeat of the "new opposition." in the camp of the victors, and although it was they who carried on their shoulders the main burden of the struggle against Zinoviev and Kamenev. What was worse for them was the fact that they suffered defeat without even unfurling their banners, without making an attempt to mobilize sympathizers, without giving a clear formulation of their position at those points where it stood apart from the position of Stalin, who, speaking openly as their friend and ally, was in fact their worst enemy and did everything to undermine their influence by digging under their positions wherever he had the opportunity to do so. This

defeat was above all an ideological defeat on the central question, which just at that time became the pivot for the whole intra-Party struggle, namely, the question of "socialism in one country." Stalin's biographers quite rightly pay much attention to this issue, but they incorrectly depict the struggle around it as a struggle between Stalin, on the one hand, and his opponents from the camp of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, on the other. The

origin and essence of the dispute is much more complex and versatile, and only against the background of this versatility does all its real significance for the fate of the dictatorship become fully understood.



The question of the possibility of building socialism in one country, without the victory of the socialist revolution in other countries, first became a subject of controversy during the first discussion about Trotskyism in 1923-1924, when Stalin was a member of the "triumvirate" along with Zinoviev and Kamenev. They all answered this question in the negative. Stalin was no different. In April 1924, in the first edition of his main work, *On the Foundations of Leninism*, he wrote:

"To overthrow the bourgeoisie, the efforts of one country are enough - the history of our revolution tells us about this. For the final victory of socialism, for the organization of socialist production, the efforts of one country, especially such a peasant country as Russia, are no longer enough, for this the efforts of the proletarians of several advanced countries are needed" <sup>76</sup>.

During this period, Stalin looked at the issue the way his then allies looked at it. From the very beginning, a different - positive - answer to this question was given by Bukharin, who connected this positive answer with the thoughts developed by Lenin in his last five articles, and especially in the article "On Cooperation" (January 1923). In that last period of his life, Lenin thought of only one problem: what should be the policy of the dictatorship in order to prevent the collapse of Soviet power? It was in this connection that Lenin reconsidered the question of the role of the peasantry in building the socialist system. Analyzing the state of the country, Lenin came to the conclusion that "we" have "everything necessary to build a complete socialist society" and have an objective opportunity to build it on one obligatory condition: if the Soviet government builds its policy in such a way that the union between workers and peasants will be the lever of this alliance, according to Lenin, can and must become cooperation, for,

How

Bukharin then formulated Lenin's thoughts, "the cooperative system in our conditions is socialism" <sup>77</sup>. Later, Bukharin showed that all five of Lenin's last articles were internally linked by concern for preserving the alliance with the peasantry and were, on the whole, "Lenin's political testament." To this it must be added that this political testament of Lenin is also internally connected with

his organizational testament, in which he demanded the removal of Stalin from the post of general secretary: the only political thought introduced by Lenin into this organizational testament was the idea of the need for an alliance with the peasantry.

Bukharin, earlier than others, was the first and almost the only one of all the participants in the disputes of 1923-1925. - began to give a positive answer to the question of the possibility of building a socialist society in Russia alone, without the help of the world revolution. But he could do this only because he began to picture the path to this socialism, and to a large extent the very content of socialist society, essentially different from all the Bolsheviks of previous years. In the disputes of that time, Bukharin's views were sometimes called neo-populist, they were seen as elements of a typical populist attitude towards the peasantry. In a sense, this is correct. Bukharin, undoubtedly, spent a lot of effort on overcoming anti-peasant tendencies, which were very influential in the entire Marxist camp of Russian socialism, not only among the Bolsheviks, but also among the Mensheviks, and perhaps most significantly in "legal Marxism" P. B. Struve and others. But the main thing that is characteristic of Bukharin's speeches of this period is his tendency to return to general humanism, which was definitely emerging even then. Repulsion from humanism, which imposes ideological fetters on the elements of revolutionary destruction, human rights, in the previous period, during the era of the Bolshevik struggle for power and during the years of the civil war, Bukharin spoke with almost more force than any other of the significant representatives of the basics of classical socialism. of the Bolshevik camp. Now, earlier than others and more boldly than others in this camp, he began to think about the need to return to the foundations of humanism. humanism"

From the end of 1924, Stalin also began to use the same formula - "socialism in one country", but he put into it a completely different content: he never in his statements

neither peasantophile nor humanistic notes in general sounded on this subject. He always poses the question in a different plane, he always concentrates the attention of his audience on other sides of the problem.

In the mid-1920s, when the main disputes were going on over the question of the possibility of building socialism in one country, Stalin never even made an attempt to analyze the situation in order to show exactly what elements of it allow him to consider the building of socialism in Russia possible, never even nowhere indicated which social forces one could rely on in this case. He does not substantiate his conclusion at all, does not prove it, but decrees: "We can build socialism." "Having consolidated its power and led the peasantry behind it, the proletariat of the victorious country can and must build a socialist society"<sup>78</sup>. He is interested in a completely different side of the problem: he tries to hammer into the heads of his readers and listeners that, in the presence of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", "we" have every opportunity to overcome "everything and every kind of internal difficulties" on our own, we have every opportunity to cope with all internal adversaries. This, for Stalin, is the true essence of the problem of building socialism in Russia - the technical possibility of suppressing the resistance of the peasantry, the possibility of forcing the countryside to submit to the decisions taken by the dictatorship. For the audience, which then, in the winter of 1924-1925, saw Stalin speaking next to

Bukharin and uttering some of those formulations that were characteristic of the latter's concepts, it could not help but seem that she was dealing, if not with like-minded people, in any case, with people who have entered into an alliance "seriously and for a long time." There is no doubt that this was precisely the impression that Stalin sought to create in those months. Then it was beneficial and useful to him. It is all the more important to emphasize that even then there was nothing in common between the building of socialism according to Bukharin and the building of socialism according to Stalin: according to Bukharin, the party, as far as internal politics is concerned, had to take the course for decades of organic cooperative construction and cultural work, all the time, in every action, trying to "catch on to the private economic interests of the peasant", and going

towards these interests, while Stalin's plan, by freeing the party from the obligation to take care of the interests of the international communist movement, in essence, began to clear the forced ideological collectivization. The theory of "socialism in one country" became an algebraic way. For training according to Stalin formula that justified the right of the party dictatorship to the unlimited use of non-economic

violence against the peasantry, if only it had enough physical strength to successfully carry out this violence. The thoroughness with which all the formulations of Stalin's printed statements on this subject in those months are weighed leaves no room for doubt that he perfectly understood the

difference between his position and that of Bukharin. He entered into an alliance with the latter and with the "peasantophiles" in general with the premeditated intention of deceiving the allies. The appearance of an alliance with the "peasantophiles" was then necessary for Stalin in view of the difficult situation in which he found himself during the liquidation of the "triumvirate". The crisis of the latter in terms of personal relations coincided with a major crisis in the political leadership experienced by the top of the dictatorship. The purge of the universities, which was carried out by the dictatorship in the winter of 1923-1924, did not stand in isolation. It interbred with the first attempt to "bridle the NEP" and, in particular, to pull up the countryside. This policy was led by the "triumvirate", but Stalin was the driving force.

In the summer of 1924 it became clear that this policy had suffered a cruel bankruptcy, especially in the countryside. The uprising in Georgia in August-September 1924 was, on Stalin's personal directives, drowned in blood, but in this; There were elements in the uprising that caused prolonged anxiety in the Kremlin: after the uprising of the workers in the industrial centers of Georgia was crushed, the village continued to put up stubborn, in places even fierce resistance for several weeks. An investigation into the causes of the uprising, carried out on fresh tracks, showed that not only national, but also social factors played a large role in its scope, and the most important among them was the dissatisfaction of the peasantry with the rural policy of the Soviet dictatorship.

The Plenum of the Central Committee, which met in October, summed up the results. It turned out that Georgian sentiments do not stand in isolation, that alarming signals about the growing discontent of the village come from everywhere. Stalin, in his report, read out a letter from the Secretary of the Gomel Party Committee, who reported on the massive refusals of the peasants to choose salary sheets for tax applications. "The same reports," he added, "are available in the Central Committee from Siberia, the South-East, Kursk, Tula, Ulyanovsk, and other provinces." It was signaled from everywhere that discontent in the countryside was growing and aggravating everywhere. "The mood in the localities among our workers," Stalin summarized, "is not very good. The village is a disturbed beehive."<sup>79</sup>

The plenum was impressed by this information. The official report about it, printed in the newspapers, did not in the least reflect the atmosphere that prevailed at the plenum, but during the factional disputes of recent years, many interesting details were told about this plenum. The uprising in Georgia was compared with the uprising of 1921 in Kronstadt and they spoke of the need to change the policy in the countryside, if not (to wish them to be repeated throughout the country. Not only Zinoviev and Kamenev, but also Trotsky, who in 1924 generally slipped notes of a desire to get closer to Rykov's group: in an interview that he gave to V. Rezvik in the summer of 1924, even before the uprising in Georgia, he not only supported Rykov's economic policy, but also in the most decisive way criticized the "triumvirate" for its then policy of restricting the NEP. He did not hide his disagreement with Rykov on foreign policy issues, but emphasized all the more clearly that the NEP had saved the country and that he was ready for loyal cooperation on the basis of the NEP in the field of economic construction. never was, he had little understanding of people, internal party politics, necessarily connected with intrigues, he did not know how to conduct and did not want to.

perform.

The last stage of the "triumvirate" policy with attempts to curtail the NEP at the plenum was severely criticized, and it was no secret to anyone that the main responsibility for it lay with Stalin. "Peasantophile" grouping, which was then

true, at the stage of formation, but already then leading a decisive struggle for the expansion of the NEP in the countryside, everyone regarded it as proving its ability to correctly understand the situation. It was at this plenum that the line was outlined at its basis that determined the policy of the dictatorship for the coming period, and which found the most complete official expression in the resolutions of the Fourteenth All-Party Conference (April 1925) and the Soviets. Not only was the agricultural tax lowered by the Third Congress, but hiring labor, etc. also benefits were established for leasing land, There was talk of assigning to the peasants for a number of years those land plots that were in their use. The party turned "to face the countryside."

In this situation, a very real possibility was created for the formation of a strong majority at the top of the dictatorship to work towards expanding the NEP, and this policy could easily lead to the political isolation of Stalin, whose position, moreover, was extremely complicated by sharp attacks

attacked him by many Georgian Bolsheviks, who sharply accused him of his policy in Georgia. It is in this context that the sharp turn in peasant policy that Stalin made should be considered. If Stalin had then openly opposed the policy of concessions to the "private economic interests of the peasant", defending the policy that he pursued in 1924 and to which he returned in 1928, he would by no means have been able to change the mood. The course "facing the village" would have been taken anyway. Now, while pretending to have gone over to the camp of the allies of the "cross-Yanophile" wing of the party and repeating after others the criticism of his own yesterday's policy, which almost led to a new Kronstadt uprising, Stalin not only brought with him, as a dowry, the whole load of personal conflicts, accumulated in recent years, but also got the opportunity to sabotage their successes from within. It was a typical example of Stalin's "rotten compromise" with a premeditated intention to deceive his opponent by calling himself his ally.

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In the critical days after Lenin's death, Zinoviev and Kamenev saved Stalin. The three of them made up a "triumvirate", in Russian vernacular "troika", which before that, for one and a half to two

previous years, since the first blow at Lenin, was the supreme authority in the country, acting as an executive committee of the Politburo. According to the plan, the conduct of big politics was supposed to lie with Zinoviev and Kamenev (Zinoviev was the chairman of the Comintern, Kamenev was the deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars), Stalin was assigned the role of an executor through the party apparatus. They wanted to use him as a labor force. In practice, the relationship developed quite differently. Stalin exerted a decisive influence on the big policy of the Troika. Zinoviev and Kamenev were busy with work in other places (Zinoviev, among other things, was the chairman of the Leningrad City Council and had to spend a lot of time in Leningrad). Stalin constantly sat in the premises of the Central Committee of the party, where the headquarters of the "troika" was located, appropriated to himself the functions of the secretary-manager of the latter and confronted the rest with accomplished facts. His power grew, and he promoted himself with such assertiveness to the role of the central figure of the entire dictatorship machine in general, that Zinoviev and Kamenev even before Lenin's death had to work out various instructions in order

to moderate the appetites of the "general secretary". Lenin's testament dealt a blow, no doubt that Zinoviev and Kamenev, saving Stalin, were sure

We are sure that now they will hold it in their hands. There is reason to believe that Stalin made some promises even to them. If so, then this is one of the most successful "rotten compromises" in his biography. Stalin,

undoubtedly, understood that all his authority in those days depended on his behavior in precisely those circles that were especially important for him - in the circles of the party "middle peasants", with whom he filled the party apparatus just at that time, How. in the center and locally. It was in this environment that Stalin recruited his supporters. He selected them not on the basis of this or that political platform and not on the basis of ideological traits. Questions of ideology played a decisive role in the formation of other factions. Stalin followed a different path: he was looking for people who would combine the will to power with the ability to look into the eyes of reality. The disputes of other factions about politics were at the heart of them the search for a political line that would reconcile the country to a dictatorship in one way or another and

could provide the latter with the support of certain segments of the population. Stalin needed people who did not build such illusions for themselves. They knew that the vast masses of the people were against them, against their political and especially economic experiments, and that if the iron hoops of dictatorship were removed from the country, then the Communist Party, whatever its policy, would soon have to say goodbye to power. It can stay in power only through violence, and in order to carry out a policy of violence against the vast majority of the country's population, it is necessary to turn the party into an iron fist, bound by severe discipline and subject to a single will. The inner-Party liberties of bygone years, the right to free criticism, the right to have one's own opinion, etc. - they were ready to sacrifice all this in the name of preserving the dictatorship and were looking for a leader who would be able to put this fist into action at the right moments and with the right skill. Lenin's

testament made an impression on them, because it came from Lenin, who brought them to power and whom they were accustomed to obey. On the days when the will was read out, they would, of course, have voted against Stalin, but they were glad when Zinoviev and Kamenev gave them an excuse not to carry out the will of the deceased. In essence, the deeds that Lenin blamed Stalin were of no particular importance in their eyes: they easily forgave Stalin for rudeness, since this rudeness was abundant in the entire work of the terrorist apparatus of the dictatorship, and from there it could not but penetrate into the life of dictators, especially since Stalin then skillfully disguised it as plebeian familiarity; his ability to intrigue many of them was even impressed, since he was often seen as a way of self-defense against intellectuals,

people with well-hung languages, but with little understanding of reality. All these accusations must have seemed trifles to them in comparison with the enormous difficulties that each of them faced in the course of their daily work in the field, and whose significance for intellectuals-ideologists, in the opinion of communist "practitioners", remained hidden behind the old bookish formulas. On June 17, 1924, Stalin spoke openly

against Zinoviev and Kamenev for the first time in a speech delivered by him at one of the closed



meetings. The fact that this speech, with all the attacks against Zinoviev and Kamenev, already appeared in Pravda on June 19-20 showed that it was a premeditated attack, and that Stalin already had very influential new candidates for allies within the Politburo, since he could publish such an article in Pravda only with the help of Bukharin, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper. The article really became a very significant stage in the biography of Stalin and in the general policy of the CPSU (b). In this speech, Stalin, first of all,

for the first time expressed a claim to the role of the only authorized interpreter of Lenin's views. Taken from this angle, Stalin's speech undoubtedly stood in connection with what took place just a few days before the publication of the first edition of his essays "On the Foundations of Leninism", essays that, as you know, remained to the end the main "theoretical work Stalin and occupy a central place in all editions of his Questions of Leninism. In these essays, Stalin gave an extremely one-sided and narrow, but undoubtedly internally coherent conception of Lenin's views on the strategy and tactics of the communists in the struggle for power (both nationally and internationally), and demanded that this particular interpretation of Lenin be made mandatory for all party propaganda.

But the most important thing in this speech was still something else, namely its inner-party meaning: the attack on Zinoviev and Kamenev was an open statement by Stalin about his readiness to blow up the "troika" and go for a complete regrouping of forces at the top of the party. True, according to his usual system, he still did not completely break ties with his former colleagues in the "troika", he still retained the possibility of working together with them as well (and therefore agreed to a compromise settlement of this conflict). But an open warning about his readiness to reach an agreement with the principled opponents of the policy pursued by the "troika" had already been issued to him. In his speech, he emphasized that Zinoviev's formulation differed significantly from Lenin's formulations, who taught that the distribution of functions

in a dictatorship it should be different: "The Soviets carry out the dictatorship, and the Party leads the Soviets." And that was just what

the opponents of the "troika" within the Politburo, who fought against the dictatorship of the party apparatus over the apparatus of the Soviet government, sought it.

## CHAPTER

### 7 Stalin and Malenkov

General Secretary of the

Central Committee of the Party, Stalin began to show not only an increased interest in all issues related to the activities of the GPU and other bodies of the political police and international intelligence, but also the desire to exert his influence on their activities. At first, however, he did not always succeed. He received a great rebuff from Dzerzhinsky, who then headed the GPU and believed that this activity should be led by the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Dzerzhinsky, therefore, made his reports only to Lenin (later, during the life of the latter and on his personal instructions, Dzerzhinsky began to make them to Rykov) and only received guidance from him. To report to Stalin. Despite his initially good personal relations with him, Dzerzhinsky resolutely refused and did not submit a single official report to him until his death.

The authority of Dzerzhinsky at that time was so great, his uncompromisingness and inflexibility in matters to which he attached fundamental importance, were so well known that Stalin (whose position was so fragile that in 1923-1925 he several times filed applications for addition from himself the title of General Secretary), had to come to terms with this refusal, harboring personal anger against Dzerzhinsky. But even during this period, Stalin began to lay his hand on the GPU, exerting influence through the Organizing Bureau on the selection of responsible employees of the GPU. It was during this period that the first threads were drawn between Stalin and Yagoda, who at that time was the secretary of the party cell of the GPU and, as such, had constant contact with the Orgburo and the secretariat of the Central Committee. But only later, when Dzerzhinsky died (in time this approximately coincided with the formation of the Politburo as the highest authority in the country, standing above the Council of People's Commissars), Stalin was able to formally assume the function of supreme supervision over the GPU, so that never again

her out

do not release your hands. He knew well that for the dictator of everything it is more important to be a complete master of the political police.

Somewhat later, Stalin extended his power to other bodies of political investigation and intelligence, in particular, to the secret apparatus of the Comintern. Stalin had been interested in them before, and his articles on the Comintern (for example, articles on the "Bolshevization" of the German Communist Party in 1925) show that he attached great importance to the problems associated with the deployment and drill of the underground apparatus of the Communist Parties of the West. This device has its own

history. Already the Second Congress of the Comintern, in July 1920, adopted a decision obliging all Communist Parties, along with open mass organizations, to create special underground groups with a special purpose, such as groups for work in the army, for contacts in the police and in other government bodies. , for collecting secret information, for secret work in other political parties with the aim of disintegrating them, etc. All these special-purpose groups from the very beginning were supported by the Comintern, that is, in fact, the Soviet government, but organizationally at the beginning they were subordinate centers of the respective communist parties and worked under their leadership. In Germany in 1919-1924. it was precisely such underground groups that were the organizers of all kinds of adventures - conspiracies, attempts, putschs, etc. Some idea, although far from complete, of their activities in those years is given by reports on the sensational processes then in Germany (especially the case of the so-called "Leipzig Check"). With the Hamburg uprising of 1923 and a series of subsequent trials, this first period in the history of the apparatus ends. Since the mid-twenties, the remnants of the old apparatus, crushed

by arrests, have been firmly taken over by the center of the Comintern, which at that time was completing the process of its transformation into an increasingly obedient instrument of the Moscow Politburo. It was at this time that Stalin began to take a systematic interest in the Comintern personally, under whose leadership the "Bolshevization" of the Communist Parties of the West was being carried out, that is, the consistent creation of a communist society everywhere.

underground.

Concealed not only from the authorities of the respective bourgeois countries, but also from the official bodies of the Communist Parties, centralized strictly disciplined, reinforced by a large number of local specially sent "professional revolutionaries", the apparatus becomes an instrument of Moscow, primarily for supervising the local Communist Parties and for keeping them in full control. obedience. With its help, the tops of the national communist parties are disintegrated where these tops had a strong desire for national independence of the local communist movement. This internal role of the apparatus is so great that it is impossible to understand the development of the Comintern without knowing the history of the formation and work of the apparatus. The process of organizational

"Stalinization" of the Comintern was one of the sides of the great main process of the rebirth of world communism in the direction from Leninism, as the extreme utopian rebellious wing of the international labor movement of the early 20th century, to Stalinism, as a special variety of totalitarian statism, only outwardly retaining elements of the former communist phraseology. In the process of this rebirth, the entire "philosophy of the era" of Bolshevism changed (and changed), a completely new concept was formed (and was formed) both of the content of that "world communist revolution", which is the main task of all the activities of the communists, and of their strategy and tactics of struggle for her. For the communists who seized power in Russia in October 1917, headed by Lenin and Trotsky, the world communist revolution was the sum total of a series of violent coups carried out in France by French forces, in England by British forces, in Germany by German forces, etc. . labor movement. The USSR was supposed to provide all possible assistance to these movements; this assistance could be very significant and even go as far as armed intervention in the affairs of other countries. But in the main it remained only an aid to the movements that grow on local soil, from the local working-class movement (and are led by the forces put forward by these movements. Both Lenin and Trotsky, and the entire first generation of Bolsheviks, although they subjected

severe criticism of the labor movement of the West, with great respect for the communist movement in the West, reckoned with its features. Stalin, on the

contrary, was always free from elements of respect for the labor and communist movement of the West. And there is no doubt that all of Stalin's amendments to Lenin's concept of the world communist revolution were dictated precisely by these sentiments; since the proletariat of the West is not revolutionary in its essence and does not want to make a world revolution, this revolution must be imported from the USSR. Of course, elements of the forcible introduction of revolution from the Soviet East to the democratic West were present in the Bolshevik ideology even before Stalin. Neither Lenin nor Trotsky were "vegetarians" in this matter at all. And Stalin, substantiating his amendments to the Leninist conception, often rightly referred to Lenin himself. But these Leninist elements of

introducing the revolution from outside are so concentrated in Stalin that it would be more correct to consider the views of the latter not as amendments and additions to the Leninist concept, but as a special, internally integral concept, in a number of respects sharply opposed to Lenin's, although its author was a student and successor of Lenin. .

According to Stalin, from the moment the Soviet government was created, the main driving force of the world revolution was the "proletarian dictatorship in the USSR", whose army, armed to the teeth, must carry the revolution through the whole world on the tips of their bayonets. The mood of the working masses in the countries where the Soviet armies are to come, the general character of the workers' movement there, even the extent of the influence of the local communists - all this is only of third importance. The choice of time and place for the strike of these armies, its direction and slogans - all this should be determined not by the tasks of helping the movements of "fraternal parties", but by considerations of the big policy of the leaders of the USSR, as the only country in the world where the victorious "proletarian dictatorship is working

to complete" world revolution". In full accordance with this, the role of the Soviet armies is by no means limited to the tasks of destroying the old world, that is, the fragile state machine of the bourgeois countries, which did

the forces of the local labor movement to make a revolution. Being itself the highest achievement in the construction of the proletarian dictatorship, the Soviet army also has positive tasks. In the countries it occupies, it can and; should also act as a builder, laying the foundations of the "new world". Without exception, all the activities of local communists must be completely subordinated to the interests of the big politics of the USSR and, even in small things, follow the instructions that come from Moscow, which, of course, has the full right not to let anyone in on its secret plans, but which all communists of the world are obliged to unconditionally support.

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While at the head of the Comintern stood first Zinoviev, then Bukharin, until the end of 1928, Stalin had to be very careful in his attempts to bring the apparatus under his real control. Only after the removal of Bukharin and the entry into the Comintern of Molotov, a direct protege of Stalin, did the latter's opportunities increase. Nevertheless, even after this arrival, in view of the special conditions of the Comintern's work, Stalin could not directly withdraw the apparatus from the Comintern's system of organs. And since the apparatus, at least formally, was subordinate to the Comintern, Stalin was forced

for the time being to retain some semblance of independence for him. To gain control over the apparatus, one had to follow a different path. Even earlier, the practice was established to appoint all responsible workers for secret work under the Comintern only from candidates approved by the delegation of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Now such candidates were escorted through the Scientific and Distribution Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Uchraspred), behind which stood Stalin's personal secretariat. It was through these doors and precisely around this time that Malenkov began to

come to power over the apparatus, who, of course, on the instructions of Stalin, first collected information about the personnel of the apparatus's workers, and then, during the years of the Yezhovshchina, subjected this staff to the most severe purge. In previous years, the main cadres of the workers of the apparatus were recruited from the ranks of foreign communists, active participants in all sorts of communist adventures of the previous era, who now lived as emigrants in Moscow.

They lived in a very special little world that never merged with the world of the Soviet Communists, a kind of German settlement, which in the Moscow of the twentieth century kept, perhaps, even further from the outside world than the German settlement of the times of Ivan the Terrible. They moved only in their midst, remembered the past, grumbled at the present and considered themselves "keepers of the traditions of the heroic past." It was the "feeding medium" of the apparatus of the Comintern in general and of its secret apparatus in particular. In 1936-1938. Malenkov dealt with all of them: with the apparatus of the employees of the Comintern, and with the central workers of the secret apparatus, and with the "feeding medium" in general. The only survivors were those who proved themselves to be dog-like devotion to Stalin. The rest were either destroyed or sent to distant concentration camps. Especially ruthless was the reprisal against German, Polish and Baltic emigrants. It was said in Moscow at the time that if Himmler had led the purge, he could not

have been more merciless. It cannot be said that the comparison with Himmler was completely unfounded. The point, of course, is not that Malenkov belonged to a group of people much more consistent than Himmler, the pedant schoolteacher. More importantly, the purge in general was internally connected with the transfer of the apparatus to a completely different foreign policy orientation: Stalin abruptly took a course towards rapprochement with Hitler, and Malenkov purged the apparatus so that it

would not interrupt at a critical moment. Stalin never abandoned the idea of the possibility of collusion with German militarism and fascism. Traces of this concept can be found in a number of his statements already when anti-fascist notes sounded most frankly in the foreign policy of the USSR. But at the beginning of 1936, as we know from materials published later, Stalin decided that the time had come to move from words to action, and simultaneously with the start of preparations for the big trials and the purge, he moved on to practical measures to find ways to collude with Hitler. It was at this time at the meetings of the Politburo that Stalin began to insistently emphasize that collusion with Hitler was both necessary and possible. It was for this that special agents were sent to Berlin in order to find ways for rapprochement. Such people were the Kande-lyaks, the old

an acquaintance of Stalin who was appointed trade representative to Berlin, and a Berlin secret resident of the NKVD, who then acted under the pseudonym Rudolf and has since made a brilliant career as a Soviet diplomat. Rudolf began to look for suitable people in Hitler's party environment, and things got off the ground. Already in December 1936, Stalin, as a guiding line for all senior political intelligence officers abroad, gave the directive: "We will come to an agreement with Germany in the near future!" Information about these negotiations then reached the American authorities: a record of them, based on a conversation with the famous journalist Voltaire Duranty, is in the diary of prof. William E. Dodd, then United States Ambassador to Berlin (April 11, 1937). In time, this entry coincides with the date of Rudolph's flight to Moscow with the first proposals of people from Hitler's entourage. Dodd also recorded his doubts that these talks might involve political issues; it seemed to him that Hitler had to go further than negotiations on economic issues; cannot: it was the result of an organic inability for an honest democrat to understand the measure of meanness of totalitarian dictators.

In fact, the talks dealt with just the biggest political issues, right down to the questions of the "black redistribution" of the whole world. That's why they took so long. The more thorough was the cleaning of the entire apparatus. They dealt with everyone who might have thought that they would not accept the idea of an agreement with Nazi Germany. The only thing that should have remained from the former ideology was the boundless, blind faith that the USSR constituted the most important base of the world revolution, and that whatever the Soviet leaders did, it was to the benefit of world communism.

The reprisals intensified especially when the two largest residents of the NKVD abroad, who worked in close contact with the apparatus, not only broke with the NKVD, but also began to come out with revelations in the foreign press. These were Rais and Krivitsky, who worked in various foreign intelligence agencies from 1919-

1920s and enjoyed complete confidence. Both of them were Jews, and it is clear that Stalin's plans to ally with the militant anti-Semite Hitler influenced their decision.



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On the eve of Stalin's pact with Hitler, the new apparatus obedient to Stalin launched a real orgy of disinformation work, the task of which was to cover up the negotiations that had begun between Stalin and Hitler, and at the same time to make it impossible to soften relations between Hitler and the democratic countries of the West. Suffice it to recall the campaign that the organs of the apparatus launched on the eve of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with the aim of drawing the democracies of the West into a conflict not only with Germany, but also with Japan. The Soviet dictatorship during this period was portrayed as an implacable and most consistent enemy of fascism, a fighter against the "Munich Pact" with Hitler and concessions to "Japanese militarism". In reality, however; this was done to inflate the price that Stalin wanted to receive from Hitler and Japan for his defection to their side. The line pursued by the apparatus during those 22 months when the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was in force was, of course, in many points diametrically opposed to the previous one: all the forces of the apparatus were directed towards

disorganizing the rear of the democratic countries, i.e., towards political assistance to Hitler. In different countries, their activities, of course, were of a different nature. But with all this difference, she was full of purpose. Leon Blum once declared in the Chamber of Deputies that it was impossible to distinguish the underground leaflets of the Communists from the products of the defeatist propaganda of the Nazis. The materials published by the well-known French researcher A. Rossi on the period of the "strange war" of 1939-1940 show that this assertion of Blum is no longer enough: there are many grounds for speaking about the presence and direct conscious cooperation of the Stalinist apparatus with the Nazi secret agents. In order to crush the democratic faction, the Stalinist apparatus did literally everything in its power.

The pro-Hitler work of the apparatus bore the same character in America, where the Soviet government made an attempt to disrupt the material and moral assistance that America began to provide to the countries of Western Europe that fought against Hitler. "March on Washington", picketing by the Communists of the White House for

his policy of warmongering, the intensified inflating of all industrial conflicts, especially in

branches, one way or another connected with work for the war, all these were speeches that the Comintern could rightfully be proud of in the reviews dated for May 1,

1941. The activity of the apparatus in the countries of the Hitlerite bloc was of a completely different nature: here they were quieter than water, below the grass. "Di Welt" - the main organ of the apparatus for Germany, published in 1939-1941. in Stockholm, completely avoided criticism of Hitler's policies and actions. The only critical blows that were directed against Hitler's policy were the blows against the "plutocratic groups" surrounded by the Hitlerite leadership, who seek an agreement with the Anglo-American "plutocrats" and thereby jeopardize the cause of a lasting rapprochement between the peoples of Germany and the USSR. The German Social Democrats, proclaimed "agents of Anglo-American imperialism," were proclaimed to be the main supporters of these "traitorous" plans and the main carrier of the elements of disintegration among the German people.

The press, which was in the orbit of the apparatus's influence, intensively explained what benefits a lasting alliance between Germany and the USSR would bring, and printed maps of the redivision of the world, on which the "German-African" empire (that was the period of Rommel's first campaign) peacefully coexisted next to the huge "Eurasia", stretching far beyond Constantinople, to the whole of Asia Minor and Iran, to the shores of the

Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. An even more difficult test for the apparatus was the new turn in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the turn that resulted from Hitler's "treacherous" and "unprovoked" attack on June 22, 1941. The position of the apparatus was, indeed, exceptionally difficult. All the old installations were no longer good, all the front organizations were full of unreliable people. Nevertheless, the device almost without a hitch switched to a new job. This was especially noticeable in America, where people who almost yesterday walked around with posters at the White House, cursing the "warmonger" Roosevelt, literally the next morning began to appear at the same White House in the role of petitioners,

proving the need to intervene in the war in order to save Stalin. True, the firm

of the official Communist Party turned out to be too compromised to be suitable for widespread use. Therefore, from the very beginning, they tried to push it into the background as far as possible, and soon they completely liquidated it, formally dissolving the entire party. The more space opened up for all kinds of fellow travelers, whom the apparatus began to mobilize and direct. As a result, the merits of the apparatus in the matter of rehabilitating the Soviet Union and attracting the sympathy of broad sections of the American population to it turned out to be enormous.

It was in this situation that the act of dissolving the Comintern (May 1943) was born, which was both the greatest victory of the apparatus over the official Communist parties, and one of the greatest deceptions of the war years, which made it easier for Stalin to play foreign policy.

The meaning of this dissolution in the West has always been and continues to be interpreted quite wrongly. It is seen as a concession that the Soviet government was forced to make under pressure from its then allies (primarily America), who insistently demanded that the Kremlin stop interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. This outward appearance was indeed given to the dissolution, since Stalin, who at that time was in dire need of the help of the West, precisely this impression was trying to create. However, interference in the affairs of other countries through the Comintern and the official Communist Parties was already a past stage in the development of the USSR. This weapon was not only compromised, since the whole world knew it, but also worn out, since the limits of influence of the official parties of the Comintern were already revealed to be very limited. These weapons proved to be especially unsuitable and of little use in wartime, when there were few opportunities for open political struggle anywhere. For work both in the underground and in America, the apparatus was a much more convenient and politically profitable form. The dissolution of the Comintern not only did not interfere with the work of the latter, but, on the contrary, facilitated it, even wider than before, opening the doors of all kinds of salons and political

a lobby for the secret representatives of the apparatus, who willingly dissociated themselves from the closed

Comintern. The dissolution of the Comintern, and then the subsequent reshaping of the Communist Party of America, were not acts of the Kremlin's refusal to interfere in the internal affairs of America, but the consolidation of a new form of this intervention, much more beneficial for Stalin's policy. The dissolution of the Comintern definitively deprived foreign communists of the opportunity to exert any influence whatsoever on the policy of the Kremlin. This possibility was not significant in the previous period either. The times when the secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern had the right to participate in meetings of the Politburo are long gone. Stalin had no desire to coordinate his foreign and domestic policy with the interests of the international communist movement, which he despised. The dissolution of the Comintern eliminated yet another alien growth on the body of the dictatorship, which "evolved" more and more fully towards a totalitarian, undisguised despotism.

The dissolution of the Comintern became not a theatrical decoration, but serious act. Comintern, that is, the organization that unites

nyala communist parties of the whole world, was really liquidated. His publishing activity was terminated. Its openly functioning official apparatus was dissolved. But this dissolution did not in the least destroy the influence of the Kremlin on foreign communist parties, nor did it in any way relieve them of the obligation to carry out the Kremlin's orders. He only freed the Politburo from the need to listen to some extent to the opinions of foreign Communist Parties and finally transferred all power over the latter to a secret apparatus. It was at this time that this apparatus finally found its true head,

Malenkov, who officially became the head of the apparatus. With the dissolution of the Comintern, all its connections and all organizations subordinated to it were transferred to the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, of which Malenkov was the undivided owner at that time. The latter, having purged the apparatus in 1937-1938, undoubtedly filled it with his people: he was then the head of all party cadres. \* \* \*

After the Eighteenth Congress, Malenkov's behind-the-scenes role came to the open surface of the life of the CPSU(b), and along the party line he became Stalin's right hand. At this congress, the party statutes were again revised, and one of the most important changes was the centralization and universalization (if you can use this term) of accounting for party members. In place of the former department of leading party bodies, which registered only responsible workers, a personnel department was created in the apparatus of the Central Committee. This very name already showed in what direction the process of change was going: the Directorate, headed by the "chief" (this term then first appeared in the charter of the CPSU (b)), not only took into account certain groups of party workers, it was supposed to manage all party cadres. From the very beginning, the

activity of the Personnel Department was based on the principle of mandatory strictly "personal accounting of each member and candidate of the party" (the words of Malenkov at the Eighteenth Congress). By the time of this congress (more precisely, by March 1, 1939), there were almost 2.5 million of them (1,588,852 members and 888,814 candidates). Each of them had a special individual card with detailed biographical data. This individual card often grew into a large dossier and made it possible to know what kind of a given communist he was and what job he could be appointed to, what post the party could entrust him with. All these members and candidates were divided into categories - according to the degree of responsibility of the work that

they can perform, and depending on this category, they were subject to the supervision of either local organizations, or Regional Committees, or the Central Committee. The creation of the

Personnel Directorate colossally increased the power of the Party apparatus over each individual member of the Party, and in accordance with this, the role of the Personnel Directorate in the general apparatus of the Central Committee increased colossally. In the apparatus of each city committee, district committee, regional committee, regional committee, each Central Committee of the National Party, their own personnel departments were created, which, however, were formally subordinate to local organizations, but were at the same time connected with the central Personnel Department and, of course, were under its influence. The personnel department permeated the entire apparatus of the party from top to bottom and

Malenkov became the head of this Personnel Department in March 1939. Of course, he had every right to this: the system was invented and thought out by him, and he was the builder of this entire colossal building. He was selected by strictly tested personnel of this apparatus, which he knew how to firmly hold in his hands. Rooms full of steel cabinets with millions of cards of different colors and in different combinations, marked with different ink, with conventional icons, with links to various documents kept specially, in secret and highly secret safes; specially selected, specially checked and specially trained employees, sorting new data and spreading them on cards, making additions and corrections - this is how the file cabinet looked like. Particular attention of the Department was paid to the training of workers for all possible cases - unfortunate and happy.

No matter what happened, no matter who died, no matter what catastrophe struck the country, Malenkov and his staff were able to present lists of possible and fully qualified deputies in a few hours, perhaps even minutes.

They say that Malenkov took only engineers to this headquarters of his closest employees, believing that only people who had gone through the exact science of engineering construction could manage the complex machine of personnel of a large party. In any case, both of his then assistant directors, Evgeny Andreev and Nikolai Shatalin, were indeed engineers. Engineering qualifications for the management of the Directorate were, indeed, necessary from another point of view: in the scope of the Directorate, Malenkov included not only the cadres of the party apparatus in the narrow sense of the word, but also the cadres of the entire state apparatus. From the very first days of the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, the party became

the owner of this state apparatus. By 1939, political

sectors of this apparatus of the state, everything is more or less

important posts were occupied by the communists, and their activities were under the control of party organizations. In these sectors, the Directorate could not do anything fundamentally new - it only had to introduce its own system into the matter of filling this apparatus with appropriately selected people

The situation was completely different in the economic sectors. With the complete nationalization of the entire economic life of the country, both the quantitative size and the relative importance of these sectors of the state apparatus in the implementation of the dictatorship became especially important, and the role of the communists in them was relatively weak. Therefore, Malenkov, as a top priority, set the full distribution of the activities of the Personnel Department to these economic sectors of the state apparatus. Selecting appropriate personnel for these sectors, the Administration had to organize the functioning of the apparatus of the economic sectors of the country, primarily the apparatus of industry.

But the problem of managing the apparatus of the economic sector ran into another problem. This leadership required a cadre of qualified specialists—engineers, technicians, architects, and so on. The Management tried to find a way out of the impasse by going beyond the limits of the CPSU (b), taking into account all engineers and specialists in general, including non-party ones, without exception. This was a step towards turning the Party Personnel Administration into a nationwide center for managing the entire economic elite. Such a program of the Personnel Administration was substantiated in the report made by Malenkov on February 15, 1941 at the Eighteenth All-Union Conference of the CPSU (b), "On the tasks of party

organizations in the field of industry and transport." Malenkov's main political statement in this report was to proclaim the primacy of "the interests of the state." "We are all servants of the state," he declared, making a reservation, of course: "Comrade Stalin teaches us this." But this reference, in any case, was not quite correct, since Stalin never, either before Malenkov's report or after, said anything of the sort. Formally, Stalin never left the position of Lenin's formulations of the "withering away of the state." But since Stalin did not protest Malenkov's reference to him, there can be no doubt that the statement by Malenkov, then head of Stalin's personal secretariat, reflected the true mood of the latter.

The CPSU (b) for Malenkov, as well as for all other representatives Stalinist period, of course, should be undivided

master in the state. But this should be done only from above, only from the top of the state pyramid. At the bottom, especially in the enterprises of the economic sectors, where the Party performs the function of organizing the labor force, Party members and Party organizations must completely subordinate themselves to the needs and interests of the production process. There they are, indeed, only servants of the state. Related to this are the innovations in building communist grass-roots organizations in industrial enterprises, which the Personnel Department began to put into practice on the eve of the war: newspaper reports about the life of such cells are full of instructions on the election of new cell secretaries, and secretaries are chosen almost only engineers, technicians and other specialists. Communists must carry out their new function in enterprises under the guidance of technically qualified people. At the same time, the appointment of special party organizers

from one or another high party authority - from the regional committee or from the Central Committee - is being introduced to all more or less significant industrial enterprises. The functions of the secretaries of local grassroots organizations, to some extent subordinate to the latter and connected with their moods, during this period are reduced to a minimum. In fact, they are left only with functions related to the organization of the workforce within a given enterprise in order to increase the productivity of the latter. All the functions of the party organization that were associated with the rights to participate in the management of the enterprise were transferred to the specified party organizer, whose role in the enterprise, especially if it was the party organizer of the Central Committee, became extremely important. Of course, he did not replace the director of the enterprise, but he received the actual right to push him

into the background. Emphasizing the need to attract technical intelligentsia with special engineering and technical knowledge in the said report by Malenkov grows together with a sharp negative attitude towards "ignoramus" who, for one reason or another, find themselves in leading positions in industrial enterprises. Malenkov calls for a merciless struggle against them.



So that there is no doubt about whom he is talking about, Malenkov instructs that in the fight against them one should not pay attention to their habit of "boasting about their proletarian origin", but to replace them with "new people, experts in their field." After that, there is no doubt that Malenkov's words are an attack on representatives of the older generation of party leaders who were promoted to command posts at a time when the leadership of the CPSU (b) paid main attention to "proletarian origin" and "party experience", to revolutionary "merits in the past" rather than an engineering qualification. It is this older generation of "know-it-alls", people who "know nothing and do not want to know", Malenkov calls "unfit workers" and

demands their replacement by specialists from the "new people", even if they were just "non-party Bolsheviks".

"Yezhovshchina", in which Malenkov played such a huge role and which was basically a barbaric form of change in the ruling stratum, did not end for Malenkov. It has taken on new forms. He considered it necessary to continue the struggle against the older generation.

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The war broke the thread of development, as it was determined by the internal struggle. The defense against an external force was on the order of the day. The front cracked and crumbled under the blows of the German panzer divisions. The armies lacked the will to fight. In less than four months, almost 4 million people surrendered to the Germans - a figure that the history of wars did not know. Pali Minsk, Riga, Kyiv, Smolensk. The Germans approached Leningrad and Moscow.

Just in those days, Stalin frankly confessed to Harriman, Roosevelt's emergency officer, who had flown to Moscow to organize assistance: "We know the world revolution; they will not fight for Soviet power either .. Maybe they will fight for Russia". All ideological work had to be reversed. An eyewitness account has been preserved, a young officer from among journalists, who just these days arrived from the front in Moscow on a business trip and accidentally ended up with fellow artists in a cooperative workshop that was preparing banners for presentation

the first regiments to receive the title of Guards. On the crimson velvet of thirty banners was written: "For the Motherland! For Stalin!". Shcherbakov, then secretary of the Central Committee and the Moscow Committee, came to receive the banners. They showed him the work. He "peered" at the inscriptions, "chuckled vaguely" and went to the phone to talk with "himself" Stalin. From the phone he came with an order for a "small alteration": remove "For Stalin!" everywhere, and "For the Motherland!" draw much larger. Especially for this, the parade was postponed for a

day. It was October 16, 1941, the day when Guderian's tanks were rushing towards Moscow, and the Soviet nobility fled from Moscow in a feverish mess. Apparently, it was this day that should be considered a turning point in the ideological setting of the propaganda of the CPSU (b). And communism, and Soviet power, and even hints of a world revolution disappear from the columns of Soviet newspapers, just as the name of Stalin disappears from them. The communists are doing everything to bring down the people he began to feel the war that was being fought against him as a struggle "For the

Motherland!", "For Russia!". The carefully compiled central file of the Personnel Department had to be urgently packed and sent to the Urals, where it lay until the end of the war, along with another - the central file of the NKVD. The work of these two institutions, of course, did not stop for a minute. On the contrary, she became even more assertive, more angry. But she lost a lot in her systematicity. Malenkov, who remained head of Stalin's personal secretariat, became the latter's closest assistant both in the State Defense Committee (he became one of its four members, along with Molotov, Voroshilov and Beria), and in the Council of People's Commissars, where Malenkov became Stalin's deputy.

The most responsible assignments are entrusted to Malenkov. So, in September 1941, when the Germans, having broken through the defense line on the Novgorod lakes, rolled towards Leningrad and the fate of the latter seemed already sealed, Stalin sent Malenkov and Zhukov to Leningrad, giving them absolutely exclusive powers. In Leningrad there were then two full-fledged members of the Politburo, Voroshilov and Zhdanov (Malenkov was then only a candidate). Malenkov wiped them both out of business and by measures of the most severe terror helped Zhukov stop the collapse of the front. The Germans stopped at

approaches to the city and stood on them for almost two and a half years, Leningrad was visible to the naked eye from their positions, but they could not enter it. A year later, it was also repeated with Stalingrad, where then the second summer of the German offensive was to find its victorious conclusion. With Zhukov and with the same emergency powers, Malenkov flew to Stalingrad, by the same measures of the most severe terror, throwing hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people to death, turned the city into a huge cemetery for German hopes of victory. But

such business trips, no matter how important they were, occupied only a secondary place in Malenkov's activities during the war years. His main work was the work in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). By the beginning of the war, the secretariat of the Central Committee consisted of five people - Stalin, Zhdanov, Andreev, Malenkov and Shcherbakov. Stalin, overloaded with other things, could only occasionally listen to reports on the work of the party. Andreev was elected chairman of the Central Control Commission of the Central Committee even earlier and retired from his current work. Zhdanov, whose influence had been greatly shaken after the Finnish war, was in Leningrad, which was soon cut off from Moscow, and could only occasionally fly to the Kremlin. The position itself made Malenkov the sole owner of the entire party apparatus: Shcherbakov was his closest and most reliable assistant. The latter combined secretarial functions in the Central Committee with

secretary in the MK, i.e., he held in his hands the most important local organization of the party in the USSR. Shcherbakov was considered a person who was well versed in ideological issues and generally had a penchant for literature. The same age as Malenkov, Shcherbakov also belonged to the generation of Bolsheviks who did not know the underground. At the beginning of his party career, he owed everything to Zhdanov, under whose wing Shcherbakov took his first steps in Nizhny Novgorod in the 1920s. But in Moscow, where he moved around 1930 to study at the Institute of Red Professors (along the historical line), he got registered with Malenkov, who in 1932 recruited him to work in the apparatus of the Central Committee. From 1933-1934, Shcherbakov was seconded as a special observer from the Central Committee to the Union of Soviet Writers, which was just emerging at that time and with which Stalin played a very complex game.

We have the opportunity to judge Shcherbakov's role from published excerpts from Gorky's letters to him over the years. Shcherbakov then spoiled a lot of blood for Gorky, but on the other hand he earned the full confidence of Stalin's personal secretariat. This had an effect during the years of the great purge, when Malenkov sent Shcherbakov to a number of responsible points (Irkutsk, Stalino, Donbass), where a "reliable hand" was needed to carry out the purge. As a reward for this special reliability, Shcherbakov was appointed in 1938 to Moscow as the first secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee. Shcherbakov maintained and strengthened

relations with Zhdanov; in 1937 they even became related (Shcherbakov married Zhdanov's daughter), but Shcherbakov began to focus on Malenkov, who was very necessary, because Malenkov himself did not write political articles, made few speeches, did not work on ideological issues. Shcherbakov, on the contrary, had a great inclination towards all this, and therefore Malenkov, taking advantage of the very first crack in Zhdanov's position, put Shcherbakov in his place - the place of an ideologist and theorist of party propaganda.

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January 27, 1945 Leningrad celebrated the first anniversary of the lifting of the German blockade. At a solemn meeting of the Leningrad City Council, Kalinin presented the city with the Order of Lenin. However, Zhdanov was not present at the celebrations. The next day's newspaper reports did not even mention his name. At that time, Zhdanov was the first chairman of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee and formally headed the Leningrad City Council. The official explanation for this absence of Zhdanov was his stay in Finland, where

Zhdanov was a special commissioner of the Politburo for transfers with Finland. But this explanation, of course, could not be sufficient. Zhdanov led Leningrad during all the years of the siege; Finland was very close at hand and flying from there to the celebrations, of course, did not present any difficulties. The absence of Zhdanov was forced and was explained by the order of the secretariat of the Central Committee, that is, Malenkov. It was the punishment imposed by Malenkov on Zhdanov for the mistakes made by the latter during the war years.

The first mistake is the Politburo's incorrect information about the situation in Finland. All intelligence in Finland was then

concentrated in the Leningrad regional department of the NKVD (according to Soviet rules, intelligence in neighboring countries is in charge of those NKVD departments that are located in the border centers) and was under the direct supervision of Zhdanov. This intelligence was exposed by the Finns, who turned it into a source of disinformation. Based on this false information, Zhdanov guaranteed the Politburo an easy victory in the Soviet-Finnish war, which resulted in the complete failure of the first, December offensive.

Further, the chairman of the Leningrad Regional Committee was blamed for his confusion in September 1941, which almost led to the fall of Leningrad. An even

more serious mistake was Zhdanov's behavior towards the partisans in the autumn of 1944. The tactics of the Soviet authorities in relation to the partisans who fought in the rear of the Germans had already been established by this time. Malenkov, who was also appointed by Stalin to head a special committee for the restoration of Soviet institutions in areas under German occupation, established very cruel rules requiring the immediate disarmament of the partisans after the liberation of the territories and the liquidation of their formations. Those who were fit for age and health were to be included in regular military units, and the rest, after "checking", were to be sent either to their homeland or to the east, as special settlers. Zhdanov, taking advantage of his position as a member of the Politburo, took things a little differently and in the late autumn of 1944 convened in Leningrad a "congress of partisans of the Northern Region", which actually ended in an uprising. The partisans, who retained their personal weapons, disarmed the police and destroyed all the shops in the city center. For almost a day, Leningrad was in the power of the partisans, and only a special division of the NKVD troops that arrived by plane from Moscow restored order in the city, carrying out, of course, mass executions of partisans.

Added to this was the story of the unsuccessful film about the siege of Leningrad, which was put under direct

Zhdanov's observation. This film was supposed to become a monument to the heroism of the population of Leningrad during the years of the siege. But he came out too creepy: despite all the retouching, both people and streets with houses, photographed from nature in the immediate vicinity of the terrible

events were full of horror and made a heavy impression on the viewer. This impression was by no means dissipated by photographs of various party and military nobles, whose whole appearance was sharply discordant with the general background of hunger and poverty. A repulsive impression was also made by Zhdanov himself, who had the tactlessness to allow himself to be filmed for this film. The film was shown only to a narrow circle of people in Moscow and Leningrad and made such a bad impression that it was hastily filmed.

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As the war progressed, Malenkov's importance grew more and more. His exceptional capacity for work gave him the opportunity to intervene in the affairs of industry. Entirely under his supervision was such an important area as the aviation industry. Malenkov also directed policy towards areas liberated from German occupation. From here there was only one step towards leading politics in the territories occupied by the Soviet army, primarily in Germany. In the autumn of 1944, even before the entry of Soviet armies into German territory, the Defense Committee raised the question of a

policy towards Germany. Several points of view emerged. In a special memorandum, Malenkov defended a policy that was called "the policy of economic disarmament of Germany." He proceeded from the premise that the Soviet occupation of part of Germany would be short-lived, that the Germans would be able to quickly come to an agreement with the West, and then, under their combined pressure, the USSR would have to clear Germany, which would begin to recover rapidly and soon become an ally of the West to attack the USSR. Therefore, policy in Germany should pursue two main tasks: the maximum reduction of the economic potential of Germany in general and the export from Germany of the maximum possible number of machines, inventory, equipment and other equipment necessary for restoration work in the USSR. The first task should dominate the second, and therefore the dismantling and destruction of German enterprises had to be carried out even when export was impossible or unnecessary.

Malenkov's point of view was approved by Stalin, and in October November 1944 he began to form the apparatus of the Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars, of which Malenkov was appointed head.

As his deputy, he took a candidate member of the Politburo Voznesensky, chairman of the State Planning Commission; authorized for

Germany appointed Saburov, in the future one of Stalin's deputies in the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers. The main personnel of the apparatus were taken from the employees of the Economic Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, where they were all selected by Malenkov himself. Initially, operations in Germany were supposed to be carried out by the army, but Khrulev, who was in charge of the rear troops, answered with a categorical refusal, citing the lack of necessary personnel in the army. Then Malenkov suggested that all the People's Commissariats and institutions in general interested in receiving certain materials from Germany should send to the Special Committee of Special Commissioners with the appropriate staff of assistants. There was a whole army of those, a total of several thousand people, who attacked Germany as soon as its borders were crossed. Among the commissioners there were also representatives of the Academy of

Sciences, museums, libraries, the Archives Department, etc. In accordance with the directives of Malenkov, the work of this army of commissioners from the very beginning was in the nature of a barbaric robbery of the occupied territory, which caused the more embitterment of the population of Germany, the clearer it was. often outright nonsense. A lot of valuables perished aimlessly. It was possible to pursue such a policy only by giving up in advance the desire to win over at least some part of the population. Another side of the negative results of this policy was even more important: it introduced disintegration into the ranks of the Soviet army. This fact had to be

taken seriously. The first big offensive of the Soviet armies on German territory, the so-called January offensive on the Oder, did not give the results that were expected from it (it was supposed to end with the capture of Berlin). Despite the abundance of concentrated troops and artillery, the offensive was thwarted, because the spirit of the army quickly decomposed. The investigation found that many units did not comply with military orders, as both soldiers and command staff were taken for violence and robbery. The frantic anti-German propaganda, marching under the Ehrenburg slogan "Kill the German!", had a very detrimental effect on the spirit of the army. It was recognized

therefore, it is necessary to make significant amendments to the general orientation of political propaganda. And in April 1945, the head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department Aleksandrov published in Pravda an article against I. Ehrenburg and his vulgar anti-German harassment. However, anti-German propaganda was based on

the same political assumptions that underlay Malenkov's entire policy towards Germany. Around this policy, as well as around all the activities of the Malenkov Special Committee, a fierce struggle began, which dragged on until the end of the summer. Active

a role in it was played by Mikoyan, who drew up a memorandum on the need to replace "the policy of economic disarmament of Germany" with the "policy of economic development of Germany." The main idea of this Mikoyan memorandum was the possibility of a long period of Soviet occupation of East Germany and the resulting need to find political and psychological contact with groups of the German population. Of course, Mikoyan did not refuse to pump out reparations, but he insisted on introducing a system into this matter, was against aimless destruction and was in favor of working out a definite plan for reparations. As a concrete measure, Mikoyan proposed centralizing all the work of the commissioners and placing it under the control of the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade (headed by Mikoyan). These specific conclusions of Mikoyan, pursuing departmental interests, did not receive support in the Politburo against them, a bloc of

other members of the Politburo was created, who had their own in Germany authorized and were interested in the uncontrollability of their work. But Mikoyan's general thoughts were approved.

Sensky

A native of the Tula province, a native of the spiritual environment, a seminarian by education, Voznesensky was nominated for responsible work by Zhdanov, who in the mid-1930s. made him chairman of the Leningrad Gosplan. But then in Moscow, Voznesensky always worked in harmony with Malenkov, who pushed him to more and more responsible posts. Especially



they worked closely together during the war years, when Voznesensky went along with Malenkov and other "young" in all matters and was considered a faithful "Malenkovite". But in 1945, after Zhdanov returned to Moscow to work in the secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) (this happened shortly after Yalta Conference), Voznesensky abruptly turned the front and went over to the camp of the "Zhdanovites", starting to openly oppose Malenkov. Voznesensky's behavior was of such a nature that there were even suggestions that he had previously been a hidden "agent of Zhdanov" under Malenkov. The latter, in general, is extremely vengeful in nature, Voznesensky took this "treason" very sharply, looked suspiciously at everyone with whom Voznesensky maintained close ties, and was clearly burning with a thirst for revenge.

In the same period, in the summer of 1945, Malenkov had to receive another heavy blow - a catastrophe with his henchman and protégé, people's commissar of the aviation industry, Shakhurin. The latter received several awards during the war years and advanced very much. Malenkov, who observed this industry and along the line

Defense Committee, and through the Politburo, all the time patronized Shakhurin. But in the summer of 1945, Stalin unexpectedly demanded Shakhurin IK for a personal report, subjected him to a detailed interrogation, and then severely scolded and kicked him out. , caused by insufficient attention to the proposals of inventors, etc. The authors of the note stated that such a policy of the People's Commissariat of the aviation industry makes the Soviet Union, from the point of view of aviation, completely incapable of fighting against the West. Stalin was not satisfied with Shakhurin's explanations, and he accused the people's commissar of hid something, lied to him about something. Shakhurin was immediately arrested, put on trial and sentenced to 15 years in the camps. Malenkov was accused of "lack of vigilance". He was not harmed, but it was recognized that he was overburdened with business, and he was relieved of both the activity of supervising industry and the chairmanship of the Special Committee on German Affairs.

Around this time, Zhdanov, who returned to the secretariat of the Central Committee and took over the leadership of all the ideological work of the party, carried out the first, as yet partial, purge in the apparatus of the Propaganda and Agitation Department. Alexandrov himself was not touched, but a number of his closest employees were removed, the editors "Bolshevik" (it was always composed of people who are currently considered the best theoreticians who fully reflect the line of the party) was radically restructured, and Zhdanov introduced into it several people whom he considered his own and who, indeed, helped him in subsequent purges. The leaders of the "leading" theoretical institutions of the party were also removed. Mitin, the director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, was replaced by Kruzhkov, and Svetlov was appointed to the post of director of the Institute of Philosophy at the USSR Academy of Sciences instead of Yudin. With these appointments of his proteges, Zhdanov occupied leading positions in the ideological apparatus of the Central Committee, preparing his big blow against the "Malenkovites". The date of the change in the editorial board of Bolshevik determines the date of the start of this seizure by Zhdanov of the apparatus of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, the last issue of Bolshevik with the old editorial board was signed for printing on August 20, 1945, the first issue of the new edition was signed for printing on October 9, was delayed for seven weeks, which were filled with the first restructuring of the apparatus, as it had developed during the war years.

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The lawsuit between Malenkov and Zhdanov was first brought to trial at the plenum of the Central Committee, which met in March 1946. This was the first post-war plenum. In the seven years that have passed since 1939, when the Central Committee was elected by the Eighteenth Party Congress, many changes have taken place in the composition of the Central Committee. More than a quarter of the members have died or disappeared. But fundamentally it was the same Central Committee in the selection of which Malenkov played such an enormous role. Malenkov undoubtedly expected a sympathetic response from the majority of the plenum. But his calculations turned out to be not entirely correct. Stalin's Politburo was re-elected in full. True, Malenkov and Beria were transferred from candidates to full members of the Politburo, and Bulganin and Kosygin were re-elected as candidates. But at the same time in

The Politburo was re-elected by all those whom during the war years Malenkov pushed aside from leading central work and who therefore were strongly opposed to him - Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Andreev and Voroshilov. More importantly, Malenkov lost his majority in the secretariat of the Central Committee, where Zhdanov and his henchmen.

The only success (if it can be called a success) of Malenkov in considering the composition of the Politburo was the rejection of the proposal to transfer Voznesensky from candidate to full member of the Politburo. It was Malenkov's revenge on the "traitor" for his return to the Zhdanovites' camp. Only in the spring of 1947 did Zhdanov, at the next plenum of the Central Committee, finally achieve that Voznesensky be made a full member of the Politburo.

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Having taken positions in the secretariat of the Central Committee, Zhdanov immediately proceeded to further develop his offensive against Malenkov. For Zhdanov, from the very beginning, the struggle, if taken from a large historical perspective, was in the name of a very definite and integral program: in 1941, in order to save their power, the communists had to roll up many of their banners and hide many of their slogans. Now Zhdanov fought against all these wartime concessions, for a return to the pre-war program, slogans and methods of work. On the eve of the war, the communists proclaimed that the period of building socialism was ending and that the Soviet Union was coming close to the new tasks of building a communist society. Even a special commission was set up under the chairmanship of Stalin to draw up a new party program, and it was known that Zhdanov had already begun to write

it. Now Zhdanov called for a return to this concept. Malenkov was held responsible for all the concessions and indulgences of the war years

The first months of the struggle was behind the scenes. We know about it only from changes in the personnel of the leading Party bodies. Already in early April 1946, A. A. Kuznetsov was released from work in the Leningrad Regional Committee and moved to Moscow, where he immediately took over the threads of the struggle against Malenkov through the organizational apparatus, while Zhdanov concentrated his forces on preparing the offensive along the lines of political, ideological and cultural

work. The offensives unfolded clearly in concert, according to a common plan, supplementing and supporting one

another. Earlier than others, the struggle around the replacement of the post of head of the Main Political Directorate of the Ministry of the Armed Forces intensified, a post all the more important because this directorate worked as a department in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which gave its chief great opportunities to influence all internal party politics in general (this chief department was automatically included in the Organizing Bureau). The urgency of replacing this post was determined by the acuteness of the situation in the army, which went through a period of demobilization and post-war reorganization, and after the death of Shcherbakov in 1945, the Political Administration did not have a real owner who would feel strong enough in this place to carry out the necessary transformations. And the question of what

these transformations should be was far from indisputable. Zhdanov aimed for that post Iosif Vasilyevich Shikin, his political worker in Leningrad since the pre-war years. Not a military man in all his previous activities, Shikin had nothing to do with work in the army before the war. Only in August 1942, on a common list with A. A. Kuznetsov and other political workers from the Zhdanov entourage, Shikin was transferred to political work in the army, receiving the rank of divisional political commissar, so that after the abolition of the institute of political commissars in the army, he would receive the rank of major general. As a political worker, completely alien to the army, Shikin did not enjoy sympathy in the military environment. Political workers, who had the functions of political control over moods in the army, generally never enjoyed great sympathy among the military. During the war years, this attitude became stronger and aggravated, especially in relation to those political workers who did not share the hardships of front-line life with the army, but sat in the rear.

Under these conditions, it is quite clear that the candidacy of Shikin, by this time already a colonel general, met with resolute resistance from the military generals, headed by Marshal G.K. forces, leading all ground forces. In the summer months of 1946, the struggle took on a very

tense character and ended with the victory of Zhdanov. The "military party" of military marshals was beaten by the party of "political generals" from the category of political workers. The leadership of the work on the political re-education of the political workers of the Soviet army was entrusted to Shikin, who began this work with a purge of the senior command staff who had come forward during the war. The first to lose his post was the real winner of Hitler, Marshal Zhukov, whose signature is the first under the Soviet text of the act of surrender of Germany. Now he has gone into semi-exile, to a minor post in the provinces. Shikin held out as head of the Main Political Directorate until March 1949, when it was his turn to disappear from the horizon. In the foreign press, his name then flashed next to the name of A. A. Kuznetsov, Voznesensky, Rodionov and other supporters of Zhdanov, who especially came forward in the struggle against the "Malenkovites" and were then forced to pay for it. This was an additional confirmation of his belonging to the "Zhdanovites" and the meaning of his appointment in 1946.

The most difficult for Zhdanov was the struggle for the apparatus of the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation, which then played a significant role, leading all the ideological work of the party in general. The head of this Department was G. F. Aleksandrov. During the war years, Alexandrov developed a great deal of activity, wrote a lot himself, edited even more what was written by others, personally supervised the work of the Office, took an active part in the selection, together with Malenkov, of leading personnel for the propaganda departments in the field. The most important was Stalin's personal trust in him, which made Alexandrov's position so strong that it was difficult even to overthrow him, even Zhdanov, who was then at the zenith of his successes and had a majority in the secretariat (the Central Committee, and in the Orgburo, and in the Politburo).

The first open blow against Alexandrov was the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of August 14, 1946 "On the magazines Zvezda and Leningrad", which opened a whole series of "famous" in the fate of Soviet culture "decisions of the Central Committee on ideological issues", which determined the political content of the entire "Zhdanovsky" period of post-war purges on the cultural front. Formally, the decision of the Central Committee was directed against the Leningrad

The city committee of the party, which was in charge of the magazines Zvezda and Leningrad, and which not only permitted the cooperation in them of such authors "alien to Soviet literature" as Zoshchenko and Akhmatova, but also allowed the former to be included in the editorial staff of Zvezda. Two other resolutions of the Central Committee, adopted over the next three weeks - "On the repertoire of drama theaters and measures to improve it" (dated August 26, 1946) and "On the film "Big Life"" (OT September 4) - as well as times and confirm that the attack by Zhdanov was against the entire policy of the Propaganda and Agitation Directorate during the war years. She openly attacked Aleksandrov and even more so against Malenkov, who was Aleksandrov's main patron

and inspirer. In September 1946, another influential group actively joined this "anti-Malenkovsky" front - the group of Andreev, a member of the Politburo. On September 26, the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the facts of violation of the Charter of the Agricultural Artel" was dated. On October 9, the same Council of Ministers, together with the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, adopted (a decision to create a special Council for Collective Farm Affairs, endowed with emergency rights. Andreev, a member of the Politburo and Stalin's deputy for chairmanship of the Council of Ministers, was appointed chairman of this Council. There was also Andreev on the list of members of this new Soviet. Much more important is the fact that N. S. Patolichev was appointed one of Andreev's deputies, whose name was

printed with the note "Secretary of the Central Committee." Not before "Meanwhile, the fact that Patolichev was one of the secretaries of the Central Committee must be considered undoubted. Former secretary of the Yaroslavl and then Chelyabinsk regional committees, member of the Central Committee since February 1941, Patolichev in March 1946 At the plenum, he was elected to the Organizing Bureau along with three other secretaries of the regional committees - Andrianov, Rodionov and Suslov. Their election was the result of a decision to renew the central apparatus by attracting the most prominent representatives of the party apparatus in the field to it. Since August 1946, the figure of Patolichev (appears on the front stands during various celebrations invariably among other secretaries of the Central Committee wh

simultaneously members of the Politburo - for the first time on August 14, 1946, on the day of aviation, next to A. A. Kuznetsov and G. M. Popov. In addition to the list of members of the Council for Collective Farm Affairs, Patolichev was named secretary of the Central Committee in the report on the opening of the Academy of Social Sciences (Pravda. 1946. November 2). Finally, at a solemn meeting on November 6, 1946, Patolichev took a seat on the presidium in the same the environment itself - Kuznetsov, Patolichev, Popov. This place is pa Tolichev also occupied the podium during the parade on November 7, 1946.

But the number of secretaries of the Central Committee has remained unchanged since 1941: there are five of them, including Stalin (by the plenum of the Central Committee in March 1946, Stalin, Malenkov, Zhdanov, Kuznetsov and Popov were elected). The appearance of a new secretary testified to the departure of one of the old ones. Only Malenkov could be like that. No reports were made about his resignation from the post of first secretary of the Central Committee (Stalin does not have a serial number, he is the "general secretary"), but a comparison of all indirect indications forces us to recognize him as indisputable. In the biography of Malenkov, which was published in Vechernyaya Moskva on November 24, 1947, when the elections of deputies to the Moscow Soviet were taking place, when listing the posts that Malenkov occupies, the post of secretary of the Central Committee was not named. As confirmation of the conclusion about the removal of Malenkov from the post of first secretary of the Central Committee, the fact of Malenkov's appointment as Stalin's deputy as chairman of the Council of Ministers (approved by the Supreme Council on October 18, 1946) should also be considered. The principle of non-combination of the work of the secretary of the Central Committee with work in the Council of Ministers at that time was observed very sequentially.

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Starting in the autumn of 1946, waves of mass purges began to roll over the entire USSR, gradually expanding and capturing more and more new social groups. It was the Zhdanov purge, a purge whose main point was directed against everything new that had been introduced during the war years into Party communist ideology and into Soviet practice. From the "Yezhov" purge of 1936-1938. this new purge was distinguished not only by completely different political tasks, but also by the whole character of its implementation.

The main difference was that, under Yezhov, the young cadres of "nominees" cleaned first of all the upper layer of the party-

the Soviet ruling elite, which they were ordered to physically exterminate from above, and now, on the contrary, the ruling elite, led by the remnants of "Stalin's experienced comrades-in-arms," carefully "combed" the party-Soviet young.

Malenkov himself, meanwhile, for many months left the open arena of public life, both party and Soviet. His name almost completely disappeared from the columns of the Soviet press, with the exception of only the lists of those present at the solemn parades. He was sent to work in the agricultural sector, the situation of which was extremely difficult. The harvest in 1946 was exceptionally poor, hardly reaching half of the pre-war level, with a

significantly increased territory and population. For the USSR, exhausted by the war, this was a real disaster. The country lived on the verge of genuine famine, especially the countryside. Not only famine, but also the size of the crop failure was a consequence of the policy of the Soviet government. A special committee set up by the

government under the name of the Committee for the Restoration of the Destroyed Regions played a much darker role in the life of the country than foreign invaders. they dealt not only with individuals found guilty of any offenses committed individually, but also with groups of the population and with the population of entire villages and even districts, the mood in which under the Germans was not sufficiently pro-Soviet. Particularly systematic were such group reprisals against the population of those rural areas where moods hostile to collective farms were revealed. As a rule, the entire population of such regions was forcibly taken to the North or to the East - to Siberia, the Urals, to the Kazakh steppes, etc. The number of such migrants, forcibly sent to different camps, must be determined in 5-- 6 million people. Another stream of people moved to meet them from the North and East, moving to the deserted

places.



It was truly a great migration of peoples, which was carried out in a planned manner for all the liberated regions. Under these conditions, and without drought, crops could not be good. At the head of the Committee, which by such methods restored the areas of the recent German occupation, was Malenkov. Of all his many-sided activities of the war years, almost only mass resettlements were not blamed on him by the Zhdanovites. On the collective farm line, he was mostly blamed for something completely different: pursuing its general line of orientation towards the generation of people who had advanced during the war years, the Malenkov Committee for the Restoration of Destroyed Regions systematically replaced the posts of collective farm chairmen and other command posts in the collective farm village with war veterans - often disabled who had the titles of heroes of the Soviet Union or high orders. The authority of Malenkov in those years was so great that this policy regarding appointments from areas of recent German occupation spread to virtually the entire USSR. The authorities used every pretext to remove the former heads of the collective farms and appoint wartime figures in their places. And since 1944 the type of war hero

and an order bearer, often a semi-invalid, as chairman of a collective farm or foreman becomes the most characteristic of a collective farm village.

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1943--1945 were the period of the highest rise in the successes of the secret apparatus of the former Comintern, headed and directed by Malenkov. The official Communist parties were everywhere in the pen. The apparatus became the complete and undivided master in the communist camp. In Europe, the apparatus, having at its disposal cadres of well-trained "professionals" of the underground movement, used them to establish its actual dictatorship over the entire resistance movement, in order to direct this movement towards acts that were unnecessary and even harmful from the point of view of the interests of the struggle against Hitler, but advantageous from the point of view of the plans of communist leaders. This includes above all acts of terror against random members of the German occupying army, acts which, while doing no good to the resistance movement, caused further

more senseless German massacres of the population. In doing so, the Communists sought to make the war as cruel as possible, thus preparing the cadres for the future civil war, which, in their opinion, was to replace the war between states.

The apparatus was even more active in America, where its direct task was primarily to seize responsible positions in the state apparatus with its people. This was necessary, first of all, to influence the work of this apparatus and through it the policy of the government, which, like any government in democratic countries, carefully listened to the moods of its closest aides and collaborators. No less important was this seizure of posts in the US state apparatus for the achievement of another task: for the deployment of penetrating espionage everywhere. It was precisely at this time that the apparatus directed special efforts to the

development of this espionage. Usually, during periods of war, other governments direct the spearhead of their intelligence work to the camp of the enemy. The apparatus led by Malenkov took a different path and directed the main efforts of its espionage work against America. This had its own logic: since 1943, the prospect of victory and the complete defeat of Nazi Germany began to clearly emerge on the horizon. For the Bolsheviks, this meant that America would be the main enemy tomorrow; and they, taking advantage of the position of an ally, led a deep reconnaissance. Just at that time, the apparatus led by Malenkov arranged to obtain information about all the secret work with the atomic bomb

and  
about other latest inventions in the field of weapons.

This policy of the apparatus led by Malenkov triumphed completely in the post-war years. But it was not shared by all the leaders of the Communist parties outside the USSR. Some of the leading leaders of the VKPb also stood in opposition to it). It was headed by Zhdanov, who before the war headed the delegation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the Comintern. With him were his closest collaborators in the Comintern - Manuilsky, Lozovsky and others. They were in favor of restoring the Comintern and returning to the foundations of pre-war international politics. It was around this issue that a struggle unfolded, the central figures of which were Zhdanov and Malenkov.

The first focused on the revival of the Communist parties of the West and the re-establishment of the Comintern; the second became the ideologist of the continuation and development of international politics through the hands of the apparatus.

With great simplification, but these groups can be defined as orientations towards the mass communist movement, on the one hand, and towards work by the methods of "fifth columns", on the other. Of course, neither Zhdanov renounced in convenient cases the methods of work with the help of the "fifth columns", nor Malenkov did not refuse mass working demonstrations. They differed only on the question of what exactly should be emphasized. Zhdanov's first victory was on the issue of the dissolution of the Communist Party of the United States. The latter's position on this issue boiled down to an attempt to apply Stalin's old statements about the "general crisis of capitalism" to the current moment, under which a world war should unleash a revolutionary movement in the West - in Europe and America. Zhdanov called on the policy of the USSR to be structured in such a way that it would unleash these revolutionary movements, for which, first of all, it was necessary to eliminate the wartime policy and return to the old policy of "irreconcilable class struggle."

Zhdanov's victory over Malenkov in the summer of 1946, of course, immediately affected the policy of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in matters of the international movement, and 1947 was a year of attempts to apply these views of Zhdanov to the practice of the communist movement in the West. Withdrawal of French and Italian communists from the government coalition, congresses of former members of the partisan movement in Rome, attempts at mass political and economic strikes in France and other countries, attacks by armed communist groups on American cargo, etc. - - these are the most important stages of the communist attempts to do this. of the year. From the communist point of view, their balance was negative: not only did they not lead the communists to victory, but they also did not become a factor in the growth

communist movement.

On the other hand, not everything was finished with the role of the apparatus. The removal of Malenkov from the post of secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks did not yet mean his complete removal from the leadership of the apparatus. This apparatus did not come under the jurisdiction of Zhdanov when the latter took over

the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: in the fall of 1946, a decision was made to unite all work on political intelligence outside the USSR in the hands of Beria. In accordance with this decision, the apparatus was transferred from the jurisdiction of the foreign department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the control of Beria, who, having become close to Malenkov during the war years, attracted him to further leadership of the apparatus. This explains the fact that Malenkov was sent to the Cominform, which it was decided to create instead of the Comintern, as a delegate of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), along with Zhdanov, who

became a kind of representative of the interests of the apparatus in the Cominform. With this appointment, the struggle between Zhdanov and Malenkov, which reached particular tension in the field of domestic politics just in the summer of 1947, was also transferred to the Cominform, where two questions played a special role: the strategy of the main offensive against the "Anglo-Saxon world" through revolutions in Europe both in America and through national movements in Asia, primarily in China; about the offensive in the Balkans, primarily in Yugoslavia, in connection with Tito's policy.

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In the foreign policy of the USSR, the struggle between the two main lines of attack on the capitalist world has been going on since the early 1920s. It has its roots in disputes about the nature of the communist movement. Stalin was always an "Easterner" and his entire concept of the world revolution, carried on the bayonets of the Soviet armies, is inextricably linked with an orientation towards the East as the main direction of revolutionary aggression and towards the colonial peoples as the main factor in the decomposition of the capitalist world. After the end of the Second World War, this question arose in a new form. The growing influence of the communist parties in Western Europe and the instability of European governments increased the belief in the possibility of victory in the case of communist aggression in the West among the leaders of foreign policy in the USSR. Zhdanov was the ideologist of this policy, and his line of attack by the forces of the communist parties of the West was connected with the line of the diplomatic and political offensive of the Soviet government. Wave of strikes 1947-1948 in Western Europe, it was not by chance that it coincided with the struggle for Berlin - an attempt to launch a major diplomatic and political offensive in the West.

The question of Yugoslavia from the point of view of great geopolitical prospects was a special case of this plan. The plan to create a Balkan federation was originally associated with the idea of drawing Greece into the communist orbit. Tito, who was the initiator of raising the question of such a federation, thought of including in it not only all the Balkan countries, including Romania, but also Poland. General Marko, the leader of the Greek communist uprisings in northern Greece, was also drawn into the negotiations. The supporters of this plan were the then leaders of the governments of the "people's democratic" republics in Romania, Albania, etc. They were supported by Zhdanov. The proclamation of the federation was supposed to be associated with the start of an offensive against Greece to help the partisans of General Markos. This plan

was rejected as a result of the actual sabotage on the part of Tito, who did not want a big war, and an attack on Greece would undoubtedly have caused such a war. Instead, Tito put forward a plan for the gradual construction of a federation, starting with the creation of a customs union between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. By doing this, he completely emasculated the elements of foreign policy aggression from the federation plan, leaving only the tasks of economic consolidation of the independence of the Balkan countries, which was objectively directed against plans to create a large economic entity from all satellite countries led by the USSR.

On the side of this plan, Tito attracted G. Dimitrov, the former head of the Comintern in 1934-1943, at that time the chairman of the government in Bulgaria. Between them there was already a complete agreement, but all the calculations were made without the owner, who was sitting in the Kremlin, who imposed a categorical veto on these plans. On January 17, 1948, Dimitrov, who was then in Bucharest, gave an interview to representatives of the press in which he spoke in favor of the need to create a Balkan federation in the near future. In response to this, on January 28, Pravda published a short but extremely impressive note signed by the Editors, very emphatically stating that the Balkan countries "need not a problematic union or confederation, but to strengthen and protect their independence and sovereignty through mobilization and the organization of internal democratic forces". Immediately

the main advocates of the plans for a Balkan federation, the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs, were summoned to Moscow for negotiations. Stalin, who personally participated in these negotiations, did not hide his distrust and discontent. Stalin, in his usual manner, put provocative questions before the audience, trying to find out the true mood of the supporters of the federation. Especially sharply he attacked Dimitrov personally. A few more months there was a struggle behind the scenes. In June, a meeting of the Cominform was convened, to which the Kremlin presented the present indictment against Tito.

The latter did not attend the meeting. On June 28, 1948, the materials of the meeting were published. At the same time, Tito's reply was also published. The fact of a complete break was fixed. An open struggle began.

This break was the actual end of the Cominform and at the same time the end of Zhdanov's biography. On July 21, 1948, a telegram appeared in Pravda expressing the indignation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in connection with the assassination attempt on the leader of the Japanese Communists. Under the telegram was the signature: "Malenkov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR." This signature meant the complete victory of Malenkov and the complete defeat of Zhdanov. Malenkov not only returned to the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks; the fact that he signed a telegram related to international affairs showed that he had taken the place of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which was in charge of the international relations of the party, that is, he had taken the place that Zhdanov had previously occupied. The latter was still listed as the secretary of the Central Committee, since only a plenum could remove him. But in fact, he was removed from all cases, and most likely was under investigation in connection with the catastrophic developments in Yugoslavia. Malenkov took the helm of the party's big politics.

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Taking over the general policy of the party, Malenkov first of all intervened in the affairs of science, in the congress of biologists, which was scheduled for early August. This congress was prepared by Zhdanov. The direction in which he intended to lead it can only be guessed from the speech of his son, the young physiologist Yuri Zhdanov, whom his father hired in the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, apparently as

responsible science instructor. Young Zhdanov, at a meeting of lecturers on modern Darwinism, convened by the Propaganda Department, made statements that were directed against the theory of the notorious Lysenko. There is no doubt that these remarks of young Zhdanov could not but reflect the opinion of his father. But young Zhdanov did not take into account that the

secretariat was no longer headed by his father, but by Zhdanov's vicious enemy - Malenkov. A persecution immediately began against Zhdanov's son, which was stopped by Stalin's personal intervention. On August 7, 1948, a penitential letter from Zhdanov the son was published in Pravda, which ended the campaign against him. On the same day, August 7, at a session of the All-Union

Agricultural Academy, Lysenko, around whose "scientific theories" there was a fierce struggle, made a triumphant statement that the Central Committee had considered his report on the situation in biological science and approved the report. Since no plenum of the Central Committee was held at that time, there is no doubt that it was Malenkov who approved the report on behalf of the Central Committee. The defeat of the biologists that followed was the first act of a new period of persecution of science. Under these

conditions, the death that came to Zhdanov on August 31, 1948, even if it was completely natural, played the role of a deliverer. There is no doubt that he was in for a severe reprisal: we know what fate befell all his closest assistants both in work in the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and in work in the Comintern - Cominform. Pravda's article on Zhdanov's funeral reported that on the train that brought Zhdanov's body to Moscow (he died in a dacha near Moscow), members of Zhdanov's family and two representatives of the Central Committee of the party arrived - Politburo member Voznesensky and Secretary of the Central Committee A. A. Kuznetsov. Both of them disappeared without a trace in the months following Zhdanov's death. Manuilsky, Zhdanov's closest collaborator in the Comintern of the prewar years, the envoy who brought Zhdanov's order to America to restore the official Communist Party of America, was also repressed. Lozovsky, also a close collaborator of Zhdanov, also disappeared.

After the death of Zhdanov, in fact, only one more meeting of the Cominform took place - in November 1949 in Hungary - and this

the meeting was devoted to denunciations of Tito and talk about the struggle for peace. At the same time, a brutal purge of foreign communist parties began, a purge accompanied by trials and executions. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Albania - everywhere in these countries all the leaders of the communist parties who in one way or another revealed their sympathies for Zhdanov or his policies, everyone who

somehow connected their names with attempts to defend

independence of local communist parties. Malenkov transferred the center of military-political aggression to the East. The blockade of Berlin, which Zhdanov began and which almost led to war in the West, Malenkov continued for some time solely as a distraction, from the autumn of 1948 shifting his attention to China and throwing huge funds and forces there. It was there that a grand victory was won: in China, the communist revolution won. No less important changes were made by Malenkov on the fronts of

domestic politics. In the purges of Zhdanov, the main thing was the struggle against the glorification of the past, on the one hand, and against the worship of the bourgeois culture of the West, on the other. With great care, trying to accurately dose, he insisted on the need to return to the old

communist criteria of the 1930s. Malenkov's purges, which began in March 1949 with a crusade against the "cosmopolitans", from the very beginning contained elements of a critical rejection of the West in general. This was followed on the ideological front from the end of 1949 by a period of mass purges of the party and Soviet apparatus. In terms of their size, they apparently exceeded the purges of 1936-1938, but they were more organized and systematic, and at the same time they were not accompanied by such massacres as during the years of Yezhovshchina. In fact, during these years, the entire party leadership was replaced.

#### Notes 1

Safarov G Colonial revolution (Experience of Turkestan) / GIZ. M, 1921, p. 118. 2 Burnashev

Khanif. The practice of new politics // Bulletin of agitation and propaganda / Organ of the Ferghana Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Turkestan. 1922 Feb. Cit. Quoted from: Socialist Bulletin. 1923 No 2 S. 15.



3 Frunze M. Selected works. 1951. S. 101. 4 Stalin I.

Works. T. 4. S. 362. The article was first published on October 10, 1920. Lenin's report and the debate on it at the Second Congress of the Comintern, see: Second Congress of the Communist International: Protocols. M., 1934. S. 98--161. 5 Safarov G. Decree. op. pp. 104--105,

115--116. 6 Furmanov D. From the diaries // October. 1936. March. P. 175. 7 Agabekov G. S. GPU. Notes of the

Chekist. Berlin, 1930. S. 47. The author of this book, who at one time held a number of prominent posts in the Cheka-GPU (he worked in Turkestan, Persia, Turkey, at one time was the head of the Eastern Sector of the OGPU, etc.), was initiated into many of the secrets of this obscure institution and in his books (there were two of them) reveal the behind-the-scenes side of a number of interesting events. A number of his stories were fully confirmed, and therefore one should also trust his story about the agreement between Lenin and Enver, especially since this agreement was completely in line with the then policy of the Soviet government.

8 Much later, during the period of the bloody "Yezhovshchina" of 1936-1938, a message flashed in the Soviet press that the operations that Enver fell victim to were led by the future "Iron People's Commissar" Yezhov, who went there on the high road of his party-Chekist career. If this report is true, then it is more than likely that the beginning of Yezhov's personal acquaintance with Malenkov belongs to those distant times. 9

Judging by some indications, at that time Malenkov worked in the political department of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, which was formed specifically for operations in the mountainous regions of southeastern Turkestan, i.e., on the territory of these republics.

10 Luknitsky P. Tajikistan. Series "Our Motherland" / Ed. Central Committee of the Komsomol. M., 1951. S. 206. See also: Ilyutko F. Basmachism in Lokai / GIZ.

M., 1929. 11 Preobrazhensky E. Party Leader // Pravda. 1924. March

14. 12 Quot. Quoted from: Kamenev L. Tax policy in the countryside. Pg., 1923. S. 18.

13 Op. Quoted from: Socialist Bulletin. 1924. No 24. S. 14. 14

Pravda. 1924. 17 Jan.

15 According to the official census published by the Central Bank of proletarian students, among the students of the workers' faculty of the Moscow Institute of Transport Engineers in 1925, there were from 72 to 81% patients with tuberculosis, neurasthenia and anemia (Russian School Abroad. Prague, No. 19, 1926, p. 48 ).

16 Zhaba S. Petrograd students in the struggle for a free higher school. Paris, 1, 923. S. 20. 17 During the

discussion in December 1923 - January 1924. about 9,400 votes were cast in the higher education cells of Moscow (report of the then secretary of the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, I. A. Zelensky, at the conference of the Moscow

organization // Pravda. 1024. No 11). 18 Revolutionary Russia. Organ of the Socialist revolutionaries (Yuriev, Estonia). 1901, No 12-13, Oct. S. 38.

19 Revolutionary Russia (Berlin). (1923. No 28--29, July-Aug. S. 35.

20 There is a large literature on the party crisis. The speeches of Kamenev, Preobrazhensky and others at the Moscow Regional Conference in January 1924, and then the speeches and reports at the Thirteenth All-Party Conference, should be considered the main and most reliable source. See also: Bukharin N. To the question of Trotskyism. M., 1925; Stalin I. About the opposition. M., 1928 (in this edition, Stalin's articles are given more fully than in his later Collected Works); Trotsky L. New course. M., 1924; He is. From the materials of the party discussion. Tver, 1924; Sorina V. Discussion of 1923-1924 // Proletarian Revolution. T. 7. 1936. S. 11--60. On the "Working Group" see: G. Pismanik. Working Group ("Myasnikovshchina") // Proletarian Revolution. T. 6. 1931; Myasnikov A. For the Party (On the Crisis of the Party) / GIZ, M., 1921. 40 pages (marked: "Only for party members"). 21 Socialist Bulletin. 1924 No 11. 22 Bolshevik

(Moscow). 1924. No 2, 15 Apr. P. 87. 23 Truth.

1924. 9 Apr. 24 Political dictionary, M., 1940. S. 326.

25 Evening Moscow.

1947. Dec. 6 Feb. 28, 1948 26 Captain N.

Ruslanov, author of the article "The Rise of

Malenkov" (Socialist Vestnik, No 7-8, 1953), claims that Malenkov in 1924 was "the only one of the 72 secretaries of the party cells of higher schools in Moscow who took the side of Stalin ". On what

the basis of this assertion is unknown; but it cannot be recognized as correct. Supporters of Stalin, who then formally went along with Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and others, were a minority among university students, but they were still not so few. When voting by cells, they collected about 30% of all votes, and among them were many very capable workers who then made a great career. In "Pravda" dated January 9-11, 1924, a large "Open Letter to Comrade Trotsky" was printed, under which such representatives of the then communist youth as A. A. Zhdanov, N. A. Voznesensky, A. N. Poskrebyshchev, L. Z. Mekhlis, P. N. Pospelov and others. There were many careerists among the "red students" who guessed that the wind was blowing into Stalin's sails.

27 Our industrial command staff (According to the materials of the accounting and distribution department of the Central Committee of the RCP) / Ed. Red new. M., 1928. S. 10--11.

28 All-Union party census of 1927 / Ed.

Statistical Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Issue. 5. M., 1927. S. 6.

29 Engineer's speech op. according to Zinoviev's report. See: Thirteenth Congress of the RCP (Bolsheviks). M., 1924. S. 109. 30 Protocols of the Eighth Congress of the RCP (b). M., 1919. S. 143, 146, 149-150. 31 of the CPSU(b) in the

resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee

(hereinafter referred to as the CPSU(b) in resolutions). 5th ed. / Marx Institute--Engels-Lenin under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks. M., 1936. T. K S 315, 330--331. 32 Protocols of the Twelfth Congress. M., 1923. S. 113 et seq. 33 Report of Shkiryatov at the Twelfth Congress // Protocols Twelfth Congress. pp. 221--222. 34 Ibid. S.

56 35 Ibid. 187. 86

Regulations on the

Organizational and Distribution Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, approved by the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on March 13, 1925, publ. in the book: Handbook of a party worker. M., 1926. S. 228--230. At the same time, Stalin approved the "Regulations on Responsible Instructors of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" (ibid., pp. 230-231), which in a number of respects is an addition to the "Regulations" on

Orgaspred, since the responsible instructors of the Central Committee worked together with the Orgaspred.

37 of the CPSU (b) in resolutions. T. 1. S. 509--510. It must be pointed out that the Twelfth Congress was generally dominated by the point of view of the need for a frank transition from the Soviet dictatorship to the dictatorship of the Communist Party. The general resolution on the report of the Central Committee stated directly that "the dictatorship of the working class cannot be ensured otherwise than in the form of the dictatorship of its advanced vanguard, i.e., the Communist Party" ["VKP(b) in resolutions. T. 1. P. 483]. Since this formulation diverged too sharply from Lenin's statements, it provoked many critical attacks, and Stalin considered it advantageous to soon dissociate himself from it, shifting the responsibility to Zinoviev and Kamenev.

38 Of the obituaries that appeared after Tovstukha's death, the most complete was the obituary written clearly on the basis of his official autobiography in Proletarian Revolution, an organ of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. Book. 6. 1935. S. 130--131. The official obituary signed by all members and candidates of the Politburo, secretaries, Central Committee and heads of departments of this secretariat is also printed there - an honor that was bestowed only on the most prominent party leaders. The fact that these signatures are accompanied by the signatures of two members of the NKVD collegium - G. Yagoda and K. Pauker - must be considered, apparently, as confirmation of the rumors about the leading participation of Tovstukha in the work of the Organs of the OPTU - NKVD, according to these rumors in difficult

1929--1932 representatives of the Politburo and the collegium of the OGPU--  
The NKVD were Mikoyan and Tovstukha.

34 Trotsky L. The role of Heinrich Yagoda // Opposition Bulletin  
(Paris). 1938. No. 65, Apr. S. 9.

40 He is. Behind the walls of the Kremlin // Opposition Bulletin. 1939. No. 73 Jan. P.  
12. 41 It is in

this capacity that Tovstukha appears in the letter from Moscow. (Bulletin of the  
Opposition [Berlin]. 1929. No I--2, July, p. 16). This letter is in its content a direct continuation  
of the well-known recording of the conversation

Bukharin with Kamenev on July 11, 1928 (see: Socialist Bulletin, 1929, No. 6, March 22, pp. 10-11). 42 Labor.  
(1950. Feb. 7; Pravda. 1937. Dec. 11; Evening Moscow. 1947. Nov. 13.

43 Opposition Bulletin. 1936. No. 52--53, Oct. P. 5. 44  
Trotsky L. My life. Vol. 2 / Ed. Granite. Berlin, 1930, pp. 202, 178. 45  
B.

Bazhenov's memoirs are quoted here and below from the Russian text // Vozrozhdeniye (Paris). 1928. 13 Nov. 46 This episode was  
told by L. Trotsky in his letter to his son L. L.  
Sedov // Opposition Bulletin. 1936. No. 52--53, Oct. S. 5.

47 The resolution on the publication of the "Testament" was adopted by the Fifteenth Party Congress on December 9, 1927, but this decision was not put into practice. The full text of the testament was published in the USSR in the Bulletins of the

Fifteenth Congress, Vol. 30. S. 35--37. The testament was excluded from the general edition of the minutes of

this congress. 48 In his speech at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on October 23, 1927, Stalin stated that the testament had been "announced" at the Thirteenth Congress. This statement is incorrect. At the Thirteenth Congress, the testament was not read out - it was then only brought to the attention of the Presidium of the Congress, and the editorial committee of the Fifteenth Congress had to use a more cautious wording, noting that the will "at the request of Vladimir Ilyich" was "brought to the attention of the Thirteenth

Congress" ( Bulletin, issue 30, p. 35). 49 These aspects of Stalin's biography, relating to 1907-1912, are almost completely not covered in the literature. The most detailed instructions were given in April 1918 in connection with the process that Stalin initiated against Yu. O. Martov in connection with these accusations. It should be noted that even the Bolshevik tribunal, which made every effort to defend Stalin, was forced to pass a very mild sentence on Martov (reprimand), but this sentence was then, on the initiative of Sverdlov, was canceled

by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. 50 Larin Yu. Oil business workers. -1908). M., 1909. S. 8. 51

Machiavelli Niccolo. Works. T. 1. Foreword by L.  
Kameneva / Ed. Academy. M., 1934. S. 11--12

52 That is why Vyshinsky, apparently at Stalin's dictation, at the trial severely attacked Kamenev for his preface to Machiavelli (see Vyshinsky A. Ya. Judicial speeches / Legal publishing house. M., 1948. P. 386--387.

53 This was written, in particular, by L. Zakovsky, then the head of the Leningrad department of the NKVD, in the book: We will destroy spies, saboteurs and pests to the end / Partizdat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. M., 1937. P. 14.

54 PB Struve's story about his disputes with Lenin in 1894-1895, see Valentinov N. From the past. Struve about Lenin // Socialist Bulletin. 1954. No 8--9. S. 171.

55 Voitinsky V. Years of victories and defeats / Ed. Grzhebin. Berlin, 1924. Vol. 2, S. 103

56 Lenin V. I. Works. 2nd ed. T. 22. P. 202. 57 AI Rykov told the American journalist V. Reswick about this side of Stalin's activity (Reswick William. I dream revolution. Chicago, 1952. P. 118). 58 For example, Stalin's letter to Lenin dated March 1921 on the

"Electrification Plan", first published by V.V. Kuibyshev (Stalin: Collection of articles on the 501st anniversary of his birth / Gosizdat. M., 1930, pp. 33--34 ).

59 Reswick William. Ibid. P. 118 60

Trotsky L. My life. T. 2. S. 183. 61 A Brief History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks / Ed. V. Knorina. M., 1934. S. 275.

62 Lenin V. I. Works. 4th ed. T. 33. S. 428. 63 Trotsky

L. My life. T. 2, S. 223. 64 Dmitrievsky S.

Stalin / Ed. Arrow. Berlin, 1931, p. 285. 65 Trotsky in his articles of 1939-1940. told one extremely important episode, which, perhaps, will force historians to recognize Stalin as the murderer of Lenin, not only through insulting his wife, but also in the more direct sense of the word, a murderer-poisoner. According to this story by Trotsky, at the end of February 1923, Stalin informed the Politburo about Lenin's request to give him poison for suicide, with which Lenin allegedly addressed him. According to Stalin, Lenin was afraid of a new blow and wanted to be able to commit suicide in this case. Trotsky emphasizes the "mysterious and false" tone

Stalin, who spoke in favor of satisfying the request of the "old man" under the pretext that the suffering of the latter was becoming unbearable. Trotsky spoke out strongly against it, Zinoviev supported him, and Stalin's proposal was dropped without a formal vote, but, as Trotsky relates, for a long time afterwards he was

troubled by the question: what, in fact, did Stalin want? This question is really extremely important, especially since the very fact that Lenin addressed Stalin with this request is highly doubtful: at that time, Lenin already treated Stalin without any confidence, and it is not clear how he could turn to him with such an intimate request. This fact takes on special significance in

the light of another story. The author of these lines met with an emigrant of the war years, who during the last decade before the war wandered a lot in Soviet prisons, including political isolation wards, where she had a large number of interesting meetings. In the Chelyabinsk detention center, she had to meet with an old prisoner, who in 1922-1924. worked as a cook in Gorki, where the sick Lenin lived then. This old man repented to the narrator that he mixed drugs into Lenin's food that worsened Lenin's condition. He acted in this way at the insistence of people whom he considered representatives of Stalin. At the time of our first meeting, this narrator had not heard anything about Trotsky's articles, while a number of her other stories later found complete confirmation.

If this story is recognized as reliable, then Stalin's statement to the Politburo, which Trotsky talks about, has a very definite meaning: Stalin created an alibi for himself in case it became known about the work of a poisoning cook. 66 Such candidates at that

time were Dzerzhinsky, Kalinin Molotov, Rudzutak, Sokolnikov and Frunze. Only Molotov was loyal to Stalin. 67 Kamenev's reports in the spring of 1925

are collected in the 12th volume of his Works (Moscow, 1926). This volume also published his report at the Third Congress of Soviets. This congress adopted a number of decisions, which later became the object of severe criticism from the opposition, including granting peasants the right to lease their land, expanding the rights to use hired labor, etc.

Obviously, these resolutions were adopted with the knowledge and consent of the Politburo.

68 Trotsky's political position in relation to these issues until 1925 was formulated by him in a speech delivered on September 1, 1925 in Zaporozhye (published as a separate brochure: On our new tasks / Gosizdat. M., 1925. 19 p.) and 8 November 1925 in Kislovodsk (published as a brochure: 8 years. Results and prospects / Gosizdat. M., 1926). V. Rezvik talks about an interview that Trotsky gave him in the first days after Lenin's death and which was not allowed by Stalin's censorship. In this interview, Trotsky openly criticized Stalin and the latter Zinoviev and Kamenev, who then supported the latter, and gave a very high rating to Rykov precisely for his firmness in pursuing a policy in the spirit of the NEP, which saves the country from a new revolution (Reswick William \* Ibid. P. 78). 69 Trotsky L. My life. T. 2. S. 184.

70 Reswick William. Ibid. P. 118.

71 See reports by Zinoviev at a meeting of the Leningrad City Council (Leningradskaya Pravda, April 14 and 15, 1925) and at a conference of workers in the Leningrad Military District (Leningradskaya Pravda, EY June 1925). 72 Bukharin's report

at a meeting of the activists of the Moscow organization // Pravda. 1926. Jan. 10 73 The most

complete summary works and collections of materials on the "new opposition" are the collection: Discussion of 1925: Materials and Documents / Under the general editorship of K. A. Popov with a preface by E. Yaroslavsky. M., 1929. XII and 390 pages, as well as an essay by I. Vavilin "Struggle against the "new opposition" in the Leningrad organization of the Bolsheviks" // Red Chronicle. T. 1 (58). L., 1934. S. 18--36. Both of these works are, of course, tendentious and provide coverage in the spirit of Stalin's articles and speeches. Primary sources are, first of all, the newspapers of that time and the minutes of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Party Congresses and the Fourteenth Conference.

74 Words by P. Zalutsky quoted in F. Leonov's letter to Uglanova see in the book: Discussion of 1925. S. 11.

75 Report at the XXIII emergency Leningrad provincial conference / Gosizdat. L., 1926. S. 42.



76 Stalin, I. On the foundations of Leninism. M., 1924. This edition, later withdrawn from circulation by Stalin, is the first. The history of the change in the text was told by Stalin himself (see: Questions of Leninism. Ts ed. M., 1939. P. 137).

77 See: Bukharin N. New tasks in the field of our peasant policy // Pravda. 1925. 24 Apr. He is. The path to socialism and the workers' and peasants' union. M, 1925 These two works of Bukharin should be considered basic for understanding this side of his political position in that period. Bukharin gave a generalized summary of his views on Lenin's views over the last period in a pamphlet: Lenin's Political Testament. M., 1929. 78 IV Stalin. On the results of the work

of the XIV Conference of the RCP (b).

Report at the meeting of the Moscow organization on May 9, 1926.

79 Stalin's position on the peasant question is covered in his collection of articles: The Peasant Question: Articles and Speeches (M., 1924. 36 p.). See Zinoviev's articles and speeches on the same topic in his collection: Facing the Village (L., 1925).

Documents

I Germany and the Russian Revolutionaries during the First World War  
From

the Compiling Editor The

relationship between the Bolshevik Party and the Kaiser government during the World War years remained a mystery to historians for a long time. Fragmentary information spread around the world like a sensation that the German government, interested in the speedy weakening of the Russian Empire and the latter's withdrawal from the war, found it profitable to finance the Russian socialist parties that stood for the defeat of Russia in the war and conducted intensified defeatist propaganda. And only in the second half of the 1950s. documents were handed over to historians, allowing a deeper and more careful study of the already legendary issue of German money and the "sealed wagon" in which a group of Bolsheviks headed by Lenin returned to Russia.

\* \* \*

Among the collections of such documents, one should first of all mention the English edition prepared by Z. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia 1915-1918. Documents from the Archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs" (London, 1958) and a collection of documents published in German in 1957 under the editorship of V. Halweg "Lenin's Return to Russia in 1917" (issued in Russian by the International Relations Publishing House "" Moscow, 1990).

It should be noted that these publications, which clearly indicated the connection with the German government of such well-known revolutionaries as the Swiss Social Democrat Karl Moor (Bayer), the Russian-Romanian-Bulgarian socialist X. Rakovsky, the Socialist-Revolutionaries Tsivin (Weiss) and Rubakin, caused a real commotion among the still living revolutionaries. And it is not surprising that the documents of these collections, as well as new, not yet published

documents of the German Foreign Ministry, Nikolaevsky began to collect in his archive after 1957.

Leaving aside the question of how significant the role of Germany and Austria-Hungary was in organizing the Bolshevik coup and this coup could have happened without German and Austrian subsidies, it should be noted that the subversive work of Germany against Russia was only part of the general German policy aimed at weakening the enemy. Germany spent at least 382 million marks on so-called "peace propaganda" (moreover, until May 1917, more money was spent on Romania or Italy than on Russia, which did not prevent both Romania and Italy from participating in the war on the side of the Entente). Tens of millions of marks were spent on bribing four newspapers in France. In Russia, the Germans apparently failed to bribe a single newspaper, and Germany's financing of Lenin's Pravda in 1917 seemed to be the only

exception.

The German government considered a possible Russian revolution as part of this subversive action. It hoped, not without reason, that the revolution would lead to the collapse of the Russian Empire, its exit from the war and the conclusion of a separate peace, which the revolutionaries promised to give if they came to power. Germany is this world

was necessary already because in 1917 she did not have the necessary forces to wage a war on two fronts. Having

staked on the revolution in Russia, the German government, during the critical days and weeks for the Provisional Government, supported the Leninist group, helped it and other "defeatists" to pass through Germany and Sweden, and received the consent of the Swedish government for the passage of emigrants to the Finnish border. From there it was quite close to Petrograd. It is not surprising that the revolt that took place in October 1917 did not come as a surprise to the German government. Fair or not, it looked at what had happened as the work of its own hands. But Germany would

never have been able to achieve its goals with such ease if the interests of the German government had not coincided in a number of points with the program of another interested party: the Russian defeatist revolutionaries, whose most influential and active wing, as it turned out, was Lenin's (Bolsheviks) . In what way did the goals of Germany and the revolutionaries coincide in the war? Like the German government, the Leninist

group was interested in the Defeat of Russia. Like the German government, the Bolsheviks wanted the collapse of the Russian Empire. The Germans wanted this for the sake of the general weakening of post-war Russia. The revolutionaries, among whom many demanded the separation of the border regions from the

Russian Empire also for national reasons (for example, one of the prominent Polish revolutionaries Piłsudski), looked at the growth of national separatist tendencies (nationalism of small nations) as a phenomenon that was in direct connection with the revolutionary movement.

Coinciding on some points, the goals of Germany and the revolutionaries in the war diverged on others. Germany looked at the Russian revolutionaries as a subversive element and hoped to use them to withdraw Russia from the war. Keeping the socialists in power after the end of the war, apparently, was not part of the plans of the German government. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, looked at the assistance offered by the German government as a means for organizing a revolution in Russia and throughout Europe, primarily in Germany. The German government knew that the main task

Socialists was the organization of the revolution in Germany. The revolutionaries knew that the German government did not want to allow the German socialists to come to power, and considered the Russian revolutionaries as a tool for realizing their own "imperialist" plans. Each side hoped to outplay the other. In the end, the Leninist group won this game, outplaying everyone, including Parvus, the founder of the idea of German-Bolshevik cooperation.

The program of the European socialists was abstract: revolution. Lenin's program was specific: revolution in Russia and coming to power. Like a man subordinated to his own goal, he accepted everything that contributed to his program, and discarded everything that interfered. If the Quadruple Alliance offered assistance, then insofar as this assistance contributed to Lenin's rise to power, it should have been accepted. If this assistance could be provided on the terms of the proclamation by Lenin of a certain political platform, then insofar as this platform contributed to the achievement of the main goal: Lenin's coming to power, it should have been accepted and announced. Were the Germans interested in a separate peace with Russia? Lenin made the slogan of an immediate signing of peace and an end to the war the main point of his program. Did the Germans want the collapse of the Russian Empire? Lenin supported the revolutionary slogan of self-determination of peoples, which allowed for the actual disintegration of the Russian Empire. In order to compromise the Entente, did the Germans want to publish secret treaties of Russian diplomacy, showing the aggressive nature of Russia and its allies? Lenin called for publication of the secret treaties of the Russian government. (And one could only wonder how the interests of one of the most radical Russian revolutionaries could so coincide with the goals of con

the conservative government of Germany. ) The fantasy of the German government essentially dried up on this. According to the plan of the Germans, the Eastern Front was liquidated in this way: by bringing Lenin to power and concluding a separate peace with Russia engulfed in revolution.

You have to give credit to Lenin. He fulfilled his promise to the German government in the very first hours of coming to power: on October 26, at the Congress of Soviets, he read out the well-known decree on peace. On

the following day the decree was published by the Petrograd Telegraph Agency (captured and controlled by the Bolsheviks). The governments of the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, closely following what is happening, noted this statement, but differed in their reaction to it. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, Count O. Chernin, one of the most sensible diplomats of his time, urged the German and Austro-Hungarian semi-official bodies to start discussing the statement of the Soviet government in a tone favorable to the Bolsheviks and pave the way for the early start of peace negotiations, so that both a truce, and then a peace, can be concluded sooner. German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Kühlmann objected to this, believing that the struggle for power between Lenin and Kerensky was not yet over, that the Bolshevik regime could by no means be called stable; and by seizing prematurely on an unofficial Bolshevik statement, transmitted not in the form of a note, but by telegraph, the Germans run the risk of appearing weak. In addition, the Germans were afraid to compromise the Bolsheviks by too hasty display of friendly feelings towards the Leninist government and thereby give the Entente and Lenin's opponents in Russia to claim that the Bolsheviks were in cahoots with Germany. Therefore, on October 26 (November 8), the German envoy in Stockholm recommended that the Foreign Ministry not publish in the German and Austrian press any statements about a preliminary agreement with the Bolsheviks.

In these November days of 1917, the Eastern Front as a military factor ceased to exist, and the Germans began to transfer troops to the west. On November 14 (27), the German High Command agreed to conduct official peace negotiations with representatives of the Soviet authorities. The start of negotiations was scheduled for November 19 (December 2). For its part, in a statement dated November 15 (28), the Soviet government indicated that if France, Great Britain, Italy, the USA, Belgium, Serbia, Romania, Japan and China refused to join the Bolsheviks, Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Bloc would begin separate negotiations. This was the declaration

the German government had been waiting for. The next day, November 16 (29), German Chancellor Gertling, speaking in the Reichstag, confirmed that he was ready to enter into negotiations, as

only the Russian government will send special representatives to the Germans. On November 17 (30), Austria-Hungary agreed to join the negotiations under the indicated conditions. It remained only to keep the

Bolsheviks in power until the signing of the agreement. And Germany helped the Bolsheviks in three directions: financial, diplomatic and military. Germany financed the Bolshevik government in various ways. She put pressure on the neutral countries, trying to force them to recognize the Bolsheviks as the legitimate government of Russia. If, at the same time, victories on the diplomatic front turned out to be insignificant, it was largely due to the opposition of the Entente. Germany did not now want to deal with anyone but the Bolsheviks from negotiations with other socialist parties. This policy of the Germans did not change in essence until October 1918, when diplomatic

relations with Soviet Russia were finally severed in response to the subversive activities of the Soviet embassy in Germany, which aimed at organizing a communist uprising there.

Below are published, translated from German and English, documents from the time of the First World War concerning the relationship of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries with the German government and its agents. The vast majority of documents in Russian are published for the first time. The notes given by me are indicated in the publication as "Note by Yu. F." All other notes were compiled by the editors of the English and German collections of documents. Yu. Felshtinskyi Telegram No 76 DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS --

TO THE STATS SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (at Headquarters)1 Berlin,

January 9, 1915, the Imperial Ambassador in Constantinople sent telegram No. 70 with the following

content: "The well-known Russian socialist and publicist Dr. Russia and who was expelled from Germany several times, the last

time writes a lot here, mainly on questions of the Turkish economy. Since the beginning of the war, Parvus has taken a clearly pro-German position. He assists Dr. Zimmer in his support of the Ukrainian

movement, and also did a lot of useful work in founding a newspaper

Batsaris in Bucharest. In a conversation with me arranged at his request by Zimmer, Parvus said that the Russian democrats could achieve their goals only by completely destroying tsarism and dividing Russia into smaller states. On the other hand, Germany, too, will not achieve full success unless a real revolution is ignited in Russia. But even after the war, Russia will be a danger to Germany, unless the Russian Empire is divided into separate parts. Consequently, the interests of Germany coincide with those of the Russian revolutionaries, who are already actively fighting. It is true that the individual factions are disunited, and there is an inconsistency between them. The Mensheviks have not yet united with the Bolsheviks, who, meanwhile, have already begun to act. Parvus sees his task in joining forces and organizing a broad revolutionary upsurge. To do this, it is necessary first of all to convene a congress, the leaders of the movement - perhaps in Geneva. He is ready to take the first steps in this direction, but he will need a lot of money. Therefore, he asks to be given the opportunity to present his plans in Berlin. In particular, he is convinced that if a certain imperial circular is issued that promises the German Social Democrats, as a reward for patriotic behavior, the immediate improvement of elementary schools and the reduction of the working day, this will have a significant impact not only on the German socialists serving in the army, but and Russians, who adhere to the same political views as Parvus. Today, Parvus left via Sofia and Bucharest for Vienna, where he will meet with the Russian revolutionaries. Dr. Zimmer will arrive in Berlin at the same time as Parvus and will be able to arrange the necessary meetings with him. According to Parvus, it is necessary to act quickly so that the Russian recruits arrive at the front already "infected" with the revolutionary microbe. Wangenheim".

It would be desirable that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs receive Parvus<sup>3</sup>.

STATE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS -- IN THE MFA  
GERMANY

Telegram No. 40 Stavka, January 13, 1915, 12.20

Received: January 13,

1.43 We intend to send Ritzler<sup>4</sup> to meet the Russian revolutionary Parvus in Berlin. It will have detailed instructions. Please telegraph the time of Parvus' arrival. Parvus must not know that Ritzler is coming from Headquarters.

Jagow<sup>5</sup> MEMORANDUM OF DR.  
GELFAND

March 9, 1915 Preparations for a Mass Strike

in Russia Preparations should be made for a political mass strike in Russia under the slogan "Freedom and Peace" in order to be held in the spring. The center of the movement will be Petrograd, and in Petrograd itself, the Obukhov, Putilov and Baltic plants. The strike is to interrupt the railway communication between Petrograd and Warsaw and Moscow and Warsaw and to paralyze the South Western Railway. The railroad strike will be mainly directed at large centers with a large number of workers, railroad depots, etc. In order to expand the scope of the strike, as many railroad bridges as possible should be blown up, as was the case during the strike movement of 1904-1905. Conference of Russian Socialist Leaders This goal can only be achieved under the leadership of Russian Social Democrats.

The radical  
wing of this party has  
already begun

to operate, but they need to be joined by a moderate minority group. Until now, the unification has been mainly hampered by the radicals. However, two weeks ago their leader Lenin<sup>6</sup> himself openly raised the question of uniting with the minority. It should be possible to achieve unification on the basis of a compromise, the need to weaken the administrative apparatus of the country as a result of the war, and thus begin the necessary actions. It should be understood that moderate

caused

use



the group has always been under the great influence of the German Social Democrats, and the personal authority of certain German and Austrian Social Democratic leaders can still exert a strong influence on them. After careful preliminary soundings, it is important that the congress of Russian social democratic leaders be held in Switzerland or another neutral country. The congress should include:

1. Social Democratic Party of Bolsheviks. 2. The Menshevik Party. 3. Jewish League. 4. Ukrainian organization Spilka. 5. Polish Social Democratic Party. 6. Social Democratic Party of Poland. 7. Lithuanian Social Democratic Party. 8. Finnish Social Democrats. Such a congress can take place only if it is

possible in advance to ensure unanimity on the question of starting immediate action against tsarism. The Congress may be preceded by a discussion between Bolsheviks and

Mensheviks. Possible additions to the list of groups participating in the congress: the Armenian party Dashnaktsutyun and Hindshak.

The Congress will be of great importance, and its decisions may have the most powerful influence on public opinion in France and England. Russian

Social Revolutionaries The

Russian Social Revolutionary Party must be negotiated separately. Its members are more inclined towards nationalism, and their influence on the workers is minimal. In Petrograd, there are only a few adherents of this party on the Baltic Sea. In preparing a mass

strike, this party can safely be disregarded. On the other hand, this party enjoys influence among the peasants, while primary school teachers act as propagandists. Local Movements Simultaneously with the preparation of conditions for a mass strike, it is

necessary to begin agitation. Through Bulgaria and Romania, you can establish a connection with Odessa, Nikolaev, Sevastopol, Rostov-on-Don, Batumi and Baku. During the revolution, the Russian workers of these cities put forward demands of a local and industrial nature, to which the owners of enterprises initially agreed, but

then they didn't do it. However, the workers did not forget their demands. Two years ago, sailors and shipyard workers made the same demands again during a strike. Agitation should be built precisely on this and gradually given it a political character. Although it is unlikely that a general strike could be organized in the Chornomorsk region, local strikes could be held in Nikolaev, Rostov and at some enterprises in Odessa due to unemployment in these places. Such strikes will be important in breaking the dormancy into which the internal movements in the Russian Empire fell at the beginning of the war. To organize this movement, it is necessary to revive the

organization of Russian sailors, which in recent years had its center first in Constantinople, and then in Alexandria. Now it is better for her to have her center in Constance or Galati. The fact that the cities on the Black Sea coast will be seriously affected by war at sea makes them particularly susceptible to political agitation. Special efforts should be made to ensure that, as in 1905, the revolutionary organizations, with the support of the workers, control the city administration in order to alleviate the plight of the poor classes suffering because of the war. This latter will also serve as one of the impetuses for the general revolutionary movement. If there is an uprising in Odessa, the Turkish fleet can support it. The prospects for a mutiny in the Black Sea Fleet cannot be assessed

before establishing closer contact with Sevastopol.

A strike in Baku near the oil fields can be organized relatively easily. It is important that a significant part of the workers here are Tatars, that is, Muslims. If such a strike occurs, then, as in 1905, attempts will be made to set fire to oil wells and depots. It also seems possible to organize strikes in the area of the mines on

the Donets. Particularly favorable are the conditions in the Urals, where many support the Bolsheviks. Given the poverty of the local population, organizing strikes among the miners will not be difficult, for this only insignificant sums of money will be needed. Siberia Particular attention should be paid to Siberia.

In

Europe, it is known only as a place of exile, but along the Siberian routes, near the iron

roads and rivers live proud and independent peasants who do not want to have anything to do with the central government. In the

cities there are business circles and intelligentsia, consisting of political exiles and those under their influence.

Siberian constituencies sent socialist deputies to the Duma. During the revolution of 1905, all management was in fact in the hands of the revolutionary committee. The administrative apparatus is extremely weak, and the military apparatus has been reduced to a minimum, since the danger from Japan, apparently, has disappeared. These circumstances make it possible to create several centers of activity in Siberia. At the same time, it is necessary to prepare the escape of political exiles to European Russia, which is a purely financial problem. If this is done, several thousand excellent agitators with extensive connections and undeniable authority can be sent to the agitation centers mentioned above and to Petrograd. This, of course, can only be carried out by the socialist organizations themselves, since only they have sufficient information about the usefulness of individuals.

The scale and interconnection of actions depend on the firmness of the positions of the socialist organizations and the coordination between them. On the other hand, these actions themselves will serve as a stimulus for joint action and unity among the socialist parties, and for this reason alone they should be taken immediately.

Campaign in the

press The main tendency of this activity must be simultaneously explained within the Russian socialist parties by means of discussions in the newspapers, through leaflets, etc. Leaflets and pamphlets in Russian can be printed in Switzerland. In Paris, several leaders of the Mensheviks publish a Russian newspaper, Golos, and despite the unusual circumstances in which it is published, the paper maintains a

completely objective attitude towards the war. This paper cannot avoid participating in the discussion of party tactics. The Swiss and Italian socialists, as well as Danish, Dutch, Swedish and American ones, can also be enlisted in publishing commentaries on these topics. Internationally renowned German socialist leaders will be able to take part in this discussion.

Such a press campaign would have a significant impact on the positions of the neutral countries, especially Italy, and this would be passed on to the socialist circles in England and France. Even an objective reflection of the course of the conduct of the war, which in England and France can be carried out only under the auspices of the socialists, and even then with great difficulty, can be of great service.

The socialist press in Bulgaria and Romania may ease of being involved in the struggle against tsarism.

Since Romania will be the center of revolutionary agitation in southern Russia, the position of the Romanian daily press in this regard is extremely important both in itself and because it shapes Romania's own attitude towards the war. All the big Romanian newspapers are published with Russian money, and this imposes certain financial obligations on them. However, it is possible to organize a group of well-known journalists to publish a large independent daily newspaper that would have a pro-German focus. The Romanian press, tuned in to the wave of the Russian victory, has seriously undermined its prestige during this war, and the new newspaper will be able to win over the reader with an objective chronicle. And as things go on, public opinion will turn to it more and more often, and as a result, other newspapers will have to change their positions.

#### Campaigning in North America

The United States requires special attention. The masses of Jews and Slavs living here are a very receptive element for anti-Tsarist agitation, and the Russian Social Democrats and the Jewish League have extensive connections here. A number of agitators should be sent here. In addition to their personal influence, they will encourage the already existing forces on the ground to vigorous action, strengthen organizations, support many Russian and Jewish undertakings in the press, in a word, they will contribute to the systematization of local actions. This can be extremely important considering that

millions of Russian emigrants, most of whom are only

recently left Russia, retained ties with their homeland. Moreover, the movement of Russian emigrants in America cannot but influence American public opinion. In addition, agitators from these circles can be sent to Russia. In connection with the war, which decides

the future of the German nation, German emigration should also be activated. A strong anti-Tsarist movement among Russian and Russian Jews in America would contribute to such activation. A number of representatives of the German and Austrian Social Democracy should be sent to America. Height

revolutionary movement

Agitation in neutral states and agitation in Russia will experience mutual influence. Further developments largely depend on the course of the war. After the enthusiasm of the first days in Russia, there was a sobering up. The tsarist regime needs quick victories, but in reality it suffers bloody defeats. Even if the Russian army remains in its current positions for the winter, a wave of discontent will sweep across the country. The apparatus of agitation described above will use, deepen, expand and spread these moods of the masses to all parts of the country. Widespread strikes, uprisings caused by the discontent of the masses, increased political agitation—all this will put the tsarist government in a difficult position. If it responds with repression, it will cause even more bitterness; if it shows tolerance, it will be taken as a sign of weakness and further fuel the revolutionary fire. In 1904-1905 we saw much proof of this. If, on the other hand, the Russian army is defeated, then the anti-government movement will acquire unprecedented proportions. In any case, with the mobilization of available forces according to the above plan, one can count on a mass strike in the spring. If the mass strike reaches any significant extent, the tsarist regime will be forced to concentrate its military forces inside Russia, especially around Petrograd and Moscow. In addition, the government will need troops to protect the railroads. During the strike in December 1905, only two regiments were needed to protect the railway line between Moscow and Petrograd, and it was only thanks to these regiments that the railway bridges near Tver and in other places were not blown up, and guards regiments were transferred to Moscow, which suppressed

insurrection. Although the main effort will be directed to organizing a railway strike on

West, attempts will be made to organize other railway strikes as far as possible. Even if this does not succeed everywhere, the tsarist government will have to deploy larger military forces to protect bridges, stations, etc. A strike will cause confusion within the administrative apparatus and lead to its collapse.

### Peasant movement and Ukraine

The peasant movement, as in 1905, can become an important factor. The conditions in which the Russian peasantry lives have not only not improved since then, but, on the contrary, have worsened. For the Russian peasant, the main question is land. Therefore, the peasants will once again begin to plow up the landlords' lands and thereby create a threat to the landowners. The peasant question in Russia is reduced to the question of land ownership, and its solution is closely connected with the creation of cooperatives and low-interest credit organizations, with school education, the tax system and public administration in general. In Ukraine, all these factors, taken together, give rise to demands for autonomy. As long as the tsarist regime dominates there, which is expressed in the granting of land to the Muscovite aristocracy and in protecting the big Russian landowners from the Ukrainian peasants by all available means, the peasants have no choice but to revolt, as soon as they feel the weakness of the government or see that the regime is in a difficult position. One of the first tasks of the Ukrainian government will be to establish order and legality in place of the anarchy resulting from the activities of the Moscow government, and with the support of the Ukrainian people, it will easily accomplish this task. The formation of an independent Ukraine will be both liberation from the tsarist regime and salvation from the chaos of peasant uprisings.

If peasant uprisings arise in central Russia (and the Great Russian peasants will certainly not remain inactive when their Ukrainian brethren rise alongside them), then the Social Revolutionary Party will also abandon its policy of inaction. This party has a great influence on the Russian peasants through elementary school teachers and enjoys prestige among the Trudoviks,

Peasants' People's Party in the Duma. The Russian Social Democrats will immediately react to peasant unrest if the peasants decide to fight against tsarism.

#### Movement in Finland

Within the overall movement, important actions can be taken in Finland. Finnish parties are in a difficult situation, as there are significant military forces in the country. On the other hand, the Finns do not want to be annexed to Sweden. But the Swedes have no intention of annexing Finland; they simply want to turn it into a buffer, i.e., an independent state. The Swedish party in Finland is a small minority. Therefore, first of all, an attempt should be made to reach an agreement between the Swedish government and the most powerful Finnish parties, among which the Social Democratic is the most important. This can probably be achieved if the Swedes promise the Finns full autonomy and let them decide which group of countries they want to join. As soon as such an agreement has been reached, the planned preparations for a general uprising in Finland can safely proceed. The Finnish Social Democrats have excellent organizations like those of the German Social Democrats. The stubborn struggle for their rights in the face of tsarist despotism taught the Finns to be careful and coordinate their actions. Language differences also contribute to this. All preparations must be secret until a powerful wave of strikes sweeps across Russia. This will be the signal for an uprising in Finland. Since Finland is very vast, the tsarist government will be faced with a choice - either to break up its army into small independent units that will attack various rebel points, or to concentrate troops in the most important administrative and strategic places, giving the rest of the territory to the rebels. The first tactic was used by tsarism in 1905 against the revolutionary movement. Many expeditionary units, large and small, were organized, and their commanders were given full military and civil authority. This plan was developed in Petrograd by a special commission consisting of members of the general staff and representatives of the highest administrative bodies. The revolutionaries knew about the work

this commission, but failed to thwart this plan. Nevertheless, it took the tsarist government two years and the entire available army to suppress the uprising. If the tsarist government still decides to act in Finland in this way, the Swedish army will have to intervene to protect the independence of Finland, because, although this plan may be the best way to suppress the uprising, it deprives the army of the opportunity to resist the intervention of hostile forces. Poe

Therefore, the tsarist government will most likely stop in the background and gather troops in the administrative centers, that is, on the coast and the railway. They may even interrupt the railway connection with Sweden. However, in fact, the Russians will control only the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. The insurgents will organize the National Guard, as in 1904-1905, take defensive measures and prepare for the entry of Swedish troops into the country, which may be hindered by the destruction of the railways. Naturally, much depends on the development of events in Petrograd.

Finns can be very useful even before a general uprising. They can provide information on the number, location and movement of Russian troops in Finland and on the movement of the Russian fleet. They can install a signaling system to correct the flight of aircraft. (The Finnish custom of painting village houses, and especially their roofs, red is very useful here. An unpainted part of the red roof would serve as a signal). They could also set up wireless telegraph stations and prepare everything for blowing up bridges and buildings. And most importantly, they can help in the connections of Russian revolutionaries with Petrograd. With the size of Finland, its proximity to the Petrograd region and regular communication with Petrograd, they could, despite the military occupation, organize an information and transport network. It is possible to create warehouses of weapons and smuggle weapons, wavyvka, etc. to Petrograd. The Caucasus During the revolution, the tsarist government practically ignored the

Caucasus for a long time. Since there is no threat of external interference in the Caucasus, they turned a blind eye to everything that happened there. It got to the point that the government tolerated governors,



who were in open contact with the revolutionary committee. The tsarist government had no doubt that, having restored its control in Russia, it would be able to subjugate the Caucasus again, and it was right. At the moment, due to the Russian-Turkish war, the situation is completely different. There is a possibility of secession of the Caucasus, and the meaning of the uprising in the rear of the warring army is clear to everyone. But, unlike Finland, where a well-organized general uprising is possible, the movement in the Caucasus will always be subject to national strife and internal party struggle. During the years of the revolution, the Georgians were the strongest in the Caucasus.

At that time, supported by the masses of small tenants, they achieved full control over Kutaisi by organizing their administration, courts, etc. But this movement was led not by separatists, but by social democrats. Some Armenians fought in the ranks of the Social Democrats, while the rest of their compatriots rallied around the Armenian nationalist parties, which had long since abandoned their separatist aspirations. But we must remember that after the defeat of the revolution and in connection with the war, separatist sentiments became more popular. Tatar workers took part in the strikes.

In general, the Tatar population played a reactionary role: they succumbed to the anti-Armenian propaganda of the agents of the Petrograd government, and this led to bloody clashes between these two nationalities. But after the call to holy war, the tsarist government could no longer openly rely on the Muslims. Nevertheless, they will secretly incite religious hatred and stir up the fear of Armenians before this very holy war. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary, first of all, to make every effort on the Turkish side to assure the Caucasian Muslims that it is precisely in order to achieve the goal of this holy war that close cooperation of Muslims with their Christian neighbors in the fight against tsarism is required. An agreement must be made between the Young Turks and the Armenian parties in Turkey, identical to those in Russia. It is beyond the scope of this memorandum to discuss the details of this plan, which will encounter many difficulties along the way. But it must be emphasized that the resolute stand of the Russian Social-Democrats will have a strong influence on

activities of Armenians and Georgians in the Caucasus. Perhaps the Social Democrats will be able to take control of the entire movement into their own hands, and then, of course, they will incline all the national parties to unite in the struggle. This is yet another reason that speaks of the necessity of holding the conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Party proposed above.

The holy war, which gives rise to major movements in Persia, Egypt, North Africa, etc., is unlikely to have a similar effect in Russia. The Volga Tatars and Komi will certainly not take part in it, since they are peaceful and absolutely downtrodden peoples who would face a numerically superior mass of the Russian population. The situation in the Caucasus is somewhat different, but we must remember that the Muslims were pacified there a long time ago. The memory of the former heroic struggle for independence has faded, and the Muslim population is not civilized enough to organize a modern revolutionary movement. The old conflict between the mountain tribes of the Caucasus and the Russians was simply a struggle against a centralized state. Since then the tribal organization

fully

disintegrated, tribal leaders became landowners, the connection between them and the people weakened, and the people lost the will to independence. Since Muslims feel that they are on a lower level economically and culturally than the Christian population, they seek the support of the government as the most powerful force. They would, of course, prefer a Muslim government, "oh, it can be established only after the victory over the tsarist government. The Turkish army will be welcomed here, but no one will go to war against the Russians, this will fall to the lot of the Turks. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of the emergence of individual rebel groups, especially on the Persian border, but there is no hope that the Muslim population of the Caucasus will wage a real guerrilla war. However, the uprising of the Kuban Cossacks is quite real, and propaganda in Ukraine can help in this. other, an atmosphere of unrest. In addition to the effects of war, special measures may be taken to exacerbate this

anxiety. For obvious reasons, the most favorable areas in this sense are the Black basin, the sea and the Caucasus. Particular attention should be paid to Nikolaev, as the shipyards here are working hard to launch two large warships. We should try to organize a strike of shipyard workers. This strike does not have to be political; based on economic requirements. The tsarist government, in order to survive, must quickly win victories at the front - this is a fact that does

not require proof. If it holds out until spring, then even the current situation, in which the Russian army is being tortured without achieving anything, can only result in a revolution. However, one cannot ignore the difficulties facing the movement. First and foremost, this is mobilization, which has deprived the country of the most active young elements; secondly, it is the growth of

national feelings caused by the war. But if the war is lost, this feeling will degenerate into bitterness directed against tsarism. It should be understood that, unlike the Ukrainian or Finnish Social Democrats, the Russian Social Democratic Party will never take a position hostile to the Russian Empire. Even during the revolution, this party had more than a million workers in its ranks, and since then the number of its followers among the masses of the people has grown so much.

However, the government was twice forced to change the electoral legislation for fear that the Duma would be flooded with Social Democratic deputies. Such a party must necessarily represent the interests and moods of the masses who did not want war and are now compelled to participate in it. The Social Democrats resolutely oppose the unlimited expansion of power outside, which is the goal of tsarist diplomacy. They consider this a serious obstacle to the internal development of the peoples that make up the empire - including the Russian people. They hold tsarism responsible for the war and will therefore hold it responsible for the defeat in the war. They will demand the overthrow of the government and the swift conclusion of peace. If the revolutionary movement

reaches significant proportions, and even if the tsarist government remains in power in Petrograd

government, an interim government can be formed to discuss the issue of a truce and a peace treaty and to start diplomatic negotiations.

If the tsarist government is forced to conclude an armistice before this happens, then the better the revolutionary movement is prepared, the louder it will then declare itself. Even if the tsarist government manages to retain power during the war, it will not be able to hold on after the conclusion of a peace dictated from outside.

In this way the armies of the Central Powers and the revolutionary movement will crush the colossal political centralization which is the embodiment of the tsarist empire and threatens the cause of world peace, and will destroy the pillar of political reaction in Europe. Siberia Particular attention

should

be paid to Siberia, because the huge shipments of artillery and other weapons from the United States of America to Russia are likely to be carried through Siberia. Therefore, the Siberian project should be considered separately from others. Several energetic and well-equipped agents should be sent to Siberia with a special task of blowing up railway bridges. They will find enough help among the exiles. Explosives must be obtained from the Ural mines, but small quantities can probably be smuggled out of Finland. Technical details should be worked out here. Press Campaign Developments since the completion of this memorandum have confirmed the predictions regarding

Romania and

Bulgaria. The Bulgarian press became pro-German, significant changes are noticeable in the position of the Romanian press. Our efforts will soon lead to even more noticeable results. Now it is especially important to start working on (missing word). 1. Financial support for the Bolshevik group in the Russian Social Democratic Party, which is fighting against tsarism with all means

available to it. Its leaders are in Switzerland.

2. Establishing direct links with revolutionary organizations in Odessa and Nikolaev through Bucharest and Iasi.

3. Establishing contacts with the organization of Russian sailors. Some contacts have already been made through a person in Sofia, further contacts are possible through Amsterdam. 4. Support for the

activities of the Jewish socialist organizations "League" (not Zionists).

5. Identification of authoritative Russian social democrats and social revolutionaries in Switzerland, Italy, Copenhagen and Stockholm and support for those of them who advocate immediate active action against tsarism.

6. Support for those revolutionary writers who will continue to fight against tsarism, even during the war. 7. Ties with the Finnish Social Democrats. 8.

Organization of congresses of Russian revolutionaries.

9. Influence on public opinion in neutral countries, especially on the opinions of the socialist press and socialist organizations in terms of the fight against tsarism in Russia and rapprochement with the central states. This has already been done successfully in Bulgaria and Romania, but it is necessary to continue work in this direction in Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Italy.

10. Preparation of an expedition to Siberia with a special mission to blow up the most important railway bridges and prevent the supply of weapons from America to Russia. The expedition must be provided with sufficient sums of money to carry out the escape of a number of expelled political prisoners.

11. Technical preparations for the uprising in Russia: a) drawing up accurate maps of Russian railways, indicating the most important bridges to be destroyed in order to disrupt communication, indicating the main administrative buildings, depots and workshops that need to be given special attention;

b) exact figures on the amount of explosives needed. The scarcity of materials and the difficult conditions under which these actions will be carried out must be borne in mind;

c) clear and simple instructions for the use of explosives to blow up bridges, large buildings, etc.; d) simple formulas for making explosives; e) development of a plan of resistance to the armed forces by the insurgent population of Petrograd, with special attention to

working quarters, protecting houses and streets, erecting barricades and protecting against cavalry and infantry.

The Jewish Socialist "League" in Russia is a revolutionary organization supported by the workers, which played an important role even in 1904. It has nothing to do with the Zionists, from whom nothing can be expected: 1) because their party structure is very

weak, 2) because Russian patriotic tendencies have strongly manifested themselves in its ranks since the beginning of the war, 3) because after the Balkan war the

core of their leaders actively tried to come to an agreement with the British and Russian diplomatic circles - which, however, did not prevent them from trying to influence the German government as well.

4) because they are incapable of any political action. FROELICH TO  
AMBASSADOR BERGEN TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN  
MINISTRY Berlin, March

26, 1915 Contents: Dr. Alexander Gelfand-Parvus<sup>7</sup> The German bank sent me a transfer for another 500,000 marks, which I enclose. I would like to draw your attention to my letter of March 20, which states that Dr. Helphand is demanding the sum of one million marks, not counting losses in the transfer from one currency to another; and that such losses, if they occur in Copenhagen, Bucharest or Zurich, and any other costs, must be reimbursed

us.

Therefore, I would ask you to make the necessary transfer to the German Bank so that I can pay Dr. Gelfand this difference as well. Yours, etc.,

FRELICCH STATE SECRETARY

OF  
FOREIGN

AFFAIRS TO THE MINISTER OF FINANCE OF GERMANY Berlin, June  
6, 1915 Five million marks

are required for

revolutionary propaganda in Russia. Since we are unable to cover this amount from the funds at our disposal, I would request Your Excellency to provide it to me under line VI of title II of the contingency budget. I would be extremely grateful to your

Excellency, if you would inform me of the actions you have taken. JAGOV THE  
GERMAN

MESSENGER IN COPENHAGEN --  
TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

August 14, 1915

Your Excellency! Dr.

Helphand, with whom I recently again had a detailed conversation, informed me yesterday that he had received a telegram from Arthur Kohn's social science publishing house in Munich that only the first part of his paper had arrived. With the permission of the Foreign Office, I sent three further parts, but they have not yet arrived in Munich. This worries Dr. Gelfand, who fears that the paper will not be published by the September 1st deadline. Can Your Excellency see to it that the manuscripts are sent immediately. Now I know Gelfand better, and I believe that he is undoubtedly an unusually important person, and we should use his

extraordinary abilities while the war is going on, and, if possible, after it, regardless of whether we personally share his views. He has a huge plan, the first part of which he has already implemented. However, in order for this plan not to fail, he must be able to publish his treatise in full no later than September 1st. He intends to influence the German Social Democrats with this essay, since he has information that among them there is now an opinion according to which Russia is already "defeated and prostrate on the earth", and that, starting from this false premise, they agree to treat Russia with sentimental indulgence. Its purpose is to vigorously counter these very dangerous sentiments. That is why, for tactical and

practical reasons, in his article he made certain concessions to the socialists, with whom he himself is dissatisfied. However, he expects in this way to win sufficient confidence in the broad circles of the party, which will give him the power he needs at this critical moment and will enable him later to come up with his own independent program.

Helphand told me that he was ready to make changes if they hinted at them, but would like to insist that the manuscript be sent to the publisher. Any necessary corrections or changes can be made by those who will read and edit the manuscript in Munich. This request seems to me well-

founded, and I believe that it must be carried out if we do not want to impede Gelfand's plans. As soon as he gets public attention (and he has no doubt he will succeed), he will publish a second article in mid-September, aimed directly at Russia. Immediately after that, he is going to start making leaflets. Helphand told me that he was received by Your Excellency and had the opportunity to personally present his plan. Dr.

Zimmer, with whom I spoke during his last visit to Copenhagen, was going to report to you by word of mouth about his last conversation with Helphand, so Your Excellency is probably well aware of these plans. It is my understanding that these plans were approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff, while the Ministry of the Interior and the Imperial Chancellery of the Interior objected. I think it would be undesirable to take into account at the moment one-sided, and therefore short-sighted objections, from whatever side they come.

Otherwise, we will never reach that great crack that I see so clearly. I hope that we will not only come out of this war as victors and the strongest power in the world, but that after the ordeals to which the German workers in particular have been subjected - truly (not in an offensive sense of the word) "common people" - we will be able to with confidence to enlist in cooperation those elements that before the war stood on the sidelines and seemed unreliable, and to unite them around the throne. It may be risky

to use the forces behind Gelfand, but refusing their services because of the fear that we will not be able to control these forces would be an absolute admission of our weakness. I have not given up on this hope yet.



Those who do not understand the signs of our time will never understand where we are going and what is at stake at the moment.

Your Excellency, the current situation is too seriously to get sentimental, so I'm done. Yours and others,

BROCKDORF-RANZAU<sup>9</sup>  
THE GERMAN EMINISTOR IN  
COPENHAGEN TO THE CHANCELER<sup>10</sup>

"Message No 489 December 21, 1915,

Dr. Helphand, who returned yesterday from Berlin, was with me today and reported on the results of his trip. He emphasized that received with unusual courtesy in all the most important government offices and that he had the impression that his proposals were met with approval in influential circles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Finance. As regards his financial plan,<sup>11</sup> he was given to understand that

the Minister of Finance should still will find out whether there are any obstacles to his project from the point of view of the economy of the empire. A detailed conversation with Minister Gelferich<sup>12</sup> convinced him that he was very positive about his project and that he not only agrees with this project for political reasons, but also recognizes its benefit from a less obvious point of view of the empire's economy. The Minister of Finance expressed only some doubts about the possibility of the immediate practical implementation of the project,

considering that a delay of eight to ten months would be needed. At the same time, Minister Helferich remarked that it might be difficult to maintain complete secrecy, which is necessary for the practical

preparation.

Dr. Gelfand stressed that under these circumstances it was all the more necessary to begin preparations immediately, since the MIG must in any case count on a third winter campaign and the course of action he proposed might prove necessary.

Dr. Helphand also said that about 20 million rubles would be needed for the complete organization of the Russian revolution. This amount, of course, cannot be distributed immediately, as this could lead to the discovery of the source of this money. However, taking into account

the fact that action should be taken, he proposed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the sum of one million rubles should be given immediately to his secret agent. This secret agent fully agrees with him that the revolution will start around January 9-22 and that, even if it does not immediately cover the whole country, it will make it impossible to return to the old situation and stability. In 1905, the bourgeois parties supported the revolution and, on their own initiative, paid the wages of the striking workers. Now the bourgeoisie does not sympathize with the revolutionary movement, and as a result the revolutionary committee must bear all the costs. His agent, who returns to Russia in about a week, will immediately begin to establish contacts between the various revolutionary centers upon his return, but this is impossible without fairly large material resources.

Taking all this into account, Dr. Helphand asked me to support his request, which he made personally in Berlin, for the issue of the said sum to his secret agent. He specifically stressed that this must be done immediately, since his agent could no longer delay his return to Petrograd and would return to Russia in a week at the latest, even if by then he had not received the required money. I ask Your Excellency to send me instructions by

telegram so that I can inform Dr. Helphand of the decision. I dare say that his request is not an attempt to satisfy his own interests, it follows from practical considerations without any secondary personal goals.

BROCKDORF-  
RANZAU GERMAN FINANCE MINISTER TO DEPUTY  
STATS SECRETARY OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS Berlin, December  
26, 1915 Dear  
Zimmermann<sup>13</sup> With gratitude I return to you the report of Count

Brockdorff Rantzau. In fact, I treated Helphand with more restraint. than he portrayed it in Copenhagen. In my opinion, he has fantasized too much in his plans, especially in the so-called financial plan, in which we are unlikely to be able to participate. WITH

on the other hand, it is worth discussing the issue of providing him with 1 million rubles, which he asks for propaganda. If the Foreign Office considers this expense justified and useful, I will not object. In this case, I ask you to send an application in the usual form and refer to our personal agreement. With belated

But cordial Christmas  
congratulations.

Yours,  
etc.

HELFERICH STATE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE  
GERMAN ENVOY

Telegram No 952 Berlin, December 26, 1915

Your Excellency can pay one million rubles

Gelfand. The corresponding amount should be taken from the cash desk of the mission.

YAGOV

[Address: ] It should be reported to Count Rantzau that Dr. Helferich is by no means as sympathetic to Gelfand's fantastic financial plan as he thinks. I'M READY

HEAD OF THE GERMAN COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MR.  
STEINWACHS TO AMBASSADOR BERGEN TO THE  
GERMAN FOREIGN

MINISTRY Berlin, January 18, 1916 I have the honor to forward to Your Excellency the following: 1. Letter from

Keskula<sup>14</sup> dated January 9, 1916

Democratic Labor Party.

3. Translation of the message about the execution of Russian volunteers in

France.

STEINWAKS Appendix: Letter  
from Keskula to Steinwax  
Stockholm, January

9, 1916 Dear Director, Today I was told that something had arrived for me. Tomorrow I will go to the Mission and take the opportunity to send this letter.

It's now 10.30pm and I have to be brief, especially since I was negotiating from 10am to 10.15pm today.

Today, at last, the situation in Russia has been fully clarified, in terms of organization, and at the same time, the clarification of the chaotic situation in Russia has begun. I have high hopes for the actions taken. In my last letter, I already wrote about the results that they can give: "The situation requires activation on my part, and I will do it."

I now have the perfect new employee; through him I have the opportunity to work throughout Scandinavia, as well as in Russia. A small private publishing house should be set up to publish pamphlets about Russia and an information leaflet in Swedish for the revolutionary movement. In addition, Denmark and Norway and, if possible, other countries must be regularly informed about the situation in the Russian revolutionary movement. For the distribution of this literature, we have at our disposal an extensive apparatus of the Socialist Youth Organization (in Sweden alone there are over 600 peddlers). At the same time, a

central bureau should be established to support the revolutionary movement (through agitation and fundraising) and open to the public. This bureau will support the Russian movement - both morally and materially - quite openly and without consultation with the leaders of the Russian revolutionary centers outside Russia. For the latter, it will simply provide funds for publications destined for Russia, and possibly also for their transfer. At the end of the week, my attorney will travel to Russia (for about a month) to discuss the question of financial support that Western Europe can provide to the revolutionary centers in Russia. At the same time, he will establish ways to send him information about the Russian revolutionary movement. This agent has excellent connections, so I

hope the negotiations go smoothly. In the local affairs, it was necessary to urgently put things in order, as serious decay was discovered (appropriation of funds from the revolutionary movement, false information in order to squeeze money, etc.). I kicked out the violators, figured out the situation and scaled up and

intensity of our activities. All this demanded such an effort from me that there was no time left for anything else.

Tomorrow I will begin to review the situation in Russia and, unless more important matters arise, I will also take up the Frankfurter Allgemeine.

Tomorrow I will send you a telegram saying that the mail from Stockholm to Switzerland is being searched for Russian documents. Today or in the coming days somewhat higher. lots of interesting documents from Russia will be sent to Lenin. I have read them all, but have not been able to make copies. Would you be kind enough to return them to me, because it is very important to copy some of them and distribute them in Russia. They call for an armed uprising and mutinies in the army. One of them, coming from the Moscow "Charity Committee", is particularly interesting: it proposes a dictatorial directorate for Russia, which should include, among others, Messrs. Guchkov<sup>15</sup>, Kerensky<sup>17</sup> (!). Judging by the comically sentimental outpourings of Lvov<sup>16</sup>, this is the brainchild of the right wing of the so-called nationalists (Shulgin<sup>18</sup>). Some of these documents are extremely interesting because they show the degree of development achieved by the Russian revolutionary movement towards the end of 1915. They testify to the presence of all the symptoms that appeared in the summer of 1905. From the ideological point of view, the Russian revolutionary movement must be considered fundamentally fully mature and ready. It remains only to clarify the details. Now the transformation of the revolutionary movement into an active one is only a matter of agitation and, most importantly, organization. I would especially like to recommend these documents to Baron von L<sup>19</sup>. Due to the very poor printing quality, the leaflets are only of historical and cultural significance, but perhaps they will remind you of your promise to send us printing equipment. I ask you to handle these papers with the utmost care, because I would not at all want to spoil the pleasure of Lenin's Christmas gifts. In other words, send them here first, and from here they will be properly forwarded to the addressee. At the end of the week the second Russian pamphlet of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democrats (that is, Lenin) will appear. She has been lying there for two months (while I was in Berlin), because the money that I

paid in advance before leaving, were stolen with typical Russian composure. Yesterday I deposited the full amount again. I have already indicated what measures I have taken against such things. If this is happening inside and around the Central Committee, then it is terrible to think what is happening on the periphery. Even the revolution should be beaten out of these Russians with police batons so that they do not give up halfway through. I mentioned this to show all the difficulties that one has to face here. I'll write more later. Yours, etc. A.

STEIN THE GERMAN

MESSENGER IN COPENHAGEN TO THE CHANCELER

Communication No 19 January 23,

1916 Dr. Helphand, who returned to Copenhagen after three weeks in Stockholm, where he met with Russian revolutionaries, confidentially told me the following:

The amount of 1 million rubles placed at his disposal was immediately sent, has already been delivered to Petrograd and is being used for its intended purpose. Helphand insisted on taking action on 22 January. However, his agents strongly advised against it, saying that immediate action would be premature. They described the situation as follows: The Organizations are still determined

to start a revolutionary struggle, but in the last two months the political situation has changed so that it would be unwise to act immediately. The opposition of the bourgeois parties against the revolutionary

uprising is still stronger than before. The government, too, does not sit idly by, but skillfully opposes the revolutionary movement. It gave leadership positions to several figures who had been spokesmen for revolutionary ideas before the war, and in this way greatly weakened the movement. Further, it took measures to improve the food supply for the inhabitants of Petrograd. Passenger traffic between Moscow and Petrograd was temporarily suspended in order to ensure the rapid delivery of food to Petrograd.

However, the biggest obstacle is the position of the right wing, which would like to use the uprising for their own purposes. It is feared in the revolutionary camp that if the uprising were to take place at the present moment, the reactionaries would mingle with the

revolutionaries to bring anarchy into the movement. The revolutionaries are not so sure of their control over the masses as to claim that they will remain masters of the situation if these masses take to the streets. For all these reasons, it is necessary to postpone the insurrection until the time when such confidence

will appear.

Propaganda for peace on the part of the reactionaries also compromises the uprising, which should serve the goals of the revolution. Although these factors cannot be considered serious enough to cancel the insurrection, they are nevertheless significant and make premature action unwise. It is highly probable that the convening of the Duma could lead to further political conflicts and trigger revolutionary action sooner than the leaders see fit. The leaders of the revolutionary movement are now of the opinion that in the present circumstances, unless there are unexpected changes, it is important to continue to take a wait-and-see attitude, in order to be sure not only that sufficient masses can be brought out into the streets, but also that will retain control over them when served

signal.

The parties on the right are peace-minded, and it is believed that the government can be led to the idea of peace. The position of Khvostov,<sup>20</sup> the Minister of the Interior, is uncertain. Although he is closely connected with the reactionary parties, in a confidential conversation with some leading people he said that "he is the most advanced revolutionary in Russia" and that Tsar Nicholas must be overthrown. At a meeting of one of the committees of the Duma, Khvostov arranged for him to be asked the question: does he know that there is a group in court circles advocating for peace? He replied that these were false rumours, and that he had expelled from Petrograd the person who spread them, namely Madame Vasilchikov<sup>22</sup>. It is known from an exceptionally reliable source that the treaty with the Entente was read in its entirety at the congress of right-

wing parties. At the same time, special attention was paid to the point where it is said that, in the event of an enemy threat to the royal palaces or in the event of a revolution in the country, Russia has the right to a separate peace. There is no doubt that this document was read out. The only question is its authenticity.

BROCKDORF-RANZAU  
STEINWAKS TO AMBASSADOR BERGEN IN THE GERMAN  
MFA

Memorandum Berlin,

May 8, 1916 According to a report dated April 28, a loan of 130,000 marks, issued to me by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the end of September 1915 for Russian propaganda, has not only been completely exhausted, but also closed with a deficit in 1011. 93 marks. This deficit was paid to me today by the cash desk of the representation.

Later, in December 1915, Your Excellency agreed to pay another 60,000 marks, which Mr. Keskula was to spend on Russian propaganda in the form of three monthly investments. Of this money, I managed to get 50,000 marks in savings for a loan of 130,000 marks. I covered most of the remaining 10,000 marks from my own funds. In addition, the initial amount went to support more or less successful new ventures and activities, of which I received oral reports from time to time.

Finally, as agreed with Your Excellency, 2,000 rubles and 1,500 Swiss francs were provided to the Political Department of the General Staff of the Army for Prince Machabelli's enterprise<sup>23</sup>.

Immediately or in the coming weeks or months will be required significant sums for the following enterprises: 1.

During the last few months, Keskula has established numerous contacts with Russia and several times sent Scandinavian socialists there with recommendations to leading figures who familiarized them so well with the situation in Russia that the reports published later aroused admiration in socialist circles North. He also maintained very useful contacts with Lenin and transmitted to us the contents of the reports on the situation in Russia sent to Lenin by his trusted agents in Russia. Therefore, we must continue to provide Keskula with all the necessary means. Considering the extremely unfavorable conditions of exchange, 20,000 marks a month would be just enough.

2. Lichev has now begun all his preparations (i.e., the bureau in Stockholm and Gaparanda) and is gathering together all the Russians